area handbook series 

Pakistan 

a country study 



If 

at; 



Pakistan 

a country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Peter R. Blood 
Research Completed 
April 1994 



On the cover: Marble screen with tendril and geometric 
design in Shish Mahal (Palace of Mirrors), Lahore 
Fort, Punjab 



Sixth Edition, First Printing, 1995. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Pakistan: a country study / Federal Research Division, 
Library of Congress ; edited by Peter R. Blood. — 6th ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) 
(DA Pam ; 550-48) 

"Supersedes the 1984 edition of Pakistan: a country 
study, edited by Richard F. Nyrop" — T.p. verso. 

"Research completed April 1994." 

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 333-361) and 
index. 

ISBN 0-8444-0834-4 

1. Pakistan. I. Blood, Peter R., 1952- . II. Library of 
Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. IV. 
Series: DA Pam ; 550-48. 
DS376.9.P376 1995 94-17247 
954.91— dc20 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-48 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared 
by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress 
under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program spon- 
sored by the Department of the Army. The last two pages of this 
book list the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign coun- 
try, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and 
national security systems and institutions, and examining the 
interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are 
shaped by cultural factors. Each study is written by a multidisci- 
plinary team of social scientists. The authors seek to provide a 
basic understanding of the observed society, striving for a 
dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is 
devoted to the people who make up the society, their origins, 
dominant beliefs and values, their common interests and the 
issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their 
involvement with national institutions, and their attitudes 
toward each other and toward their social system and political 
order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should 
not be construed as an expression of an official United States 
government position, policy, or decision. The authors have 
sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. 
Corrections, additions, and suggestions for changes from read- 
ers will be welcomed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, DC 20540-5220 



iii 



Acknowledgments 



The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the 
writers of the 1984 edition of Pakistan: A Country Study, edited 
by Richard F. Nyrop. Portions of their work were incorporated 
into this volume. 

The authors are also grateful to individuals in various United 
States government agencies and diplomatic and private institu- 
tions who shared their time, research materials, and expertise 
about Pakistan. Special thanks are owed to the Embassy of Paki- 
stan in Washington; to Anne T. Sweetser for her helpful com- 
ments on Pakistani society and culture; and to Mustapha Kamal 
Pasha at the American University and Barbara Leitch LePoer at 
the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, for 
their insightful comments on various parts of the manuscript. 
Thanks are also given to Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the 
Country Studies/Area Handbook Program for the Department 
of the Army. 

The authors also wish to thank members of the Federal 
Research Division staff who contributed directly to the prepara- 
tion of the manuscript. These people include Sandra W. Med- 
itz, who reviewed all drafts and served as liaison with the 
sponsoring agency; Robert L. Worden and Andrea M. Savada, 
who reviewed each chapter and made numerous suggestions 
and points of clarification; Ilona Peterson, who provided cur- 
rent information about AIDS in Pakistan; David P. Cabitto, who 
provided graphics support; Marilyn L. Majeska, who managed 
editing and edited portions of the manuscript; Alberta J. King, 
who provided bibliographic assistance; Andrea T. Merrill, who 
managed production; and Barbara Edgerton and Izella Wat- 
son, who did the word processing. 

Also involved in preparing the text were Sheila Ross, who 
edited the chapters; Catherine Schwartzstein, who performed 
the final prepublication editorial review; Joan C. Cook, who 
compiled the index; and Janie L. Gilchrist, David P. Cabitto, 
and Stephen C. Cranton, who prepared the camera-ready copy. 

Harriett R. Blood prepared the topography and drainage 
map; other maps and charts were prepared by Maryland Map- 
ping and Graphics. Meg Blood designed the illustrations for 
the cover and the title page of each chapter. 



v 



Finally, the authors acknowledge the generosity of the indi- 
viduals and the public and private agencies who allowed their 
photographs to be used in this study. 



vi 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Table A. Chronology of Important Events xv 

Country Profile xxi 

Introduction xxix 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Craig Baxter 

EARLY CIVILIZATIONS 4 

ISLAM IN INDIA 8 

THE MUGHAL PERIOD 11 

COMPANY RULE 16 

THE BRITISH RAJ 18 

The Forward Policy 20 

The Seeds of Muslim Nationalism 21 

Beginnings of Self-Government 24 

The Two Nations Theory 28 

Toward Partition 30 

INDEPENDENT PAKISTAN 33 

Problems at Independence 33 

Constitutional Beginnings 37 

Early Foreign Policy 43 

Collapse of the Parliamentary System 43 

THE AYUB KHAN ERA 44 

Basic Democracies 47 

The 1962 Constitution 49 

Ayub Khan's Foreign Policy and the 1965 War 

with India 50 

YAHY\ KHAN AND BANGLADESH 54 

ZULFIQAR ALI BHUTTO AND A NEW 

CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 58 

vii 



ZIA UL-HAQ AND MILITARY 

DOMINATION, 1977-88 63 

PAKISTAN AND THE WORLD DURING 

THE ZIA REGIME 69 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 75 

Anita M. Weiss 

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 79 

Boundaries 79 

Topography and Drainage 82 

Climate 87 

Pollution and Environmental Issues 88 

National Conservation Goals 90 

POPULATION 91 

Population Distribution and Density 92 

Population Planning Policies and Problems 92 

Migration and Growth of Major Cities 95 

Impact of Migration to the Persian 

Gulf Countries 97 

Repercussions of the War in Afghanistan 98 

SOCIAL STRUCTURE 100 

Traditional Kinship Patterns 100 

Linguistic and Ethnic Groups 103 

Men, Women, and the Division of Space 118 

The Status of Women and the 

Women's Movement 120 

RELIGIOUS LIFE 124 

Basic Tenets of Islam 1 25 

Islam in Pakistani Society 127 

Politicized Islam 128 

Non-Muslim Minorities 130 

EDUCATION 131 

Structure of the System 132 

Female Education 133 

Reform Efforts 134 

HEALTH AND WELFARE 135 

Maternal and Child Health 136 

Health Care Policies and Developments 137 

Special Problems: Smoking, Drugs, and AIDS .... 139 

Zakat as a Welfare System 141 

PROSPECTS FOR SOCIAL COHESION 142 

viii 



Chapter 3. The Economy 147 

John D. Rogers 

STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 150 

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 152 

Policy Developments since Independence 152 

Development Planning 158 

FINANCE 160 

Budget 160 

Fiscal Administration 161 

Monetary Process 161 

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1 65 

Foreign Aid 165 

Foreign Trade 166 

External Debt 168 

LABOR 170 

AGRICULTURE 172 

Land Use 172 

Irrigation 173 

Drainage 176 

Farm Ownership and Land Reform 177 

Cropping Patterns and Production 179 

Livestock 181 

Forestry 181 

Fishing 182 

INDUSTRY 182 

Manufacturing 183 

Construction 184 

Energy 184 

Mining and Quarrying 189 

SERVICES 189 

Transportation 189 

Telecommunications 194 

Tourism 195 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 197 

Mary Louise Becker 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL 

INHERITANCE 200 

Independence 200 

Role of Islam 201 

Regional and Ethnic Factors 201 

ix 



The Civil Service 202 

The Military 203 

EARLY POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 203 

Early Constitution Building, 1947-58 203 

Ayub Khan, 1958-69 204 

Yahya Khan, 1969-71 206 

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 1971-77 207 

Ziaul-Haq, 1977-88 207 

CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE .... 210 

President 210 

Parliament and Federal Government 210 

Provincial Governments 213 

Judiciary 213 

POLITICAL DYNAMICS 214 

Muslim League 215 

Islami Jamhoori Ittehad 216 

Jamaat-i-Islami 217 

Pakistan People's Party 218 

Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz 221 

Awami National Party 222 

Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam 222 

Tehrik-i-Istiqlal 223 

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE ZIA 223 

The First Government of Benazir Bhutto 223 

The Caretaker Government of Ghulam 

Mustafa Jatoi 227 

The Government of Nawaz Sharif 229 

President Ghulam Ishaq Khan as 

Power Broker 235 

The "Silent Revolution": A Year of 

Political Struggle 236 

The Caretaker Government of 

Moeen Qureshi 237 

Benazir Bhutto Returns 238 

THE MEDIA 241 

FOREIGN POLICY 243 

India 244 

Other South Asian Countries 246 

The Former Soviet Union 248 

China 248 



x 



Middle East 249 

The United States and the West 250 

International Organizations 253 

Chapter 5. National Security 255 

Thomas Perry Thornton 

THE ARMED SERVICES: A HISTORICAL 

PERSPECTIVE 257 

The Colonial Background 257 

The Formation of Pakistan 260 

PAKISTAN'S EVOLVING SECURITY DILEMMA 263 

Survival in a Harsh Environment 263 

The United States Alliance 264 

The Army Assumes Control 267 

Collapse of Pakistan's Security System 268 

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 269 

The Military Reasserts Itself 274 

Pakistan Becomes a Frontline State 276 

The Armed Forces in a New World Order 280 

THE ARMED SERVICES 285 

Constitutional Basis and Missions 285 

Defense Strategy 286 

Ministry of Defence 287 

Army and Paramilitary Forces 288 

Navy 290 

Air Force 291 

Personnel and Training 292 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 295 

Military Production 295 

Budget 299 

Military Justice 299 

Foreign Security Relationships 300 

The Role of Islam 302 

INTERNAL SECURITY 304 

Role and Structure of the Security Forces 304 

Character of the Security Forces 306 

Crime 308 

Narcotics 308 

Courts and Criminal Procedure 309 

Prisons 310 

Islamic Provisions 311 

xi 



Emergency Provisions 313 

Subversion and Civil Unrest 314 

Appendix. Tables 319 

Bibliography 333 

Glossary 363 

Index 367 

Contributors 395 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Pakistan, 1994 xxviii 

2 Indus Valley Culture Sites, ca. 2500-1600 B.C 6 

3 Kushan Empire, ca. A.D. 150 10 

4 Mughal Empire, Late Seventeenth Century 12 

5 Topography and Drainage 84 

6 Population by Age and Gender, 1993 94 

7 Principal Ethnic Groups 108 

8 Transportation System: Roads, 1994 190 

9 Transportation System: Railroads, Airports, and 

Ports, 1994 191 

10 Structure of the Government, 1994 212 

11 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1994 296 

12 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1994 297 



xii 



Preface 



This edition supersedes the 1984 edition of Pakistan: A 
Country Study, edited by Richard F. Nyrop. Like its predecessor, 
the present book is an attempt to treat in a compact and objec- 
tive manner the dominant historical, social, economic, politi- 
cal, and national security aspects of contemporary Pakistan. 
Sources of information included scholarly books, journals, and 
monographs; official reports and documents of governments 
and international organizations; foreign and domestic newspa- 
pers and periodicals; and interviews with individuals with spe- 
cial competence in South Asian affairs. Relatively up-to-date 
economic data were available from several sources, but the 
sources were not always in agreement. Most demographic data 
should be viewed as well-informed estimates. 

Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book; brief 
comments on some of the more valuable sources for further 
reading appear at the conclusion of each chapter. Measure- 
ments are given in the metric system; a conversion table is pro- 
vided to assist readers unfamiliar with the metric system (see 
table 1, Appendix). For the convenience of the reader, a brief 
chronology of the major eras and events of South Asian and 
Pakistani history is included (see table A). 

The transliteration of various words and phrases posed a 
problem. For many words of Arabic origin — such as Muslim, 
Quran, and zakat — the authors followed a modified version of 
the system adopted by the United States Board on Geographic 
Names. In numerous instances, however, the authors adhered 
to the spelling used by the government and people of Pakistan. 
There is thus some variance in spellings: for example, the 
Prophet Muhammad, but Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The reader 
should also note that the term Khan, which appears with 
numerous names (for example, Ayub Khan, Ghaffar Khan, and 
Yahya Khan), is an honorific and is almost never a surname. 

The body of the text reflects information available as of 
April 1994. Certain other portions of the text, however, have 
been updated. The Introduction discusses significant events 
that have occurred since the completion of research, and the 
Chronology and Country Profile include updated information 
as available. 



xiii 



Table A. Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



ANCIENT EMPIRES 

ca. 2500-1600 B.C. 
ca. 1500-500 B.C. 
ca. 563-483 B.C. 
ca. 321-180 B.C. 

ca. 180B.C.-A.D. 150 
ca. A.D. 78-ca. 200 
ca. A.D. 319-ca. 600 
COMING OF ISLAM 
711 

1001-1030 
1192 

1206-1526 
1398 

MUGHAL PERIOD 
1526 

1556 

1556-1605 
1605-27 

1628-58 
1658-1707 
1707-1858 
BRITISH PERIOD 
1757 

1799-1839 

1830s 

1838-42 

1843 

1845-50 

1857-58 

1858 

1878-80 

1885 

1893 

1905 
1906 



Indus Valley culture. 

Migrations of Indo- Aryan-speaking tribes; the Vedic Age. 

Life of Siddhartha Gautama — the Buddha; founding of Buddhism. 

Mauryan Empire; reign of Ashoka (ca. 274-236 B.C.); spread of 
Buddhism. 

Saka dynasties in Indus Valley. 

Kushan Empire; Gandharan art flourishes. 

Gupta Empire; classical age in northern India. 

Muhammad bin Qasim, an Arab general, conquers Sindh and incor- 
porates it into Umayyad Caliphate. 

Mahmud of Ghazni raids Indian subcontinent from Afghanistan. 

Muhammad of Ghor defeats Rajputs. 

Delhi Sultanate. 

Timur destroys Delhi. 

Babur defeats last Lodhi sultan in first Battle of Panipat, thus laying 
foundation of Mughal Empire. 

Akbar victorious in second Battle of Panipat. 

Reign of Akbar. 

Reign of Jahangir; in 1612 East India Company opens first trading 
post (factory). 

Reign of Shah Jahan, builder of Taj Mahal. 

Reign of Aurangzeb, last great Mughal ruler. 

Lesser emperors; decline of Mughal Empire. 

Battle of Plassey and British victory over Mughal forces in Bengal; 
conventional date for beginning of British rule in India. 

Sikh kingdom established in Punjab under Maharaja Ranjit Singh. 

Introduction of British education and other reform measures. 

First Anglo-Afghan War. 

British annex Sindh, Hyderabad, and Khairpur. 

Sikh Wars; British annex Punjab; Kashmir sold to Dogra Dynasty, 
to be ruled under British paramountcy. 

Uprising, variously known as Indian Mutiny, Sepoy Rebellion, and 
by Indian nationalists as First War of Independence. 

East India Company dissolved; rule of India under British crown 
(the British Raj) begins; marks formal end of Mughal Empire. 

Second Anglo- Afghan War. 

Indian National Congress formed. 

Durand Line established as boundary between Afghanistan and 
British India. 

Partition of Bengal. 

All-India Muslim League founded. 



XV 



Table A. Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



1909 
1911 
1916 

1919 
1935 
1940 

1946 August 

1947 June 



INDEPENDENT PAKISTAN 
1947 August 



October 

1948 September 

1949 January 

1951 October 

1955 August 
October 

1956 March 
1958 October 

1965 August 

1969 March 

1970 July 
December 

1971 March 



April 



Morley-Minto Reforms establish separate electorates for Muslims. 
Partition of Bengal annulled. 

Congress-Muslim League Pact (often referred to as Lucknow Pact) 
signed. 

Montague-Chelmsford Reforms; Third Anglo- Afghan War. 
Government of India Act of 1935. 

Muslim League adopts "Pakistan Resolution" demanding separate 
nation for Muslims of India. "Two Nations Theory" articulated by 
Muslim League leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah and others. 

Muslim League observes "Direct Action Day." Widespread commu- 
nal rioting spreads to many parts of India. 

Legislation introduced in British Parliament calling for indepen- 
dence and partition of India; communal rioting and mass move- 
ments of population begin, resulting in next months in 250,000 
deaths and up to 24 million refugees. 

Partition of British India; India achieves independence and incorpo- 
rates West Bengal and Assam; Pakistan is created and incorpo- 
rates East Bengal (East Wing, or East Pakistan) and territory in 
the northwest (West Wing, or West Pakistan); Jinnah becomes 
governor general of Pakistan; Liaquat Ali Khan becomes prime 
minister. 

Start of first Indo-Pakistani War over sovereignty of Kashmir. 

Jinnah dies; Khwaja Nazimuddin becomes governor general. 

United Nations-arranged cease-fire between Pakistan and India 
takes effect, ending first Indo-Pakistani War. 

Liaquat assassinated; Nazimuddin becomes prime minister; Ghu- 
lam Mohammad becomes governor general. 

Ghulam Mohammad resigns; succeeded by Iskander Mirza. 

"One Unit Plan" establishes the four provinces of West Pakistan as 
one administrative unit. 

Constitution adopted; Mirza becomes president. 

Mirza abrogates constitution and declares martial law; Mirza sent 
into exile; General Mohammad Ayub Khan, chief martial law 
administrator (CMLA), assumes presidency. 

Start of second Indo-Pakistani War over Kashmir. 

Martial law declared; Ayub Khan resigns; CMLA General Agha 
Mohammad Yahya Khan assumes presidency. 

One Unit Plan abolished; four provinces reestablished in West Paki- 
stan. 

First general elections; Awami League under Sheikh Mujibur Rah- 
man (Mujib) secures absolute majority in new National Assem- 
bly; West Pakistan-dominated government declines to convene 
assembly. 

East Pakistan attempts to secede, beginning civil war; Mujib 
imprisoned in West Pakistan; the "independent, sovereign repub- 
lic of Bangladesh" first proclaimed from captured radio station in 
Chittagong. 

Formal declaration of independence of Bangladesh issued; govern- 
ment-in-exile formed in Calcutta. 



Table A. Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



December 

1972 July 

1973 August 

1976 January 

1977 March 

July 

1978 September 

1979 February 
April 

November 



December 
1980 January 

1983 August 

1985 January 
February 
March 
July 

1986 August 

December 
1988 May 



August 



India invades East Pakistan; India first nation to recognize Bang- 
ladesh; Pakistani military surrenders to Indian armed forces, 
marking Bangladeshi independence; Yahya Khan resigns; 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto becomes CMLA and president of Pakistan. 

Bhutto and India's prime minister, Indira Gandhi, conclude Simla 
Agreement, adjusting 1949 cease-fire line between Pakistan and 
India and creating new Line of Control. 

New constitution goes into effect; Bhutto becomes prime minister. 

Diplomatic relations established between Pakistan and Bangladesh. 

General elections; massive victory by Bhutto's party evokes wide- 
spread rioting and protest. 

General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, chief of the army staff, appoints 
himself CMLA and proclaims martial law. 

Zia ul-Haq becomes nation's sixth president, replacing Fazal Elahi 
Chaudhry. 

Islamic penal code introduced. 

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto hanged. 

Mob storms and burns down United States Embassy in Islamabad, 
killing two Americans and two Pakistani employees; United 
States cultural centers in Rawalpindi and Lahore also torched; 
attacks in response to Iranian-inspired rumors that United States 
citizens responsible for November 20 attack on Grand Mosque in 
Mecca. 

Large-scale movements of Soviet troops and military equipment 
into Afghanistan. 

United States president Jimmy Carter pledges military assistance to 
help Pakistan defend itself against Soviet threat; Carter offers 
US$400 million, rejected by Zia as "peanuts." 

President Zia ul-Haq announces that martial law will be lifted in 
1985 but warns that army will retain key role in future govern- 
ments. 

Non-Islamic banking abolished. 

General elections held for National Assembly. 

Mohammad Khan Junejo invited by Zia to form civilian cabinet. 

Economy declared to be in conformity with Islam. 

Movement for the Restoration of Democracy launches campaign 
against government, demanding new general elections; Benazir 
Bhutto arrested in Karachi. 

New federal cabinet sworn into office by President Zia with Junejo 
continuing as prime minister. 

Prime Minister Junejo expands federal government to include five 
new ministers and three new ministers of state; President Zia dis- 
misses Junejo government, dissolves national and provincial 
assemblies, and orders new elections to be held within ninety 
days. 

Zia, the United States ambassador to Pakistan, and top army offi- 
cials killed in mysterious airplane crash near Bahawalpur in Pun- 
jab; Ghulam Ishaq Khan, chairman of Senate, sworn in as acting 
president; General Mirza Aslam Beg becomes chief of the army 
staff. 



Table A. Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



October 

November 

December 



1989 February 
June 

September 
October 

1990 May-June 
August 

October 



November 
1991 February 



May 
July 

1992 December 

1993 January 

April 
June 



Joint United States-Pakistani investigatory committee concludes 
that Zia's death was caused by "criminal act of sabotage." 

Elections held for National Assembly; Pakistan People's Party 
(PPP) wins ninety-three out of 207 seats contested. 

Benazir Bhutto sworn in as first female prime minister of a Muslim 
nation; PPP and MQM parties sign "Karachi Declaration," an 
accord to restore peace in Sindh; Pakistan and India sign accords 
at South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
summit in Islamabad, including agreement not to attack each 
other's nuclear facilities. 

Soviet Union completes withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. 

Combined Opposition Parties, consisting of most opposition 
groups, formed in National Assembly, with Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi 
as leader. 

Pakistan's largest ever military exercise, Zarb-e-Momin (Sword of 
the Faithful), commences. 

Pakistan rejoins Commonwealth of Nations (withdrew in 1972 to 
protest recognition of Bangladesh by member states). 

Ethnic troubles mount in Sindh; rift develops between PPP and coa- 
lition partners. 

President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismisses Prime Minister Benazir 
Bhutto, her cabinet, and National Assembly; orders new elections 
for October 24, 1990; Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi becomes caretaker 
prime minister. 

United States president George Bush unable to deliver annual certi- 
fication that Pakistan does not possess nuclear weapons as condi- 
tion of continued assistance and arms and technology transfers, 
leading to cutoff of most aid. National elections held; Benazir 
Bhutto's PPP loses to coalition of rightist parties. 

Mian Nawaz Sharif elected prime minister. 

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif liberalizes economy, lifts controls on 
foreign currency entering country, and announces policies to 
encourage new investment; numerous pro-Iraq demonstrations 
and widespread public opposition to Nawaz Sharifs support of 
Desert Storm, but pro-United Nations stance reiterated. 

Shariat Bill adopted by National Assembly. 

Opposition members call upon president to dismiss government 
because of deteriorating law and order situation, particularly in 
Sindh. 

Babri Mosque in Ayodya, India, destroyed by Hindu fundamental- 
ists seeking to build Hindu temple on contested site; communal 
violence mounts over incident; Pakistan asks Indian government 
to protect Muslims in India. 

General Asif Nawaz Janjua, chief of the army staff, dies of a heart 
attack and is replaced with Lieutenant General Abdul Waheed; 
Aimal Kansi, a Pakistani, shoots two Central Intelligence Agency 
employees to death and wounds three others in Washington, 
before fleeing the country. 

President Ishaq Khan dismisses government of Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif, citing corruption. 

Twenty-two Pakistani troops are killed while undertaking peace- 
keeping duties in Somalia. 



Table A. Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



July 

October 
November 

1994 January 
August 

1995 March 
July 



President Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif resign 
under pressure from military; World Bank officer Moeen Qureshi 
named caretaker prime minister pending elections in October. 
Wassim Sajjad becomes acting president; India rejects Pakistan's 
proposal to sign regional nuclear test ban treaty. 

Benazir Bhutto's PPP wins slim margin in national elections and 
builds coalition government; Benazir appointed prime minister. 

PPP stalwart, Farooq Leghari, defeats acting president, Wassim Saj- 
jad, and becomes president. 

Benazir opens first all-female police station in Rawalpindi. 

Pakistan places its troops on high alert along the Line of Control 
after India deploys two more army divisions in Kashmir; former 
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif makes public statement claiming 
that Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons. 

Terrorist attack on streets of Karachi kills two American employees 
of United States consulate and draws international attention to 
mounting law and order problems in Pakistan. 

United States press carries allegations by United States intelligence 
officials that Pakistan has surreptitiously received fully operable 
medium-range M-ll ballistic missiles from China. 



xix 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Islamic Republic of Pakistan. 

Short Form: Pakistan. 

Term for Citizens: Pakistani(s). 

Capital: Islamabad (Islamabad Capital Territory) . 

Date of Independence: August 14, 1947, from Britain. 

NOTE — The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 



xxi 



Geography 



Size: Total land area estimated to be 796,095 square 
kilometers. 

Topography: Three major geographic areas: northern 
highlands, Indus River plain, and Balochistan Plateau. 

Climate: Generally arid; hot summers, cool or cold winters; 
wide variations of temperature in given locale and between 
coastal area on Arabian Sea and glacial regions of northern 
highlands; little rainfall. 

Society 

Population: 1994 (July) estimated at 129 million; annual 
growth rate officially estimated at 3.1 percent. 

Ethnic Groups: In general, percentages of population similar 
to linguistic groups: Punjabis 66 percent, Sindhis 13 percent, 
Pakhtuns 9 percent, Baloch 3 percent, muhajirs (immigrants 
from India and their descendants) 8 percent, and other ethnic 
groups 1 percent. 

Language: Urdu official language, but English in general use in 
government, military, business, and higher education. Urdu 
spoken as native tongue by only 8 percent of population, 
Punjabi by 48 percent, Punjabi variant Siraiki by 10 percent, 
Sindhi by 12 percent, Pakhtu or Pashto by 8 percent, Balochi 
by 3 percent, Hindko by 2 percent, and Brahui by 1 percent. 
Native speakers of other languages, including English and 
Burushaski, account for 8 percent of population. 

Religion: About 97 percent of Pakistanis are Muslim, 77 
percent of whom are Sunni and 20 percent Shia; remaining 3 
percent of population divided equally among Christian, 
Hindu, and other religions. 

Education and Literacy: In 1992 overall literacy rate estimated 
at more than 36 percent for adult population. Literacy rates 
substantially lower for women. In 1990 only forty-five educated 
women for every 100 educated men. Education organized into 
five levels: primary (grades one through five); middle (grades 
six through eight); high (grades nine and ten); intermediate 
(grades eleven and twelve); and university undergraduate and 
graduate programs. Preparatory classes (kachi, or nursery) 



xxii 



formally incorporated into system in 1988. 

Health and Welfare: Substandard housing, inadequate 
sanitation and water supply, and widespread malnutrition 
contribute to spread of disease and to high infant, childhood, 
and maternal mortality. In the mid-1990s, leading causes of 
death gastroenteritis, respiratory infections, congenital 
abnormalities, tuberculosis, malaria, and typhoid fever. 

Economy 

Salient Features: Low-income country with promising growth, 
but transition to middle-income nation held back by chronic 
problems, including rapidly rising population, sizable 
government deficits, heavy dependence on foreign aid, large 
military expenditures, and recurrent governmental instability. 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In FY 1993, equivalent of 
US$50.8 billion, or about US$408 per capita; GDP growth rate 
averaged 5.3 percent a year between 1950 and 1993. 

Agriculture: Declined over the past four decades from 53 
percent of GDP in 1950 to 25 percent of GDP in FY 1993, but 
still employs 48 percent of labor force. Pakistan notable for 
having world's largest continuous irrigation canal system. 

Industry: Leading growth component of economy, industry 
(including mining, manufacturing, and utilities) accounted for 
21.7 percent of GDP in FY 1993, up from 8 percent in FY 1950, 
and employed 13 percent of labor force. 

Services: Services (including construction, trade, 
transportation and communications, and other services) 
accounted for 53.3 percent of GDP in FY 1993 and employed 
39 percent of labor force. About 7 percent of civilian work 
force employed in construction, 13 percent in trade, 5 percent 
in transportation, and 14 percent in other services. 

Energy: Firewood, bagasse, and dung major energy sources. 
Small crude oil production; over 90 percent of petroleum 
requirements imported. Natural gas, oil, and hydroelectric 
power major domestic commercial energy sources. Substantial 
deposits of poor-quality coal. Energy supplies constrain 
industrialization. 

Foreign Trade: United States and Japan largest trading 
partners. In FY 1993 United States accounted for 13.7 percent 



xxiii 



of Pakistan's exports and 11.2 percent of its imports. Japan 
accounted for 6.6 percent of exports and 14.2 percent of 
imports. Germany, Britain, and Saudi Arabia important trading 
partners. Hong Kong important export market. China 
significant supplier of imports. Trade with India negligible. 
Cotton and rice major exports; petrochemicals, chemicals, 
machinery, and transportation equipment major imports. 

Balance of Payments and External Debt: Negative balance of 
trade in early and mid-1990s. In FY 1992, exports US$6.9 
billion and imports US$9.3 billion, resulting in trade deficit of 
approximately US$2.4 billion. Trade deficit expected to 
increase to US$2.5 billion in 1993. World Bank estimated 
US$24.1 billion external debt in 1992. 

Foreign Aid: Dependent on foreign aid for development 
efforts and balancing debt payments. United States largest 
donor of aid since independence, but all United States military 
aid and all new civilian commitments ended October 1990. 

Currency and Exchange Rate: Rupee (Rs) divided into 100 
paisa. US$1 = Rs30.30 in February 1994. 

Fiscal Year: July 1 to June 30. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Roads: Road system approximately 180,000 kilometers in 1992; 
asphalt roads about 51 percent of total. Work on four-lane 339- 
kilometer highway between Lahore and Islamabad began 
January 1993. Number of motor vehicles estimated at nearly 2 
million in 1992, including 932,000 motorcycles, 454,000 
automobiles, 220,000 tractors, 157,000 trucks and vans/and 
37,000 buses. 

Railroads: 8,775 kilometers total; 7,718 kilometers broad 
gauge, 445 kilometers meter gauge, and 610 kilometers less 
than meter gauge; 1,037 kilometers broad-gauge double track; 
286 kilometers electrified; most government owned. 

Civil Aviation: International airports at Karachi, Islamabad, 
Lahore, Peshawar, and Quetta. Pakistan International Airlines 
national carrier. 

Ports: Major ports at Karachi, Port Muhammad bin Qasim, 
Gwadar, and Pasni. 

Telecommunications: Telegraph and telephone systems 



xxiv 



government owned; more than 1.6 million telephone 
connections in March 1993. Radio and telephone dominated 
by government corporations; Pakistan Broadcasting 
Corporation had monopoly on radio broadcasting, with home 
service of 270 hours daily in twenty languages and world 
service of ten hours daily in two languages in 1995; nineteen 
AM and eight FM broadcasting stations. Government- 
controlled Pakistan Television Corporation (PTV) transmits 
daily; privately owned People's Television Network transmits on 
eight channels; twenty-nine television broadcast stations; more 
than 2 million television sets in use in 1995. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Has shifted among various forms of 
parliamentary, military, and presidential governments in 
pursuit of political stability. The 1973 constitution, as amended 
in 1985, provides for parliamentary system with president as 
head of state and popularly elected prime minister as head of 
government. Bicameral legislature, Majlis-i-Shoora (Council of 
Advisers), consists of Senate (upper house) and National 
Assembly (lower house). 

Politics: Return of democracy and open political debate after 
death of General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq in 1988; politics 
characterized by varied and volatile mix of ethnic and regional 
alliances. Provincialism and ethnic rivalries continue to impede 
progress toward national integration. Major political parties 
include Pakistan People's Party, Pakistan Muslim League 
(Nawaz Sharif faction), Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz, Awami 
National Party, Jamaat-i-Islami, Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam, and 
Solidarity Movement (Tehrik-i-Istiqlal). 

Judicial System: Supreme Court, provincial high courts, and 
other lesser courts exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction. 
Federal Shariat Court decides if a civil law is repugnant to 
injunctions of Islam. 

Administrative Divisions: Four provinces — Balochistan, 
North-West Frontier Province, Punjab, and Sindh; one 
territory — Federally Administered Tribal Areas; one capital 
territory — Islamabad Capital Territory; and Pakistani- 
administered portion of disputed Jammu and Kashmir 
region — Azad (Free) Kashmir and the Northern Areas. 

Foreign Relations: Member of United Nations, Commonwealth 



xxv 



of Nations, Economic Cooperation Organization, South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation, and numerous other 
international organizations. Relations with United States 
historically close but turbulent. Acrimonious relations with 
India and fallout from Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979- 
89) have been defining factors in recent foreign policy. 

National Security 

Armed forces: Active army strength in 1994 was 520,000, with 
300,000 reserve personnel; navy, 22,000, with 5,000 reserve 
personnel; air force, 45,000, with 8,000 reserve personnel; 
paramilitary forces — including National Guard, Frontier 
Corps, Pakistan Rangers, Mehran Force, Coast Guard, and 
Maritime Security Agency — exceeded 300,000. 

Major Military Units: Army organized in nine corps. Under 
corps headquarters, twenty-one divisions. Navy organized in 
four commands, COMPAK — the fleet; COMLOG — logistics; 
COMFORNAV — naval installations in the north of Pakistan; 
and COMKAR — naval headquarters at Karachi. Air force 
organized in eighteen squadrons to defend three air defense 
districts — north, central, and south. 

Military Equipment: Army equipment includes tanks, mostly of 
Chinese manufacture but some United States-made armored 
personnel carriers, artillery pieces, motorized rocket 
launchers, mortars, air defense guns, TOW antitank guided 
weapons, surface-to-surface missiles, ship-to-surface missiles, 
and surface-to-air missiles. Navy equipment includes 
submarines with United States Harpoon missiles, destroyers, 
guided missile frigates, frigates, surface-to-air missiles, torpedo 
craft, minehunters, combat aircraft, and armed helicopters. Air 
force equipment includes F-16 fighters (mainstay of force), 
Chinese J-6s and J-5s, French Mirages, and C-130 Hercules 
transport aircraft. 

Defense Budget: US$3.5 billion in FY 1994, representing 26 
percent of government spending and about 9 percent of gross 
national product. 

Foreign Military Relations: Principal military tie with United 
States, but relationship periodically strained. China, a steady 
source of military equipment, has joined Pakistan in 
cooperative ventures in weapons production. Security 
relationships also with Saudi Arabia, Persian Gulf states, Iran, 



xxvi 



and Turkey. 

International Security Forces: Pakistani troops contributed to 
various international security initiatives, including United 
States-led alliance in Persian Gulf War and United Nations 
peacekeeping efforts in Somalia and Bosnia. Pakistan has sent 
peacekeeping observers to Croatia, Iraq-Kuwait border zones, 
Liberia, Mozambique, and Western Sahara. 

Internal Security and Police: Internal security occasionally 
threatened by regional interests, particularly by sectarian 
violence in Sindh in early 1990s. Police often perceived as 
abusers of civil rights. Widespread violent crime and narcotics- 
related incidents constitute potential threats to domestic 
security. 



xxvii 




xxviii 



Introduction 



PAKISTAN BECAME AN INDEPENDENT STATE in 1947, the 
realization of a yearning by India's Muslims, who feared domi- 
nation by the Hindu majority in a postcolonial India. As the 
British made their final plans to surrender the "Jewel in the 
Crown" of their empire, the earlier, elite "Two Nations The- 
ory," premised on the notion of a separate homeland for the 
subcontinent's Muslim minority, had broadened its popular 
appeal and evolved into a collective vision championed by Mus- 
lims of all backgrounds. After independence, a debate com- 
menced among contending groups over further refinement of 
that vision. Agreement on what system of government the new 
nation should adopt — a critical aspect of the debate — was 
never fully reached. Indeed, few nations have in so short a 
period undergone as many successive political and constitu- 
tional experiments as has Pakistan. This irresolution contrib- 
uted, in the decades following independence, to a recurrent 
pattern of crisis: repeated coups and extended periods in 
which martial law replaced civilian government, violent deaths 
of several national leaders, periodic strife among ethnic 
groups, and, most traumatically, a civil war that divided the 
country in two. 

The struggle over the character and soul of Pakistan contin- 
ues. Although democracy returned to Pakistan in 1988 after a 
long lapse, it is on trial daily, its continuation by no means cer- 
tain. Definition of the vision of what Pakistan represents is still 
being contested from many opposing quarters. 

Pakistan's status in the world has changed dramatically in the 
nearly one-half century of its existence as an independent 
state. In the twilight years of the Cold War, it achieved interna- 
tional stature as a "frontline" state during the Soviet occupation 
of neighboring Afghanistan. With the Soviet departure from 
Afghanistan in the late 1980s and the end of the Cold War, 
Pakistan's role in the world arena has become less visible, and 
its voice has diminished to the level of many other developing 
states competing in the new world order. Yet, during the years 
it spent in support of the Afghan struggle against Soviet domi- 
nation, Pakistan impressed upon the world community a new 
appreciation of its standing among Islamic nations and of its 
ideological commitment to causes it champions. 



xxix 



In terms of its military and economic development, Pakistan 
is a "threshold" state. The world's first Islamic "de facto" 
nuclear-weapons state, it has long been at loggerheads with its 
larger and more powerful neighbor, India, which, like Paki- 
stan, denies having built nuclear weapons but not its ability to 
do so at the "turn of a screw." A nation well positioned to serve 
as an economic model for other developing countries in the 
post-Cold War era — especially the Islamic states of the former 
Soviet Union — Pakistan has shown steady and impressive 
long-term economic growth and is successfully making the 
transition from an overwhelmingly agricultural to an industrial 
economy. Yet, despite its considerable achievements in technol- 
ogy and commerce, Pakistan confronts many of the same prob- 
lems it faced at its birth. The nation has one of the world's 
highest population growth rates, making it difficult for the gov- 
ernment to address the problems of poverty and attendant ills 
that affect so many in its society. Indeed, social development 
has lagged behind economic gains. Quality of life indicators — 
literacy rates, especially among women, human rights, and uni- 
versal access to heath care — have shown Pakistan to be a coun- 
try with serious deficiencies. 

Throughout history, Pakistan has been strongly affected by 
its geostrategic placement as a South Asian frontier located at 
the juncture of South Asia, West Asia, and Central Asia. Schol- 
ars have called Pakistan the "fulcrum of Asia" because since 
antiquity invaders have traversed this frontier carrying with 
them the seeds of great civilizations. The armies of Islam came 
to South Asia through the same mountain passes in the north- 
west of Pakistan that the Indo-Aryans, Alexander the Great, the 
Kushans, and others had earlier entered. 

Present-day Pakistan has been shaped by its rich history, pre- 
Islamic as well as Islamic, but colored in particular by the exi- 
gencies of its troubled and bloody birth as a nation in 1947. 
The partitioning of British India into India and Pakistan was 
preceded and accompanied by communal riots of unprece- 
dented violence and scope that forced millions of Hindu, Mus- 
lim, and Sikh refugees to flee across the new international 
borders. 

The partition plan that led to the separate states of India and 
Pakistan was drawn up in an atmosphere of urgency as a swell 
of religious and ethnic unrest shook India. Under guidelines 
established with the help of Britain's last viceroy in India, Lord 
Louis Mountbatten, the perplexing task of establishing the new 



xxx 



boundaries of Pakistan was accomplished. Most Indian Mus- 
lims lived either on the dusty plains of Punjab or in the humid 
delta of Bengal. Contiguous Muslim-majority districts in Punjab 
and Bengal were awarded to Pakistan under the plan's guide- 
lines. The additional task of deciding the status of the more 
than 500 semiautonomous princely states of India still 
remained. All but three of these quickly acceded to either Paki- 
stan or India. But the two largest princely states, Jammu and 
Kashmir (usually just called Kashmir) and Hyderabad, and one 
small state, Junagadh, posed special problems. Hyderabad and 
Junagadh were located within territory awarded to India but 
were both Hindu majority states ruled by a Muslim leader. 
These states hesitated but were quickly incorporated by force 
into India. 

The status of the third state, Kashmir, which had borders 
with both India and Pakistan, proved especially problematic. 
Unlike Hyderabad and Junagadh, Kashmir had a Muslim 
majority and was ruled by a Hindu. Kashmir's maharaja was 
reluctant to accede to either Pakistan or India, but when 
threatened by a Muslim uprising (with outside support from 
Pakistani tribesmen) against his unpopular rule, he hurriedly 
signed the documents of accession, in October 1947, required 
by India before it would provide aid. Pakistan then launched 
an active military and diplomatic campaign to undo the acces- 
sion, which it maintained was secured by fraud. Kashmir was 
subsequently divided by the occupying armies of both nations, 
the Indians holding two-thirds of the state, including the Mus- 
lim-dominated Vale of Kashmir and the Hindu-majority region 
of Jammu to the south, while the Pakistanis controlled the west- 
ern third, which they called Azad (Free) Kashmir. India and 
Pakistan fought two major wars to maintain or seize control 
over this state: in 1947-48 and in 1965. Kashmir's contested 
and indeterminate status continues dangerously to complicate 
relations between South Asia's two most powerful states. 

The bifurcated Pakistan that existed from August 1947 to 
December 1971 was composed of two parts, or wings, known as 
East Pakistan and West Pakistan, separated by 1,600 kilometers 
of Indian territory. Observers pointed out, however, that the 
people of the two wings were estranged from each other in lan- 
guage and cultural traditions: that the Bengali "monsoon 
Islam" of the East Wing was alien to the "desert Islam" of the 
West Wing. The East Wing, notable for its Bengali ethnic 
homogeneity and its collective Bangla cultural and linguistic 



xxxi 



heritage, contained over half of the population of Pakistan and 
sharply contrasted with the ethnic and linguistic diversity of the 
West Wing. The West Wing consisted of four major ethnic 
groups — Punjabis, Pakhtuns, Sindhis, and Baloch. The muhajirs 
(see Glossary) constituted a fifth important group. The politi- 
cal leaders of Pakistan, however — particularly those of West 
Pakistan — asserted that the Islamic faith and a shared fear of 
"Hindu India" provided an indestructible bond joining the two 
societies into one nation. This assertion proved flawed. A cul- 
ture of distrust grew between the two wings, fueled by imbal- 
ances of representation in the government and military. 
Furthermore, Bengali politicians argued that the economic 
"underdevelopment" of East Pakistan was a result of the "inter- 
nal colonialism" of the rapacious capitalist class of West Paki- 
stan. In the final analysis, real and perceived inequities would 
fray this "indestructible" bond holding the country together. 
Less than a quarter century after the country's founding, Paki- 
stan would fission, the eastern wing becoming the independent 
nation of Bangladesh. 

It was neither Pakistan's precarious security nor its cultural 
and ethnic diversity, but rather characteristics deeply rooted in 
the nation's polity that most impeded its early democratic 
development. The essentials for such a process — disciplined 
political parties and a participatory mass electorate — were 
missing in Pakistan's first years as an independent state. The 
All-India Muslim League, the party that led the struggle for 
Pakistan, failed to mature into a stable democratic party with a 
national following capable of holding together the nation's 
diverse ethnic and cultural groups. Instead, it disintegrated 
into rival factions soon after independence. Lack of a consen- 
sus over prospective Islamic provisions for the nation's gover- 
nance, Bengali resentment over the West Pakistanis' initial 
imposition of Urdu as the national language, and the reluc- 
tance of West Pakistani politicians to share power with politi- 
cians of the East Wing — all were factors that delayed the 
acceptance of Pakistan's first constitution until nine years after 
independence. The nation was also dealt a severe psychological 
blow when in September 1948, only thirteen months after inde- 
pendence, Mohammad Ali Jinnah — known reverentially as the 
Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader) — died. Jinnah's role in the cre- 
ation of Pakistan had been so dominant that it has been 
observed that he had neither peers nor associates, only lieuten- 
ants and aides. Jinnah's primary lieutenant, Liaquat Ali Khan, 



xxxii 



the nation's first prime minister, was assassinated in October 
1951. 

Jinnah's and Liaquat's leadership, so critical to the nation in 
its infancy, was replaced in the early and mid-1950s by the gen- 
erally lackluster, often inept performances of the nation's poli- 
ticians. Those few politicians who were effective were all too 
willing to play upon the emotions of an electorate as yet unac- 
customed to open democratic debate. The ethnic and provin- 
cial causes championed by these politicians too often took 
precedence over national concerns. The government was weak 
and unable to quell the violence and ethnic unrest that dis- 
tracted it from building strong parliamentary institutions. 

Believing that Pakistan's first attempt at establishing a parlia- 
mentary system of government failed, in the late 1950s the mil- 
itary ousted the "inefficient and rascally" politicians. During 
this period, however, the belief that democracy was the "natural 
state" of Pakistan and an important political goal was not 
entirely abandoned. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Pakistan's first 
"soldier-statesman," regarded himself as more of a reformer 
than an autocrat and, as chief martial law administrator, early 
on acknowledged the need to relinquish some military control. 
In his unique governmental system called the "Basic Democra- 
cies," Ayub Khan became the "civilian" head of a military 
regime. Ayub Khan's "democracy from above" allowed for con- 
trolled participation of the electorate and was supposed to cap- 
ture the peculiar "genius" of Pakistan. To his critics, however, 
Ayub Khan's political system was better characterized as a form 
of "representational dictatorship." In 1969 an ailing Ayub Khan 
was forced to resign following nationwide rioting against his 
regime's perceived corruption, spent economic policies, and 
responsibility for Pakistan's defeat in the 1965 Indo-Pakistani 
War over Kashmir. Ayub Khan was briefly succeeded by his 
army commander in chief, General Agha Mohammad Yahya 
Khan, who would best be remembered for presiding over the 
two most traumatic and psychologically devastating events in 
the country's history: the humiliating defeat of Pakistan's 
armed forces by India and the secession of East Pakistan. 

The East Wing of Pakistan had not benefited greatly from 
Ayub Khan's "Decade of Progress," with its gains in agricultural 
production and trade. Bengali politicians wanted to improve 
what they considered to be the second-class political and eco- 
nomic status of their province vis-a-vis West Pakistan, just as 
they had earlier agitated for greater cultural and linguistic rec- 



xxxiii 



ognition. The country's first nationwide direct elections were 
held in December 1970. The East Pakistan-based Awami 
League, campaigning on a platform calling for almost total 
provincial autonomy, won virtually all the seats allotted to the 
East Wing and was thereby assured a majority in the national 
legislature. 

The results of Pakistan's first nationwide experiment in 
democracy were not honored. Fearing Bengali dominance in 
the nation's political affairs, West Pakistani politicians, led by 
Pakistan People's Party (PPP) leader Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and 
supported by senior army officers, most of whom were Pun- 
jabis, pressured Yahya Khan to postpone the convening of the 
National Assembly. When the Bengalis of East Pakistan revolted 
openly at this turn of events, the Pakistani military banned the 
Awami League, arrested its leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, 
and began a massive military crackdown. In the savage civil war 
that followed, tens of thousands of Bengalis were killed, and an 
estimated 10 million people took refuge in India. In early 
December 1971, India entered the war and within weeks deci- 
sively defeated the Pakistani military. From the aftermath of 
the war and the dismemberment of Pakistan came the birth of 
a new nation: Bangladesh. 

To most Pakistanis, the news of Pakistan's defeat came as a 
numbing shock — their military was both disgraced and con- 
demned for its brutal crackdown in East Pakistan. Literally 
overnight, the country had lost its status as the largest Muslim 
nation in the world. Gone, too, were any illusions of military 
parity with India. 

Pakistan soon recovered under the charismatic leadership of 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who launched a forceful campaign to 
restore the people's self-confidence and to repair Pakistan's tar- 
nished image abroad. Initially, Bhutto was sworn in as presi- 
dent and chief martial law administrator, the two positions he 
took over from Yahya Khan. Although he soon revoked formal 
martial law, he governed autocratically until he was overthrown 
in 1977. 

A man of contradictions, and a product of a privileged feu- 
dal background, the Western-educated Bhutto nonetheless 
expounded populist themes of shared wealth, national unity, 
and the need to restore political democracy under the slogan 
"Islam our Faith, Democracy our Polity, Socialism our Econ- 
omy." Bhutto nationalized a large number of the most impor- 
tant manufacturing, insurance, and domestically owned 



xxxiv 



banking industries — actions that substantially slowed economic 
growth. 

By the mid-1970s, Bhutto's autocratic tendencies were inter- 
fering with his ability to govern. His determination to crush 
any and all potential opposition had become obsessive. Bhutto 
purged his party of real or imagined opponents, created a pra- 
etorian security force answerable only to himself, brought the 
prestigious civil service under his personal control, and sacked 
military officers who possessed what he described as "Bonapar- 
tist tendencies." Fatefully, Bhutto then named General Moham- 
mad Zia ul-Haq — a relatively junior and obscure general — to 
hold the top army post. Most observers had predicted that 
Bhutto's PPP would retain control of the National Assembly in 
the elections of March 1977, but the margin of the PPP's vic- 
tory was so overwhelming that charges of fraud were immedi- 
ately made, and riots erupted throughout the country. General 
Zia was well positioned to act against Bhutto. He abruptly 
informed the nation that he had taken over as the chief martial 
law administrator but assured the people that the military 
desired only to supervise fair elections, which he said would be 
held in ninety days. This was the first of many promises Zia did 
not keep. As the elections approached, Zia announced that 
criminal charges were being brought against Bhutto and post- 
poned the elections until after Bhutto had been tried in court. 
Bhutto was found guilty of complicity in the murder of a politi- 
cal opponent, and later hanged. The memory of Bhutto and 
the circumstances surrounding his fall became a rallying cry 
for his daughter, Benazir, who, during the 1980s, sought 
revenge as she began her political ascent in steadfast opposi- 
tion to Zia and martial law. 

Zia ul-Haq's eleven years of rule left a profound — and con- 
troversial — legacy on Pakistani society. Zia's military junta dif- 
fered in important aspects from the earlier military regime of 
Ayub Khan. Like Zia, Ayub Khan had been contemptuous of 
politicians; his style of governing was autocratic in the tradition 
of the British Raj and its Mughal predecessors. Nevertheless, 
Ayub Khan welcomed Western influences in his quest for eco- 
nomic development, and he introduced various reform mea- 
sures, such as the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, which 
provided protection for women within their families. More- 
over, early in his rule, Ayub Khan isolated the army from the 
governmental decision-making process and instead relied 



xxxv 



heavily on senior civil servants and a few conservative politi- 
cians. 

Zia's rule, by contrast, was notable for the high visibility of a 
small number of army officers and for his fervent advocacy of a 
more stringent version of Islamic orthodoxy. Zia made clear his 
desire to supplant the prevailing legal system with Islamic law, 
the sharia (see Glossary) , and championed a role for Islam that 
was more state directed and less a matter of personal choice. 
He proclaimed that all laws had to conform with Islamic tenets 
and values and charged the military with protecting the 
nation's ideology as well as its territorial integrity. His establish- 
ment of the Federal Shariat Court to examine laws in light of 
the injunctions of Islam further involved the state in religious 
affairs. 

The crucial and perplexing question of the role Islam 
should play in Pakistan existed before the creation of the 
nation and remains unresolved today. Jinnah supplied a histor- 
ical reference to the dilemma, stating in his inaugural address, 
"You will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be 
Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the reli- 
gious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individ- 
ual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State." Although 
each of Pakistan's indigenous constitutions has defined Paki- 
stan as an Islamic state, determining what this means in prac- 
tice has usually been left open to individual preference. Zia 
elevated the tempo of the debate over the role of Islam in Paki- 
stani society by directly involving the state with religion. 

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and its 
nine-year occupation of that country not only had a direct 
impact on Pakistani society in general but also held vital impor- 
tance for Zia's leadership, influencing his domestic and inter- 
national image as well as the survival of his regime. From the 
beginning of his rule, Zia was regarded by much of the world 
community as a usurper of power and as something of an inter- 
national pariah. He furthered his isolation by deciding, early in 
his regime, to pursue the development of nuclear weapons, a 
program begun earlier by Bhutto. Building on the long and 
close relationship between the United States and Pakistan dat- 
ing from the early years of the Cold War, United States presi- 
dent Jimmy Carter and his administration worked energetically 
but unsuccessfully to discourage Pakistan's nuclear program 
and finally suspended all economic and military aid on April 6, 
1979. The execution of Bhutto two days earlier had added to 



xxxvi 



United States displeasure with the Zia regime and Pakistan. 
Relations with the United States soured further when a Paki- 
stani mob burned down the United States Embassy in Novem- 
ber 1979. 

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan abruptly ended Paki- 
stan's estrangement from the United States. Within days, Paki- 
stan once again became Washington's indispensable frontline 
ally against Soviet expansionism. Massive military and eco- 
nomic assistance flowed into Pakistan despite Zia's continued 
pursuit of nuclear weapons technology. Pakistan's nuclear pro- 
gram made major advances in the 1980s. Moreover, the change 
in geostrategic circumstances following the occupation of 
neighboring Afghanistan allowed Zia to postpone the prom- 
ised elections repeatedly while he consolidated his position. 
Foreign assistance provided a stimulus to the economy and 
became an important means by which Zia neutralized his oppo- 
nents. The war, depicted by Zia and the Afghan resistance as a 
holy war of believers versus nonbelievers, facilitated Zia's 
efforts to transform Pakistan into a state governed by Islamic 
law. 

The war in Afghanistan had many profound and disturbing 
residual effects on Pakistani society. Pakistan absorbed more 
than 3.2 million Afghan refugees into its North-West Frontier 
Province and Balochistan. The influx of so many displaced 
people threatened to overwhelm the local economies as refu- 
gees competed with Pakistanis for resources. With the refugees 
came an arsenal of weapons. Domestic violence increased dra- 
matically during the war years, and observers spoke dismally of 
a "Kalashnikov culture" asserting itself in Pakistani society. 

By the time of Zia's death in an airplane explosion in August 
1988, an agreement had been signed signaling the end of 
Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, and the Soviet pull- 
out had already begun. Domestic politics in Pakistan were sur- 
prisingly tranquil as Pakistan prepared for a transition of power 
and elections to the National Assembly, which Zia had earlier 
dissolved. An era seemed to have ended and a new, more prom- 
ising one to have begun. The prospect for genuine democracy 
in Pakistan appeared to have dramatically improved, and Paki- 
stan appeared to have reached a watershed in its political devel- 
opment. 

After her party won a plurality of seats in the parliamentary 
elections of November 1988, Benazir Bhutto formed a fragile 
coalition government and assumed the position of prime min- 



xxxvii 



ister. She became the first freely elected leader in Pakistan 
since her father was deposed and the first woman to hold such 
a high position in a Muslim country. Confronted by severe dis- 
advantages from the start, Benazir soon discovered that the art 
of governance was considerably more difficult than orchestrat- 
ing opposition politics. An experienced politician but an inex- 
perienced head of government, she was outmaneuvered by her 
political opposition, intimidated by the military, and diverted 
from her reform program. Benazir was also frustrated by her 
inability to control the spreading social disorder, the wide- 
spread banditry, and the mounting ethnic violence between 
Sindhis and muhajirs in her home province of Sindh. A pro- 
longed struggle between Bhutto and the provincial govern- 
ment of Mian Nawaz Sharif in Punjab culminated in 
bureaucrat-turned-president Ghulam Ishaq Khan's siding with 
Nawaz Sharif against Benazir. Empowered by the Eighth 
Amendment provisions of the constitution — a direct legacy of 
the Zia ul-Haq regime, which strengthened the powers of the 
president at the expense of the prime minister — Ishaq Khan 
dismissed Benazir in August 1990 for alleged corruption and 
her inability to maintain law and order. He also dismissed her 
cabinet and dissolved the National Assembly as well as the 
Sindh and North-West Frontier Province provincial assemblies 
and ordered new elections for October. 

The elections brought Nawaz Sharif s Islamic Democratic 
Alliance (Islami Jamhoori Ittehad — IJI) coalition to power, and 
for a brief period there appeared to be a workable relationship 
between the new prime minister and the president. Yet this alli- 
ance soon unraveled over policy differences, specifically over 
the question of who had the power to appoint the top army 
commander. In charges similar to those Ishaq Khan had before 
brought against Benazir, Nawaz Sharif was accused in early 
1993 of "corruption and mismanagement." Nawaz Sharif, like 
Benazir before him, was dismissed and parliament dissolved — 
without a vote of confidence ever having been taken in the leg- 
islature. This time, however, the Supreme Court overturned 
the president's action, declaring it unconstitutional. The court 
restored both the prime minister and parliament. The 
Supreme Court's ruling, which served as a stunning rebuke to 
Ishaq Khan, succeeded in defusing his presidentially engi- 
neered crisis and, more important, allowed Ishaq Khan's oppo- 
nents to boldly challenge the legitimacy of the civil-military 



xxxviii 



bureaucracy that had so often interrupted the process of dem- 
ocratic nation building. 

The crisis in government continued as Ishaq Khan, still 
resolved to undermine the prime minister, brazenly manipu- 
lated provincial politics, dissolving the provincial assemblies in 
Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province. Fears of military 
intervention and the reimposition of martial law loomed as the 
ongoing feud between the president and prime minister 
threatened to bring effective government to a standstill. 
Although the army ultimately intervened in mid-1993 to break 
the stalemate and convinced both men to step down, fears of a 
military takeover were unfounded. The army proved sensitive 
to the spirit of the times and exercised admirable restraint as it 
assumed a new and benign role as arbiter rather than manipu- 
lator of the nation's politics. 

A caretaker government led by World Bank official Moeen 
Qureshi was installed in July 1993, with the mandate to preside 
over new elections for the national and provincial assemblies. 
The caretaker government surprised everyone with its vigor 
and impressed Pakistanis and international observers alike. 
During his three-month tenure, Qureshi earned the accolade 
"Mr. Clean" by initiating an impressive number of reform mea- 
sures. Qureshi published lists of unpaid debts and prevented 
debtor-politicians from running for office. He also devalued 
the currency and cut farm subsidies and public-service expen- 
ditures. Because the Qureshi caretaker government was tempo- 
rary and not much constrained by the realpolitik of Pakistani 
society, observers doubted that any succeeding government 
would be able to match its record and boldness of action. 

In October 1993, Qureshi fulfilled his primary mandate of 
holding new elections for the national and provincial assem- 
blies. The contest was now between two staunch adversaries — 
Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto — and their respective parties. 
Although Benazir's PPP received less of the popular vote than 
Nawaz Sharif s Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N), it won a nar- 
row plurality of seats in the National Assembly, enabling Bena- 
zir to form a government. Presidential elections were held in 
November, and Farooq Leghari, a member of Benazir's party, 
won, thereby strengthening her position. 

In a political culture that traditionally placed great emphasis 
on the personal characteristics of its leaders and considerably 
less on the development of its democratic institutions, the per- 
sonality of these leaders has always been of paramount, and 



xxxix 



many would argue exaggerated, importance. The case of Bena- 
zir Bhutto, Pakistan's prime minister in mid-1995, is no excep- 
tion. Benazir's return to the pinnacle of Pakistani politics in 
October 1993 was portrayed with great theater as a redemptive 
second coming for the country's self-proclaimed "Daughter of 
Destiny." Benazir pledged this time to fulfill some of the prom- 
ises she had failed to keep during her first tenure as prime min- 
ister. These included calming the potentially explosive ethnic 
problems in the country, strengthening a treasury overbur- 
dened with debt, reconstructing a financial system weakened 
by corruption, managing a burgeoning population with inade- 
quate access to social services and one making heavy demands 
on the country's fragile ecology, enforcing women's rights in a 
decidedly male-dominated society, and forging a consensus on 
the role of Islam in contemporary Pakistani society. Above all, 
Benazir promised to steer Pakistan further along the road to 
democracy — a difficult and sensitive task in a country whose 
power structure has traditionally been authoritarian and whose 
politics have been socially divisive and confrontational. 

As before, Benazir faces a continual challenge from Nawaz 
Sharif, who appears to be pursuing the same destabilizing polit- 
ical strategies that succeeded in paralyzing her first govern- 
ment. For a short while, following Benazir's return to power, 
her public rhetoric and that of her opponent seemed less con- 
frontational than before and tended to stress themes of politi- 
cal stability, cooperation, and accommodation. This period of 
detente was short-lived, however, as a familiar pattern in Paki- 
stani politics soon reasserted itself, with vigorous opposition 
attempts to bring down Benazir's government. Unrestrained 
and sometimes chimerical criticism fueled opposition-orches- 
trated general strikes, which continued unabated throughout 
1994 and into 1995. In response, Benazir branded her opposi- 
tion as traitorous and "antistate." By the end of the first half of 
1995, relations had become so vitriolic between Benazir and 
Nawaz Sharif that in June, Nawaz Sharif accused Benazir of 
being "part of the problem" of the escalating violence in Kara- 
chi, and Benazir, for her part, leveled an accusation of treason 
against the former prime minister and chief rival, only months 
after her government had arrested Nawaz Sharif s father for 
alleged financial crimes. 

Promising to be true to her reform agenda, Benazir unveiled 
a government budget in June 1994 that called for lowering 
import duties, making the rupee convertible on the current 



xl 



account, broadening the tax base, and holding down defense 
spending. These measures will be strengthened by Pakistan's 
receipt of most of the US$2.5 billion in aid requested at a meet- 
ing of international donors in 1994. In order to receive US$1.4 
billion in preferential International Monetary Fund (IMF — see 
Glossary) credits, Pakistan agreed to a three-year structural 
adjustment program of fiscal austerity and deficit cutting. 
Under guidelines set by the IMF, Pakistan hopes to raise its 
gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) growth to an 
average of 6.5 percent per year while eventually lowering infla- 
tion to 5 percent. Whether this goal can be reached depends 
largely on raising Pakistan's export earnings, which suffered in 
the past few years primarily as a result of a drought, a major 
flood, and a plant virus "leaf curl" that has devastated cotton 
production. 

Most observers believe that Pakistan's greatest economic 
advantage is its people: the country possesses a reservoir of 
entrepreneurial and technical skills necessary for rapid eco- 
nomic growth and development. The textile industry is espe- 
cially critical to Pakistan's development. This dynamic sector in 
the economy — a major producer of cotton cloth and yarn — 
should benefit from the phaseout of textile import quotas 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
By late 1994, Pakistan's official foreign-exchange reserves had 
risen from below US$300 million the previous year to more 
than US$3 billion. The government's continuing strategy of 
privatizing state-owned enterprises appears to be invigorating 
the economy and attracting substantial foreign investment in 
the country's stock exchanges. An optimistic Benazir stated 
that "Pakistan is poised for an economic takeoff and noted 
that in the "new world of today, trade had replaced aid." 

Although Pakistan's recent economic gains are encouraging, 
the country faces a number of long-term impediments to 
growth. The most serious of these are rapid population growth, 
governmental neglect of social development, continued high 
inflation and unemployment, a bloated and inefficient bureau- 
cracy, widespread tax evasion and corruption, a weak infra- 
structure, and defense expenditures that consume more than 
25 percent (some estimates are as high as 40 percent) of gov- 
ernment spending. 

Benazir will also need to address Pakistan's most pressing 
social problems if her reform program is to have a lasting 
effect. Many of these problems are caused by the skewed distri- 



xli 



bution of resources in Pakistan. Although the middle class is 
growing, wealth has remained largely in the control of the 
nation's elite. Agitation caused by the unfulfilled promise of ris- 
ing expectations is fueled by sophisticated media, which extend 
a glimpse of a better life to every village and basti (barrio) . 

Pakistan must also work to protect its international image. In 
mid-1995 human rights violations continued to be widely 
reported, including arbitrary arrest and detention, torture of 
prisoners, and incidents of extrajudicial killings by overzealous 
police, most often in connection with government efforts to 
restore law and order to troubled Sindh. The government, 
faced with unprecedented levels of societal violence, has been 
forced to take strong action. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto 
pledged to use "ruthlessness" where necessary to confront and 
to root out ethnic and religious militants. Pakistan is also chal- 
lenged by pervasive narcotics syndicates, which wield great 
influence in Karachi, as well as in Peshawar in the North-West 
Frontier Province. Pakistan has become one of the world's lead- 
ing producers of heroin, supplying a reported 20 to 40 percent 
of the heroin consumed in the United States and 70 percent of 
that consumed in Europe. Pakistan also has an expanding 
domestic market for illicit drugs — a scourge that is having a 
devastating effect on Pakistani society. The Pakistan govern- 
ment estimates that there are 2.5 million drug addicts in the 
country — 1.7 million of them addicted to heroin. 

A particularly worrisome problem is Pakistan's unwanted 
role as a base for Islamic militants. These militants come from a 
wide range of Arab countries, including Algeria, Tunisia, 
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan, as well as nations 
in Central Asia and the Far East, and are mostly based in the 
North-West Frontier Province. Many of these militants partici- 
pated in the war in Afghanistan but now serve other, often 
extremist, causes. An attack that killed two American employ- 
ees of the United States consulate in Karachi in March 1995 
has drawn international attention to the growing terrorist activ- 
ity in Pakistan. 

Pakistan's most pressing foreign relations problem is still 
Kashmir. India routinely accuses Pakistan of supporting a Kash- 
miri "intifadah" — a Muslim uprising in Indian-controlled areas 
of Kashmir. The rebellion, which is centered in the Vale of 
Kashmir, a scenic intermontane valley with a Muslim majority, 
has claimed 20,000 lives since 1990. Pakistan claims only to 
have lent moral and political support to Muslim and Sikh sepa- 



xlii 



ratist sentiments in Kashmir and the Indian state of Punjab, 
respectively, while it accuses India of creating dissension in 
Pakistan's province of Sindh. The Kashmir issue has now broad- 
ened in scope and has taken on a new and ominous dimension. 
In February 1993, then Central Intelligence Agency director 
James Woolsey testified before Congress that the arms race 
between India and Pakistan represented the "most probable 
prospect" for the future use of nuclear weapons. These senti- 
ments were echoed the following year by United Nations secre- 
tary general Boutros-Ghali, who cautioned that an escalation of 
hostilities between Pakistan and India could lead to an acci- 
dent, with "disastrous repercussions." Tensions on the military 
Line of Control between Pakistani-controlled Azad Kashmir 
and Indian-held Kashmir remained high in mid-1995. 

In August 1994, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif made 
an announcement calculated to showcase his hard-line stance 
on Kashmir, embarrass Benazir's government, and further 
complicate its relations with the United States over the two 
countries' most sensitive bilateral issue — Pakistan's clandestine 
nuclear weapons program. He stated, "If India dares to attack 
Azad Kashmir, it will have to face the Pakistani atom bomb. I 
declare that Pakistan is in possession of an atom bomb." 

Nawaz Sharif s statement fortified the position of United 
States supporters of the Pressler Amendment of the Foreign 
Assistance Act, which has suspended United States aid and 
most military arms sales to Pakistan since October 1990. Under 
the amendment, the president must make the required annual 
certification to Congress that Pakistan does not possess a 
nuclear weapon. The last certification had been given — guard- 
edly — by President George Bush in November 1989. 

The timing of Nawaz Sharif s statement also threatened to 
undermine President William J. Clinton's earlier South Asian 
nonproliferation initiative: a proposal to Congress to authorize 
the release to Pakistan of twenty-eight F— 16 fighter airplanes 
(purchased before the aid cutoff) in return for a verifiable cap 
on Pakistan's production of fissile nuclear material. In mid- 
1995, following a visit to the United States by Benazir Bhutto, 
the Clinton administration and Congress appeared to be mov- 
ing toward agreement to significantly relax the Pressler 
Amendment and other "country specific" sanctions that Paki- 
stanis believe unfairly penalize their country for its nuclear pro- 
gram while overlooking India's program. Relaxation of the 
sanctions could yet be derailed as new accusations by United 



xliii 



States intelligence officials surfaced in the United States press 
in early July 1995 alleging that Pakistan had surreptitiously 
received fully operable medium-range M-ll ballistic missiles 
from China. The Clinton administration, however, maintains 
that there is no conclusive proof that the missiles have been 
delivered, and until there is, there will be no change regarding 
sanctions. 

Events in Pakistan point to a nation undergoing profound 
and accelerated change but one very much indebted to its past. 
Change in Pakistan is perhaps most turbulent in the metropolis 
of Karachi — Pakistan's economic hub and a city whose well- 
being may offer a glimpse of the future prospects of the nation. 
In mid-1995 Karachi continued to be plagued by a volatile com- 
bination of sectarian, ethnic, political, and economic unrest. 
The city of more than 12 million seems, in the words of one 
Pakistan watcher, to have fallen almost into a Hobbesian state 
of "all against all," as religious, political, and criminal gangs — 
many well armed — wage a battle for control. In a city that is 
growing by more than 400,000 people a year and has an unem- 
ployment rate as high as 14 percent, recruits for feuding reli- 
gious and political factions are easily found. The violence left 
as many as 1,000 dead in 1994 and snowed little sign of abating 
in 1995. The army, ordered to provide a measure of security for 
the city, pulled out in December 1994 after a two- and one-half- 
year presence, tiring of its police role and mindful that Kara- 
chi's streets were becoming too dangerous for its troops. 

There are many explanations for the lawlessness and disor- 
der in Karachi. Economists cite rampant economic growth. 
Sociologists cite problems arising from Sunni (see Glossary) 
and Shia (see Glossary) divisions in Islam and from linguistic 
and ethnic competition, primarily between Urdu-speaking 
muhajirs and native Sindhis. The government complains of 
unruly political parties that are sometimes too willing to 
include criminal and drug-trafficking elements in their ranks, 
and it even raises the specter of the "hidden hand" of Indian 
agents provocateurs intent on destabilizing Pakistan. 

In the final analysis, Karachi may present the greatest risk as 
well as the greatest potential for the nation's future. Some 
observers are predicting that the success or failure of Benazir's 
leadership will ultimately rest on whether she succeeds in man- 
aging the crisis in Karachi. On the one hand, if the city contin- 
ues to be mired in anarchy and violence, its reputation as a 
cosmopolitan symbol of the new Pakistan will be tarnished. If 



xliv 



security does not improve, foreign investors are likely to stay 
away, delaying Pakistan's much-anticipated economic takeoff. 
On the other hand, if the situation in Pakistan's largest "urban 
laboratory" improves, the lessons learned can be applied else- 
where in the nation. 

Benazir's father, former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 
wrote in 1977, "Politics is not the conversion of a flowering soci- 
ety into a wasteland. Politics is the soul of life. It is my eternal 
romance with the people. Only the people can break this eter- 
nal bond." These words highlighted his philosophy of bringing 
politics to the street and deriving strength from the masses. 
This philosophy served his daughter well during her years as an 
opposition figure but considerably less so during her first term 
as prime minister. Whether or not Benazir can keep the alle- 
giance of the people while presiding over the maturation of 
Pakistan's democratic institutions will largely depend on her 
understanding of her nation's complex political legacy. 

July 1 0, 1 995 Peter R. Blood 



xlv 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 




Artist's rendition of tile mosaic of horsemen and soldiers from the Pictured 
Wall, Lahore Fort, Punjab. Artwork represents seventeenth-century tessellated 
tile work of the Mughal period. 



WHEN BRITISH ARCHAEOLOGIST Sir Mortimer Wheeler 
was commissioned in 1947 by the government of Pakistan to 
give a historical account of the new country, he entitled his 
work Five Thousand Years of Pakistan. Indeed, Pakistan has a his- 
tory that can be dated back to the Indus Valley civilization (ca. 
2500-1600 B.C.), the principal sites of which lay in present-day 
Sindh and Punjab provinces. Pakistan was later the entryway 
for the migrating pastoral tribes known as Indo-Aryans, or sim- 
ply Aryans, who brought with them and developed the rudi- 
ments of the broad and evolutionary religio-philosophical 
system later recognized as Hinduism. They also brought an 
early version of Sanskrit, the base of Urdu, Punjabi, and Sindhi, 
languages that are spoken in much of Pakistan today. 

Hindu rulers were eventually displaced by Muslim invaders, 
who, in the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries, entered 
northwestern India through the same passes in the mountains 
used earlier by the Aryans. The culmination of Muslim rule in 
the Mughal Empire (1526-1858, with effective rule between 
1560 and 1707) encompassed much of the area that is today 
Pakistan. Sikhism, another religious movement that arose par- 
tially on the soil of present-day Pakistan, was briefly dominant 
in the Punjab and in the northwest in the early nineteenth cen- 
tury. These regimes subsequently fell to the expanding power 
of the British, whose empire lasted from the eighteenth cen- 
tury to the mid-twentieth century, until they too left the scene, 
yielding power to the successor states of India and Pakistan. 

The departure of the British was a goal of the Muslim move- 
ment championed by the All-India Muslim League (created in 
1906 to counter the Hindu-dominated Indian National Con- 
gress) , which strove for both political independence and cul- 
tural separation from the Hindu-majority regions of British 
India. These objectives were reached in 1947, when British 
India received its independence as two new sovereign states. 
The Muslim-majority areas in northwestern and eastern India 
were separated and became Pakistan, divided into the West 
Wing and East Wing, respectively. The placement of two widely 
separated regions within a single state did not last, and in 1971 
the East Wing broke away and achieved independence as Bang- 
ladesh. 



3 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

The pride that Pakistan displayed after independence in its 
long and multicultural history has disappeared in many of its 
officially sponsored textbooks and other material used for 
teaching history (although the Indus Valley sites remain high 
on the list of the directors of tourism). As noted anthropologist 
Akbar S. Ahmed has written in History Today, "In Pakistan the 
Hindu past simply does not exist. History only begins in the 
seventh century after the advent of Islam and the Muslim inva- 
sion of Sindh." 

Early Civilizations 

From the earliest times, the Indus Valley region has been 
both a transmitter of cultures and a receptacle of different eth- 
nic, linguistic, and religious groups. Indus Valley civilization 
appeared around 2500 B.C. along the Indus River valley in 
Punjab and Sindh. This civilization, which had a writing system, 
urban centers, and a diversified social and economic system, 
was discovered in the 1920s at its two most important sites: 
Mohenjo-daro, in Sindh near Sukkur, and Harappa, in Punjab 
south of Lahore (see fig. 2). A number of other lesser sites 
stretching from the Himalayan foothills in Indian Punjab to 
Gujarat east of the Indus River and to Balochistan to the west 
have also been discovered and studied. How closely these 
places were connected to Mohenjo-daro and Harappa is not 
clearly known, but evidence indicates that there was some link 
and that the people inhabiting these places were probably 
related. 

An abundance of artifacts have been found at Harappa — in 
fact, the archaeological yield there has been so rich that the 
name of that city has often been equated with the Indus Valley 
civilization (Harappan culture) it represents. Yet the site was 
damaged in the latter part of the nineteenth century when 
engineers constructing the Lahore-Multan railroad used brick 
from the ancient city for ballast. Fortunately, the site at 
Mohenjo-daro has been less disturbed in modern times and 
shows a well-planned and well-constructed city of brick. 

Indus Valley civilization was essentially a city culture sus- 
tained by surplus agricultural produce and extensive com- 
merce, which included trade with Sumer in southern 
Mesopotamia in what is today Iraq. Copper and bronze were in 
use, but not iron. Mohenjo-daro and Harappa were cities built 
on similar plans of well-laid-out streets, elaborate drainage sys- 
tems, public baths, differentiated residential areas, flat-roofed 



4 



Historical Setting 



brick houses, and fortified administrative and religious centers 
enclosing meeting halls and granaries. Weights and measures 
were standardized. Distinctive engraved stamp seals were used, 
perhaps to identify property. Cotton was spun, woven, and dyed 
for clothing. Wheat, rice, and other food crops were cultivated, 
and a variety of animals were domesticated. Wheel-made pot- 
tery — some of it adorned with animal and geometric motifs — 
has been found in profusion at all the major Indus Valley sites. 
A centralized administration has been inferred from the cul- 
tural uniformity revealed, but it remains uncertain whether 
authority lay with a priestly or a commercial oligarchy. 

By far the most exquisite but most obscure artifacts 
unearthed to date are the small, square steatite seals engraved 
with human or animal motifs. Large numbers of the seals have 
been found at Mohenjo-daro, many bearing pictographic 
inscriptions generally thought to be a kind of script. Despite 
the efforts of philologists from all parts of the world, however, 
and despite the use of computers, the script remains undeci- 
phered, and it is unknown if it is proto-Dravidian or proto-San- 
skrit. Nevertheless, extensive research on the Indus Valley sites, 
which has led to speculations on both the archaeological and 
the linguistic contributions of the pre-Aryan population to 
Hinduism's subsequent development, has offered new insights 
into the cultural heritage of the Dravidian population still 
dominant in southern India. Artifacts with motifs relating to 
asceticism and fertility rites suggest that these concepts entered 
Hinduism from the earlier civilization. Although historians 
agree that the civilization ceased abruptly, at least in Mohenjo- 
daro and Harappa, there is disagreement on the possible 
causes for its end. Conquering hordes of Aryan invaders from 
central and western Asia have long been thought by historians 
to have been the "destroyers" of Indus Valley civilization, but 
this view is increasingly open to scientific scrutiny and reinter- 
pretation. Other, perhaps more plausible explanations include 
recurrent floods caused by tectonic earth movement, soil salin- 
ity, and desertification. 

Until the entry of the Europeans by sea in the late fifteenth 
century, and with the exception of the Arab conquests of 
Muhammad bin Qasim in the early eighth century, the route 
taken by peoples who migrated to India has been through the 
mountain passes, most notably the Khyber Pass, in northwest- 
ern Pakistan. Although unrecorded migrations may have taken 
place earlier, it is certain that migrations increased in the sec- 



5 



Pakistan: A Country Study 




Source: Based on information from Robert Eric Mortimer Wheeler, Early India and 
Pakistan: To Ashoka, New York, 1968, 95; and Joseph E. Schwartzberg, ed., A 
Historical Atlas of South Asia, New York, 1992, 9. 

Figure 2. Indus Valley Culture Sites, ca. 2500-1 600 B. C 

ond millennium B.C. The records of these people — who spoke 
an Indo-European language — are literary, not archaeological, 
and were preserved in the Vedas, collections of orally transmit- 
ted hymns. In the greatest of these, the "Rig Veda," the Aryan 
speakers appear as a tribally organized, pastoral, and pantheis- 
tic people. The later Vedas and other Sanskritic sources, such 
as the Puranas (literally, "old writings" — an encyclopedic collec- 
tion of Hindu legends, myths, and genealogy) , indicate an east- 
ward movement from the Indus Valley into the Ganges Valley 
(called Ganga in Asia) and southward at least as far as the 
Vindhya Range, in central India. A social and political system 
evolved in which the Aryans dominated, but various indige- 
nous peoples and ideas were accommodated and absorbed. 
The caste system that remained characteristic of Hinduism also 
evolved. One theory is that the three highest castes — Brah- 



6 



Historical Setting 



mins, Kshatriyas, and Vaishyas — were composed of Aryans, 
while a lower caste — the Sudras — came from the indigenous 
peoples. 

By the sixth century B.C., knowledge of Indian history 
becomes more focused because of the available Buddhist and 
Jain sources of a later period. Northern India was populated by 
a number of small princely states that rose and fell in the sixth 
century B.C. In this milieu, a phenomenon arose that affected 
the history of the region for several centuries — Buddhism. Sid- 
dhartha Gautama, the Buddha, or "Enlightened One" (ca. 
563-483 B.C.), was born in the Ganges Valley. His teachings 
were spread in all directions by monks, missionaries, and mer- 
chants. The Buddha's teachings proved enormously popular 
when considered against the more obscure and highly compli- 
cated rituals and philosophy of Vedic Hinduism. The original 
doctrines of the Buddha also constituted a protest against the 
inequities of the caste system, thereby attracting large numbers 
of followers. 

At about the same time, the semi-independent kingdom of 
Gandhara, roughly located in northern Pakistan and centered 
in the region of Peshawar, stood between the expanding king- 
doms of the Ganges Valley to the east and the Achaemenid 
Empire of Persia to the west. Gandhara probably came under 
the influence of Persia during the reign of Cyrus the Great 
(559-530 B.C.). The Persian Empire fell to Alexander the 
Great in 330 B.C., and he continued his march eastward 
through Afghanistan and into India. Alexander defeated 
Porus, the Gandharan ruler of Taxila, in 326 B.C. and marched 
on to the Ravi River before turning back. The return march 
through Sindh and Balochistan ended with Alexander's death 
at Babylon in 323 B.C. 

Greek rule did not survive in northwestern India, although a 
school of art known as Indo-Greek developed and influenced 
art as far as Central Asia. The region of Gandhara was con- 
quered by Chandragupta (r. ca. 321-ca. 297 B.C.), the founder 
of the Mauryan Empire, the first universal state of northern 
India, with its capital at present-day Patna in Bihar. His grand- 
son, Ashoka (r. ca. 274-ca. 236 B.C.), became a Buddhist. Tax- 
ila became a leading center of Buddhist learning. Successors to 
Alexander at times controlled the northwestern region of 
present-day Pakistan and even the Punjab after Mauryan power 
waned in the region. 



7 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

The northern regions of Pakistan came under the rule of 
the Sakas, who originated in Central Asia in the second century 
B.C. They were soon driven eastward by Pahlavas (Parthians 
related to the Scythians), who in turn were displaced by the 
Kushans (also known as the Yueh-Chih in Chinese chronicles) . 

The Kushans had earlier moved into territory in the north- 
ern part of present-day Afghanistan and had taken control of 
Bactria. Kanishka, the greatest of the Kushan rulers (r. ca. A.D. 
120-60), extended his empire from Patna in the east to 
Bukhara in the west and from the Pamirs in the north to cen- 
tral India, with the capital at Peshawar (then Purushapura) 
(see fig. 3). Kushan territories were eventually overrun by the 
Huns in the north and taken over by the Guptas in the east and 
the Sassanians of Persia in the west. 

The age of the imperial Guptas in northern India (fourth to 
seventh centuries A.D.) is regarded as the classical age of 
Hindu civilization. Sanskrit literature was of a high standard; 
extensive knowledge in astronomy, mathematics, and medicine 
was gained; and artistic expression flowered. Society became 
more settled and more hierarchical, and rigid social codes 
emerged that separated castes and occupations. The Guptas 
maintained loose control over the upper Indus Valley. 

Northern India suffered a sharp decline after the seventh 
century. As a result, Islam came to a disunited India through 
the same passes that Aryans, Alexander, Kushans, and others 
had entered. 

Islam in India 

The initial entry of Islam into India came in the first century 
after the death of the Prophet Muhammad (see Basic Tenets of 
Islam, ch. 2). The Umayyad caliph in Damascus sent an expedi- 
tion to Balochistan and Sindh in 711 led by Muhammad bin 
Qasim (for whom Karachi's second port is named). The expe- 
dition went as far north as Multan but was not able to retain 
that region and was not successful in expanding Islamic rule to 
other parts of India. Coastal trade and the presence of a Mus- 
lim colony in Sindh, however, permitted significant cultural 
exchanges and the introduction into the subcontinent of 
saintly teachers (Sufi — see Glossary). Muslim influence grew 
with conversions. 

Almost three centuries later, the Turks and the Afghans 
spearheaded the Islamic conquest in India through the tradi- 
tional invasion routes of the northwest. Mahmud of Ghazni 



8 



Dhyani Buddha, second- 
century Buddha statue from 
the historic site of Taxila 
Courtesy Prints and 
Photographs Division, 
Library of Congress 



(979-1030) led a series of raids against Rajput kingdoms and 
rich Hindu temples and established a base in the Punjab for 
future incursions. Mahmud's tactics originated the legend of 
idol-smashing Muslims bent on plunder and forced conver- 
sions, a reputation that persists in India to the present day. 

During the last quarter of the twelfth century, Muhammad 
of Ghor invaded the Indo-Gangetic Plain, conquering in suc- 
cession Ghazni, Multan, Sindh, Lahore, and Delhi. His succes- 
sors established the first dynasty of the Delhi Sultanate, the 
Mamluk Dynasty (mamluk means "slave") in 1211 (however, the 
Delhi Sultanate is traditionally held to have been founded in 
1206). The territory under control of the Muslim rulers in 
Delhi expanded rapidly. By mid-century, Bengal and much of 
central India were under the Delhi Sultanate. Several Turko- 
Afghan dynasties ruled from Delhi: the Mamluk (1211-90), the 
Khalji (1290-1320), the Tughlaq (1320-1413), the Sayyid 
(1414-51), and the Lodhi (1451-1526). As Muslims extended 
their rule into southern India, only the Hindu kingdom of 
Vijayanagar remained immune, until it too fell in 1565. There 
were also kingdoms independent of Delhi in the Deccan, 
Gujarat, Malwa (central India), and Bengal. Nevertheless, 
almost all of the area in present-day Pakistan remained gener- 
ally under the rule of Delhi. 



9 



Pakistan: A Country Study 







Probable boundary of 




©mpir© or kinQdom 


• 


Populated place 


Maru 


Geopolitical region 


100 200 


400 Kilometers 


I ' — H— 

100 


200 400 Miles 



> 



'Bay 

of 
Bengal 



Source: Based on information from William C. Brice, ed., An Historical Atlas of Islam, 
Leiden, 1981, 47-53; and C. Collin Davies, An Historical Atlas of the Indian 
Peninsula, London, 1959, 15. 

Figure 3. Kushan Empire, ca. A.D. 150 



The sultans of Delhi enjoyed cordial, if superficial, relations 
with Muslim rulers in the Near East but owed them no alle- 
giance. The sultans based their laws on the Quran and the 
sharia (see Glossary) and permitted non-Muslim subjects to 



10 



Historical Setting 



practice their religion only if they paid jizya (see Glossary), or 
head tax. The sultans ruled from urban centers — while military 
camps and trading posts provided the nuclei for towns that 
sprang up in the countryside. Perhaps the greatest contribu- 
tion of the sultanate was its temporary success in insulating the 
subcontinent from the potential devastation of the Mongol 
invasion from Central Asia in the thirteenth century. The sul- 
tanate ushered in a period of Indian cultural renaissance 
resulting from the stimulation of Islam by Hinduism. The 
resulting "Indo-Muslim" fusion left lasting monuments in archi- 
tecture, music, literature, and religion. The sultanate suffered 
from the sacking of Delhi in 1398 by Timur (Tamerlane) but 
revived briefly under the Lodhis before it was conquered by the 
Mughals. 

The Mughal Period 

India in the sixteenth century presented a fragmented pic- 
ture of rulers, both Muslim and Hindu, who lacked concern 
for their subjects and who failed to create a common body of 
laws or institutions. Outside developments also played a role in 
shaping events. The circumnavigation of Africa by the Portu- 
guese explorer Vasco da Gama in 1498 allowed Europeans to 
challenge Arab control of the trading routes between Europe 
and Asia. In Central Asia and Afghanistan, shifts in power 
pushed Babur of Ferghana (in present-day Uzbekistan) south- 
ward, first to Kabul and then to India. The dynasty he founded 
endured for more than three centuries. 

Claiming descent from both Chinggis Khan (Genghis Khan) 
and Timur, Babur combined strength and courage with a love 
of beauty, and military ability with cultivation. Babur concen- 
trated on gaining control of northwestern India. He did so in 
1526 by defeating the last Lodhi sultan on the field of Panipat, 
a town just northwest of Delhi. Babur then turned to the tasks 
of persuading his Central Asian followers to stay on in India 
and of overcoming other contenders for power, mainly the 
Rajputs and the Afghans. He succeeded in both tasks but died 
shortly thereafter in 1530. The Mughal Empire was one of the 
largest centralized states in premodern history and was the pre- 
cursor to the British Indian Empire (see fig. 4). 

The perennial question of who was the greatest of the six 
"Great Mughals" receives varying answers in present-day Paki- 
stan and India. Some favor Babur the pioneer and others his 
great-grandson, Shahjahan (r. 1628-58), builder of the Taj 



11 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



Approximate limit of 

Mughal Empire 




Source: Based on information from Joseph E. Schwartzberg, ed., A Historical Atlas of 
South Asia, New York, 1992, 46. 

Figure 4. Mughal Empire, Late Seventeenth Century 

Mahal and other magnificent buildings. The other two tower- 
ing figures of the era by general consensus were Akbar (r. 
1556-1605) and Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707). Both rulers 
expanded the empire greatly and were able administrators. 
Akbar was known for his religious tolerance and administrative 



12 



Historical Setting 



genius, while Aurangzeb was a pious Muslim and fierce protec- 
tor of orthodox Islam in an alien and heterodox environment. 

Akbar succeeded his father, Humayun (r. 1530-40 and 1555- 
56), whose rule was interrupted by the Afghan Sur Dynasty, 
which rebelled against him. It was only just before his death 
that Humayun was able to regain the empire and leave it to his 
son. In restoring and expanding Mughal rule, Akbar based his 
authority on the ability and loyalty of his followers, irrespective 
of their religion. In 1564 the jizya on non-Muslims was abol- 
ished, and bans on temple building and Hindu pilgrimages 
were lifted. 

Akbar's methods of administration reinforced his power 
against two possible sources of challenge — the Afghan-Turkish 
aristocracy and the traditional interpreters of Islamic law, the 
ulama (see Glossary). He created a ranked imperial service 
based on ability rather than birth, whose members were 
obliged to serve wherever required. They were remunerated 
with cash rather than land and were kept away from their 
inherited estates, thus centralizing the imperial power base and 
ensuring its supremacy. The military and political functions of 
the imperial service were separate from those of revenue col- 
lection, which was supervised by the imperial treasury. This sys- 
tem of administration, known as the mansabdari, was based on 
loyal service and cash payments and was the backbone of the 
Mughal Empire; its effectiveness depended on personal loyalty 
to the emperor and his ability and willingness to choose, remu- 
nerate, and supervise. 

Akbar declared himself the final arbiter in all disputes of law 
derived from the Quran and the sharia. He backed his religious 
authority primarily with his authority in the state. In 1580 he 
also initiated a syncretic court religion called the Din-i-Ilahi 
(Divine Faith). In theory, the new faith was compatible with 
any other, provided that the devotee was loyal to the emperor. 
In practice, however, its ritual and content profoundly 
offended orthodox Muslims. The ulama found their influence 
undermined. The concept of Islam as a superior religion with a 
historic mission in the world appeared to be compromised. 
The syncretism of the court and its tolerance of both Hindus 
and unorthodox Shia (see Glossary) sects among Muslims trig- 
gered a reaction among Sunni (see Glossary) Muslims. In the 
fratricidal war of succession that closed the reign of Akbar's 
grandson Shah Jahan in 1658, the aristocracy supported the 
austere military commander Aurangzeb against his learned 



13 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

and eclectic brother Dara Shikoh, whom Aurangzeb defeated 
in battle and later had decapitated in 1662. 

Aurangzeb's reign ushered in the decline of the Mughal 
Empire. Aurangzeb, who in the latter half of his long rule 
assumed the title "Alamgir," or "world-seizer," was known for 
aggressively expanding the empire's frontiers and for his mili- 
tant enforcement of orthodox Sunni Islam. During his reign, 
the Mughal Empire reached its greatest geographical extent, 
yet his policies also led to its dissolution. Although he was an 
outstanding general and a rigorous administrator, his reign was 
characterized by a decline in fiscal and military standards as 
security and luxury increased. Land rather than cash became 
the usual means of remunerating high-ranking officials, and 
divisive tendencies in his large empire further undermined 
central authority. 

In 1679 Aurangzeb reimposed the hated jizya on Hindus. 
Coming after a series of other taxes and also discriminatory 
measures favoring Sunni Muslims, this action by the "prayer- 
monger," as he was called, incited rebellion among Hindus and 
others in many parts of the empire — Jat, Sikh, and Rajput 
forces in the north and Maratha forces in the Deccan. The 
emperor managed to crush the rebellions in the north, but at a 
high cost to agricultural productivity and to the legitimacy of 
Mughal rule. Aurangzeb was compelled to move his headquar- 
ters to Daulatabad in the Deccan to mount a costly campaign 
against Maratha guerrilla fighters, which lasted twenty-six years 
until he died in 1707 at the age of ninety. Aurangzeb, 
oppressed by a sense of failure, isolation, and impending 
doom, lamented that in life he "came alone" and would "go as 
a stranger." 

In the century and one-half that followed, effective control 
by Aurangzeb's successors weakened. Succession to imperial 
and even provincial power, which had often become heredi- 
tary, was subject to intrigue and force. The mansabdari system 
gave way to the zamindari system, in which high-ranking offi- 
cials took on the appearance of hereditary landed aristocracy 
with powers of collecting rents. As Delhi's control waned, other 
contenders for power emerged and clashed, thus preparing the 
way for the eventual British takeover. 

Vasco da Gama led the first documented European expedi- 
tion to India, sailing into Calicut on the southwest coast in 
1498. In 1510 the Portuguese captured Goa, which became the 
seat of their activity. Under Admiral Alfonso de Albuquerque, 



14 



Mughal painting of 
Aurangzeb, the last of the 
Great Mughals 
Courtesy Prints and 
Photographs Division, 
Library of Congress 




Portugal successfully challenged Arab power in the Indian 
Ocean and dominated the sea routes for a century. Jesuits 
came to "convert, to converse, and to record" observations of 
India. The Protestant countries of the Netherlands and 
England, upset by the Portuguese monopoly, formed private 
trading companies at the turn of the seventeenth century to 
challenge the Portuguese. 

Mughal officials permitted the new carriers of India's consid- 
erable export trade to establish trading posts (factories) in 
India. The Dutch East India Company concentrated mainly on 
the spice trade from present-day Indonesia. Britain's East India 
Company carried on trade with India. The French East India 
Company also set up factories. 

During the wars of the eighteenth century, the factories 
served not only as collection and transshipment points for 
trade but also increasingly as fortified centers of refuge for 
both foreigners and Indians. British factories gradually began 
to apply British law to disputes arising within their jurisdiction. 
The posts also began to grow in area and population. Armed 
company servants were effective protectors of trade. As rival 
contenders for power called for armed assistance and as indi- 
vidual European adventurers found permanent homes in 
India, British and French companies found themselves more 



15 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

and more involved in local politics in the south and in Bengal. 
Plots and counterplots climaxed when British East India Com- 
pany forces, led by Robert Clive, decisively defeated the larger 
but divided forces of Nawab Siraj-ud-Dawlah at Plassey (Pilasi) 
in Bengal in 1757. 

Company Rule 

It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that 
almost all of the territory that constitutes Pakistan and India 
came under the rule of the British East India Company. The 
patterns of territorial acquisition and rule as applied by the 
company in Sindh and Punjab and the manner of governance 
became the basis for direct British rule in the British Indian 
Empire and indirect rule in the princely states under the para- 
mountcy of the crown. 

Although the British had earlier ruled in the factory areas, 
the beginning of British rule is often dated from the Battle of 
Plassey. Give's victory was consolidated in 1764 at the Battle of 
Buxar (in Bihar), where the emperor, Shah Alam II, was 
defeated. As a result, Shah Alam was coerced to appoint the 
company to be the diwan (collector of revenue) for the areas of 
Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa (this pretense of Mughal control was 
abandoned in 1827). The company thus became the supreme, 
but not the titular, power in much of the Ganges Valley, and 
company agents continued to trade on terms highly favorable 
to them. 

The area controlled by the company expanded during the 
first three decades of the nineteenth century by two methods. 
The first was the use of subsidiary agreements (sanad) between 
the British and the local rulers, under which control of foreign 
affairs, defense, and communications was transferred from the 
ruler to the company and the rulers were allowed to rule as 
they wished (up to a limit) on other matters. This development 
created what came to be called the Native States, or Princely 
India, that is, the world of the maharaja and his Muslim coun- 
terpart, the nawab. The second method was outright military 
conquest or direct annexation of territories; it was these areas 
that were properly called British India. Most of northern India 
was annexed by the British. 

At the start of the nineteenth century, most of present-day 
Pakistan was under independent rulers. Sindh was ruled by the 
Muslim Talpur mirs (chiefs) in three small states that were 
annexed by the British in 1843. In the Punjab, the decline of 



16 



Historical Setting 



the Mughal Empire allowed the rise of the Sikhs, first as a mili- 
tary force and later as a political administration in Lahore. The 
kingdom of Lahore was at its most powerful and expansive dur- 
ing the rule of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, when Sikh control was 
extended beyond Peshawar, and Kashmir was added to his 
dominions in 1819. After Ranjit Singh died in 1839, political 
conditions in the Punjab deteriorated, and the British fought 
two wars with the Sikhs. The second of these wars, in 1849, saw 
the annexation of the Punjab, including the present-day North- 
West Frontier Province, to the company's territories. Kashmir 
was transferred by sale in the Treaty of Amritsar in 1850 to the 
Dogra Dynasty, which ruled the area under British para- 
mountcy until 1947. 

As the British increased their territory in India, so did Russia 
expand in Central Asia. The East India Company signed trea- 
ties with a number of Afghan rulers and with Ranjit Singh. Rus- 
sia backed Persian ambitions in western Afghanistan. In 1838 
the company's actions brought about the First Anglo-Afghan 
War (1838-42). Assisted by Sikh allies, the company took Kan- 
dahar and Kabul and made its own candidate amir. The amir 
proved unpopular with the Afghans, however, and the British 
garrison's position became untenable. The retreat of the Brit- 
ish from Kabul in January 1842 was one of the worst disasters in 
British military history, as a column of more than 16,000 
(about one-third soldiers, the rest camp followers) was annihi- 
lated by Afghan tribesmen as they struggled through the snow- 
bound passes on their way back to India. The British later sent 
a punitive expedition to Kabul, which it burned in retribution, 
but made no attempt to reoccupy Afghanistan. 

In the Punjab, annexed in 1849, a group of extraordinarily 
able British officers, serving first the company and then the 
British crown, governed the area. They avoided the administra- 
tive mistakes made earlier in Bengal. A number of reforms 
were introduced, although local customs were generally 
respected. Irrigation projects later in the century helped the 
Punjab become the granary of northern India (see Irrigation, 
ch. 3). The respect gained by the new administration could be 
gauged by the fact that within ten years Punjabi troops were 
fighting for the British elsewhere in India to subdue the upris- 
ing of 1857-58 (see the British Raj, this ch.). The Punjab was to 
become the major recruiting area for the British Indian Army, 
recruiting both Sikhs and Muslims. 



17 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



The British Raj 

The uprising of 1857-58 became the great divide in nine- 
teenth-century South Asian history. Understated by British his- 
torians as the Indian Mutiny or Sepoy Rebellion and referred 
to with some exaggeration by later Indian nationalists as the 
First War of Independence, the uprising nevertheless heralded 
the formal end of the Mughal Empire and marked the end of 
company rule in India as well. In general, the uprising was a 
reaction to British expansionism and the outcome of the poli- 
cies of modernization and annexation of Governor General 
Lord Dalhousie (1848-56), especially in Oudh (Avadh, now 
part of the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh) in 1856. The immedi- 
ate spark for mutiny by the sepoys (Indian soldiers employed 
by the East India Company) was the introduction of the new 
Enfield rifle, which had cartridges, allegedly greased with cow 
or pig fat, the tips of which had to be bitten off before loading. 
Both Muslim and Hindu soldiers were outraged at this offense 
to their religious scruples and refused to comply. British offic- 
ers responded by summarily dismissing regiment after regi- 
ment from the Bengal Army for refusing to load their weapons. 
The mutiny was ignited at the cantonment at Meerut, north of 
Delhi, when all three of the sepoy regiments rose in revolt 
against the British, killing some British officers before heading 
for Delhi to restore Bahadur Shah II to imperial glory. 
Although the area of fighting was limited to northern and cen- 
tral India and participation was limited to sepoys of the Bengal 
army and some princely states, the uprisings lasted a year and 
were a severe blow to British confidence. In putting down the 
rebellion, British troops were aided substantially by their 
recently recruited troops from the Punjab. 

The uprising of 1857-58 heralded the formal end of the 
Mughal Empire and marked as well the end of company rule in 
India. The British Parliament passed the Government of India 
Act of 1858, which transferred authority to the British crown, 
represented in India by the governor general, who thereafter 
also had the title of viceroy. Queen Victoria was proclaimed 
empress of India in 1877. 

The Victorian model of administration in British India 
became the standard reference point for law, order, and pro- 
bity in Pakistan. At the apex of the administration stood the 
governor general, almost always a British peer. The governor 
general held supreme legislative and executive powers and was 
responsible directly to the secretary of state for India, a mem- 



18 



Historical Setting 



ber of the British cabinet. British India was divided into prov- 
inces (suba) for administrative purposes, each headed, 
depending on size and importance, by a governor or lieuten- 
ant governor. Provinces were divided into divisions, and these 
in turn were divided into districts (zilla), the basic administra- 
tive units, encompassing substantial territory and population. 
In many cases, the provinces and districts followed the lines of 
those created by the Mughals. 

The district officer was the linchpin of the system. The offi- 
cer was revenue collector as well as dispenser of justice and was 
called district collector, district magistrate, and, in some areas, 
deputy commissioner (the DC) with equal validity. District 
officers were usually drawn from the prestigious meritocracy, 
the Indian Civil Service. Recruitment to the Indian Civil Ser- 
vice was competitive, based on examination of young men with 
a British classical education. Exclusively British at its beginning, 
the Indian Civil Service was forced to open its doors slightly to 
successful Indian candidates. After 1871 district boards and 
municipal committees were established to assist the district 
officers in their administrative functions. Thus elective politics, 
in however limited a form, was introduced to the subcontinent. 
The governor general was also known as the viceroy and crown 
representative when dealing with Indian princes. Relations 
between the British crown and Indian princes were set out in 
an elusive doctrine of "paramountcy." The princes promised 
loyalty and surrendered all rights to conduct foreign or 
defense policy; the crown promised noninterference in inter- 
nal affairs (except in cases of gross maladministration or injus- 
tice) and protection from external and internal enemies. 

The British Raj was socially and politically conservative, but 
it brought profound economic change to the subcontinent. 
For strategic, administrative, and commercial reasons, the Brit- 
ish improved transportation and communications and kept 
them in good repair. Coal mines were opened in Bihar and 
Bengal, and irrigation canals were laid out in the Yamuna (also 
seen as Jumna), Ganges, and Indus valleys; the Indus Valley 
became the largest irrigated area in the world. The expansion 
of irrigation in the Punjab led to the development of canal col- 
onies, settled mainly by Sikhs and Muslims, and the designa- 
tion of the Punjab as the granary of India. Law and order 
guaranteed a high rate of return on British, and later Indian, 
investment in these enterprises. 



19 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



Racial criteria were also used in a dramatic overhaul of the 
British Indian Army. The number of British soldiers was 
increased relative to the Indians, and Indians were excluded 
from artillery and technical services. A theory of "martial 
races" was used to accelerate recruitment from among "loyal" 
Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims, Dogras, Gurkas, and Pakhtuns 
(Pathans — see Glossary) and to discourage enlistment of "dis- 
loyal" Bengalis and high-caste Hindus. 

The Forward Policy 

British policy toward the tribal peoples on the northwest 
frontier vacillated between caution and adventurism during 
the latter half of the nineteenth century. Some viceroys 
opposed extending direct administration or defense beyond 
the Indus River. Others favored a more assertive posture, or 
"forward policy." The latter's view prevailed, partly because 
Russian advances in Central Asia gave their arguments cre- 
dence. In 1874 Sir Robert Sandeman was sent to improve Brit- 
ish relations with the Baloch tribes and the khan of Kalat. In 
1876 Sandeman concluded a treaty with the khan that brought 
his territories — including Kharan, Makran, and Las Bela — 
under British suzerainty. The Second Anglo-Afghan War was 
fought in 1878-80, sparked by the Afghan amir's refusal to 
accept a British diplomatic mission to Kabal. When British 
forces subsequently occupied much of Afghanistan, a treaty 
(Treaty of Gandamak) was concluded in May 1879, which 
forced Afghanistan to accept Britain's control of its foreign 
affairs and to cede to the British various frontier areas, includ- 
ing the districts of Pishin, Sibi, Harnai, and Thai Chotiali. Dur- 
ing succeeding years, other tribal areas were forcibly occupied 
by the British. In 1883 the British leased the Bolan Pass, south- 
east of Quetta, from the khan of Kalat on a permanent basis, 
and in 1887 some areas of Balochistan were declared British 
territory. 

A similar forward policy was pursued farther north. A British 
political agent was stationed in Gilgit in 1876 to report on Rus- 
sian activities as well as on developments in the nearby states of 
Hunza and Nagar. In 1889 the Gilgit Agency was made perma- 
nent. A British expedition was sent against Hunza and Nagar, 
which submitted to British control. A new mirirom the ruling 
family of Hunza was appointed by the British. British garrisons 
were established in Hunza and Chitral in 1892. A formal pro- 
tectorate was declared over Chitral and Gilgit in 1893. 



20 



Historical Setting 



Also in 1893, Sir Mortimer Durand negotiated an agreement 
with Amir Abdur Rahman Khan of Afghanistan to fix an only 
partially surveyed line (the Durand Line) running from Chitral 
to Balochistan to designate the areas of influence for the 
Afghans and the British. Each party pledged not to interfere in 
the other's lands. This agreement brought under British domi- 
nation territory and peoples that had not yet been conquered 
and would become the source of much difficulty between Paki- 
stan and Afghanistan in the future (see Boundaries, ch. 2; For- 
eign Policy, ch. 4) . 

The establishment of British hegemony in the northwest 
frontier regions did not lead to direct administration similar to 
that in other parts of India. Local customary law continued, as 
did the traditional lines of authority and social customs upheld 
by the maliks (tribal chiefs). To a large extent, the frontier was 
little more than a vast buffer zone with Afghanistan between 
the British and Russian empires in Asia and a training ground 
for the British Indian Army. 

The Seeds of Muslim Nationalism 

The uprising of 1857-58 was the last fitful assertion of an all 
but moribund Mughal Empire. Mutinous sepoys had marched 
from Meerut, the site of the first outbreak, to Delhi proclaim- 
ing their intention to restore the poet-emperor Bahadur Shah 
II to power. British forces with Punjabi sepoys recaptured Delhi 
and banished the emperor to Burma, where he died in penury 
in 1862. British distrust of Muslim aristocracy resulted from the 
rebellious sepoys' attempt to restore the power of the emperor. 
Muslim leaders were alleged to have had a major role in plan- 
ning and leading the revolt, although the revolt itself was a 
series of badly planned and uncoordinated uprisings and the 
principal leaders, Nana Sahib and Tantia Topi, were Hindus. In 
the eyes of British rulers, Muslim leaders had been discredited. 

As a consequence, the landed Muslim upper classes in the 
north Indian heartland retreated into cultural and political iso- 
lation, while fellow Muslims in the Punjab were rewarded for 
assisting the British. The former failed to reemerge economi- 
cally and produced no large group comparable to the upwardly 
mobile British-educated Hindu middle class. They did not 
revise the doctrines of Islam to meet the challenges posed by 
alien rule, Christian missionaries, and revivalist Hindu sects, 
such as the Arya Samaj, attempting reconversion to Hinduism. 
The former Muslim rulers of India were in danger of becoming 



21 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

a permanent noncompetitive class in the British Raj at the very 
time the forces of Indian nationalism were gathering strength. 

One response to British rule came to be known as the 
Deoband Movement, which was led by the ulama, who were 
expanding traditional Islamic education. The ulama also 
sought to reform the teaching of Islamic law and to promote its 
application in contemporary Muslim society. They promoted 
publications in Urdu, established fund-raising drives, and 
undertook other modern organizational work on an all-India 
basis. While most Deobandis eventually were to support the 
Indian National Congress and a united India, a group that 
favored the creation of Pakistan later emerged as the core of 
the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam party (see Political Dynamics, ch. 
4). 

Another response was led by Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-98, 
known as Sir Syed) and was called the Aligarh Movement after 
the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College (now Aligarh Mus- 
lim University), which he founded in 1875 at Aligarh in north- 
central India (see Education, ch. 2) . Sir Syed considered access 
to British education as the best means of social mobility for the 
sons of the Muslim gentry under colonial rule. 

Meanwhile, the beginnings of the Indian nationalist move- 
ment were to be discerned in the increasing tendency to form 
all-India associations representing various interests. English- 
speaking Indians, predominantly middle-class but from differ- 
ent parts of the country, were discovering the efficacy of associ- 
ations and public meetings in propagating their views to a 
wider audience and in winning the attention of the British gov- 
ernment. In 1885 the Indian National Congress (also referred 
to as Congress) was founded to formulate proposals and 
demands to present to the British. 

A national, all-India forum, Congress was an umbrella orga- 
nization. Many of its members envisioned a long British period 
of tutelage and advocated strictly constitutionalist and gradual- 
ist reforms, but after World War I, Congress argued for a 
speedy end to alien rule. The idea of the territorial integrity of 
India and opposition to any sectarian division of India, how- 
ever, always remained sacrosanct to Congress. 

Although Sir Syed often voiced demands similar to those 
made by the founders of Congress — local self-government, 
Indian representation on the viceroy's and the governors' 
councils, and equal duties for Indian members of the Indian 
Civil Service and the judicial service — he remained aloof when 



22 



Historical Setting 



Congress was founded and advised his followers not to join it, 
because he thought the organization would be dominated by 
Hindus and would inevitably become antigovernment. It has 
been argued that Sir Syed's fear of Hindu domination sowed 
the seeds for the "Two Nations Theory" later espoused by the 
All-India Muslim League (also referred to as the Muslim 
League), founded in 1906, and led to its demand for a separate 
state for the Muslims of India — reinforcing his view that the 
British were the only guarantors of the rights of the Muslims. 
Sir Syed argued that education and not politics was the key to 
Muslim advancement. Graduates of Aligarh generally made 
their careers initially in administration, not politics, and thus 
were not greatly affected by the introduction of representative 
institutions at the provincial level by the India Councils Act of 
1892. 

Events in Bengal proved that agitation was as useful as poli- 
tics. Lord Curzon (George Nathaniel Curzon), the viceroy, par- 
titioned the large province of Bengal (which then included 
Bihar and Orissa) in 1905. Although the province was 
unwieldy, Curzon 's plan divided the Bengali speakers by creat- 
ing the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam and reduc- 
ing the original province to western Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. 
The eastern province had a Muslim majority. 

A massive antipartition campaign was launched against the 
British by Hindus in Bengal, using constitutional methods as 
well as terrorism spearheaded by revolutionaries. The partition 
of Bengal was annulled in 1911. The province of Eastern Ben- 
gal and Assam was dissolved, Bengal proper was reunited, 
Assam was separated, and a new province of Bihar and Orissa 
was created. Although the reunited Bengal province had a 
small Muslim majority, ambitious Muslims in the province were 
disgruntled and looked to the Muslim League for better pros- 
pects. 

The All-India Muslim League had been founded in Dhaka to 
promote loyalty to the British and "to protect and advance the 
political rights of the Muslims of India and respectfully repre- 
sent their needs and aspirations to the Government." It was 
also stated that there was no intention to affect the rights of 
other religious groups. Earlier that same year, a group of Mus- 
lims — the Simla Delegation — led by Aga Khan III, met the vice- 
roy and put forward the concept of "separate electorates." If 
the proposal were accepted, Muslim members of elected bod- 
ies would be chosen from electorates composed of Muslims 



23 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



only, and the number of seats in the elected bodies allotted to 
Muslims would be at least proportional to the Muslim share of 
the population, but preferably "weighted" to give Muslims a 
share in seats somewhat higher than their proportion of the 
population. The principles of communal representation, sepa- 
rate electorates, and weightage were included in the Govern- 
ment of India Act of 1909 and were expanded to include such 
other groups as Sikhs and Christians in later constitutional 
enactments. 

Beginnings of Self-Government 

The Government of India Act of 1909 — also known as the 
Morley-Minto Reforms (John Morley was the secretary of state 
for India, and Gilbert Elliot, fourth earl of Minto, was vice- 
roy) — gave Indians limited roles in the central and provincial 
legislatures, known as legislative councils. Indians had previ- 
ously been appointed to legislative councils, but after the 
reforms some were elected to them. At the center, the majority 
of council members continued to be government-appointed 
officials, and the viceroy was in no way responsible to the legis- 
lature. At the provincial level, the elected members, together 
with unofficial appointees, outnumbered the appointed offi- 
cials, but responsibility of the governor to the legislature was 
not contemplated. Morley made it clear in introducing the leg- 
islation to the British Parliament that parliamentary self-gov- 
ernment was not the goal of the British government. 

The granting of separate electorates and communal repre- 
sentation was welcomed by Muslims but opposed by Congress. 
The Muslim League was pleased by the apparent British inten- 
tion to support and safeguard Muslim interests in the subconti- 
nent. Separate electorates remained a part of the Muslim 
League platform even after the independence of Pakistan. 
Congress opposition was understandable. As the majority com- 
munity in most provinces, Hindus stood to lose from weighted 
minority representation. Congress also presented itself as a 
national secular party and could not support identification of 
voters with a particular community. 

The Morley-Minto Reforms were a milestone. Step by step, 
the elective principle was introduced for membership in 
Indian legislative councils. The "electorate" was limited, how- 
ever, to a small group of upper-class Indians. These elected 
members increasingly became an "opposition" to the "official 
government." Communal electorates were later extended to 



24 



Historical Setting 



other communities and made a political factor of the Indian 
tendency toward group identification through religion. The 
practice created certain vital questions for all concerned. The 
intentions of the British were questioned. How humanitarian 
was their concern for the minorities? Were separate electorates 
a manifestation of "divide and rule?" 

For Muslims it was important both to gain a place in all-India 
politics and to retain their Muslim identity, objectives that 
required varying responses according to circumstances, as the 
example of Mohammad Ali Jinnah illustrates. Jinnah, who was 
born in 1876, studied law in England and began his career as 
an enthusiastic liberal in Congress on returning to India. In 
1913 he joined the Muslim League, which had been shocked 
by the 1911 annulment of the partition of Bengal into cooper- 
ating with Congress to make demands on the British. Jinnah 
continued his membership in Congress until 1919. During this 
dual membership period, he was described by a leading Con- 
gress spokesperson as the "ambassador of Hindu-Muslim 
unity." 

India's important contributions to the efforts of the British 
Empire in World War I stimulated further demands by Indians 
and further response from the British. Congress and the Mus- 
lim League met in joint session in December 1916. Under the 
leadership of Jinnah and Pandit Motilal Nehru (father of Jawal- 
harlal Nehru) , unity was preached, and a proposal for constitu- 
tional reform was made that included the concept of separate 
electorates. The resulting Congress-Muslim League Pact (often 
referred to as the Lucknow Pact) was a sincere effort to com- 
promise. Congress accepted the separate electorates 
demanded by the Muslim League, and the Muslim League 
joined with Congress in demanding self-government. The pact 
was expected to lead to permanent and constitutional united 
action. 

In August 1917, the British government formally announced 
a policy of "increasing association of Indians in every branch of 
the administration and the gradual development of 
self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realiza- 
tion of responsible government in India as an integral part of 
the British Empire." Constitutional reforms were embodied in 
the Government of India Act of 1919 — also known as the 
Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms (Edwin Samuel Montagu was 
Britain's secretary of state for India; the Marquess of Chelms- 
ford was viceroy) . These reforms represented the maximum 



25 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

concessions the British were prepared to make at that time. 
The franchise was extended, and increased authority was given 
to central and provincial legislative councils, but the viceroy 
remained responsible only to London. 

The changes at the provincial level were significant, as the 
provincial legislative councils contained a considerable major- 
ity of elected members. In a system called "dyarchy," the nation- 
building departments of government — agriculture, education, 
public works, and the like — were placed under ministers who 
were individually responsible to the legislature. The depart- 
ments that made up the "steel frame" of British rule — finance, 
revenue, and home affairs — were retained by executive coun- 
cillors, who were often, but not always, British and who were 
responsible to the governor. 

The 1919 reforms did not satisfy political demands in India. 
The British repressed opposition, and restrictions on the press 
and on movement were reenacted. An apparently unwitting 
example of violation of rules against the gathering of people 
led to the massacre at Jalianwala Bagh in Amritsar in April 
1919. This tragedy galvanized such political leaders as Jawahar- 
lal Nehru (1889-1964) and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi 
(1869-1948) and the masses who followed them to press for 
further action. 

The Allies' post- World War I peace settlement with Turkey 
provided an additional stimulus to the grievances of the Mus- 
lims, who feared that one goal of the Allies was to end the 
caliphate of the Ottoman sultan. After the end of the Mughal 
Empire, the Ottoman caliph had become the symbol of Islamic 
authority and unity to Indian Sunni Muslims. A pan-Islamic 
movement, known as the Khilafat Movement, spread in India. 
It was a mass repudiation of Muslim loyalty to British rule and 
thus legitimated Muslim participation in the Indian nationalist 
movement. The leaders of the Khilafat Movement used Islamic 
symbols to unite the diverse but assertive Muslim community 
on an all-India basis and bargain with both Congress leaders 
and the British for recognition of minority rights and political 
concessions. 

Muslim leaders from the Deoband and Aligarh movements 
joined Gandhi in mobilizing the masses for the 1920 and 1921 
demonstrations of civil disobedience and noncooperation in 
response to the massacre at Amritsar. At the same time, Gandhi 
endorsed the Khilafat Movement, thereby placing many Hin- 
dus behind what had been solely a Muslim demand. 



26 



Historical Setting 



Despite impressive achievements, however, the Khilafat 
Movement failed. Turkey rejected the caliphate and became a 
secular state. Furthermore, the religious, mass-based aspects of 
the movement alienated such Western-oriented constitutional 
politicians as Jinnah, who resigned from Congress. Other Mus- 
lims also were uncomfortable with Gandhi's leadership. British 
historian Sir Percival Spear wrote that "a mass appeal in his 
[Gandhi's] hands could not be other than a Hindu one. He 
could transcend caste but not community. The [Hindu] 
devices he used went sour in the mouths of Muslims." In the 
final analysis, the movement failed to lay a lasting foundation 
of Indian unity and served only to aggravate Hindu-Muslim dif- 
ferences among masses that were being politicized. Indeed, as 
India moved closer to the self-government implied in the Mon- 
tagu-Chelmsford Reforms, rivalry over what might be called 
the spoils of independence sharpened the differences between 
the communities. 

The political picture in India was not at all clear when the 
mandated decennial review of the Government of India Act of 
1919 became due in 1929. Prospects of further constitutional 
reforms spurred greater agitation and a frenzy of demands 
from different groups. The commission in charge of the review 
was headed by Sir John Simon, who recommended further con- 
stitutional change, but it was not until 1935 that a new Govern- 
ment of India Act was passed. Three consecutive roundtable 
conferences were held in London in 1930, 1931, and 1932, at 
which a wide variety of interests from India were represented. 
The major disagreement concerned the continuation of sepa- 
rate electorates, which Gandhi and Congress strongly opposed. 
As a result, the decision was forced on the British government. 
Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald issued his "communal 
award," which continued the system of separate electorates at 
both the central and the provincial level. 

The principal result of the act was "provincial autonomy." 
The dyarchical system was discontinued, and all subjects were 
placed under ministers who were individually and collectively 
responsible to the former legislative councils, which were 
renamed legislative assemblies. (In a few provinces, including 
Bengal, a bicameral system was established; the upper house 
continued to be called a legislative council.) Almost all assem- 
bly members were elected, with the exception of some special 
and otherwise unrepresented groups. After the elections, pro- 
vincial chief ministers and cabinets took office, although the 



27 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

governors had limited "emergency powers." Sindh was sepa- 
rated from Bombay and became a province. The 1919 reforms 
had earlier been introduced in the North-West Frontier Prov- 
ince. Balochistan, however, retained special status; it had no 
legislature and was governed by an "agent general to the gover- 
nor general." At the center, the act essentially provided for the 
establishment of dyarchy, but it also provided for a federal sys- 
tem that included the princes. The princes refused to join a sys- 
tem that might force them to accept decisions made by elected 
politicians. Thus, the full provisions of the 1935 act did not 
come into force at the center. 

The Two Nations Theory 

Events in the late 1920s and 1930s led Muslims to begin to 
think that their destiny might be in a separate state, a concept 
that developed into the demand for partition. Motilal Nehru 
convened an "all-party" conference in 1929 to suggest changes 
that would lead to independence when the British took up the 
report of the Simon Commission. The majority of the delegates 
demanded the end of the system of separate electorates. Jin- 
nah, in turn, put forward fifteen points that would satisfy Mus- 
lim interests — in particular, the retention of separate 
electorates or the creation of "safeguards" to prevent a 
Hindu-controlled legislature. Jinnah's proposals were rejected, 
and from then on cooperation between Hindus and Muslims in 
the independence movement was rare. 

In his presidential address to the Muslim League session at 
Allahabad in 1930, the leading modern Muslim philosopher in 
South Asia, Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1876-1938), described India 
as Asia in miniature, in which a unitary form of government 
was inconceivable and religious community rather than terri- 
tory was the basis for identification. To him, communalism in 
its highest sense was the key to the formation of a harmonious 
whole in India. Therefore, he demanded the establishment of 
a confederated India to include a Muslim state consisting of 
Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh, and Balochistan. 
In subsequent speeches and writings, Iqbal reiterated the 
claims of Muslims to be considered a nation "based on unity of 
language, race, history, religion, and identity of economic 
interests." 

Iqbal gave no name to his projected state. That was done by 
a group of students at Cambridge in Britain who issued a pam- 
phlet in 1933 entitled Now or Never. They opposed the idea of 



28 



Historical Setting 



federation, denied that India was a single country, and 
demanded partition into regions, the northwest receiving 
national status as a "Pakistan." They explained the term as fol- 
lows: "Pakistan . . . is . . . composed of letters taken from the 
names of our homelands: that is, Punjab, Afghania [North- 
West Frontier Province], Kashmir, Iran, Sindh, Tukharistan, 
Afghanistan, and Balochistan. It means the land of the Paks, 
the spiritually pure and clean." 

In 1934Jinnah returned to the leadership of the Muslim 
League after a period of residence in London, but found it 
divided and without a sense of mission. He set about restoring 
a sense of purpose to Muslims, and he emphasized the Two 
Nations Theory. 

The 1937-40 period was critical in the growth of the Two 
Nations Theory. Under the 1935 Government of India Act, 
elections to the provincial legislative assemblies were held in 
1937. Congress gained majorities in seven of the eleven prov- 
inces. Congress took a strictly legalistic stand on the formation 
of provincial ministries and refused to form coalition govern- 
ments with the Muslim League, even in the United Provinces 
(Uttar Pradesh in contemporary India), which had a substan- 
tial Muslim minority, and vigorously denied the Muslim 
League's claim to be the only true representative of Indian 
Muslims. This claim, however, was not substantiated because 
the Muslim League had done poorly in the elections, especially 
in the Muslim-majority provinces such as Punjab and the 
North-West Frontier Province. The conduct of Congress gov- 
ernments in the Muslim-minority provinces permanently alien- 
ated the Muslim League. 

By the late 1930s, Jinnah was convinced of the need for a 
unifying issue among Muslims, and Pakistan was the obvious 
answer. At its annual session in Lahore on March 23, 1940, the 
Muslim League resolved that the areas of Muslim majority in 
northwestern and eastern India should be grouped together to 
constitute independent states — autonomous and sovereign — 
and that any independence plan without this provision was 
unacceptable to Muslims. Federation was rejected. The Lahore 
Resolution was often referred to as the "Pakistan Resolution"; 
however, the word Pakistan did not appear in it. 

An interesting aspect of the Pakistan movement was that it 
received its greatest support from areas in which Muslims were 
a minority. In those areas, the main issue was finding an alter- 



29 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

native to replacing British rule with Congress, that is, Hindu, 
rule. 

Toward Partition 

Congress predictably opposed all proposals for partition and 
advocated a united India with a strong center and a fully 
responsible parliamentary government. To many, notably to 
Jawaharlal Nehru, the idea of a sovereign state based on a com- 
mon religion seemed a historical anachronism and a denial of 
democracy. From 1940 on, reconciliation between Congress 
and the Muslim League became increasingly difficult, if not 
impossible. 

During World War II, the Muslim League and Congress 
adopted different attitudes toward British rule. British priori- 
ties were driven by the expediencies of defense, and war was 
declared abruptly without any prior consultation with Indian 
politicians. Congress ministers in the provinces resigned in 
protest. As a consequence, Congress, with most of its leaders in 
jail for opposition to the Raj, lost its political leverage over the 
British. The Muslim League, however, followed a course of 
cooperation, gaining time to consolidate. The British appreci- 
ated the loyalty and valor of the British Indian Army, many of 
whose members were Punjabi Muslims. The Muslim League's 
success could be gauged from its sweep of 90 percent of the 
Muslim seats in the 1946 election, compared with only 4.5 per- 
cent in the 1937 elections. The 1946 election was, in effect, a 
plebiscite among Muslims on Pakistan. In London it became 
clear that there were three parties in any discussion on the 
future of India: the British, Congress, and the Muslim League. 

Spurred by the Japanese advance in Asia and forceful per- 
suasion from Washington, British prime minister Winston 
Churchill's coalition war government in 1942 had dispatched 
Sir Stafford Cripps to India with a proposal for settlement. The 
plan provided for dominion status after the war for an Indian 
union of British Indian provinces and princely states wishing to 
accede to it, a separate dominion for those who did not, and 
firm defense links between Britain and an Indian union. 
Cripps himself was sympathetic to Indian nationalism. How- 
ever, his mission failed, and Gandhi described it as "a post- 
dated check on a crashing bank." 

In August 1942, Gandhi launched the "Quit India Move- 
ment" against the British. Jinnah condemned the movement. 
The government retaliated by arresting about 60,000 individu- 



30 



Historical Setting 



als and outlawing Congress. Communal riots increased. Talks 
between Jinnah and Gandhi in 1944 proved as futile as negotia- 
tions between Gandhi and the viceroy. 

In July 1945, the Labour Party came to power in Britain with 
a large majority. Its choices in India were limited by the decline 
of British power and the necessity of retaining Indian links in 
imperial defense. General unrest in India spread, and, when a 
naval mutiny in Bombay broke out in 1945, British officials 
came to the conclusion that independence was the only alter- 
native to forcible retention of control over an unwilling depen- 
dency. The viceroy, Lord Wavell, met with Indian leaders in 
Simla in 1945 to decide what form of interim government 
would be acceptable. No agreement was reached. 

New elections to the provincial and central legislatures were 
ordered, and a three-man team came to India from Britain to 
discuss plans for self-government. The Cabinet Mission Plan, 
proposed by Cripps, represented Britain's last, desperate 
attempt to transfer the power it retained over India to a single 
union. The mission put forward a three-tier federal form of 
government in which the central government would be limited 
to power over defense, foreign relations, currency, and com- 
munications; significant other powers would be delegated to 
the provinces. The plan also prescribed the zones that would 
be created: northeastern Bengal and Assam would be joined to 
form a zone with a slight Muslim majority; in the northwest, 
Punjab, Sindh, North-West Frontier Province, and Balochistan 
would be joined for a clear Muslim majority; and the remain- 
der of the country would be the third zone, with a clear Hindu 
majority. The approximation of the boundaries of a new Paki- 
stan was clear from the delineation of the zones. The mission 
also suggested the right of veto on legislation by communities 
that saw their interests adversely affected. Finally, the mission 
proposed that an interim government be established immedi- 
ately and that new elections be held. 

Congress and the Muslim League emerged from the 1946 
elections as the two dominant parties, although the Muslim 
League again was unable to capture a majority of the Muslim 
seats in the North-West Frontier Province. At first, both parties 
seemed to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan, despite many reser- 
vations, but the subsequent behavior of the leaders soon led to 
bitterness and mistrust. Nehru effectively quashed any pros- 
pect of the plan's success when he announced that Congress 
would not be "fettered" by agreements with the British, thereby 



31 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

making it clear that Congress would use its majority in the 
newly created Constituent Assembly to write a constitution that 
conformed to its ideas. The formation of an interim govern- 
ment was also controversial. Jinnah demanded equality 
between the Muslim League and Congress, a proposal rejected 
by the viceroy. The Muslim League boycotted the interim gov- 
ernment, and each party disputed the right of the other to 
appoint Muslim ministers, a prerogative Jinnah claimed 
belonged solely to the Muslim League. 

When the viceroy proceeded to form an interim government 
without the Muslim League, Jinnah called for demonstrations, 
or "Direct Action," on August 16, 1946. Communal rioting 
broke out on an unprecedented scale, especially in Bengal and 
Bihar. The massacre of Muslims in Calcutta brought Gandhi to 
the scene, where he worked with the Muslim League provincial 
chief minister, Hussain Shahid Suhrawardy. Gandhi's and 
Suhrawardy's efforts calmed fears in Bengal, but rioting quickly 
spread elsewhere and continued well into 1947. Jinnah permit- 
ted the Muslim League to enter the interim government in an 
effort to stem further communal violence. Disagreements 
among the ministers paralyzed the government, already 
haunted by the specter of civil war. 

In February 1947, Lord Mountbatten was appointed viceroy 
with specific instructions to arrange for a transfer of power by 
June 1948. Mountbatten assessed the situation and became 
convinced that Congress was willing to accept partition as the 
price for independence, that Jinnah would accept a smaller 
Pakistan than the one he demanded (that is, all of Punjab and 
Bengal) , and that Sikhs would learn to accept a division of Pun- 
jab. Mountbatten was convinced by the rising temperature of 
communal emotions that the June 1948 date for partition was 
too distant and persuaded most Indian leaders that immediate 
acceptance of his plan was imperative. 

On June 3, 1947, British prime minister Clement Attlee 
introduced a bill in the House of Commons calling for the 
independence and partition of India. On July 14, the House of 
Commons passed the India Independence Act, by which two 
independent dominions were created on the subcontinent; the 
princely states were left to accede to either. The partition plan 
stated that contiguous Muslim-majority districts in Punjab and 
Bengal would go to Pakistan, provided that the legislatures of 
the two provinces agreed that the provinces should be parti- 
tioned — they did. Sindh's legislature and Balochistan's jirga 



32 



Historical Setting 



(council of tribal leaders) agreed to join Pakistan. A plebiscite 
was held in the Sylhet District of Assam, and, as a result, part of 
the district was transferred to Pakistan. A plebiscite was also 
held in the North-West Frontier Province. Despite a boycott by 
Congress, the province was deemed to have chosen Pakistan. 
The princely states, however, presented a more difficult prob- 
lem. All but three of the more than 500 states quickly acceded 
to Pakistan or India under guidelines established with the aid 
of Mountbatten. The states made their decisions after giving 
consideration to the geographic location of their respective 
areas and to their religious majority. Two states hesitated but 
were quickly absorbed into India: Hyderabad, the most popu- 
lated of the princely states, whose Muslim ruler desired inde- 
pendence; and Junagadh, a small state with a Muslim prince 
that tried to accede to Pakistan despite its majority Hindu pop- 
ulation. The accession of the third state, Jammu and Kashmir, 
also could not be resolved peacefully, and its indeterminate sta- 
tus has poisoned relations between India and Pakistan ever 
since (see Survival in a Harsh Environment, ch. 5). 

Throughout the summer of 1947, as communal violence 
mounted, preparations for partition proceeded in Delhi. Assets 
were divided, boundary commissions were set up to demarcate 
frontiers, and British troops were evacuated. The military was 
restructured into two forces. Law and order broke down in dif- 
ferent parts of the country. Civil servants were given the choice 
of joining either country; British officers could retire with com- 
pensation if not invited to stay on. Jinnah and Nehru tried 
unsuccessfully to quell the passions of communal fury that nei- 
ther fully understood. On August 14, 1947, Pakistan and India 
achieved independence. Jinnah became the first governor gen- 
eral of the Dominion of Pakistan. 

Independent Pakistan 

Problems at Independence 

In August 1947, Pakistan was faced with a number of prob- 
lems, some immediate but others long term. The most impor- 
tant of these concerns was the role played by Islam. Was 
Pakistan to be a secular state serving as a homeland for Mus- 
lims of the subcontinent, or was it to be an Islamic state gov- 
erned by the sharia, in which non-Muslims would be 
second-class citizens? The second question concerned the dis- 
tribution of power between the center and the provincial gov- 



33 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

ernments, a question that eventually led to the dissolution of 
the country with the painful loss of the East Wing (East Bengal, 
later East Pakistan, now Bangladesh) in 1971, an issue that 
remained unresolved in the early 1990s. 

The territory of Pakistan was divided into two parts at inde- 
pendence, separated by about 1,600 kilometers of Indian terri- 
tory. The 1940 Lahore Resolution had called for independent 
"states" in the northwest and the northeast. This objective was 
changed, by a 1946 meeting of Muslim League legislators, to a 
call for a single state (the acronym Pakistan had no letter for 
Bengal) . Pakistan lacked the machinery, personnel, and equip- 
ment for a new government. Even its capital, Karachi, was a sec- 
ond choice — Lahore was rejected because it was too close to 
the Indian border. Pakistan's economy seemed unviable after 
severing ties with India, the major market for its commodities. 
And, much of Punjab's electricity was imported from Indian 
power stations. 

Above all other concerns were the violence and the refugee 
problem: Muslims were fleeing India; Hindus and Sikhs were 
fleeing Pakistan. Jinnah's plea to regard religion as a personal 
matter, not a state matter, was ignored. No one was prepared 
for the communal rioting and the mass movements of popula- 
tion that followed the June 3, 1947, London announcement of 
imminent independence and partition. The most conservative 
estimates of the casualties were 250,000 dead and 12 million to 
24 million refugees. The actual boundaries of the two new 
states were not even known until August 17, when they were 
announced by a commission headed by a British judge. The 
boundaries — unacceptable to both India and Pakistan — have 
remained. 

West Pakistan lost its Hindus and Sikhs. These communities 
had managed much of the commercial activity of West Paki- 
stan. The Sikhs were especially prominent in agricultural colo- 
nies. They were replaced largely by Muslims from India, mostly 
Urdu speakers from the United Provinces. Although some peo- 
ple, especially Muslims from eastern Punjab (in India) , settled 
in western Punjab (in Pakistan), many headed for Karachi and 
other cities in Sindh, where they took the jobs vacated by 
departing Hindus. In 1951 close to half of the population of 
Pakistan's major cities were immigrants (muhajirs — refugees 
from India and their descendants) . 

The aspirations for Pakistan that had been so important to 
Muslims in Muslim-minority provinces and the goals for the 



34 



Historical Setting 



new state these urban refugees supported were not always com- 
patible with those of the traditional rural people already inhab- 
iting Pakistan, whose support for the concept of Pakistan came 
much later. Pakistani society was polarized from its inception. 

The land and people west of the Indus River continued to 
pose problems. The most immediate problem was the contin- 
ued presence of a Congress government in the North-West 
Frontier Province, a government effective at the grassroots 
level and popular despite the loss in the plebiscite. Led by 
Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his Khudai-i-Khitmagar (Ser- 
vants of God, a Congress faction) , this group was often referred 
to as the Red Shirts after its members' attire. Ghaffar Khan 
asked his followers not to participate in the July 1947 plebiscite. 

Pakistan also had to establish its legitimacy against a possible 
challenge from Afghanistan. Irredentist claims from Kabul 
were based on the ethnic unity of tribes straddling the border; 
the emotional appeal of "Pakhtunistan," homeland of the 
Pakhtuns, was undeniable. However, Pakistan upheld the trea- 
ties Britain had signed with Afghanistan and refused to discuss 
the validity of the Durand Line as the international border (see 
The Forward Policy, this ch.). Relations with Afghanistan were 
hostile, resulting in the rupture of diplomatic and commercial 
relations and leading Afghanistan to cast the only vote against 
Pakistan's admission to the United Nations (UN) in 1947. 

The India Independence Act left the princes theoretically 
free to accede to either dominion. The frontier princely states 
of Dir, Chitral, Amb, and Hunza acceded quickly to Pakistan 
while retaining substantial autonomy in internal administra- 
tion and customary law. The khan of Kalat in Baiochistan 
declared independence on August 15, 1947, but offered to 
negotiate a special relationship with Pakistan. Other Baloch 
sardar (tribal chiefs) also expressed their preference for a sepa- 
rate identity. Pakistan took military action against them and the 
khan and brought about their accession in 1948. The state of 
Bahawalpur, with a Muslim ruler and a Muslim population, 
acceded to Pakistan, as did Khairpur. 

The maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, unpopular among his 
subjects, was reluctant to decide on accession to either domin- 
ion. He first signed agreements with both Pakistan and India 
that would provide for the continued flow of people and goods 
to Kashmir — as it is usually called — from both dominions. 
Alarmed by reports of oppression of fellow Muslims in Kash- 
mir, armed groups from the North-West Frontier Province 



35 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

entered the maharaja's territory. The ruler requested military 
assistance from India but had to sign documents acceding to 
India before that country would provide aid in October 1947. 

The government of Pakistan refused to recognize the acces- 
sion and denounced it as a fraud even though the Indian gov- 
ernment announced that it would require an expression of the 
people's will through a plebiscite after the invaders were driven 
back. Pakistan launched an active military and diplomatic cam- 
paign to undo the accession. The UN Security Council eventu- 
ally brought about a cease-fire between Pakistani and Indian 
troops, which took place on January 1, 1949, thus ending the 
first Indo-Pakistani War, and directed that a plebiscite be held. 
The cease-fire agreement formalized the military status quo, 
leaving about 30 percent of Kashmir under Pakistani control 
(see India, ch. 4; The Formation of Pakistan, ch. 5). 

Partition and its accompanying confusion also brought 
severe economic challenges to the two newly created and 
antagonistic countries. The partition plan ignored the princi- 
ples of complementarity. West Pakistan, for example, tradition- 
ally produced more wheat than it consumed and had supplied 
the deficit areas in India. Cotton grown in West Pakistan was 
used in mills in Bombay and other west Indian cities. Commod- 
ities such as coal and sugar were in short supply in Pakistan — 
they had traditionally come from areas now part of India. Fur- 
thermore, Pakistan faced logistic problems for its commercial 
transportation because of the four major ports in British India, 
it was awarded only Karachi. But the problem that proved most 
intractable was defining relations between the two wings of 
Pakistan, which had had little economic exchange before parti- 
tion. 

The two dominions decided to allow free movement of 
goods, persons, and capital for one year after independence, 
but this agreement broke down. In November 1947, Pakistan 
levied export duties on jute; India retaliated with export duties 
of its own. The trade war reached a crisis in September 1949 
when Britain devalued the pound, to which both the Pakistani 
rupee and the Indian rupee were pegged. India followed Brit- 
ain's lead, but Pakistan did not, so India severed trade relations 
with Pakistan. The outbreak of the Korean War (1950-53), and 
the consequent price rises in jute, leather, cotton, and wool as a 
result of wartime needs, saved the economy of Pakistan. New 
trading relationships were formed, and the construction of cot- 
ton and jute mills in Pakistan was quickly undertaken. 



36 



Historical Setting 



Although India and Pakistan resumed trade in 1951, both the 
volume and the value of trade steadily declined; the two coun- 
tries ignored bilateral trade for the most part and developed 
the new international trade links they had made. 

The assets of British India were divided in the ratio of seven- 
teen for India to five for Pakistan by decision of the Viceroy's 
Council in June 1947. Division was difficult to implement, how- 
ever, and Pakistan complained of nondeliveries. A financial 
agreement was reached in December 1948, but the actual set- 
tlement of financial and other disputes continued until 1960 
(see Structure of the Economy, ch. 3). 

Division of the all-India services of the Indian Civil Service 
and the Indian Police Service was also difficult. Only 101 out of 
a total of 1,157 Indian officers were Muslim. Among these Mus- 
lim officers, ninety-five officers opted for Pakistan; they were 
joined by one Christian, eleven Muslim military officers trans- 
ferring to civilian service, and fifty Britons, for a total of 157. 
But only twenty of them had had more than fifteen years of ser- 
vice, and more than half had had fewer than ten years. These 
men formed the core of the Civil Service of Pakistan, which 
became one of the most elite and privileged bureaucracies in 
the world. Members of the Civil Service of Pakistan were the 
architects of the administrative, judicial, and diplomatic ser- 
vices. They proved indispensable in running the government 
machinery during Pakistan's first two decades, and their contri- 
butions to government policy and economics were profound 
during the era of Mohammad Ayub Khan. The government of 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s precipitated a major reorgani- 
zation and reorientation of the bureaucracy, however, which 
resulted in a noticeable decline in both the morale and the 
standards of the bureaucracy (see Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and a 
New Constitutional System, this ch; Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 1971- 
77, ch. 4). 

Constitutional Beginnings 

At independence Jinnah was the supreme authority. An 
accomplished politician, he won independence for Pakistan 
within seven years of the Lahore Resolution and was hailed by 
his followers as the Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader). As governor 
general, he assumed the ceremonial functions of head of state 
while taking on effective power as head of government, domi- 
nating his prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan (the Quaid-i-Millet, 
or Leader of the Nation). To these roles, he added the leader- 



37 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

ship of the Muslim League and the office of president of the 
Constituent Assembly. 

Although Jinnah had led the movement for Pakistan as a 
separate Muslim nation, he was appalled by the communal 
riots and urged equal rights for all citizens irrespective of reli- 
gion. Jinnah died in September 1948 — only thirteen months 
after independence — leaving his successors to tackle the prob- 
lems of Pakistan's identity. 

Jinnah's acknowledged lieutenant, Liaquat Ali Khan, 
assumed leadership and continued in the position of prime 
minister. Born to a Punjabi landed family, Liaquat used his 
experience in law to attempt to frame a constitution along the 
lines of the British Westminster system of parliamentary 
democracy. He failed in large part because neither the Muslim 
League nor the Constituent Assembly was equipped to resolve 
in a parliamentary manner the problems and conflicts of the 
role of Islam and the degree of autonomy for the provinces. 
Liaquat's term of office ended when he was assassinated in 
Rawalpindi in October 1951. He was replaced by Khwaja Nazi- 
muddin, who stepped down as governor general; Nazimuddin 
was replaced as governor general by Ghulam Mohammad, the 
former minister of finance. 

The Muslim League, unlike Congress, had not prepared 
itself for a postindependence role. Congress had constitu- 
tional, economic, social, and even foreign policy plans in place 
before independence and was ready to put them into effect 
when the time came. The Muslim League was so preoccupied 
with the struggle for Pakistan that it was poorly prepared for 
effective government. Its leaders were largely urban profession- 
als whose political base was mainly in areas that were in India. 
In the areas that had become Pakistan, its base was weak. Land- 
lords with ascriptive and inherited privileges were uncomfort- 
able with procedures of decision making through debate, 
discussion, compromise, and majority vote. The Muslim 
League was a party with little grassroots support, a weak organi- 
zational structure, powerful factional leaders, and decisions 
made at the top. Although Ghulam Mohammad tried to exer- 
cise the "viceregal" power that Jinnah had used so powerfully as 
governor general, concern for office and the fruits of power 
were more important to most of the politicians than the evolu- 
tion of ideology or the implementation of mass programs. The 
effect of this lack of direction was shown most clearly when the 
Muslim League was routed in the 1954 election in East Pakistan 



38 



Mohammad Alijinnah, the 
Quaid-i-Azam 
Courtesy Embassy of 
Pakistan, Washington 



Liaquat Ali Khan, the 
Quaid-i-Millet 
Courtesy Embassy of 
Pakistan, Washington 



by the United Front — mainly a coalition of the Awami League 
and the Krishak Sramik Party, led by two one-time Muslim 
League members, Hussain Shahid Suhrawardy and Fazlul Haq, 
who ran on an autonomist platform. Other parties established 
during this period included the leftist National Awami Party (a 
breakaway from the Awami League) , which also supported pro- 
vincial autonomy. Islamic parties also made their appearance 
on the electoral scene, most notably the Jamaat-i-Islami. 

The Muslim League was held responsible for the deteriora- 
tion of politics and society after independence and had to 
answer for its failure to fulfill people's high expectations. There 
was a rising level of opposition and frustration and an increas- 
ing use of repressive laws inherited from the British or enacted 
by Pakistan that included preventive detention and rules pro- 
hibiting the gathering of more than five persons. In 1949 the 
Public and Representative Office Disqualification Act 



39 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

(PRODA) allowed the government to disqualify persons found 
guilty of "misconduct," a term that acquired a broad definition. 
In 1952 the Security of Pakistan Act expanded the powers of 
the government in the interests of public order. 

The armed forces also posed a threat to Liaquat's govern- 
ment, which was less hostile toward India than some officers 
wished. In March 1951, Major General Mohammad Akbar 
Khan, chief of the general staff, was arrested along with four- 
teen other officers on charges of plotting a coup d'etat. The 
authors of what became known as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy 
were tried in secret, convicted, and sentenced to imprison- 
ment. All were subsequently released. 

Pakistan's first Constituent Assembly was made up of mem- 
bers of the preparation Indian Constituent Assembly who rep- 
resented areas that had gone to Pakistan. The body's eighty 
members functioned as the legislature of Pakistan. As a 
constitution-making body, the assembly's only achievement was 
the Objectives Resolution of March 1949, which specified that 
Pakistan would be Islamic, democratic, and federal. But the 
assembly could not reach agreement on how these objectives 
would take form, raising fears among minorities and concern 
among East Bengalis. Other important matters remained 
equally problematic — the division of executive power between 
the governor general and the prime minister; the distribution 
of power between the center and the provinces; the balance of 
power, especially electoral, between the two wings; and the role 
of Islam in the government. With the 1951 assassination of 
Liaquat, resolution of these issues became unlikely. 

During the years after Liaquat's assassination, none of these 
problems were resolved, and a major confrontation occurred 
between the governor general, Ghulam Mohammad, a Punjabi 
from the civil service, and the prime minister, Nazimuddin, a 
former chief minister of united Bengal and now chief minister 
of East Bengal. Ghulam Mohammad, who relished the trap- 
pings of dominance earlier held by Jinnah, asserted his power 
by declaring martial law in 1953 in Punjab during disturbances 
involving the Ahmadiyyas, a small but influential sect consid- 
ered heterodox by orthodox Muslims. A year later, he imposed 
governor's rule after the Muslim League defeat in East Bengal, 
not permitting the United Front to take office. When Nazi- 
muddin attempted to limit the power of the governor general 
through amendments to the Government of India Act of 
1935 — then still the basic law for Pakistan, as altered by the 



40 



Historical Setting 



India Independence Act of 1947 — Ghulam Mohammad uncer- 
emoniously dismissed him in April 1953, and then the follow- 
ing year appointed his own "cabinet of talents," dismissing the 
Constituent Assembly. 

The so-called cabinet of talents was headed by Mohammad 
Ali Bogra, a minor political figure from East Bengal who had 
previously been Pakistan's ambassador to the United States. 
Significantly, the cabinet also included both military and civil 
officials. Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali, who had been head of the 
Civil Service of Pakistan, became minister of finance. General 
Mohammad Ayub Khan became minister of defense while 
retaining his post as commander in chief of the army. Major 
General Iskander Mirza, a military officer who was seconded to 
civilian posts, including becoming governor of East Bengal 
when Ghulam Mohammad imposed governor's rule on that 
province, became minister of home affairs. The cabinet thus 
provided an opportunity for the military to take a direct role in 
politics. Ghulam Mohammad was successful in subordinating 
the prime minister because of the support of military and civil 
officers as well as the backing of the strong landed interests in 
Punjab. The facade of parliamentary government crumbled, 
exposing the military's role in Pakistan's political system to 
public view. 

The revived Constituent Assembly convened in 1955. It dif- 
fered in composition from the first such assembly because of 
the notable reduction of Muslim League members and the 
presence of a United Front coalition from East Bengal. Provin- 
cial autonomy was the main plank of the United Front. Also in 
1955, failing health and the ascendancy of General Mirza 
forced Ghulam Mohammad to resign as governor general. He 
died the following year. 

In 1956 the Constituent Assembly adopted a constitution 
that proclaimed Pakistan an Islamic republic and contained 
directives for the establishment of an Islamic state. It also 
renamed the Constituent Assembly the Legislative Assembly 
and changed the name of the head of state from governor gen- 
eral to president. The lawyer-politicians who led the Pakistan 
movement used the principles and legal precedents of a nonre- 
ligious British parliamentary tradition even while they 
advanced the idea of Muslim nationhood as an axiom. Many of 
them represented a liberal movement in Islam, in which their 
personal religion was compatible with Western technology and 
political institutions. They saw the basis for democratic pro- 



41 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

cesses and tolerance in the Islamic tradition of ijma (consensus 
of the community) and ijtihad (the concept of continuing 
interpretations of Islamic law). Most of Pakistan's intelligentsia 
and Westernized elites belonged to the group of ijma modern- 
ists (see Religious Life, ch. 2). 

In contrast stood the traditionalist ulama, whose position 
was a legalistic one based on the unity of religion and politics 
in Islam. The ulama asserted that the Quran, the sunna (see 
Glossary) , and the sharia provided the general principles for 
all aspects of life if correctly interpreted and applied. The gov- 
ernment's duty, therefore, was to recognize the role of the 
ulama in the interpretation of the law. Because the ulama and 
the less-learned mullahs (Muslim clerics) enjoyed influence 
among the masses, especially in urban areas, and because no 
politician could afford to be denounced as anti-Islamic, none 
dared publicly to ignore them. Nevertheless, they were not 
given powers of legal interpretation until the Muhammad Zia 
ul-Haq regime of 1977-88 (see Zia ul-Haq and Military Domi- 
nation, 1977-88, this ch; Early Political Development, ch. 4). 
The lawyer-politicians making decisions in the 1950s almost 
without exception preferred the courts and legal institutions 
they inherited from the British. 

Another interpretation of Islam was provided by an Islamist 
movement in Pakistan, regarded in some quarters as funda- 
mentalist. Its most significant organization was the 
Jamaat-i-Islami, which gradually built up support among the 
refugees, the urban lower middle class, and students (see 
Jamaat-i-Islami, ch. 4) . Unlike the traditional ulama, the Islam- 
ist movement was the outcome of modern Islamic idealism. 
Crucial in the constitutional and political development of Paki- 
stan, it forced politicians to face the question of Islamic iden- 
tity. On occasion, definitions of Islamic identity resulted in 
violent controversy, as in Punjab during the early 1950s when 
agitation was directed against the Ahmadiyyas. In the 
mid-1970s, the Ahmadiyyas were declared non-Muslims by the 
government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1971-77) and the Organi- 
zation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), based injiddah, Saudi 
Arabia. 

During the 1950s, however, the fundamentalist movement 
led by Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, the founder and leader of 
the Jamaat-i-Islami, succeeded only in introducing Islamic prin- 
ciples into the 1956 constitution. A nonjudiciable section 
called the Directive Principles of State Policy attempted to 



42 



Historical Setting 



define ways in which the Islamic way of life and Islamic moral 
standards could be pursued. The principles contained injunc- 
tions against the consumption of alcohol and the practice of 
usury. The substance of the 1956 clauses reappeared in the 
1962 constitution, but the Islamist cause was undefeated. 
Sharia courts were established under Zia, and under Prime 
Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif in the early 1990s the sharia was 
proclaimed the basic law of the land. 

Early Foreign Policy 

Pakistan's early foreign policy espoused nonalignment. 
Despite disputes with India, the policies of the two countries 
were similar: membership in the Commonwealth of Nations; 
no commitment to either the United States or the Soviet 
Union; and a role in the UN. 

Pakistan's foreign policy stance shifted significantly in 1953 
when it accepted the United States offer of military and eco- 
nomic assistance in return for membership in an alliance sys- 
tem designed to contain international communism. When the 
administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower sought a series of alli- 
ances in the "Northern Tier" — Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey — 
and in East Asia, Pakistan became a candidate for membership 
in each. In 1954 Pakistan signed a Mutual Defense Assistance 
Agreement with the United States and became a member of 
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The follow- 
ing year, Pakistan joined Iran, Iraq, and Turkey in the Baghdad 
Pact, later renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) 
after Iraq's withdrawal in 1959. Pakistan also leased bases to the 
United States for intelligence-gathering and communications 
facilities. Pakistan saw these agreements not as bulwarks against 
Soviet or Chinese aggression, but as a means to bolster itself 
against India. 

Collapse of the Parliamentary System 

The parliamentary system outlined in the 1956 constitution 
required disciplined political parties, which did not exist. The 
Muslim League — the one political party that had appeared 
capable of developing into a national democratic party — con- 
tinued to decline in prestige. In West Pakistan, Sindh and the 
North-West Frontier Province resented the political and eco- 
nomic dominance accorded Punjab and were hostile to the 
"One Unit Plan" introduced by the Constituent Assembly the 
year before. The One Unit Plan merged the western provinces 



43 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

of Balochistan, the North-West Frontier Province, Punjab, and 
Sindh into a single administrative unit named West Pakistan, 
which in the new Legislative Assembly was to have parity with 
the more populous province of East Pakistan. 

In 1956 Suhrawardy formed a coalition cabinet at the center 
that included the Awami League and the newly formed Repub- 
lican Party of the West Wing, which had broken off from the 
Muslim League. Suhrawardy was highly respected in East Paki- 
stan, but he had no measurable political strength in West Paki- 
stan. By taking a strong position in favor of the One Unit Plan, 
he lost support in Sindh, the North-West Frontier Province, 
and Balochistan. 

Societal violence and ethnic unrest further complicated the 
growth and functioning of parliamentary government. In West 
Pakistan, chief minister Khan Sahib was assassinated. In the 
North-West Frontier Province, Khan Sahib's brother, Khan 
Abdul Ghaffar Khan, of the National Awami Party, turned his 
back on national politics and said he would work for the attain- 
ment of a separate homeland for the Pakhtuns. And in 
Balochistan, the khan of Kalat again declared his indepen- 
dence, but the Pakistan Army restored Pakistani control. 

On October 7, 1958, President Mirza, with the support of 
the army, suspended the 1956 constitution, imposed martial 
law, and canceled the elections scheduled for January 1959. 
Mirza was supported by the civil service bureaucracy, which 
harbored deep suspicions of politicians. Nonetheless, on Octo- 
ber 27 Mirza was ousted and sent into lifetime exile in London. 
General Ayub Khan, the army commander in chief, assumed 
control of a military government. 

The Ayub Khan Era 

In January 1951, Ayub Khan succeeded General Sir Douglas 
Gracey as commander in chief of the Pakistan Army, becoming 
the first Pakistani in that position. Although Ayub's military 
career was not particularly brilliant and although he had not 
previously held a combat command, he was promoted over sev- 
eral senior officers with distinguished careers. Ayub Khan prob- 
ably was selected because of his reputation as an able 
administrator, his presumed lack of political ambition, and his 
lack of powerful group backing. Coming from a humble family 
of an obscure Pakhtun tribe, Ayub also lacked affiliation with 
major internal power blocks and was, therefore, acceptable to 
all elements. 



44 



Historical Setting 



Within a short time of his promotion, however, Ayub Khan 
had become a powerful political figure. Perhaps more than any 
other Pakistani, Ayub was responsible for seeking and securing 
military and economic assistance from the United States and 
for aligning Pakistan with it in international affairs. As army 
commander in chief and for a time as minister of defense in 
1954, Ayub Khan was empowered to veto virtually any govern- 
ment policy that he felt was inimical to the interests of the 
armed forces. 

By 1958 Ayub Khan and his fellow officers decided to turn 
out the "inefficient and rascally" politicians — a task easily 
accomplished without bloodshed. Ayub's philosophy was 
indebted to the Mughal and viceregal traditions; his rule was 
similarly highly personalized. Ayub justified his assumption of 
power by citing the nation's need for stability and the necessity 
for the army to play a central role. When internal stability 
broke down in the 1960s, he remained contemptuous of law- 
yer-politicians and handed over power to his fellow army offic- 
ers. 

Ayub Khan used two main approaches to governing in his 
first few years. He concentrated on consolidating power and 
intimidating the opposition. He also aimed to establish the 
groundwork for future stability through altering the economic, 
legal, and constitutional institutions. 

The imposition of martial law in 1958 targeted "antisocial" 
practices such as abducting women and children, black marke- 
teering, smuggling, and hoarding. Many in the Civil Service of 
Pakistan and the Police Service of Pakistan were investigated 
and punished for corruption, misconduct, inefficiency, or sub- 
versive activities. Ayub Khan's message was clear: he, not the 
civil servants, was in control. 

Sterner measures were used against the politicians. The 
PRODA prescribed fifteen years' exclusion from public office 
for those found guilty of corruption. The Elective Bodies Dis- 
qualification Order (EBDO) authorized special tribunals to try 
former politicians for "misconduct," an infraction not clearly 
defined. Prosecution could be avoided if the accused agreed 
not to be a candidate for any elective body for a period of seven 
years. About 7,000 individuals were "EBDOed." Some people, 
including Suhrawardy, who was arrested, fought prosecution. 

The Press and Publications Ordinance was amended in 1960 
to specify broad conditions under which newspapers and other 
publications could be commandeered or closed down. Trade 



45 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

organizations, unions, and student groups were closely moni- 
tored and cautioned to avoid political activity, and imams (see 
Glossary) at mosques were warned against including political 
matters in sermons. 

On the whole, however, the martial law years were not 
severe. The army maintained low visibility and was content to 
uphold the traditional social order. By early 1959, most army 
units had resumed their regular duties. Ayub Khan generally 
left administration in the hands of the civil bureaucracy, with 
some exceptions. 

Efforts were made to popularize the regime while the oppo- 
sition was muzzled. Ayub Khan maintained a high public pro- 
file, often taking trips expressly to "meet the people." He was 
also aware of the need to address some of the acute grievances 
of East Pakistan. To the extent possible, only Bengali members 
of the civil service were posted in the East Wing; previously, 
many of the officers had been from the West Wing and knew 
neither the region nor the language. Dhaka was designated the 
legislative capital of Pakistan, while the newly created Islama- 
bad became the administrative capital. Central government 
bodies, such as the Planning Commission, were now instructed 
to hold regular sessions in Dhaka. Public investment in East 
Pakistan increased, although private investment remained 
heavily skewed in favor of West Pakistan. The Ayub Khan 
regime was so highly centralized, however, that, in the absence 
of democratic institutions, densely populated and politicized 
Bengal continued to feel it was being slighted. 

Between 1958 and 1962, Ayub Khan used martial law to ini- 
tiate a number of reforms that reduced the power of groups 
opposing him. One such group was the landed aristocracy. The 
Land Reform Commission was set up in 1958, and in 1959 the 
government imposed a ceiling of 200 hectares of irrigated land 
and 400 hectares of unirrigated land in the West Wing for a sin- 
gle holding. In the East Wing, the landholding ceiling was 
raised from thirty-three hectares to forty-eight hectares (see 
Farm Ownership and Land Reform, ch. 3). Landholders 
retained their dominant positions in the social hierarchy and 
their political influence but heeded Ayub's warnings against 
political assertiveness. Moreover, some 4 million hectares of 
land in West Pakistan, much of it in Sindh, were released for 
public acquisition between 1959 and 1969 and sold mainly to 
civil and military officers, thus creating a new class of farmers 
having medium-sized holdings. These farms became 



46 



Historical Setting 



immensely important for future agricultural development, but 
the peasants benefited scarcely at all. 

In 1955 a legal commission was set up to suggest reforms of 
the family and marriage laws. Ayub Khan examined its report 
and in 1961 issued the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance. Among 
other things, it restricted polygyny and "regulated" marriage 
and divorce, giving women more equal treatment under the 
law than they had had before. It was a humane measure sup- 
ported by women's organizations in Pakistan, but the ordi- 
nance could not have been promulgated if the vehement 
opposition to it from the ulama and the fundamentalist Mus- 
lim groups had been allowed free expression. However, this 
law, which was similar to the one passed on family planning, 
was relatively mild and did not seriously transform the patriar- 
chal pattern of society. 

Ayub Khan adopted an energetic approach toward eco- 
nomic development that soon bore fruit in a rising rate of eco- 
nomic growth. Land reform, consolidation of holdings, and 
stern measures against hoarding were combined with rural 
credit programs and work programs, higher procurement 
prices, augmented allocations for agriculture, and, especially, 
improved seeds to put the country on the road to 
self-sufficiency in food grains in the process described as the 
Green Revolution. 

The Export Bonus Vouchers Scheme (1959) and tax incen- 
tives stimulated new industrial entrepreneurs and exporters. 
Bonus vouchers facilitated access to foreign exchange for 
imports of industrial machinery and raw materials. Tax conces- 
sions were offered for investment in less-developed areas. 
These measures had important consequences in bringing 
industry to Punjab and gave rise to a new class of small industri- 
alists. 

Basic Democracies 

Ayub Khan's martial law regime, critics observed, was a form 
of "representational dictatorship," but the new political system, 
introduced in 1959 as the "Basic Democracies" system, was an 
apt expression of what Ayub called the particular "genius" of 
Pakistan. In 1962 a new constitution was promulgated as a 
product of that indirect elective system. Ayub did not believe 
that a sophisticated parliamentary democracy was suitable for 
Pakistan. Instead, the Basic Democracies, as the individual 
administrative units were called, were intended to initiate and 



47 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

educate a largely illiterate population in the working of govern- 
ment by giving them limited representation and associating 
them with decision making at a "level commensurate with their 
ability." Basic Democracies were concerned with no more than 
local government and rural development. They were meant to 
provide a two-way channel of communication between the 
Ayub Khan regime and the common people and allow social 
change to move slowly. 

The Basic Democracies system set up a multi-tiered system of 
institutions. The lowest but most important tier was composed 
of union councils, one each for groups of villages having an 
approximate total population of 10,000. Each union council 
comprised ten directly elected members and five appointed 
members, all called Basic Democrats. Union councils were 
responsible for local agricultural and community development 
and for rural law and order maintenance; they were empow- 
ered to impose local taxes for local projects. These powers, 
however, were more than balanced at the local level by the fact 
that the controlling authority for the union councils was the 
deputy commissioner, whose high status and traditionally 
paternalistic attitudes often elicited obedient cooperation 
rather than demands. 

The next tier consisted of the tehsil (subdistrict) councils, 
which performed coordination functions. Above them, the zilla 
(district) councils, chaired by the deputy commissioners, were 
composed of nominated official and nonofficial members, 
including the chairmen of union councils. The district councils 
were assigned both compulsory and optional functions pertain- 
ing to education, sanitation, local culture, and social welfare. 
Above them, the divisional advisory councils coordinated the 
activities with representatives of government departments. The 
highest tier consisted of one development advisory council for 
each province, chaired by the governor and appointed by the 
president. The urban areas had a similar arrangement, under 
which the smaller union councils were grouped together into 
municipal committees to perform similar duties. In 1960 the 
elected members of the union councils voted to confirm Ayub 
Khan's presidency, and under the 1962 constitution they 
formed an electoral college to elect the president, the National 
Assembly (as the Legislative Assembly was renamed under the 
1962 constitution), and the provincial assemblies. 

The system of Basic Democracies did not have time to take 
root or to fulfill Ayub Khan's intentions before he and the sys- 



48 



Historical Setting 



tern fell in 1969. Whether or not a new class of political leaders 
equipped with some administrative experience could have 
emerged to replace those trained in British constitutional law 
was never discovered. And the system did not provide for the 
mobilization of the rural population around institutions of 
national integration. Its emphasis was on economic develop- 
ment and social welfare alone. The authority of the civil service 
was augmented in the Basic Democracies, and the power of the 
landlords and the big industrialists in the West Wing went 
unchallenged. 

The 1 962 Constitution 

In 1958 Ayub Khan had promised a speedy return to consti- 
tutional government. In February 1960, an eleven-member 
constitutional commission was established. The commission's 
recommendations for direct elections, strong legislative and 
judicial organs, free political parties, and defined limitations 
on presidential authority went against Ayub's philosophy of 
government, so he ordered other committees to make revi- 
sions. 

The 1962 constitution retained some aspects of the Islamic 
nature of the republic but omitted the word Islamic in its origi- 
nal version; amid protests, Ayub Khan added that word later. 
The president would be a Muslim, and the Advisory Council of 
Islamic Ideology and the Islamic Research Institute were estab- 
lished to assist the government in reconciling all legislation 
with the tenets of the Quran and the sunna. Their functions 
were advisory and their members appointed by the president, 
so the ulama had no real power base. 

Ayub Khan sought to retain certain aspects of his dominant 
authority in the 1962 constitution, which ended the period of 
martial law. The document created a presidential system in 
which the traditional powers of the chief executive were aug- 
mented by control of the legislature, the power to issue ordi- 
nances, the right of appeal to referendum, protection from 
impeachment, control over the budget, and special emergency 
powers, which included the power to suspend civil rights. As 
the 1965 elections showed, the presidential system of govern- 
ment was opposed by those who equated constitutional govern- 
ment with parliamentary democracy. The 1962 constitution 
relaxed martial law limitations on personal freedom and made 
fundamental rights justiciable. The courts continued their tra- 
ditional function of protecting the rights of individual citizens 



49 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

against encroachment by the government, but the government 
made it clear that the exercise of claims based on fundamental 
rights would not be permitted to nullify its previous progressive 
legislation on land reform and family laws. 

The National Assembly, consisting of 156 members (includ- 
ing six women) and elected by an electoral college of 80,000 
Basic Democrats, was established as the federal legislature. Leg- 
islative powers were divided between the National Assembly 
and the provincial legislative assemblies. The National Assem- 
bly was to hold sessions alternatively in Islamabad and Dhaka; 
the Supreme Court would also hold sessions in Dhaka. The ban 
on political parties was operational at the time of the first elec- 
tions to the National Assembly and the provincial legislative 
assemblies in January 1960, as was the prohibition on 
"EBDOed" politicians. Many of those elected were new and 
merged into factions formed on the basis of personal or pro- 
vincial loyalties. Despite the ban, political parties functioned 
outside the legislative bodies as vehicles of criticism and form- 
ers of opinion. In late 1962, political parties were again legal- 
ized, and factions crystallized into government and opposition 
groups. Ayub Khan combined fragments of the old Muslim 
League and created the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) as the 
official government party. 

The presidential election of January 1965 resulted in a vic- 
tory for Ayub Khan but also demonstrated the appeal of the 
opposition. Four political parties joined to form the Combined 
Opposition Parties (COP). These parties were the Council 
Muslim League, strongest in Punjab and Karachi; the Awami 
League, strongest in East Pakistan; the National Awami Party, 
strongest in the North-West Frontier Province, where it stood 
for dissolving the One Unit Plan; and the Jamaat-i-Islami, sur- 
prisingly supporting the candidacy of a woman. The COP nom- 
inated Fatima Jinnah (sister of the Quaid-i-Azam and known as 
Madar-i-Millet, the Mother of the Nation) as their presidential 
candidate. The nine-point program put forward by the COP 
emphasized the restoration of parliamentary democracy. Ayub 
won 63.3 percent of the electoral college vote. His majority was 
larger in West Pakistan (73.6 percent) than in East Pakistan 
(53.1 percent). 

Ayub Khan's Foreign Policy and the 1965 War with India 

Ayub Khan articulated his foreign policy on several occa- 
sions, particularly in his autobiography, Friends not Masters. His 



50 



Historical Setting 



objectives were the security and development of Pakistan and 
the preservation of its ideology as he saw it. Toward these ends, 
he sought to improve, or normalize, relations with Pakistan's 
immediate and looming neighbors — India, China, and the 
Soviet Union. While retaining and renewing the alliance with 
the United States, Ayub emphasized his preference for friend- 
ship, not subordination, and bargained hard for higher returns 
to Pakistan. 

Other than ideology and Kashmir, the main source of fric- 
tion between Pakistan and India was the distribution of the 
waters of the Indus River system. As the upper riparian power, 
India controlled the headworks of the prepartition irrigation 
canals. After independence India had, in addition, constructed 
several multipurpose projects on the eastern tributaries of the 
Indus. Pakistan feared that India might repeat a 1948 incident 
that curtailed the water supply as a means of coercion. A com- 
promise that appeared to meet the needs of both countries was 
reached during the 1950s, but it was not until 1960 that a solu- 
tion finally found favor with Ayub Khan and Jawaharlal Nehru. 

The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 was backed by the World 
Bank (see Glossary) and the United States. Broadly speaking, 
the agreement allocated use of the three western Indus rivers 
(the Indus itself and its tributaries, the Jhelum and the 
Chenab) to Pakistan, and the three eastern Indus tributaries 
(the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej) to India. The basis of the plan was 
that irrigation canals in Pakistan that had been supplied by the 
eastern rivers would begin to draw water from the western 
Indus rivers through a system of barrages and link canals. The 
agreement also detailed transitional arrangements, new irriga- 
tion and hydroelectric power works, and the waterlogging and 
salinity problems in Pakistan's Punjab. The Indus Basin Devel- 
opment Fund was established and financed by the World Bank, 
the major contributors to the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium, and 
India (see Foreign Aid, ch. 3) . 

Pakistan's tentative approaches to China intensified in 1959 
when China's occupation of Tibet and the flight of the Dalai 
Lama to India ended five years of Chinese-Indian friendship. 
An entente between Pakistan and China evolved in step with 
the growth of Sino-Indian hostility, which climaxed in a border 
war in 1962. This informal alliance became a keystone of Paki- 
stan's foreign policy and grew to include a border agreement in 
March 1963, highway construction connecting the two coun- 
tries at the Karakoram Pass, agreements on trade, and Chinese 



51 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

economic assistance and grants of military equipment, which 
was later thought to have included exchanges in nuclear tech- 
nology. China's diplomatic support and transfer of military 
equipment was important to Pakistan during the 1965 Indo- 
Pakistani War over Kashmir. China's new diplomatic influence 
in the UN was also exerted on Pakistan's behalf after the Indo- 
Pakistani War of 1971. Ayub Khan's foreign minister, Zulfiqar 
Ali Bhutto, is often credited for this China policy, which gave 
Pakistan new flexibility in its international relationships. The 
entente deepened during the Zia regime (1977-88). 

The Soviet Union strongly disapproved of Pakistan's alliance 
with the United States, but Moscow was interested in keeping 
doors open to both Pakistan and India. Ayub Khan was able to 
secure Soviet neutrality during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War. 

Ayub Khan was the architect of Pakistan's policy of close 
alignment with the United States, and his first major foreign 
policy act was to sign bilateral economic and military agree- 
ments with the United States in 1959 (see The United States 
Alliance, ch. 5). Nevertheless, Ayub expected more from these 
agreements than the United States was willing to offer and thus 
remained critical of the role the United States played in South 
Asia. He was vehemently opposed to simultaneous United 
States support, direct or indirect, for India's military, especially 
when this assistance was augmented in the wake of the Sino- 
Indian War of 1962. Ayub maintained, as did many Pakistanis, 
that in return for the use of Pakistani military facilities, the 
United States owed Pakistan security allegiance in all cases, not 
merely in response to communist aggression. Especially trou- 
blesome to Pakistan was United States neutrality during the 
1965 Indo-Pakistani War. The United States stance at this time 
was a contributing factor to Pakistan's closing of United States 
communications and intelligence facilities near Peshawar. Paki- 
stan did not extend the ten-year agreement signed in 1959. 

The 1965 war began as a series of border flare-ups along 
undemarcated territory at the Rann of Kutch in the southeast 
in April and soon after along the cease-fire line in Kashmir. 
The Rann of Kutch conflict was resolved by mutual consent 
and British sponsorship and arbitration, but the Kashmir con- 
flict proved more dangerous and widespread. In the early 
spring of 1965, UN observers and India reported increased 
activity by infiltrators from Pakistan into Indian-held Kashmir. 
Pakistan hoped to support an uprising by Kashmiris against 
India. No such uprising took place, and by August India had 



52 



Historical Setting 



retaken Pakistani-held positions in the north while Pakistan 
attacked in the Chamb sector in southwestern Kashmir in Sep- 
tember. Each country had limited objectives, and neither was 
economically capable of sustaining a long war because military 
supplies were cut to both countries by the United States and 
Britain. 

On September 23, a cease-fire was arranged through the UN 
Security Council. In January 1966, Ayub Khan and India's 
prime minister, Lai Bahadur Shastri, signed the Tashkent Dec- 
laration, which formally ended hostilities and called for a 
mutual withdrawal of forces. This objectively statesmanlike act 
elicited an adverse reaction in West Pakistan. Students as well 
as politicians demonstrated in urban areas, and many were 
arrested. The Tashkent Declaration was the turning point in 
the political fortunes of the Ayub Khan administration. 

In February 1966, a national conference was held in Lahore, 
where all the opposition parties convened to discuss their dif- 
ferences and their common interests. The central issue dis- 
cussed was the Tashkent Declaration, which most of the 
assembled politicians characterized as Ayub Khan's unneces- 
sary capitulation to India. More significant, perhaps, was the 
noticeable underrepresentation of politicians from the East 
Wing. About 700 persons attended the conference, but only 
twenty-one were from the East Wing. They were led by Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman (known as Mujib) of the Awami League, who 
presented his controversial six-point political and economic 
program for East Pakistani provincial autonomy. The six points 
consisted of the following demands: that the government be 
federal and parliamentary in nature, its members elected by 
universal adult suffrage with legislative representation on the 
basis of distribution of population; that the federal government 
have principal responsibility for foreign affairs and defense 
only; that each wing have its own currency and separate fiscal 
accounts; that taxation occur at the provincial level, with a fed- 
eral government funded by constitutionally guaranteed grants; 
that each federal unit control its own earnings of foreign 
exchange; and that each unit raise its own militia or paramili- 
tary forces. 

Ayub Khan also lost the services of Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Bhutto, who resigned, became a vocal opposition 
leader, and founded the Pakistan People's Party (PPP — see 
Pakistan People's Party, ch. 4). By 1968 it was obvious that 
except for the military and the civil service, Ayub had lost most 



53 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

of his support. Ayub's illness in February 1968 and the alleged 
corruption of members of his family further weakened his posi- 
tion. In West Pakistan, Bhutto's PPP called for a "revolution"; in 
the east, the Awami League's six points became the rallying cry 
of the opposition. 

In October 1968, the government sponsored a celebration 
called the Decade of Development. Instead of reminding peo- 
ple of the achievements of the Ayub Khan regime, the festivi- 
ties highlighted the frustrations of the urban poor afflicted by 
inflation and the costs of the 1965 war. For the masses, x\yub 
Khan had become the symbol of inequality. Bhutto capitalized 
on this and challenged Ayub at the ballot box. In East Pakistan, 
dissatisfaction with the system went deeper than opposition to 
Ayub Khan. In January 1969, several opposition parties formed 
the Democratic Action Committee with the declared aim of 
restoring democracy through a mass movement. 

Ayub Khan reacted by alternating conciliation and repres- 
sion. Disorder spread. The army moved into Karachi, Lahore, 
Peshawar, Dhaka, and Khulna to restore order. In rural areas of 
East Pakistan, a curfew was ineffective; local officials sensed 
government control ebbing and began retreating from the 
incipient peasant revolt. In February, Ayub released political 
prisoners, invited the Democratic Action Committee and oth- 
ers to meet him in Rawalpindi, promised a new constitution, 
and said he would not stand for reelection in 1970. Still in poor 
health and lacking the confidence of his generals, Ayub Khan 
sought a political settlement as violence continued. 

On March 25, 1969, martial law was again proclaimed; Gene- 
ral Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, the army commander in 
chief, was designated chief martial law administrator. The 1962 
constitution was abrogated, Ayub Khan announced his resigna- 
tion, and Yahya Khan assumed the presidency. Yahya soon 
promised elections on the basis of adult franchise to the 
National Assembly, which would draw up a new constitution. 
He also entered into discussions with leaders of political par- 
ties. 

Yahya Khan and Bangladesh 

The new administration formed a committee of deputy and 
provincial martial law administrators that functioned above the 
civil machinery of government. The generals held power and 
were no longer the supporting arm of the civilians — elected or 
bureaucratic — as they had been throughout much of the coun- 



54 



Historical Setting 



try's history. In the past, every significant change of govern- 
ment had relied, in large part, on the allegiance of the military. 
However, Yahya Khan and his military advisers proved no more 
capable of overcoming the nation's problems than their prede- 
cessors. The attempt to establish a military hierarchy running 
parallel to and supplanting the authority of the civilian admin- 
istration inevitably ruptured the bureaucratic-military alliance, 
on which efficiency and stability depended. Little effort was 
made to promote a national program. 

These weaknesses were not immediately apparent but 
became so as events moved quickly toward a crisis in East Paki- 
stan. On November 28, 1969, Yahya Khan made a nationwide 
broadcast announcing his proposals for a return to constitu- 
tional government. General elections for the National Assem- 
bly were set for October 5, 1970, but were postponed to 
December as the result of a severe cyclone that hit the coast of 
East Pakistan. The National Assembly was obliged within 120 
days to draw up a new constitution, which would permit maxi- 
mum provincial autonomy. Yahya, however, made it clear that 
the federal government would require powers of taxation well 
beyond those contemplated by the six points of the Awami 
League. He also reserved the right to "authenticate" the consti- 
tution. On July 1, 1970, the One Unit Plan was dissolved into 
the four original provinces. Yahya Khan also determined that 
the parity of representation in the National Assembly between 
the East Wing and the West Wing that had existed under the 
1956 and 1962 constitutions would end and that representa- 
tion would be based on population. This arrangement gave 
East Pakistan 162 seats (plus seven reserved for women) versus 
138 seats (plus six for women) for the new provinces of the 
West Wing. 

An intense election campaign took place in 1970 as restric- 
tions on press, speech, and assembly were removed. Bhutto 
campaigned in the West Wing on a strongly nationalist and left- 
ist platform. The slogan of his party was "Islam our Faith, 
Democracy our Polity, Socialism our Economy." He said that 
the PPP would provide "roti, kapra, aur makhan (bread, cloth- 
ing, and shelter) to all. He also proclaimed a "thousand year 
war with India," although this pronouncement was played 
down later in the campaign. In the East Wing, the Awami 
League gained widespread support for the six-point program. 
Its cause was further strengthened because West Pakistani poli- 



55 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

ticians were perceived as callously indifferent to the Bengali 
victims of the October cyclone and slow to come to their aid. 

The first general election conducted in Pakistan on the basis 
of one person, one vote, was held on December 7, 1970; elec- 
tions to provincial legislative assemblies followed three days 
later. The voting was heavy. Yahya Khan kept his promise of 
free and fair elections. The Awami League won a colossal vic- 
tory in East Pakistan, for it was directly elected to 160 of the 
162 seats in the east and thus gained a majority of the 300 
directly elected seats in the National Assembly (plus the thir- 
teen indirectly elected seats for women, bringing the total to 
313 members) without winning a seat in the West Wing (see 
Yahya Khan, 1969-71, ch. 4). The PPP won a large majority in 
the West Wing, especially in Punjab and Sindh, but no seats in 
the East Wing. In the North-West Frontier Province and 
Balochistan, the National Awami Party won a plurality of the 
seats. The Muslim League and the Islamic parties did poorly in 
the west and were not represented in the east. 

Any constitutional agreement clearly depended on the con- 
sent of three persons: Mujib of the East Wing, Bhutto of the 
West Wing, and Yahya Khan as the ultimate authenticator rep- 
resenting the military government. In his role as intermediary 
and head of state, Yahya tried to persuade Bhutto and Mujib to 
come to some kind of accommodation. This effort proved 
unsuccessful as Mujib insisted on his right as leader of the 
majority to form a government — a stand at variance with 
Bhutto, who claimed there were "two majorities" in Pakistan. 
Bhutto declared that the PPP would not attend the inaugural 
session of the assembly, thereby making the establishment of 
civilian government impossible. On March 1, 1971, Yahya 
Khan, who earlier had referred to Mujib as the "future prime 
minister of Pakistan," dissolved his civilian cabinet and 
declared an indefinite postponement of the National Assembly. 
In East Pakistan, the reaction was immediate. Strikes, demon- 
strations, and civil disobedience increased in tempo until there 
was open revolt. Prodded by Mujib, Bengalis declared they 
would pay no taxes and would ignore martial law regulations 
on press and radio censorship. The writ of the central govern- 
ment all but ceased to exist in East Pakistan. 

Mujib, Bhutto, and Yahya Khan held negotiations in Dhaka 
in late March in a last-ditch attempt to defuse the growing cri- 
sis; simultaneously, General Tikka Khan, who commanded the 
Pakistani forces in East Pakistan, prepared a contingency plan 



56 



Historical Setting 



for a military takeover and called for troop reinforcements to 
be flown in via Sri Lanka. In an atmosphere of distrust and sus- 
picion, the talks broke down, and on March 25 Yahya Khan and 
Bhutto flew back to West Pakistan. 

Tikka Khan's emergency plan went into operation. Road- 
blocks and barriers appeared all over Dhaka. Mujib was taken 
into custody and flown to the West Wing to stand trial for trea- 
son. Universities were attacked, and the first of many deaths 
occurred. The tempo of violence of the military crackdown 
during these first days soon accelerated into a full-blown and 
brutal civil war. 

On March 26, Yahya Khan outlawed the Awami League, 
banned political activity, and reimposed press censorship in 
both wings. Because of these strictures, people in the West 
Wing remained uninformed about the crackdown in the east 
and tended to discount reports appearing in the international 
press as an Indian conspiracy. 

Major Ziaur Rahman, a political unknown at the time, pro- 
claimed the independence of Bangladesh from Chittagong, a 
city in the southeast of the new country. He would become 
president of Bangladesh in April 1977. A Bangladeshi govern- 
ment-in-exile was formed in Calcutta. 

Ziaur Rahman and others organized Bengali troops to form 
the Mukti Bahini (Liberation Force) to resist the Pakistan 
Army. The East Pakistan Rifles, a paramilitary force, mutinied 
and joined the revolutionary forces. Nevertheless, the Pakistan 
Army pressed its heavy offensive and in early April controlled 
most of East Pakistan. More than 250,000 refugees crossed into 
India in the first few days of the war. The influx continued over 
the next six months and reached a total of about 10 million. 
No accurate estimate can be made of the numbers of people 
killed or wounded or the numbers of women raped, but the 
assessment of international human rights organizations is that 
the Pakistani crackdown was particularly alarming in its feroc- 
ity. 

Relations between Pakistan and India, already tense, deterio- 
rated sharply as a result of the crisis. On March 31, the Indian 
parliament passed a resolution in support of the "people of 
Bengal." The Mukti Bahini, formed around regular and para- 
military forces, received equipment, training, and other assis- 
tance from India. Superpower rivalries further complicated the 
situation, impinged on Pakistan's war, and possibly impeded its 
political resolution. 



57 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

In the fall, military and guerrilla operations increased, and 
Pakistan and India reported escalation of border shelling. On 
the western border of East Pakistan, military preparations were 
also in evidence. On November 21, the Mukti Bahini launched 
an offensive onjessore, southwest of Dhaka. Yahya Khan 
declared a state of emergency in all of Pakistan on November 
23 and asked his people to prepare for war. In response to 
Indian military movements along and across the Indian-East 
Pakistani border, the Pakistan Air Force attacked military tar- 
gets in northern India on December 3, and on December 4 
India began an integrated ground, naval, and air invasion of 
East Pakistan. The Indian army launched a five-pronged attack 
and began converging on Dhaka. Indian forces closed in 
around Dhaka and received the surrender of Pakistani forces 
on December 16. Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi pro- 
claimed a unilateral cease-fire on December 17. 

Violent demonstrations against the military government 
soon broke out at the news of Pakistan's defeat. Yahya Khan 
resigned on December 20. Bhutto assumed power as president 
and chief martial law administrator of a disgraced military, a 
shattered government, and a bewildered and demoralized pop- 
ulation. Formal relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh 
were not established until 1976. 

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and a New Constitutional System 

On assuming power on December 20, 1971, Bhutto prom- 
ised to make a new Pakistan out of the West Wing and to 
restore national confidence. He conveniently laid the entire 
blame for the 1971 war and Pakistan's defeat on Yahya Khan 
and his junta. Asserting the principle of civilian leadership, 
Bhutto introduced a new constitution with a modified parlia- 
mentary and federal system. He attempted to control and 
reform the civil service and took steps to revitalize a stagnant 
economy and ameliorate conditions for the poor under the 
banner of Islamic socialism. Bhutto's most visible success, how- 
ever, was in the international arena, where he employed his 
diplomatic skills. He negotiated a satisfactory peace settlement 
with India in 1972, built new links between Pakistan and the 
oil-exporting Islamic countries to the west, and generally was 
effective in repairing Pakistan's image in the aftermath of the 
war. 

Bhutto's program appeared to be laudable but fell short in 
performance. His near-monopoly of decision-making power 



58 



Historical Setting 



prevented democratic institutions from taking root, and his 
overreaching ambitions managed in time to antagonize all but 
his closest friends. 

The PPP manifesto was couched in socialist terms. When 
Bhutto issued the Economic Reform Order on January 3, 1972, 
banking and insurance institutions were nationalized, and sev- 
enty other industrial enterprises were taken over by the govern- 
ment. The Ministry of Production, which incorporated the 
Board of Industrial Management, was established to oversee 
industry. Investment in the public sector increased substan- 
tially, and Bhutto maneuvered to break the power of the 
approximately twenty elite families who had dominated the 
nation's economy during the Ayub Khan period. Trade unions 
were strengthened, and welfare measures for labor were 
announced. Although Bhutto's initial zeal diminished as he 
came face-to-face with economic realities and the shortage of 
capital, he tried to refurbish his populist image with another 
spate of nationalizations in 1976. 

Bhutto purged the military ranks of about 1 ,400 officers. He 
also created a paramilitary force called the Federal Security 
Force (which functioned almost as his personal bodyguard), a 
watchdog on the armed forces, and an internal security force. 
A white paper on defense issued in 1976 firmly subordinated 
the armed forces to civilian control and gave Bhutto, then also 
prime minister, the decisive voice in all matters relating to 
national security. In that role, Bhutto took credit for bringing 
home more than 90,000 prisoners of war without allowing any 
of them to come to trial in Bangladesh for war crimes. In 1976 
Bhutto replaced Tikka Khan, whose term had expired, with 
General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq as chief of staff of the army. 
Like Ayub Khan, Zia was appointed over several more senior 
generals. Also like Ayub, Zia came from a community not 
heavily represented in the armed forces (the Arains from Pun- 
jab) and was thought to be without political ambition. 

In April 1972, Bhutto lifted martial law and convened the 
National Assembly, which consisted of members elected from 
the West Wing in December 1970 (plus two from the East Wing 
who decided their loyalties were with a united Pakistan) . The 
standing controversies about the role of Islam, provincial 
autonomy, and the form of government — presidential or par- 
liamentary — remained on the agenda. There was much jostling 
for position among the three major political groups: the PPP, 
most powerful in Punjab and Sindh, and the National Awami 



59 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

Party (NAP) and the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI), both based 
in the North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan. The pro- 
vincial assemblies were constituted from those elected in 
December 1970. There was much tension during the process of 
drafting a new constitution, especially from members from the 
North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan. Bhutto reached 
some accommodation with opposition leaders from those two 
provinces on the matter of gubernatorial appointment and 
constitutional principle. 

Pakistan's third indigenous constitution was formally submit- 
ted on December 31, 1972, approved on April 10, 1973, and 
promulgated on independence day, August 14, 1973. Although 
Bhutto campaigned in 1970 for the restoration of a parliamen- 
tary system, by 1972 he preferred a presidential system with 
himself as president. However, in deference to the wishes of the 
opposition and some in his own cabinet, Bhutto accepted a for- 
mal parliamentary system in which the executive was responsi- 
ble to the legislature. The unicameral parliament was changed 
to a bicameral legislature, consisting of the Senate, or upper 
house, and the National Assembly, or lower house. Purportedly 
in the interests of government stability, provisions were also 
included that made it almost impossible for the National 
Assembly to remove the prime minister. The 1973 constitution 
provided for a federal structure in which residuary powers were 
reserved for the provinces. However, Bhutto dismissed the coa- 
lition NAP-JUI ministries in Balochistan and the North-West 
Frontier Province, revealing his preference for a powerful cen- 
ter without opposition in the provinces. 

Bhutto's power derived less from the 1973 constitution than 
from his charismatic appeal to the people and from the vigor 
of the PPP. Its socialist program and Bhutto's oratory had done 
much to radicalize the urban sectors in the late 1960s and were 
responsible for the popular optimism accompanying the resto- 
ration of democracy. The ideological appeal of the PPP to the 
masses sat uneasily with the compromises Bhutto reached with 
the holders of economic and political influence — the landlords 
and commercial elites. Factionalism and patrimonialism 
became rife in the PPP, especially in Punjab. The internal cohe- 
sion of the PPP and its standing in public esteem were affected 
adversely by the ubiquitous political and bureaucratic corrup- 
tion that accompanied state intervention in the economy and, 
equally, by the rising incidence of political violence, which 
included beating, arresting, and even murdering opponents. 



60 



Historical Setting 



The PPP had started as a movement mobilizing people to over- 
throw a military regime, but in Bhutto's lifetime it failed to 
change into a political party organized for peaceful function- 
ing in an open polity. 

Bhutto's predilection for a strong center and for provincial 
governments in the hands of the PPP inevitably aroused oppo- 
sition in provinces where regional and ethnic identity was 
strong. Feelings of Sindhi solidarity were maintained by 
Bhutto's personal connections with the feudal leaders (wadera) 
of Sindh and his ability to manipulate offices and officehold- 
ers. He did not enjoy the same leverage in the North-West 
Frontier Province or Balochistan. 

A long-dormant crisis erupted in Balochistan in 1973 into an 
insurgency that lasted four years and became increasingly bit- 
ter. The insurgency was put down by the Pakistan Army, which 
employed brutal methods and equipment, including 
Huey-Cobra helicopter gunships, provided by Iran and flown 
by Iranian pilots. The deep-seated Baloch nationalism based on 
tribal identity had international as well as domestic aspects. 
Divided in the nineteenth century among Iran, Afghanistan, 
and British India, the Baloch found their aspirations and tradi- 
tional nomadic life frustrated by the presence of national 
boundaries and the extension of central administration over 
their lands. Moreover, many of the most militant Baloch 
nationalists were also vaguely Marxist-Leninist and willing to 
risk Soviet protection for an autonomous Balochistan. As the 
insurgency wore on, the influence of a relatively small but disci- 
plined liberation front seemed to increase. 

Bhutto was able to mobilize domestic support for his drive 
against the Baloch. Punjab's support was most tangibly repre- 
sented in the use of the army to put down the insurgency. One 
of the main Baloch grievances was the influx of Punjabi set- 
tlers, miners, and traders into their resource-rich but sparsely 
populated lands. Bhutto could also invoke the idea of national 
integration with effect in the aftermath of Bengali secession. 
External assistance to Bhutto was generously given by the shah 
of Iran, who feared a spread of the insurrection among the Ira- 
nian Baloch. Some foreign governments feared that an inde- 
pendent or autonomous Balochistan might allow the Soviet 
Union to develop and use the port at Gwadar, and no outside 
power was willing to assist the Baloch openly or to sponsor the 
cause of Baloch autonomy. During the mid-1970s, Afghanistan 
was preoccupied with its own internal problems and seemingly 



61 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

anxious to normalize relations with Pakistan. India was fearful 
of further balkanization of the subcontinent after Bangladesh, 
and the Soviet Union did not wish to jeopardize the leverage it 
was gaining with Pakistan. However, during the Bhutto regime 
hostilities in Balochistan were protracted. The succeeding Zia 
ul-Haq government took a more moderate approach, relying 
more on economic development to placate the Baloch. 

Bhutto proceeded cautiously in the field of land reform and 
did not fulfill earlier promises of distributing land to the land- 
less on the scale he had promised, as he was forced to recog- 
nize and to cultivate the sociopolitical influence of landowners. 
However, he did not impede the process of consolidation of 
tenancy rights and acquisition of mid-sized holdings by service- 
men. Punjab was the vital agricultural region of Pakistan; it 
remained a bastion of support for the government. 

Bhutto specifically targeted the powerful and privileged Civil 
Service of Pakistan (CSP) and introduced measures of adminis- 
trative reform with the declared purpose of limiting the pater- 
nalistic power of the bureaucracy. The CSP, however, had 
played the role of guardian alongside the army since indepen- 
dence. Many of its members reacted badly to Bhutto's politiciz- 
ing appointments, for which patronage seemed a more 
important criterion than merit or seniority. 

Relations with India were, at best, uneven during the Bhutto 
period. He accomplished the return of the prisoners of war 
through the Simla Agreement of 1972, but no settlement of the 
key problem of Kashmir was possible beyond an agreement 
that any settlement should be peaceful. Bhutto reacted strongly 
to the detonation of a nuclear device by India in 1974 and 
pledged that Pakistan would match that development even if 
Pakistanis had to "eat grass" to cover the cost. 

Bhutto claimed success for his economic policies. The gross 
national product (GNP — see Glossary) and the rate of eco- 
nomic growth climbed. Inflation fell from 25 percent in fiscal 
year (FY — see Glossary) 1972 to 6 percent in FY 1976, although 
other economic measures he introduced did not perform as 
well. 

Bhutto pointed out that his foreign policy had brought Paki- 
stan prestige in the Islamic world, peace if not friendship with 
India, and self-respect in dealings with the great powers. He felt 
assured of victory in any election. Therefore, with the commit- 
ment to a constitutional order at stake, in January 1977 he 



62 



Historical Setting 



announced he would hold national and provincial assembly 
elections in March. 

The response of the opposition to this news was vigorous. 
Nine political parties ranging across the ideological spectrum 
formed a united front — the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) . 
Fundamentalist Muslims were satisfied by the adoption of 
Nizam-i-Mustafa (see Glossary), meaning "Rule of the 
Prophet," as the front's slogan. Modern secular elements, how- 
ever, respected the association of Air Marshal Asghar Khan. 
The PNA ran candidates for almost all national and provincial 
seats. As curbs on the press and political activity were relaxed 
for the election campaign, an apparently strong wave of sup- 
port for the PNA swept Pakistan's cities. This prompted a whirl- 
wind tour of the country by Bhutto, with all his winning charm 
in the forefront. In the background lurked indirect curbs on 
free expression as well as political gangsterism. 

National Assembly election results were announced on 
March 7, proclaiming the PPP the winner with 155 seats versus 
thirty-six seats for the PNA. Expecting trouble, Bhutto invoked 
Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which 
restricted assembly for political reasons. The PNA immediately 
challenged the election results as rigged and demanded a new 
election — not a recount. Bhutto refused, and a mass protest 
movement was launched against him. Religious symbols were 
used by both sides to mobilize agitation; for example, Bhutto 
imposed prohibitions on the consumption of alcoholic bever- 
ages and on gambling. Despite talks between Bhutto and oppo- 
sition leaders, the disorders persisted as a multitude of 
frustrations were vented. The army intervened on July 5 and 
took all political leaders, including Bhutto, into custody. 

Zia ul-Haq and Military Domination, 1977-88 

General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, chief of the army staff, took 
control of Pakistan by proclaiming martial law, beginning the 
longest period of rule by a single leader in Pakistan's history. It 
ended only with his death in a still-unexplained aircraft crash 
on August 17, 1988. President Fazal Elahi Chaudhry remained 
in office until his term expired in September 1978, when Zia 
assumed that office in addition to his role as chief martial law 
administrator. 

In announcing his takeover of the government, Zia stated 
that he had taken action only in order to hold new elections for 
national and provincial assemblies within ninety days. Political 



63 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

parties were not banned, and nominations were filed for seats. 
The country expected that a new "free and fair" poll would 
take place. It did not. Zia canceled the elections because, he 
said, it was his responsibility first to carry out a program of 
"accountability"; he had "unexpectedly" found "irregularities" 
in the previous regime. As a result, a number of "white papers" 
on topics ranging from fraud in the 1977 elections, to abuses 
by the Federal Security Force, and to Bhutto's manipulation of 
the press were generated. The attacks on the Bhutto adminis- 
tration increased as time passed and culminated in the trial 
and the hanging in April 1979 of Bhutto for complicity in the 
murder of a political opponent. 

After elections were canceled by decree on March 1, 1978, 
Zia banned all political activity, although political parties were 
not banned. The same month, some 200 journalists were 
arrested, and a number of newspapers were shut down. Zia, 
however, maintained that there would be elections sometime in 
1979. Members of some of the PNA parties, including the 
Jamaat-i-Islami and the Pakistan Muslim League, joined Zia's 
cabinet as he tried to give a civilian cast to his government. But 
suppression of the PPP continued, and at times Bhutto's widow, 
Nusrat, and his daughter, Benazir, were placed under house 
arrest or jailed. Elections for local bodies were held in Septem- 
ber 1979 on a nonparty basis, a system Zia continued in the 
1985 national and provincial elections. Many of those elected 
locally identified themselves as Awami Dost (Friends of the 
People) , a designation well known as a synonym for the PPP. 
Zia announced national and provincial elections for November 
17 and 20, 1979, respectively, but these, too, were canceled. 
Many thought that the showing of the Awami Dost made him 
fear that a substantial number of PPP sympathizers would be 
elected. As further restrictions were placed on political activity, 
parties were also banned. 

On February 6, 1981, the PPP — officially "defunct," as were 
the other parties — and several other parties joined to form the 
Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. Its demands were 
simple: an end to martial law and a call to hold elections under 
the suspended 1973 constitution. The Movement for the Resto- 
ration of Democracy demonstrated from time to time against 
Zia's government, especially in August 1983, but Zia was able to 
withstand its demands. Many of the leaders spent time in jail. 

Nusrat Bhutto brought a suit protesting the martial law take- 
over. The Supreme Court ruled against her and invoked once 



64 



Historical Setting 



again the "doctrine of necessity," permitting the regime to "per- 
form all such acts and promulgate all measures, which [fall] 
within the scope of the law of necessity, including the power to 
amend the Constitution." After this ruling, Zia issued the Provi- 
sional Constitutional Order of 1980, which excluded all martial 
law actions from the jurisdiction of the courts. When the 
Quetta High Court ruled that this order was beyond the power 
of the martial law regime, the Provisional Constitutional Order 
of 1981 was issued. This order required all judges of the 
Supreme Court and high courts to take new oaths in which 
they swore to act in accordance with the orders. Several judges 
refused to do so and resigned. 

In February 1982, in an unsatisfactory response to the 
demand for elections, Zia created an appointed Majlis-i-Shoora 
(Council of Advisers), claiming that this was the pattern of 
Islamic law. The body was clearly unrepresentative and had no 
powers of legislation. It served merely as a tame debating body. 

The Islamization of Pakistan was another of Zia's goals. In 
1978 he announced that Pakistani law would be based on 
Nizam-i-Mustafa, one of the demands of the PNA in the 1977 
election. This requirement meant that any laws passed by legis- 
lative bodies had to conform to Islamic law and any passed pre- 
viously would be nullified if they were repugnant to Islamic law. 
Nizam-i-Mustafa raised several problems. Most Pakistanis are 
Sunni, but there is a substantial minority of Shia whose inter- 
pretation of Islamic law differs in some important aspects from 
that of the Sunnis. Zia's introduction of state collection of zakat 
(see Glossary) was strongly protested by the Shia, and after they 
demonstrated in Islamabad, the rules were modified in 1981 
for Shia adherents. There were also major differences in the 
views held by the ulama in the interpretation of what consti- 
tuted nonconformity and repugnance in Islam (see Islam in 
Pakistani Society, ch. 2) . 

In 1979 Zia decreed the establishment of shariat courts to try 
cases under Islamic law. A year later, Islamic punishments were 
assigned to various violations (hudood — see Glossary), includ- 
ing drinking alcoholic beverages, theft, prostitution, fornica- 
tion, adultery, and bearing false witness. Zia also began a 
process for the eventual Islamization of the financial system 
aimed at "eliminating that which is forbidden and establishing 
that which is enjoined by Islam." Of special concern to Zia was 
the Islamic prohibition on interest, or riba (sometimes trans- 
lated as usury) (see Monetary Process, ch. 3) . 



65 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

Women's groups feared that Zia would repeal the Muslim 
Family Laws Ordinance of 1961, but he did not. The ordinance 
provided women critical access to basic legal protection, 
including, among other things, the right to divorce, support, 
and inheritance, and it placed limitations on polygyny. Still, 
women found unfair the rules of evidence under Islamic law by 
which women frequently were found guilty of adultery or forni- 
cation when in fact they had been raped. They also opposed 
rules that in some cases equated the testimony of two women 
with that of one man. 

After the 1985 election, two members of the Senate from the 
Jamaat-i-Islami introduced legislation to make the sharia the 
basic law of Pakistan, placing it above the constitution and 
other legislation. The bill also would have added the ulama to 
the sharia courts and would have prohibited appeals from 
these courts from going to the Supreme Court. The bill did not 
pass in 1985, but after the dismissal of Prime Minister Junejo 
and the dissolution of the national and provincial assemblies in 
1988, Zia enacted the bill by ordinance. The ordinance died 
when it was not approved by the parliament during the first 
prime ministership of Benazir Bhutto (December 1988-August 
1990), but a revised Shariat Bill was passed by the government 
of Mian Nawaz Sharif (November 1990-July 1993) in May 1991. 

Provincialism increased during Zia's tenure. He handled the 
problem of unrest in Balochistan more successfully than had 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Zia used various schemes of economic 
development to assuage the Baloch and was successful to a 
high degree. The North-West Frontier Province, alarmed at the 
presence of Soviet troops next door after the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in December 1979, remained relatively quiet. But 
the long-festering division between Sindhis and non-Sindhis 
exploded into violence in Sindh. The muhajirs formed new 
organizations, the most significant being the Refugee People's 
Movement (Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz). The incendiary tensions 
resulted not only from Sindhi-muhajir opposition but also from 
Sindhi fear of others who had moved into the province, includ- 
ing Baloch, Pakhtuns, and Punjabis. The fact that Sindhi was 
becoming the mother tongue of fewer and fewer people of 
Sindh was also resented. The violence escalated in the late 
1980s to the extent that some compared Karachi and Hydera- 
bad to the Beirut of that period. The growth of the illicit drug 
industry also added to the ethnic problem. 



66 



The Badshahi Mosque, built by the Mughals in the seventeenth century, 

as seen from Lahore Fort 
Courtesy Embassy of Pakistan, Washington 

Pressure on Zia to hold elections mounted, and some of it 
came from overseas, including from the United States. In 1984 
Zia announced that elections to legislative bodies would be 
held in 1985, and this time the schedule held. 

Zia decided to restore the separate electorates, abandoned 
under Ayub Khan. In the National Assembly, ten of the 217 
directly elected seats were set aside for minorities: four each for 
Hindus and Christians and one each for Ahmadiyyas and "oth- 
ers," including Parsis, Sikhs, and Buddhists. There were also 
twenty indirectly elected seats reserved for women, although 
women could run for directly elected seats. Zia decided that 
parties would not be permitted to participate. Each candidate, 
therefore, would be an "independent." 

Before the general elections, Zia held a national referendum 
ostensibly seeking a mandate to continue in office as president. 



67 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

The referendum, on December 19, 1984, focused on Pakistan's 
Islamization program. The electorate was asked simply if it felt 
the government was doing a good job of Islamizing the various 
social institutions of the state. Zia interpreted the positive 
results (98 percent voting "yes") to mean that he had received 
the right to a new five-year term as head of state. There was, 
however, little doubt that the vote was rigged. 

After the "election," which most PPP supporters boycotted, 
Zia announced the appointment of Mohammad Khan Junejo 
as prime minister, subject to a vote of confidence in the 
National Assembly. Junejo, a Sindhi, took office on March 23, 
1985. Zia issued the Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order, 
which was a misnomer. The constitution was so vastiy changed 
by various decrees that it was much different from the one 
enacted by the Bhutto regime. In the 1973 document, power 
had been in the hands of the prime minister; by 1985 it was in 
the hands of the president. 

Zia promised to end martial law by the end of 1985, but he 
exacted a high price for this. The Eighth Amendment to the 
constitution confirmed and legalized all acts taken under mar- 
tial law, including changes to the constitution. It affirmed the 
right of the president to appoint and dismiss the prime minis- 
ter. With the amendment passed, Zia ended martial law in late 
1985. Political parties were revived. In 1986 Junejo became 
president of a reconstituted Pakistan Muslim League. The PPP, 
although self-excluded from the National Assembly, also 
resumed activity under the leadership of Benazir Bhutto. 

Junejo, however, was not able to accomplish all of Zia's 
agenda. For example, his government did not pass the Shariat 
Bill. It allowed the resumption of political parties, a step not 
welcomed by Zia, who saw parties as divisive in what should be a 
united Islamic community. Nonetheless, the dismissal of Junejo 
on May 29, 1988, and the dissolution of the national and pro- 
vincial assemblies the next day, came as a surprise. In explain- 
ing his action, Zia pointed to the failure to carry Islamization 
forward and also to corruption, deterioration of law and order, 
and mismanagement of the economy. Another important rea- 
son for Junejo's dismissal was his interference in army promo- 
tions and his call for an investigation into an arsenal explosion 
near Islamabad; civilians were not expected to meddle in mili- 
tary affairs. 

Zia procrastinated on calling new elections, which even his 
own version of the constitution required within ninety days. He 



68 



Historical Setting 



finally set November 17, 1988, as the polling date for the 
National Assembly, with provincial elections three days later. 
His reasons for the delay were the holy month of Muharram, 
which fell in August during the hot weather, and the lack of 
current electoral registrations (a point he blamed on Junejo). 
Despite the open operation of political parties, Zia indicated 
that elections would again be on a nonparty basis. Before elec- 
tions took place, Zia was killed in an explosion aboard his air- 
plane near Bahawalpur, in Punjab, on August 17, 1988, along 
with the chairman of the joint chiefs committee, the United 
States ambassador, and twenty-seven others. A joint United 
States-Pakistani committee investigating the accident later 
established that the crash was caused by "a criminal act of sabo- 
tage perpetrated in the aircraft." 

Court actions ended the nonparty basis for the elections, 
and parties were permitted to participate. A technicality — the 
failure to register as a political party — that would have prohib- 
ited the PPP from taking part was also voided. The election 
gave a plurality, not a majority, to the PPP. Its leader, Benazir 
Bhutto, was able to gain the assistance of other groups, and she 
was sworn in as prime minister on December 1, 1988, by acting 
President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. He in turn was elected to a 
five-year term as president by the National Assembly and the 
Senate. 

Pakistan and the World During the Zia Regime 

When Zia assumed power in mid-1977, Pakistan was out of 
the limelight and indeed was considered by some observers to 
be a political backwater. By the time of Zia's death in 1988, 
however, it had, because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
in 1979, become an important actor occupying a central posi- 
tion in the world arena. 

Although Zulifqar Ali Bhutto had tried to redirect Pakistan's 
regional orientation toward West Asia and Zia continued this 
trend, the nation's geostrategic interests dictated a concentra- 
tion on South Asia. Pakistan's foreign policy was very much 
centered on India. Less than two years after Zia's assumption of 
power, Congress, led by Indira Gandhi, was voted out of office 
and replaced by the Janata Party, whose foreign minister was 
Atal Behari Vajpayee of the Jana Sangh, long seen as 
anti-Pakistan. Nonetheless, relations between Pakistan and 
India may have reached their most cordial level during the 
almost three years Janata was in power. Vajpayee visited Paki- 



69 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

stan in February 1978. There were exchanges on many issues, 
and agreements were signed on trade, cultural exchanges, and 
communications — but not on such key issues as Kashmir and 
nuclear development. 

The nuclear issue was of critical importance to both Pakistan 
and India. In 1974 India successfully tested a nuclear "device." 
Bhutto reacted strongly to this test and said Pakistan must 
develop its own "Islamic bomb." Zia thus inherited a pledge 
that for domestic reasons he could not discard, and he contin- 
ued the development program. He asked India to agree to sev- 
eral steps to end this potential nuclear arms race on the 
subcontinent. One of these measures was the simultaneous 
signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The second 
step was a joint agreement for inspection of all nuclear sites by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency. Pakistan also pro- 
posed a pact between the two countries to allow for mutual 
inspection of sites. And, finally, Pakistan proposed a South 
Asian nuclear-free zone. It appeared that Zia was looking for a 
way to terminate the costly Pakistani program. But in order to 
sell this idea in Pakistan, he required some concessions from 
India. Termination would also get him out of difficulties the 
program was causing with the United States, including the cur- 
tailment of aid in 1979. These proposals were still on the table 
in the early 1990s and were supplemented by then Prime Minis- 
ter Nawaz Sharif s call for a roundtable discussion among Paki- 
stan, India, the United States, Russia, and China on nuclear 
weapons in South Asia (see The Armed Forces in a New World 
Order, ch. 5). 

Not all relations within South Asia were negative. President 
Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh proposed an organization for 
South Asian cooperation. Pakistan was at first reluctant, fearing 
Indian domination, but eventually agreed to join the group, 
along with Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri 
Lanka. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC — see Glossary) was formally inaugurated at a summit 
meeting in Dhaka in 1985. There have been some positive steps 
toward cooperation, and regular rotating summits are held, 
although often with some delays. 

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India (1984-89) came to 
Islamabad in 1988 to attend a SAARC summit, the first visit of 
an Indian prime minister since 1960, when Nehru signed the 
Indus Waters Treaty. Zia stopped briefly in New Delhi in 
December 1985, and in February 1987 he visited again, having 



70 



Historical Setting 



invited himself to see a cricket match between the two coun- 
tries. Zia's estimation was that he and Rajiv could meet quite 
cordially but could not agree on substantive issues. 

Active and potential conflict continued to be a constant fac- 
tor in Pakistan's relations with India. The dispute over the pre- 
cise demarcation of the Line of Control, confirmed under the 
1972 Simla Agreement, in Kashmir at the Siachen Glacier 
heated up periodically and over time caused substantial casual- 
ties on both sides because of numerous small skirmishes and 
the extreme cold in the remote area. Also, in the winter of 
1986-87 the Indian army conducted Operation Brass Tacks, 
maneuvers close to the Pakistan border, and Pakistan mobi- 
lized its forces. However, the dangerous situation was defused, 
and no hostilities took place. India accused Pakistan of aiding 
Sikh insurgents in India's state of Punjab. Pakistan denied this 
accusation, but some people thought that Operation Brass 
Tacks might have been a means to strike at alleged bases in 
Pakistan's Punjab Province. Zia skillfully handled the diplo- 
macy during the period of tension (see Pakistan Becomes a 
Frontline State, ch. 5). 

Zia continued the process, begun by Bhutto, of opening 
Pakistan to the West and drew on Pakistan's Islamic, trade, and 
military ties to the Middle East. Military ties included station- 
ing Pakistani troops in Saudi Arabia and training missions in 
several other countries. Remittances from Pakistanis employed 
as migrant workers in the Middle East, especially in the Persian 
Gulf area, increased during the Zia years and became an 
important factor in Pakistan's foreign-exchange holdings (see 
Labor, ch. 3). 

Zia played a prominent role in the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) . A Pakistani was secretary general of 
the OIC, and Zia served on committees concerning the status 
of Jerusalem and the settlement of the Iran-Iraq War (1980- 
88), neither of which were successful. At the 1984 summit at 
Casablanca, Zia played a key role in the readmission of Egypt to 
the OIC and, in doing so, reminded his fellow heads of govern- 
ment that the organization was one for the entire Muslim com- 
munity and not only for Arab states. 

The United States under the administration of Jimmy Carter 
did not welcome the displacement of Bhutto by Zia; represen- 
tative government, human rights, and nuclear nonprolifera- 
tion were also of concern to Carter. The execution of Bhutto 



71 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

only added to the United States displeasure with Zia and Paki- 
stan. 

A number of United States laws — amendments to the For- 
eign Assistance Act of 1961 — applied to Pakistan and its pro- 
gram of nuclear weapons development. The 1976 Symington 
Amendment stipulated that economic assistance be terminated 
to any country that imported uranium enrichment technology. 
The Glenn Amendment of 1977 similarly called for an end to 
aid to countries that imported reprocessing technology — Paki- 
stan had from France. United States economic assistance, 
except for food aid, was terminated under the Symington 
Amendment in April 1979. In 1985 the Solarz Amendment was 
added to prohibit aid to countries that attempt to import 
nuclear commodities from the United States. In the same year, 
the Pressler Amendment was passed; referring specifically to 
Pakistan, it said that if that nation possessed a nuclear device, 
aid would be suspended. Many of these amendments could be 
waived if the president declared that it was in the national 
interests of the United States to continue assistance. 

The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, 
causing a sudden reversal of United States policy. Carter, who 
had described Pakistan as a "frontline state" in the Cold War, 
offered US$400 million in military and economic aid to Paki- 
stan — an amount that Zia spurned and contemptuously 
termed "peanuts." 

When Ronald Reagan took office in January 1981, the level 
of assistance increased substantially. Presidential waivers for 
several of the amendments were required. The initial package 
from the United States was for US$3.2 billion over six years, 
equally divided between economic and military assistance. A 
separate arrangement was made for the purchase of forty F-16 
fighter aircraft. In 1986 a follow-on program of assistance over 
a further period of six years was announced at a total of more 
than US$4 billion, of which 57 percent was economic aid and 
the rest military aid. 

The Soviet Union, meanwhile, under its new leader, Mikhail 
S. Gorbachev, was reassessing its role in Afghanistan. Indirect 
"proximity" negotiations in Geneva under the auspices of the 
UN were going on between Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the 
United States and the Soviet Union as observers. In April 1988, 
a series of agreements were signed among the United States, 
the Soviet Union, Pakistan, and Afghanistan that called for the 



72 



Historical Setting 



withdrawal of Soviet forces by mid-February 1989. The with- 
drawal was completed on time. 

Throughout the years of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, 
relations between the United States and Pakistan were best 
characterized by close cooperation. Still, United States policy 
makers became increasingly concerned that Zia and his associ- 
ates appeared to give preferential treatment to the Islamic fun- 
damentalists, especially mujahidin leader Gulbaddin Hikmatyar. 
Other disagreements persisted, particularly over the failure of 
the Zia regime to convert to representative government. Docu- 
mented Pakistani violations of human rights were another 
major issue; Pakistani involvement in narcotics trafficking was 
yet another. But the issue that after Zia's death led to another 
cutoff of aid was Pakistan's persistent drive toward nuclear 
development. 

The events of the Zia period brought Pakistan to a leading 
position in world affairs. However, Pakistan's new visibility was 
closely connected to the supportive role it played for the anti- 
Soviet mujahidin in Afghanistan — and this decreased when the 
Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan. In the 1990s, Paki- 
stan faced some major domestic problems — mounting ethnic 
and sectarian strife as well as widespread civil disorder. Pakistan 
will need to address these problems as it strives to improve its 
international standing as a maturing democratic nation and 
one aspiring to be the industrial and technological leader of 
the Muslim world. 

* * * 

For the study of the area of present-day Pakistan in the pre- 
independence period, one must generally look to histories of 
India. The most recent survey is Stanley Wolpert's A New History 
of India. Published earlier, Percival Spear's Volume 1 and Rom- 
ila Thapar's Volume 2 of A History of India also provide valuable 
information. Vincent Arthur Smith's The Oxford History of India 
gives a detailed account of the preindependence period. Two 
dictionaries that are difficult to obtain are helpful in looking 
up specific places and people: Sachchidananda Bhattacharya's 
A Dictionary of Indian History and Parshotam Mehra's A Dictio- 
nary of Modern Indian History, 1707-1947. Particularly valuable 
is the monumental A Historical Atlas of South Asia, edited by 
Joseph E. Schwartzberg. Two classic works on the Mughal 
period are Bamber Gascoigne's The Great Moghuls and Percival 



73 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



Spear's Twilight of the Mughals. A more recent, standard work on 
the Mughals is The Mughal Empire by John F. Richards. Books 
that illuminate the Muslim movement include Peter Hardy's 
The Muslims of British India; Choudhry Khaliquzzaman's Path- 
way to Pakistan; Chaudri Muhammad Ali's The Emergence of Paki- 
stan; Gail Minault's The Khilafat Movement; David Lelyveld's 
Aligarh' s First Generation; and R.J. Moore's The Crisis of Indian 
Unity, 1917-1940. There is little biographic material except on 
Jinnah: the best sources are Stanley Wolpert's Jinnah of Pakistan 
and Ayesha Jalal's The Sole Spokesman. 

Concerning independent Pakistan during the parliamentary 
period, Keith Callard's Pakistan: A Political Study and Richard S. 
Wheeler's The Politics of Pakistan are recommended. On Ayub 
Khan, Lawrence Ziring's The Ayub Khan Era is good. Bangladesh: 
A Country Study, edited by James Heitzman and Robert L. 
Worden, provides an analysis of the history of the East Wing of 
Pakistan (1947-71). The civil war is discussed in Craig Baxter's 
Bangladesh: A New Nation in an Old Setting. Bhutto's tenure is 
described in Shahidjaved Burki's Pakistan under Bhutto, 1971- 
1977 and Stanley Wolpert's Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and 
Times. The Zia ul-Haq period is discussed in Shahidjaved Burki 
and Craig Baxter's Pakistan under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia 
ul-Haq. (For further information and complete citations, see 
Bibliography.) 



74 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 




Artist's rendition of a tile mosaic composite of a man sitting, men with a 
camel, and geometric designs from the Pictured Wall, Lahore Fort, Punjab. 
Artwork represents seventeenth-century tile work of the Mughal period. 



PAKISTANI SOCIETY IS ETHNICALLY DIVERSE yet over- 
whelmingly Muslim. It is largely rural yet beset by the problems 
of hyper urbanization. Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan 
has enjoyed a robust and expanding economy — the average 
per capita income in the early 1990s approached the transition 
line separating low-income from middle-income countries — 
but wealth is poorly distributed. A middle class is emerging, but 
a narrow stratum of elite families maintains extremely dispro- 
portionate control over the nation's wealth, and almost one- 
third of all Pakistanis live in poverty. It is a male-dominated 
society in which social development has lagged considerably 
behind economic change, as revealed by such critical indica- 
tors as sanitation, access to health care, and literacy, especially 
among females. Increasing population pressure on limited 
resources, together with this pattern of social and economic 
inequity, was causing increased disquietude within the society 
in the early 1990s. 

Pakistan was created in 1947 as a homeland for Muslims in 
South Asia, and about 97 percent of Pakistanis are Muslim. The 
founders of Pakistan hoped that religion would provide a 
coherent focus for national identity, a focus that would super- 
sede the country's considerable ethnic and linguistic differ- 
ences. Although this aspiration has not been completely 
fulfilled, Islam has been a pervasive presence in Pakistani soci- 
ety, and debate continues about its appropriate role in national 
civic life. During the 1990s, Islamic discourse has been less 
prominent in political controversy, but the role that Islamic law 
should play in the country's affairs and governance remains an 
important issue. 

There is immense regional diversity in Pakistan. Pakhtuns, 
Baloch, Punjabis, and Sindhis are all Muslim, yet they have 
diverse cultural traditions and speak different languages. Eth- 
nic, regional, and — above all — family loyalties figure far more 
prominently for the average individual than do national loyal- 
ties. Punjabis, the largest ethnic group, predominate in the 
central government and the military. Baloch, Pakhtuns, and 
Sindhis find the Punjabi preponderance at odds with their own 
aspirations for provincial autonomy. Ethnic mixing within each 
province further complicates social and political relations. 



77 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

Expectations had been raised by the return of democracy to 
Pakistan in 1988 after the death of Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, by 
the continued economic expansion in the early 1990s, and by 
some observable improvement in the volatile relations among 
ethnic groups that had so divided the country in years past. 
Also in the early 1990s, previously peripheralized social move- 
ments, particularly those concerning women and the environ- 
ment, assumed a more central role in public life. As bilateral 
and multilateral development assistance has dwindled, nongov- 
ernmental organizations (NGOs) committed to economic and 
social development have emerged and have begun to take on 
important responsibilities (see Foreign Aid, ch. 3). Nonethe- 
less, the problems that confront Pakistan pose a significant 
threat to its cohesion and future. 

Sociologists speak of a loss of a sense of social contract 
among Pakistanis that has adversely affected the country's 
infrastructure: the economy, the education system, the govern- 
ment bureaucracy, and even the arts. As population pressure 
increases, the failure of the populace to develop a sense of pub- 
licly committed citizenship becomes more and more signifi- 
cant. The self-centeredness about which educator Ishtiaq 
Husain Qureshi complained soon after independence is 
increasingly noticeable in many areas of social life. Although 
many people once imagined that economic development 
would by itself improve the quality of life, few still believe this 
to be true. 

Family or personal interest and status take precedence over 
public good in Pakistan. Thus traffic laws are often enforced 
solely according to a person's political clout rather than due 
process, and admission to school depends more upon connec- 
tions or wealth than on ability. Salaries, as compared with 
bribes, are so inconsequential a privilege of employment that 
people often plead to be given appointments without pay. 

Failure to develop chic-minded citizenship is also evident in 
public administration and imbalanced government spending. 
Military expenditures, for example, dwarf combined expendi- 
tures on health and education. Meanwhile, the bureaucracy — a 
legacy of the British colonial period — has not modernized suf- 
ficiently to incorporate new technologies and innovations 
despite efforts by the government staff colleges. 

Although in the mid-1980s the World Bank (see Glossary) 
forecast the advancement of Pakistan to the ranks of middle- 
income countries, the nation had not quite achieved this tran- 



78 



The Society and Its Environment 



sition in the early 1990s. Many blame this fact on Pakistan's fail- 
ure to make significant progress in human development 
despite consistently high rates of economic growth. The annual 
population growth rate, which hovered between 3.1 and 3.3 
percent in the early 1990s, threatens to precipitate increased 
social unrest as greater numbers of people compete for dimin- 
ishing resources. 

An anonymous Pakistani writer has said that three things 
symbolized Pakistan's material culture in the 1990s: videocas- 
sette recorders (for playing Hindi films) , locally manufactured 
Japanese Suzuki cars, and Kalashnikov rifles. Although the 
majority of the people still reside in villages, they increasingly 
take social cues from cities. Videocassette tapes can be rented 
in many small villages, where residents also watch Cable News 
Network (CNN) — censored through Islamabad — on televisions 
that are as numerous as radios were in the 1970s. In many 
areas, tiny Suzuki automobiles have replaced the bicycles and 
motorcycles that were in great demand merely a decade earlier. 
Whereas urban violence was traditionally related to blood 
feuds, it has become more random and has escalated dramati- 
cally. 

Physical Environment 

Located in the northwestern part of the South Asian subcon- 
tinent, Pakistan became a state as a result of the partition of 
British India on August 14, 1947. Pakistan annexed Azad 
(Free) Kashmir after the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-48. Ini- 
tially, Pakistan also included the northeastern sector of the sub- 
continent, where Muslims are also in the majority. The East 
Wing and West Wing of Pakistan were, however, separated by 
1,600 kilometers of hostile Indian territory. The country's East 
Wing, or East Pakistan, became the independent state of Bang- 
ladesh in December 1971 (see Yahya Khan and Bangladesh, ch. 
1). 

Boundaries 

Pakistan occupies a position of great geostrategic impor- 
tance, bordered by Iran on the west, Afghanistan on the north- 
west, China on the northeast, India on the east, and the 
Arabian Sea on the south (see fig. 1) . The total land area is esti- 
mated at 796,095 square kilometers. 



79 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

The boundary with Iran, some 800 kilometers in length, was 
first delimited by a British commission in 1893, separating Iran 
from what was then British Indian Balochistan. In 1957 Paki- 
stan signed a frontier agreement with Iran, and since then the 
border between the two countries has not been a subject of 
serious dispute. 

Pakistan's boundary with Afghanistan is about 2,250 kilome- 
ters long. In the north, it runs along the ridges of the Hindu 
Kush (meaning Hindu Killer) mountains and the Pamirs, 
where a narrow strip of Afghan territory called the Wakhan 
Corridor extends between Pakistan and Tajikistan. The Hindu 
Kush was traditionally regarded as the last northwestern out- 
post beyond which Hindus could not venture in safety. The 
boundary line with Afghanistan was drawn in 1893 by Sir Mor- 
timer Durand, then foreign secretary in British India, and was 
acceded to by the amir of Afghanistan that same year. This 
boundary, called the Durand Line, was not in doubt when Paki- 
stan became independent in 1947, although its legitimacy was 
in later years disputed periodically by the Afghan government 
as well as by Pakhtun tribes straddling the Pakistan-Afghanistan 
border. On the one hand, Afghanistan claimed that the 
Durand Line had been imposed by a stronger power upon a 
weaker one, and it favored the establishment of still another 
state to be called Pashtunistan or Pakhtunistan (see Indepen- 
dent Pakistan, ch. 1; Foreign Policy, ch. 4). On the other hand, 
Pakistan, as the legatee of the British in the region, insisted on 
the legality and permanence of the boundary. The Durand 
Line remained in effect in 1994. 

In the northeastern tip of the country, Pakistan controls 
about 84,159 square kilometers of the former princely state of 
Jammu and Kashmir. This area, consisting of Azad Kashmir 
(11,639 square kilometers) and most of the Northern Areas 
(72,520 square kilometers), which includes Gilgit and Bal- 
tistan, is the most visually stunning of Pakistan. The Northern 
Areas has five of the world's seventeen highest mountains. It 
also has such extensive glaciers that it has sometimes been 
called the "third pole." The boundary line has been a matter of 
pivotal dispute between Pakistan and India since 1947, and the 
Siachen Glacier in northern Kashmir has been an important 
arena for fighting between the two sides since 1984, although 
far more soldiers have died of exposure to the cold than from 
any skirmishes in the conflict. 



80 



The Swat River valley in the North-West Frontier Province 

Courtesy Sheila Ross 

From the eastern end of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, a 
boundary of about 520 kilometers runs generally southeast 
between China and Pakistan, ending near the Karakoram Pass. 
This line was determined from 1961 to 1965 in a series of 
agreements between China and Pakistan. By mutual agree- 
ment, a new boundary treaty is to be negotiated between China 
and Pakistan when the dispute over Kashmir is finally resolved 
between India and Pakistan. 

The Pakistan-India cease-fire line runs from the Karakoram 
Pass west-southwest to a point about 130 kilometers northeast 
of Lahore. This line, about 770 kilometers long, was arranged 
with United Nations (UN) assistance at the end of the Indo- 
Pakistani War of 1947-48. The cease-fire line came into effect 
on January 1, 1949, after eighteen months of fighting and was 
last adjusted and agreed upon by the two countries in the Simla 



81 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

Agreement of July 1972. Since then, it has been generally 
known as the Line of Control. 

The Pakistan-India boundary continues irregularly south- 
ward for about 1,280 kilometers, following the line of the 1947 
Radcliffe Award, named for Sir Cyril Radcliffe, the head of the 
British boundary commission on the partition of Punjab and 
Bengal in 1947. Although this boundary with India is not for- 
mally disputed, passions still run high on both sides of the bor- 
der. Many Indians had expected the original boundary line to 
run farther to the west, thereby ceding Lahore to India; Paki- 
stanis had expected the line to run much farther east, possibly 
granting them control of Delhi, the imperial capital of the 
Mughal Empire. 

The southern borders are far less contentious than those in 
the north. The Thar Desert in the province of Sindh is sepa- 
rated from the desolate salt flats of the Rann of Kutch by a 
boundary that was first delineated in 1923-24. After partition, 
Pakistan contested this southeastern boundary. In early 1965, a 
series of border flare-ups and skirmishes occurred along the 
undemarcated territory of the Rann of Kutch. They were less 
dangerous and less widespread, however, than the conflict that 
erupted in Kashmir in the Indo-Pakistani War of August 1965. 
The Rann of Kutch dispute was ended by British mediation, 
and both sides accepted the award of the Indo-Pakistani West- 
ern Boundary Case Tribunal designated by the UN secretary 
general. The tribunal made its award on February 19, 1968, 
delimiting a line of 403 kilometers that was later demarcated by 
joint survey teams. Of its original claim of some 9,100 square 
kilometers, Pakistan was awarded only about 780 square kilo- 
meters. Beyond the western terminus of the tribunal's award, 
the final stretch of Pakistan's border with India is about eighty 
kilometers long, running west and southwest to an inlet of the 
Arabian Sea. 

Topography and Drainage 

Pakistan is divided into three major geographic areas: the 
northern highlands; the Indus River plain, with two major sub- 
divisions corresponding roughly to the provinces of Punjab 
and Sindh; and the Balochistan Plateau. Some geographers 
designate additional major regions. For example, the moun- 
tain ranges along the western border with Afghanistan are 
sometimes described separately from the Balochistan Plateau, 
and on the eastern border with India, south of the Sutlej River, 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



the Thar Desert may be considered separately from the Indus 
River plain. Nevertheless, the country may conveniently be 
visualized in general terms as divided in three by an imaginary 
line drawn eastward from the Khyber Pass and another drawn 
southwest from Islamabad down the middle of the country. 
Roughly, then, the northern highlands are north of the imagi- 
nary east-west line; the Balochistan Plateau is to the west of the 
imaginary southwest line; and the Indus River plain lies to the 
east of that line (see fig. 5). 

The northern highlands include parts of the Hindu Kush, 
the Karakoram Range, and the Himalayas. This area includes 
such famous peaks as K2 (Mount Godwin Austen; 8,611 
meters) , the second highest peak in the world, and Nanga Par- 
bat (8,126 meters), the twelfth highest. More than one-half of 
the summits are over 4,500 meters, and more than fifty peaks 
reach above 6,500 meters. Travel through the area is difficult 
and dangerous, although the government is attempting to 
develop certain areas into tourist and trekking sites. Because of 
their rugged topography and the rigors of the climate, the 
northern highlands and the Himalayas to the east have been 
formidable barriers to movement into Pakistan throughout his- 
tory. 

South of the northern highlands and west of the Indus River 
plain are the Safed Koh Range along the Afghanistan border 
and the Sulaiman Range and Kirthar Range, which define the 
western extent of the province of Sindh and reach almost to 
the southern coast. The lower reaches are far more arid than 
those in the north, and they branch into ranges that run gener- 
ally to the southwest across the province of Balochistan. North- 
south valleys in Balochistan and Sindh have restricted the 
migration of peoples along the Makran coast on the Arabian 
Sea east toward the plains. 

Several large passes cut through the ranges along the border 
with Afghanistan. Among them are the Khojak Pass, about 
eighty kilometers northwest of Quetta in Balochistan; the Khy- 
ber Pass, forty kilometers west of Peshawar and leading to 
Kabul; and the Baroghil Pass in the far north, providing access 
to the Wakhan Corridor. 

Less than one-fifth of Pakistan's land area has the potential 
for intensive agricultural use. Nearly all of the arable land is 
actively cultivated, but outputs are low by world standards (see 
Agriculture, ch. 3). Cultivation is sparse in the northern moun- 
tains, the southern deserts, and the western plateaus, but the 



83 



Pakistan: A Country Study 




The Society and Its Environment 




85 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

Indus River basin in Punjab and northern Sindh has fertile soil 
that enables Pakistan to feed its population under usual cli- 
matic conditions. 

The name Indus comes from the Sanskrit word sindhu, mean- 
ing ocean, from which also come the words Sindh, Hindu, and 
India. The Indus, one of the great rivers of the world, rises in 
southwestern Tibet only about 160 kilometers west of the 
source of the Sutlej River, which joins the Indus in Punjab, and 
the Brahmaputra, which runs eastward before turning south- 
west and flowing through Bangladesh. The catchment area of 
the Indus is estimated at almost 1 million square kilometers, 
and all of Pakistan's major rivers — the Kabul, Jhelum, Chenab, 
Ravi, and Sutlej — flow into it. The Indus River basin is a large, 
fertile alluvial plain formed by silt from the Indus. This area 
has been inhabited by agricultural civilizations for at least 5,000 
years (see Early Civilizations, ch. 1). 

The upper Indus River basin includes Punjab; the lower 
Indus River basin begins at the Panjnad River (the confluence 
of the eastern tributaries of the Indus) and extends south to 
the coast. In Punjab (meaning the "land of five waters") are the 
Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, and Sutlej rivers. The Sutlej, how- 
ever, is mostly on the Indian side of the border. In the southern 
part of the province of Punjab, the British attempted to har- 
ness the irrigation power of the water over 100 years ago when 
they established what came to be known as the canal colonies. 
The irrigation project, which facilitated the emergence of 
intensive cultivation despite arid conditions, resulted in impor- 
tant social and political transformations (see The British Raj, 
ch. 1). 

Pakistan has two great river dams: the Tarbela Dam on the 
Indus, near the early Buddhist site at Taxila, and the Mangla 
Dam on the Jhelum, where Punjab borders Azad Kashmir. The 
Warsak Dam on the Kabul River near Peshawar is smaller. 
These dams, along with a series of headworks and barrages 
built by the British and expanded since independence, are of 
vital importance to the national economy and played an impor- 
tant role in calming the raging floodwaters of 1992, which dev- 
astated large areas in the northern highlands and the Punjab 
plains (see Irrigation, ch. 3). 

Pakistan is subject to frequent seismic disturbances because 
the tectonic plate under the subcontinent hits the plate under 
Asia as it continues to move northward and to push the Hima- 
layas ever higher. The region surrounding Quetta in Balochi- 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



stan is highly prone to earthquakes. A severe quake in 1931 was 
followed by one of more destructive force in 1935. The small 
city of Quetta was almost completely destroyed, and the adja- 
cent military cantonment was heavily damaged. At least 20,000 
people were killed. Tremors continue in the vicinity of Quetta; 
the most recent major quake occurred in January 1991. Far 
fewer people were killed in the 1991 quake than died in 1935, 
although entire villages in the North-West Frontier Province 
were destroyed. A major earthquake centered in the North- 
West Frontier Province's Kohistan District in 1965 also caused 
heavy damage. 

Climate 

Pakistan lies in the temperate zone. The climate is generally 
arid, characterized by hot summers and cool or cold winters, 
and wide variations between extremes of temperature at given 
locations. There is little rainfall. These generalizations should 
not, however, obscure the distinct differences existing among 
particular locations. For example, the coastal area along the 
Arabian Sea is usually warm, whereas the frozen snow-covered 
ridges of the Karakoram Range and of other mountains of the 
far north are so cold year round that they are only accessible by 
world-class climbers for a few weeks in May and June of each 
year. 

Pakistan has four seasons: a cool, dry winter from December 
through February; a hot, dry spring from March through May; 
the summer rainy season, or southwest monsoon period, from 
June through September; and the retreating monsoon period 
of October and November. The onset and duration of these 
seasons vary somewhat according to location. 

The climate in the capital city of Islamabad varies from an 
average daily low of 2°C in January to an average daily high of 
40°C in June. Half of the annual rainfall occurs in July and 
August, averaging about 255 millimeters in each of those two 
months. The remainder of the year has significantly less rain, 
amounting to about fifty millimeters per month. Hailstorms 
are common in the spring. 

Pakistan's largest city, Karachi, which is also the country's 
industrial center, is more humid than Islamabad but gets less 
rain. Only July and August average more than twenty-five milli- 
meters of rain in the Karachi area; the remaining months are 
exceedingly dry. The temperature is also more uniform in 
Karachi than in Islamabad, ranging from an average daily low 



87 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

of 13°C during winter evenings to an average daily high of 34°C 
on summer days. Although the summer temperatures do not 
get as high as those in Punjab, the high humidity causes the res- 
idents a great deal of discomfort. 

Most areas in Punjab experience fairly cool winters, often 
accompanied by rain. Woolen shawls are worn by women and 
men for warmth because few homes are heated. By mid-Febru- 
ary, the temperature begins to rise; springtime weather contin- 
ues until mid-April, when the summer heat sets in. The onset of 
the southwest monsoon is anticipated to reach Punjab by May, 
but since the early 1970s, the weather pattern has been irregu- 
lar. The spring monsoon has either skipped over the area or 
has caused it to rain so hard that floods have resulted. June and 
July are oppressively hot. Although official estimates rarely 
place the temperature above 46°C, newspaper sources claim 
that it reaches 51 °C and regularly carry reports about people 
who have succumbed to the heat. Heat records were broken in 
Multan in June 1993, when the mercury was reported to have 
risen to 54°C. In August the oppressive heat is punctuated by 
the rainy season, referred to as barsat, which brings relief in its 
wake. The hardest part of the summer is then over, but cooler 
weather does not come until late October. 

Pollution and Environmental Issues 

Little attention was paid to pollution and environmental 
issues in Pakistan until the early 1990s. Related concerns, such 
as sanitation and potable water, received earlier scrutiny. In 
1987 only about 6 percent of rural residents and 51 percent of 
urban residents had access to sanitary facilities; in 1990 a total 
of 97.6 million Pakistanis, or approximately 80 percent of the 
population, had no access to flush toilets. Greater success has 
been achieved in bringing potable water within reach of the 
people; nearly half the population enjoyed such access by 1990. 
However, researchers at the Pakistan Medical Research Coun- 
cil, recognizing that a large proportion of diseases in Pakistan 
are caused by the consumption of polluted water, have been 
questioning the "safe" classification in use in the 1990s. Even 
the 38 percent of the population that receives its water through 
pipelines runs the risk of consuming seriously contaminated 
water, although the problem varies by area. In Punjab, for 
example, as much as 90 percent of drinking water comes from 
groundwater, as compared with only 9 percent in Sindh. 



88 



The Society and Its Environment 



The central government's Perspective Plan (1988-2003) and 
previous five-year plans do not mention sustainable develop- 
ment strategies (see Development Planning, ch. 3). Further, 
there have been no overarching policies focused on sustainable 
development and conservation. The state has focused on 
achieving self-sufficiency in food production, meeting energy 
demands, and containing the high rate of population growth, 
not on curtailing pollution or other environmental hazards. 

In 1992 Pakistan's National Conservation Strategy Report 
attempted to redress the previous inattention to the nation's 
mounting environmental problem. Drawing on the expertise 
of more than 3,000 people from a wide array of political affilia- 
tions, the government produced a document outlining the cur- 
rent state of environmental health, its sustainable goals, and 
viable program options for the future (see National Conserva- 
tion Goals, this ch.). 

Of special concern to environmentalists is the diminishing 
forest cover in watershed regions of the northern highlands, 
which has only recently come under close scrutiny. Forest areas 
have been thoughtlessly denuded. Deforestation, which 
occurred at an annual rate of 0.4 percent in 1989-90, has con- 
tributed directly to the severity of the flooding problem faced 
by the nation in the early 1990s. 

As industry has expanded, factories have emitted more and 
more toxic effluents into the air and water. The number of tex- 
tile- and food-processing mills in rural Punjab has grown 
greatly since the mid-1970s, resulting in pollution of its rivers 
and irrigation canals. Groundwater quality throughout the 
country has also suffered from rapidly increasing use of pesti- 
cides and fertilizers aimed at promoting more intensive crop- 
ping and facilitating self-sufficiency in food production. 

The National Conservation Strategy Report has documented 
how solid and liquid excreta are the major source of water pol- 
lution in the country and the cause of widespread waterborne 
diseases. Because only just over half of urban residents have 
access to sanitation, the remaining urban excreta are deposited 
on roadsides, into waterways, or incorporated into solid waste. 
Additionally, only three major sewage treatment plants exist in 
the country; two of them operate intermittently. Much of the 
untreated sewage goes into irrigation systems, where the waste- 
water is reused, and into streams and rivers, which become sew- 
age carriers at low-flow periods. Consequently, the vegetables 
grown from such wastewater have serious bacteriological con- 



89 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

tamination. Gastroenteritis, widely considered in medical cir- 
cles to be the leading cause of death in Pakistan, is transmitted 
through waterborne pollutants (see Health and Welfare, this 
ch.). 

Low-lying land is generally used for solid waste disposal, 
without the benefit of sanitary landfill methods. The National 
Conservation Strategy has raised concerns about industrial 
toxic wastes also being dumped in municipal disposal areas 
without any record of their location, quantity, or toxic composi- 
tion. Another important issue is the contamination of shallow 
groundwater near urban industries that discharge wastes 
directly into the ground. 

Water in Karachi is so contaminated that almost all residents 
boil it before consumption. Because sewerage and water lines 
have been laid side by side in most parts of the city, leakage is 
the main cause of contamination. High levels of lead also have 
been found in water in Islamabad and Rawalpindi. 

Air pollution has also become a major problem in most cit- 
ies. There are no controls on vehicular emissions, which 
account for 90 percent of pollutants. The National Conservation 
Strategy Report claims that the average Pakistani vehicle emits 
twenty-five times as much carbon monoxide, twenty times as 
many hydrocarbons, and more than three and one-half times 
as much nitrous oxide in grams per kilometer as the average 
vehicle in the United States. 

Another major source of pollution, not mentioned in the 
National Conservation Strategy Report, is noise. The hyperurban- 
ization experienced by Pakistan since the 1960s has resulted in 
loose controls for heavy equipment operation in densely popu- 
lated areas, as well as in crowded streets filled with buses, 
trucks, automobiles, and motorcycles, which often honk at 
each other and at the horse-drawn tongas (used for transport- 
ing people) and the horse-drawn rehras (used for transporting 
goods). 

National Conservation Goals 

The National Conservation Strategy Report has three explicit 
objectives: conservation of natural resources, promotion of sus- 
tainable development, and improvement of efficiency in the 
use and management of resources. It sees itself as a "call for 
action" addressed to central and provincial governments, busi- 
nesses, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) , local commu- 
nities, and individuals. The sustainable development of 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



Pakistan is viewed as a multigenerational enterprise. In seeking 
to transform attitudes and practices, the National Conservation 
Strategy recognizes that two key changes in values are needed: 
the restoration of the conservation ethic derived from Islamic 
moral values, called qanaat, and the revival of community spirit 
and responsibility, haquq-ul-abad. 

The National Conservation Strategy Report recommends four- 
teen program areas for priority implementation: maintaining 
soils in croplands, increasing efficiency of irrigation, protect- 
ing watersheds, supporting forestry and plantations, restoring 
rangelands and improving livestock, protecting water bodies 
and sustaining fisheries, conserving biodiversity, increasing 
energy efficiency, developing and deploying renewable 
resources, preventing or decreasing pollution, managing 
urban wastes, supporting institutions to manage common 
resources, integrating population and environmental pro- 
grams, and preserving the cultural heritage. It identifies sixty- 
eight specific programs in these areas, each with a long-term 
goal and expected outputs and physical investments required 
within ten years. Special attention has been paid to the poten- 
tial roles of environmental NGOs, women's organizations, and 
international NGOs in working with the government in its con- 
servation efforts. Recommendations from the National Conser- 
vation Strategy Report are incorporated in the Eighth Five-Year 
Plan (1993-98). 

Population 

In early 1994, the population of Pakistan was estimated to be 
126 million, making it the ninth most populous country in the 
world. Its land area, however, ranks thirty-second among 
nations. Thus Pakistan has about 2 percent of the world's popu- 
lation living on less than 0.7 percent of the world's land. The 
population growth rate is among the world's highest, officially 
estimated at 3.1 percent per year, but privately thought to be 
closer to 3.3 percent per year by many planners involved in 
population programs. Pakistan's population is expected to 
reach 150 million by 2000 and to account for 4 percent of the 
world's population growth between 1994 and 2004. Pakistan's 
population is expected to double between 1994 and 2022. 

These figures are estimates, however, because ethnic unrest 
led the government to postpone its decennial census in 1991. 
The government felt that tensions among Punjabis, Sindhis, 
muhajirs (immigrants or descendants of immigrants from 



91 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

India), and Pakhtuns and between the Sunni Muslim majority 
and religious minorities were such that taking the census might 
provoke violent reactions from groups who felt they had been 
undercounted. The 1991 census had still not been carried out 
as of early 1994. The 1981 census enumerated 84.2 million per- 
sons (see table 2, Appendix). 

Population Distribution and Density 

Pakistan's people are not evenly distributed throughout the 
country. There is an average of 146 persons per square kilome- 
ter, but the density varies dramatically, ranging from scarcely 
populated arid areas, especially in Balochistan, to some of the 
highest urban densities in the world in Karachi and Lahore. 

About 68 percent of the population lived in rural areas in 
1994, a decrease of 7 percent since 1970. In contrast, the num- 
ber of people living in urban areas has risen substantially, 
resulting in an urban growth rate of 4.6 percent between 1980 
and 1991. 

More than half of Pakistan's population is below the age of 
fifteen; nearly a third is below the age of nine (see fig. 6). For 
cultural reasons, enumerating the precise number of females 
has been difficult — and estimates of the percentage of females 
in the population range from 47.5 percent in the 1981 census 
to 48.3 percent in the 1987-88 Labour Force Survey. Pakistan is 
one of the few countries in the world with an inverse sex ratio: 
official sources claim there are 111 men for every 100 women. 
The discrepancy is particularly obvious among people over 
fifty: men in that age-group account for 7.1 percent of the 
country's total population and women for less than 5 percent. 
This figure reflects the secondary status of females in Pakistani 
society, especially their lack of access to quality medical care. 

Population Planning Policies and Problems 

Pakistan's extremely high rate of population growth is 
caused by a falling death rate combined with a continuing high 
birth rate. In 1950 the mortality rate was twenty-seven per 1,000 
population; by 1990 the rate had dropped to twelve (esti- 
mated) per 1,000. Yet throughout this period, the birth rate 
was forty-four per 1,000 population. On average, in 1990 each 
family had 6.2 children, and only 11 percent of couples were 
regularly practicing contraception. 

In 1952 the Family Planning Association of Pakistan, an 
NGO, initiated efforts to contain population growth. Three 



92 



The Society and Its Environment 



years later, the government began to fund the association and 
noted the need to reduce population growth in its First Five- 
Year Plan (1955-60). The government soon combined its popu- 
lation planning efforts in hospitals and clinics into a single pro- 
gram. Thus population planning was a dual effort led by the 
Family Planning Association and the public sector. 

In the mid-1960s, the Ministry of Health initiated a program 
in which intrauterine devices (IUDs) were promoted. Payments 
were offered to hospitals and clinics as incentives, and mid- 
wives were trained to treat patients. The government was able 
to attract funding from many international donors, but the 
program lost support because the targets were overly ambitious 
and because doctors and clinics allegedly overreported their 
services to claim incentive payments. 

The population planning program was suspended and sub- 
stantively reorganized after the fall of Mohammad Ayub Khan's 
government in 1969. In late December 1971, the population 
was estimated at 65.2 million. In an attempt to control the pop- 
ulation problem, the government introduced several new pro- 
grams. First, the Continuous Motivation System Programme, 
which employed young urban women to visit rural areas, was 
initiated. In 1975 the Inundation Programme was added. Based 
on the premise that greater availability would increase use, 
shopkeepers throughout the country stocked birth control 
pills and condoms. Both programs failed, however. The unmar- 
ried urban women had little understanding of the lives of the 
rural women they were to motivate, and shopkeepers kept the 
contraceptives out of sight because it was considered tasteless 
to display them in an obvious way. 

Following Zia ul-Haq's coup d'etat in 1977, government pop- 
ulation planning efforts were almost halted. In 1980 the Popu- 
lation Division, formerly under the direction of a minister of 
state, was renamed the Population Welfare Division and trans- 
ferred to the Ministry of Planning and Economic Develop- 
ment. This agency was charged with the delivery of both family 
planning services and maternal and child health care. This 
reorganized structure corresponded with the new population 
planning strategy, which was based on a multifaceted commu- 
nity-based "cafeteria" approach, in cooperation with Family 
Welfare Centres (essentially clinics) and Reproductive Health 
Centres (mostly engaged in sterilizations) . Community partici- 
pation had finally became a cornerstone of the government's 



93 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



AGE-GROUP 
70 and over 
60-69 
50-59 
40-49 
30-39 
20-29 
10-19 



1993 Population = 123.4 million 



0-9 









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ES 




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20 15 10 5 5 10 15 
PERCENTAGES OF POPULATION 



20 



Source: Based on information from PC Globe 5.0: The New World Order, 1992, Tempe, 
Arizona, 1992. 

Figure 6. Population by Age and Gender, 1993 

policy, and it was hoped that contraceptive use would rise dra- 
matically. The population by 1980 had exceeded 84 million. 

In preparing the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1983-88), the govern- 
ment projected a national population of 147 million in the year 
2000 if the growth rate were to remain at 2.8 percent per year, 
and of 134 million if the rate were to decline to the desired 2.1 
percent per year by then. By the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1988- 
93) period, the multipronged approach initiated in the 1980s 
had increased international donor assistance and had begun to 
enlist local NGOs. Efforts to improve maternal and child 
health were coupled with education campaigns. Because of 
local mores concerning modesty, the government avoided 
explicit reference to contraceptive devices and instead focused 
its public education efforts on encouraging couples to limit 
their family size to two children. 

The key to controlling population growth, according to 
activists in the women's movement, lies in raising the socioeco- 
nomic status of women. Until a woman's status is determined 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



by something other than her reproductive capabilities, and 
especially by the number of sons she bears, severe impediments 
to lowering population growth rates will persist. 

Migration and Growth of Major Cities 

Pakistan's cities are expanding much faster than the overall 
population. At independence in 1947, many refugees from 
India settled in urban areas. In the 1950s, more than one-half 
of the residents of several cities in Sindh and Punjab were 
muhajirs. Some refugee colonies were eventually recognized as 
cities in their own right. 

Between 1951 and 1981, the urban population quadrupled. 
The annual urban growth rate during the 1950s and 1960s was 
more than 5 percent. This figure dropped slightly in the 1970s 
to 4.4 percent. Between 1980 and early 1994, it averaged about 
4.6 percent. By early 1994, about 32 percent of all Pakistanis 
lived in urban areas, with 13 percent of the total population liv- 
ing in three cities, each of which had over 1 million inhabit- 
ants — Karachi, Lahore, and Faisalabad. 

The key reason for migration to urban areas has been the 
limited opportunity for economic advancement and mobility 
in rural areas. The economic and political control that local 
landlords exercise in much of the countryside has led to this 
situation. 

The urban migrant is almost invariably a male. He retains his 
ties with his village, and his rights there are acknowledged long 
after his departure. At first, migration is frequently seen as a 
temporary expedient, a way to purchase land or pay off a debt. 
Typically, the migrant sends part of his earnings to the family 
he left behind and returns to the village to work at peak agri- 
cultural seasons. Even married migrants usually leave their 
families in the village when they first migrate. The decision to 
bring a wife and children to the city is thus a milestone in the 
migration process. 

As cities have grown, they have engulfed surrounding vil- 
lages, bringing agriculturists into the urban population. Many 
of these farmers commute to urban jobs from their original 
homes. The focus of these individuals' lives remains their fam- 
ily and fellow villagers. Similarly, migrants from rural areas who 
have moved to the cities stay in close touch with relatives and 
friends who have also moved, so their loyalties reflect earlier 
patterns. The Pakistani city tends to recreate the close ties of 
the rural community. 



95 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

Pakistani cities are diverse in nature. The urban topology 
reflects the varied political history within the region. Some cit- 
ies dating from the medieval era, such as Lahore and Multan, 
served as capitals of kingdoms or small principalities, or they 
were fortified border towns prior to colonial rule. Other preco- 
lonial cities, such as Peshawar, were trading centers located at 
strategic points along the caravan route. Some cities in Sindh 
and Punjab centered on cottage industries, and their trade 
rivaled the premier European cities of the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. 

Under colonial rule, many of the older administrative cities 
declined. Where the British located a trading post (factory) 
near an existing administrative center, the city was typically 
divided into old and new, or European, sections. New towns 
and cities also emerged, especially in the expanding canal colo- 
nies; Faisalabad (formerly Lyallpur) is such a city. The town of 
Karachi expanded rapidly to become a center of rail and sea 
transport as a consequence of British rule and as a conse- 
quence of the opening of massive irrigation projects and the 
increase in agricultural exports. Pakistan's two largest cities, 
Karachi and Lahore, illustrate how differing regional and 
sociocultural histories have shaped the variations among Paki- 
stan's cities. 

Karachi absorbed tens of thousands of muhajirs following 
independence in 1947, grew nearly two and one-half times 
from 1941 to 1951, and nearly doubled again in the following 
decade. Karachi is by far Pakistan's largest city and is still rap- 
idly growing. In the early 1990s, the population exceeded 10 
million. 

Karachi's rapid growth has been directly related to the over- 
all economic growth in the country. The partition of British 
India into the independent states of Pakistan and India 
prompted an influx into Pakistan of Muslim merchants from 
various parts of the new, Hindu-majority India. These mer- 
chants, whom sociologist Hamza Alavi refers to as salariat, had 
money to invest and received unusual encouragement from the 
government, which wanted to promote the growth of the new 
state. 

Karachi at first developed in isolation. Relatively few people 
from outlying areas were engaged in running its factories, and 
the city had little impact on Pakistan's cultural fabric. But when 
the economies of southern Sindh and parts of Punjab began to 
expand, large numbers of migrants flooded the city in search 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 



of work (generally low-paying jobs), and Karachi became the 
hub of the nation's commerce. The city, however, also has seri- 
ous problems. It has the poorest slums in the country, and it 
suffers from serious interethnic conflict as a consequence of 
the influx of many competing groups. It was the site of consid- 
erable violence in the 1980s as muhajirs solidified their local 
power base vis-a-vis the Pakhtuns and native Sindhis (see Sub- 
version and Civil Unrest, ch. 5). 

Lahore, Pakistan's second largest city, contrasts markedly 
with Karachi. With just under half the population of Karachi, it 
is regarded as the cultural nucleus of Punjab. Residents of 
Lahore take special pride in their city's physical beauty, espe- 
cially in its Mughal architecture, which includes the Badshahi 
Mosque, Shalimar Gardens, Lahore Fort, and the Mughal 
emperor Jahangir's tomb. In the earliest extant historical refer- 
ence to the city, in A.D. 630 the Chinese traveler Xuan Zang 
described it as a large Brahmanical city. A center of learning by 
the twelfth century, Lahore reached its peak in the sixteenth 
century, when it became the quintessential Mughal city — the 
"grand resort of people of all nations and a center of extensive 
commerce." 

The economy and the population expanded greatly in the 
1980s in a number of other cities. The most important of these 
are Faisalabad, Gujranwala, Wazirabad, and Sialkot in Punjab; 
Hyderabad in Sindh; and Peshawar and Mardan in the 
North-West Frontier Province. 

The nation's capital was situated in Karachi at indepen- 
dence. General Mohammad Ayub Khan, who assumed power 
in 1958, aspired, however, to build a new capital that would be 
better protected from possible attack by India and would 
reflect the greatness of the new country. In 1959 Ayub Khan 
decided to move the capital to the shadow of the Margalla Hills 
near Pakistan's third largest city, Rawalpindi. The move was 
completed in 1963, and the new capital was named Islamabad 
(abode of Islam). The population of Islamabad continues to 
increase rapidly, and the official 1991 estimate of just over 
200,000 has probably been much exceeded. 

Impact of Migration to the Persian Gulf Countries 

Pakistan had a severe balance of payments deficit in the 
1970s. To deal with this deficit, as well as to strengthen ties with 
the Islamic states in the Middle East, the government of 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto encouraged both skilled and unskilled men 



97 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

to work in the Persian Gulf countries. The government set up a 
program under the Ministry of Labour, Manpower, and Over- 
seas Pakistanis to regulate this migration and also seconded 
military troops to many of the Gulf states. 

By the mid-1980s, when this temporary migration was at its 
height, there were estimated to be more than 2 million Paki- 
stanis in the Persian Gulf states remitting more than US$3 bil- 
lion every year. At the peak, the remittances accounted for 
almost half of the country's foreign-exchange earnings. By 
1990 new employment opportunities were decreasing, and the 
1990-91 Persian Gulf War forced many workers to return 
quickly to Pakistan. Workers have only slowly returned to the 
Gulf since the war ended. 

The majority of the emigrants are working-class men, who 
travel alone, leaving their wives and children behind with their 
extended families in Pakistan. These men are willing to sacri- 
fice years with their families for what they see as their only 
chance to escape poverty in a society with limited upward 
mobility. A study in the old quarter (the inner walled city) of 
Lahore in 1987 suggested that half of all working-class families 
had at least one close relative working in the Gulf. Families 
generally use the remittances for consumer goods, rather than 
investing in industry. The wage earner typically returns after 
five to ten years to live at home. 

Although this migration has had little effect on Pakistan 
demographically, it has affected its social fabric. While a man is 
away from his family, his wife often assumes responsibility for 
many day-to-day business transactions that are considered the 
province of men in this traditional male-dominated society. 
Thus for the women involved, there is a significant change in 
social role. Among the men, psychologists have identified a syn- 
drome referred to as "Dubai chalo ("let's go to Dubai"). This 
syndrome, which manifests itself as disorientation, appears to 
result from social isolation, culture shock, harsh working con- 
ditions, and the sudden acquisition of relative wealth. Men 
often feel isolated and guilty for leaving their families, and the 
resultant sociopsychological stress can be considerable. 

Repercussions of the War in Afghanistan 

The presence of large numbers Afghan refugees has had a 
weighty impact on the demographics of Pakistan. After the 
Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, refugees 
began streaming over the borders into Pakistan. By 1990 



98 




Street scene outside Lohari Gate, Lahore 
Various forms of transportation as found in Lahore — tonga, rickshaw, 

automobiles, and carts 
Courtesy Anita M. Weiss 



99 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

approximately 3.2 million refugees had settled there, a 
decrease of about 90,000 from 1989. Previously uninhabited 
areas of the North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan had 
been setded by refugees during the 1980s. The United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that in 
1990 there were 345 Afghan refugee villages. Of these, 68.5 
percent were in the North-West Frontier Province, 26.0 percent 
in Balochistan, and 5.5 percent in Punjab. Each village housed 
an average of 10,000 people, and women and children 
accounted for 75 percent of the refugee population. 

The influx of refugees has had profound social conse- 
quences, and the refugee population in desert areas has placed 
a heavy burden on the environment. Initially, Pakistanis wanted 
to help their neighbors in a time of need, but difficulties slowly 
led many to think that their friendship had gone far enough. 
Among the problems were inflation, a dearth of low-paying 
jobs because these were taken by refugees, and a proliferation 
of weapons, especially in urban areas. The escalation of ani- 
mosity between refugees and Pakistanis, particularly in Punjab, 
caused the government to restrict the refugees' free movement 
in the country in the mid-1980s. 

To assist Pakistan in preventing conflict by keeping the refu- 
gees separate from the local population, the UNHCR placed 
restrictions on disbursements of food and other goods in its 
refugee camps in the North-West Frontier Province and in 
Balochistan. Since the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghani- 
stan in February 1989, the UNHCR, the Pakistan government, 
and an array of NGOs have encouraged the refugees to return 
home, but until internecine fighting in Afghanistan stops, 
many will elect to remain in Pakistan. In early 1994, the num- 
ber of Afghan refugees still residing in Pakistan was estimated 
at 1.4 million, according to Amnesty International. 

Social Structure 

Traditional Kinship Patterns 

Pakistani social life revolves around family and kin. Even 
among members of the most Westernized elite, family retains 
its overarching significance. The family is the basis of social 
organization, providing its members with both identity and 
protection. Rarely does an individual live apart from relatives; 
even male urban migrants usually live with relatives or friends 
of kin. Children live with their parents until marriage, and sons 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



often stay with their parents after marriage, forming a joint 
family. 

The household is the primary kinship unit. In its ideal, or 
extended, form, it includes a married couple, their sons, their 
sons' wives and children, and unmarried offspring. Sons estab- 
lish separate households upon their father's death. Whether or 
not an extended household endures depends on the prefer- 
ences of the individuals involved. Quarrels and divisiveness, 
particularly among the women (mother-in-law and daughters- 
in-law), can lead to the premature dissolution of a joint house- 
hold. 

Descent is reckoned patrilineally, so only those related 
through male ancestors are considered relatives. The biradari, 
or group of male kin (the patrilineage), plays a significant role 
in social relations. Its members neither hold movable property 
in common nor share earnings, but the honor or shame of 
individual members affects the general standing of the biradari 
within the community. A common proverb expresses this view: 
"One does not share the bread, but one shares the shame." 

In theory, members of a biradari are coresidents of a single 
village. In some areas, however, land fragmentation and gener- 
ations of out-migration have led to the dispersal of many mem- 
bers of the biradari among various villages, regions, and cities. 
Patrilineal kin continue to maintain ties with their natal village 
and enjoy the legal right of first refusal in any biradari land sale. 

Members of a biradari celebrate the major life events 
together. Patrilineal kin are expected to contribute food and to 
help with guests in the ceremonies accompanying birth, mar- 
riage, death, and major religious holidays. The biradari has tra- 
ditionally served as a combined mutual aid society and welfare 
agency, arranging loans to members, assisting in finding 
employment, and contributing to the dowries of poorer fami- 
lies. 

There is considerable pressure for patrilineal kin to main- 
tain good relations with one another. Biradari members who 
quarrel will try to resolve their differences before major social 
occasions so that the patrilineage can present a united front to 
the village. People with sons and daughters of marriageable 
age keenly feel the necessity to maintain good relations 
because a person whose family is at odds with his or her biradari 
is considered a poor marriage prospect. 

Although descent is reckoned patrilineally, women maintain 
relations with their natal families throughout life. The degree 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

of involvement with maternal kin varies among ethnic groups 
and among regions of the country. The tie between brother 
and sister is typically strong and affectionate; a woman looks to 
her brothers for support in case of divorce or widowhood early 
in her marriage. In those regions where families maintain con- 
siderable contact with maternal kin, children, even though 
they are members of their father's patrilineage, are indulged by 
their mother's kin. Just as a family's relations with its biradari 
are considered in evaluating a potential spouse, so too are the 
mother's kin. 

Marriage is a means of allying two extended families; roman- 
tic attachments have little role to play. The husband and wife 
are primarily representatives of their respective families in a 
contractual arrangement, which is typically negotiated between 
two male heads of household. It is fundamentally the parents' 
responsibility to arrange marriages for their children, but older 
siblings may be actively involved if the parents die early or if 
they have been particularly successful in business or politics. 
The terms are worked out in detail and are noted, by law, at the 
local marriage registry. 

Marriage is a process of acquiring new relatives or reinforc- 
ing the ties one has with others. To participate fully in society, a 
person must be married and have children, preferably sons. 
Social ties are cemented by giving away daughters in marriage 
and receiving daughters-in-law. Marriage with one's father's 
brother's child is preferred, in part because property 
exchanged at marriage then stays within the patrilineage. The 
relationship between in-laws extends beyond the couple and 
well past the marriage event. Families related by marriage 
exchange gifts on important occasions in each others' lives. If a 
marriage is successful, it will be followed by others between the 
two families. The links thus formed persist and are reinforced 
through the generations. The pattern of continued intermar- 
riage coupled with the occasional marriage of nonrelatives cre- 
ates a convoluted web of interlocking ties of descent and 
marriage. 

A woman's life is difficult during the early years of marriage. 
A young bride has very little status in her husband's household; 
she is subservient to her mother-in-law and must negotiate rela- 
tions with her sisters-in-law. Her situation is made easier if she 
has married a cousin and her mother-in-law is also her aunt. 
The proper performance of all the elaborate marriage ceremo- 
nies and the accompanying exchange of gifts also serve to 



102 



The Society and Its Environment 



enhance the new bride's status. Likewise, a rich dowry serves as 
a trousseau; the household goods, clothing, jewelry, and furni- 
ture included remain the property of the bride after she has 
married. 

Marriage also involves a dower, called haq mehr (see Glos- 
sary) , established under Islamic law, the sharia (see Glossary) . 
Although some families set a symbolic haq mehr of Rs32 (for 
value of the rupee — see Glossary) in accordance with the tradi- 
tions of the Prophet Muhammad, others may demand hun- 
dreds of thousands of rupees. 

A wife gains status and power as she bears sons. Sons will 
bring wives for her to supervise and provide for her in her old 
age. Daughters are a liability, to be given away in an expensive 
marriage with their virginity intact. Therefore, mothers favor 
their sons. In later life, the relationship between a mother and 
her son remains intimate, in all likelihood with the mother 
retaining far more influence over her son than his wife. 

Linguistic and Ethnic Groups 

Language is an important marker of ethnic identity. Among 
the more than twenty spoken languages in Pakistan, the most 
common ones — Punjabi, Sindhi, and Urdu — as well as Pakhtu 
or Pashto, Balochi, and others, belong to the Indo-Aryan 
branch of the Indo-European language family. Additional lan- 
guages, such as Shina and other northern-area languages, are 
related to the Dardic branch of Indo-European and the early 
Dravidian language family. Brahui is one such language; it is 
spoken by a group in Balochistan. 

The Indo-Aryan vernaculars stretch across the northern half 
of the Indian subcontinent in a vast range of related local dia- 
lects that change slightly from one village to the next. Resi- 
dents of fairly distant communities typically cannot understand 
one another. Superimposed on this continuum are several 
types of more standardized literary or commercial languages. 
Although based on the vernaculars of their representative 
regions, these standardized languages are nonetheless distinct. 

Nearly half of all Pakistanis (48 percent) speak Punjabi. The 
next most commonly spoken language is Sindhi (12 percent), 
followed by the Punjabi variant Siraiki (10 percent), Pakhtu or 
Pashto (8 percent), Urdu (8 percent), Balochi (3 percent), 
Hindko (2 percent), and Brahui (1 percent). Native speakers 
of other languages, including English, Burushaski, and various 
other tongues, account for 8 percent. 



103 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

Although Urdu is the official national language, it is spoken 
as a native tongue by only 8 percent of the population. People 
who speak Urdu as their native language generally identify 
themselves as muhajirs. A large number of people from edu- 
cated backgrounds (and those who aspire to upward mobility) 
speak Urdu, as opposed to their natal languages, in their 
homes, usually to help their children master it. The Punjabi 
elite in urban centers, for example, favor Urdu, although villag- 
ers in the Punjab speak a plethora of similar dialects. 

The Urdu language originated during the Mughal period 
(1526-1858). It literally means "a camp language," for it was 
spoken by the imperial Mughal troops from Central Asia as 
they mixed with speakers of local dialects of northern India. 
Increasingly, elements of Persian, the official language of the 
Mughal administration, were incorporated until Urdu attained 
its stylized, literary form in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. The Devanagari script (used for Sanskrit and con- 
temporary Hindi) was never adopted; instead, Urdu has always 
been written using the Persian script. These two literary lan- 
guages, Urdu and Hindi, can be said to be dialects of colloquial 
Hindustani, the lingua franca of modern India before parti- 
tion. 

South Asian Muslims have long felt that Urdu symbolizes 
their shared identity. It has served as a link among educated 
Muslims and was stressed in the Pakistan independence move- 
ment. Christopher Schackle writes that "Urdu was the main lit- 
erary vehicle of the Muslim elite of India." At independence, 
the Muslim League (as the All-India Muslim League was usually 
referred to) promoted Urdu as the national language to help 
the new Pakistani state develop an identity, even though few 
people actually spoke it. However, because many of the elite 
were fluent in English, English became the de facto national 
language. The push to elevate Urdu was unpopular in East 
Pakistan, where most of the population speaks Bengali (offi- 
cially referred to as Bangla in Bangladesh since 1971) and 
identifies with its literary heritage. Language riots in Dhaka 
occurred in the early 1950s, leading to the elevation of Bengali 
as a second national language with Urdu until the secession of 
East Pakistan in 1971; when Bangladesh became independent, 
Bangla was designated the official language. 

Instruction in the best schools continued to be in English 
until the early 1980s. Mastery of English was highly desirable 
because it facilitated admission to good universities in Britain, 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



the United States, and Australia. Then, in a move to promote 
nationalism, the government of Zia ul-Haq declared Urdu to 
be the medium of instruction in government schools. Urdu was 
aggressively promoted via television, radio, and the education 
system. Private schools in urban centers (attended by children 
of the elite) were allowed to retain English, while smaller rural 
schools could continue to teach in the provincial languages 
(see Education, this ch.). 

Punjabi, spoken by nearly half of the population, is an old, 
literary language whose early writings consist chiefly of folk 
tales and romances, the most famous being the eighteenth-cen- 
tury Punjabi poet Waris Shah's version of Heer Ranjha (the love 
story of Heer and Ranjha). Although Punjabi was originally 
written in the Gurmulki script, in the twentieth century it has 
been written in the Urdu script. Punjabi has a long history of 
being mixed with Urdu among Muslims, especially in urban 
areas. Numerous dialects exist, some associated with the Sikhs 
in India and others associated with regions in Pakistan. An 
example of the latter is the variant of Punjabi spoken in Sar- 
godha in central Punjab. 

The ethnic composition of Pakistan in the early 1990s 
roughly corresponded to the linguistic distribution of the pop- 
ulation, at least among the largest groups: 66 percent of Paki- 
stanis identify themselves as Punjabis, 13 percent as Sindhis, 9 
percent as Pakhtuns, 8 percent as muhajirs, 3 percent as Baloch, 
and 1 percent as members of other ethnic groups. Each group 
is primarily concentrated in its home province, with most 
muhajirs residing in urban Sindh (see fig. 7) . 

Punjabis 

Most Punjabis trace their ancestry to pre-Islamic Jat and 
Rajput castes. However, as they intermarried with other ethnic 
groups who came to the area, certain qaums (clan or tribal 
groups) came to predominate, especially Gujjars, Awans, 
Arains, and Khokkars in northern Punjab, and Gilanis, Gar- 
dezis, Qureshis, and Abbasis in the south. Other Punjabis trace 
their heritage to Arabia, Persia, Balochistan, Afghanistan, and 
Kashmir. Thus, in contrast with many other areas, where peo- 
ple often remained isolated, Punjabis had very diverse origins. 
The extent of this diversity facilitated their coalescence into a 
coherent ethnic community that has historically placed great 
emphasis both on farming and on fighting. 



105 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

In censuses taken in British India, Punjabis were typically 
divided into "functional castes" or "agricultural tribes." The 
word caste, however, is grounded in the Hindu notions of rein- 
carnation and karma; Muslims totally reject these religious con- 
notations and use the term qaum instead. Tribal affiliation, 
based on descent and occupational specialization, tends to 
merge in Punjab into a qaum identity. An occupational group 
typically claims descent from a single ancestor, and many tribes 
traditionally followed a single occupation. The traditional 
occupation gives the group its name as well as its general posi- 
tion in the social hierarchy. 

An important aspect of Punjabi ethnicity is reciprocity at the 
village level. A man's brother is his friend, his friend is his 
brother, and both enjoy equal access to his resources. Tradi- 
tionally, a person has virtually free access to a kinsman's 
resources without foreseeable payback. This situation results in 
social networks founded on local (kinship-based) group needs 
as opposed to individual wants. These networks in turn perpet- 
uate not only friendly relations but also the structure of the 
community itself. There is great social pressure on an individ- 
ual to share and pool such resources as income, political influ- 
ence, and personal connections. Kinship obligations continue 
to be central to a Punjabi's identity and concerns. Distinctions 
based on qaum remain significant social markers, particularly 
in rural areas. 

Punjab, a region of fertile agricultural lands, is Pakistan's 
most populous province. Its landed elite remains a favored 
social stratum. Moreover, given the province's overwhelming 
importance, its landowners (in tandem with influential 
muhajirs) continue to predominate in the upper echelons of 
the military and civil service and in large part run the central 
government. This situation is resented by many Pakhtuns, 
Baloch, and, particularly, Sindhis, whose numbers and wealth 
are comparatively small and who are proportionately under- 
represented in government and the military. Many Sindhis, 
alienated from the Punjabi-dominated central government, 
still resent the fact that the capital was moved from Karachi (in 
Sindh) to Islamabad (in northern Punjab). Sindhis also have 
bitter memories of the death of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, a cham- 
pion of Sindhi regionalism, who was not only ousted but 
hanged. Of the three most prominent national politicians in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, two were Punjabis: President Zia ul- 
Haq and Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif. Only Benazir 



106 



I 




The Society and Its Environment 



Bhutto, Pakistan People's Party leader and prime minister from 
October 1993, is Sindhi. 

Pakhtuns 

The North-West Frontier Province is closely identified with 
Pakhtuns, one of the largest tribal groups in the world. The 
Pakhtuns predominate in Balochistan and are also the major 
ethnic group in southern Afghanistan. The West has long been 
fascinated with the Pakhtuns, one of the few peoples able to 
defeat the advances of British imperialism. Authors as diverse 
as Rudyard Kipling and contemporary Pakistani anthropologist 
Akbar S. Ahmed wrote about them. More is written about Pakh- 
tun norms, values, and social organization than any other eth- 
nic group in Pakistan. 

Central to identity as a Pakhtun is adherence to the male- 
centered code of conduct, the pakhtunwali. Foremost in this 
code is the notion of honor, nang, which is articulated in a 
starkly black-and-white, all-or-nothing manner. Without honor, 
life for a Pakhtun is not worth living. Honor demands the 
maintenance of sexual propriety. Complete chastity among 
female relatives is of the essence; only with the purity and good 
repute of his mother, daughters, sisters, and wife (or wives) 
does a man ensure his honor. Thus women are restricted to pri- 
vate, family compounds in much of the North-West Frontier 
Province. Census takers, invariably male, are constrained not to 
ask about the women in another man's home, and the number 
of men in a household is often overstated because sons and 
brothers are a source of strength. Hence, accurate enumera- 
tion of the population is not possible. 

Closely related to the notion of honor is the principle of 
revenge, or badal Offenses to one's honor must be avenged, or 
there is no honor. Although minor problems may be settled by 
negotiation, murder demands blood revenge, and partners in 
illicit sexual liaisons are killed if discovered. Even making lewd 
innuendos or, in the case of women, having one's reputation 
maligned may mean death. The men involved sometimes 
escape to other regions, where they may well be tracked down 
by the woman's kin. When a woman is killed, the assailant is, 
almost without exception, a close male relative. Killings associ- 
ated with sexual misconduct are the only ones that do not 
demand revenge. Even the courts are accustomed to dealing 
leniently in such cases. Vendettas and feuds are an endemic 



109 




Figure 7. Principal Ethnic Groups 



108 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

feature of social relations and an index of individual and group 
identity. 

Another major dimension of pakhtunwali is hospitality, or 
melmastia. Commensalism is a means of showing respect, 
friendship, and alliance. A complex etiquette surrounds the 
serving of guests, in which the host or his sons, when serving, 
refuse to sit with those they entertain as a mark of courtesy. 
Closely related to melmastia is the requirement of giving refuge 
to anyone, even one's enemy, for as long as the person is within 
the precincts of one's home. These codes, too, are related to 
the concept of honor, for the host gains honor by serving his 
guest, and the person who places himself under another's pro- 
tection is weak, a supplicant. Refuge must extend to the point 
of being willing to sacrifice one's own life to defend one's guest, 
but a person who demeans himself so much as to plead for 
mercy should be spared. 

Observers credit the relatively minimal tension that initially 
existed between Pakistani Pakhtuns and the large number of 
Pakhtun refugees from Afghanistan to the deeply felt obliga- 
tion of Pakhtuns to obey the customary dictates of hospitality. 
However, Pakistani Pakhtuns' frustration with the refugees 
escalated after the Soviet army withdrew from Afghanistan in 
1989. Many Pakistani Pakhtuns were upset that the internecine 
violence resulting from warring clans in conflict in Afghanistan 
was overflowing into Pakistan. In 1994 Pakistani Pakhtuns were 
as eager as other Pakistanis to see the refugees return to 
Afghanistan. 

Pakhtuns are organized into segmentary clans (called khels), 
each named for a first migrant to their area to whom they trace 
their ancestry. Membership is tied to landownership as well as 
to descent. A person who loses his land is no longer treated as a 
full (adult) member of the community. He no longer may join 
or speak in the tribal jirga, or council of tribal leaders, at which 
issues of common interest are debated. But because brothers 
divide property among themselves, rivalry builds among the 
children of brothers who may need to subdivide increasingly 
unequal portions of an original estate. Hence, a man's greatest 
rival for women, money, and land (zan, zar, and zamin, respec- 
tively) is his first cousin — his father's brother's son — even 
though the same man may be his staunchest ally in the event of 
attack from the outside. Lineages themselves have a notable 
tendency to fragment; this tendency has contributed to the 
existence of a number of well-established clans among the 



110 



The Society and Its Environment 



Pakhtuns. At every level of Pakhtun social organization, groups 
are split into a complex and shifting pattern of alliance and 
enmity. 

Most Pakhtuns are pious Sunni (see Glossary) Muslims, and 
effective religious leaders often acquire a substantial following. 
However, there is a basic ambivalence on the whole toward 
mullahs (see Glossary), who have a formal role in leading 
prayers and in taking care of the mosque. 

An intensely egalitarian ethos exists among Pakhtun men in 
a clan; the tribal leader is considered the first among equals. 
No man willingly admits himself less than any other's equal. 
Nor will he, unless driven by the most dire circumstances, put 
himself in a position of subservience or admit dependency on 
another. This sense of equality is evident in the structure of the 
men's council, composed of lineage elders who deal with mat- 
ters ranging from disputes between local lineage sections to 
relations with other tribes or with the national government. 
Although the council can make and enforce binding decisions, 
within the body itself all are considered equals. To attempt or 
to appear to coerce another is to give grave insult and to risk 
initiating a feud. 

To facilitate relations with Pakhtuns, the British appointed 
maliks, or minor chiefs. Agreements in which Pakhtuns have 
acceded to an external authority — whether the British or the 
Pakistani government — have been tenuous. The British 
resorted to a "divide and conquer" policy of playing various 
feuding factions against one another. British hegemony was fre- 
quently precarious: in 1937 Pakhtuns wiped out an entire Brit- 
ish brigade. Throughout the 1930s, there were more troops 
stationed in Waziristan (homeland of the Wazirs, among the 
most independent of Pakhtun tribes) in the southern part of 
the North-West Frontier Province than in the rest of the sub- 
continent. 

In tribal areas, where the level of wealth is generally limited, 
perennial feuding acts as a leveler. The killing, pillaging, and 
destruction keep any one lineage from amassing too much 
more than any other. In settled areas, the intensity of feuds has 
declined, although everyone continues to be loyal to the ideals 
of pakhtunwali. Government control only erratically contains 
violence — depending on whether a given government official 
has any relationship to the disputants. The proliferation of 
guns — including clones of Uzis and Kalashnikovs — has exacer- 
bated much of the violence. 



Ill 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

Since the 1980s, many Pakhtuns have entered the police 
force, civil service, and military and have virtually taken over 
the country's transportation network. A former president of 
Pakistan, Ghulam Ishaq Khan (1988-93), is a Pakhtun, as are 
many high-ranking military officers. The government of Paki- 
stan has established numerous schools in the North-West Fron- 
tier Province — including ones devoted exclusively to girls — in 
an effort to imbue Pakhtuns with a sense of Pakistani national- 
ism. 

A growing number of development projects in the North- 
West Frontier Province have provided diverse employment 
opportunities for Pakhtuns. Notably, the government has set 
up comprehensive projects such as building roads and schools 
as a substitution for cultivating opium poppies. Incentives for 
industrial investment have also been provided. However, the 
government lost much credibility when it proposed in 1991 (a 
proposal soon withdrawn) to build up the local infrastructure 
in the Gadoon-Amazai area of the North-West Frontier Prov- 
ince and to encourage it as a target for tax-free investment. 
Observers attributed the government's withdrawal of the incen- 
tive package to local unrest. 

Sindhis 

During the British Raj, Sindh, situated south of Punjab, was 
the neglected hinterland of Bombay. The society was domi- 
nated by a small number of major landholders (waderas). Most 
people were tenant farmers facing terms of contract that were 
a scant improvement over outright servitude; a middle class 
barely existed. The social landscape consisted largely of unre- 
mitting poverty, and feudal landlords ruled with little concern 
for any outside interference. A series of irrigation projects in 
the 1930s merely served to increase the wealth of large land- 
owners when their wastelands were made more productive. 
Reformist legislation in the 1940s that was intended to improve 
the lot of the poor had little success. At the time of indepen- 
dence, the province had entrenched extremes of wealth and 
poverty. 

There was considerable upheaval in Sindh in the years fol- 
lowing partition. Millions of Hindus and Sikhs left for India 
and were replaced by roughly 7 million muhajirs, who took the 
places of the fairly well-educated emigrant Hindus and Sikhs in 
the commercial life of the province. Later, the muhajirs pro- 
vided the political basis of the Refugee People's Movement 



112 



The Society and Its Environment 



(Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz — MQM). As Karachi became increas- 
ingly identified as a muhajir city, other cities in Sindh, notably 
Thatta, Hyderabad, and Larkana, became the headquarters for 
Sindhi resistance. 

In 1994 Sindh continued to be an ethnic battlefield within 
Pakistan. During the 1980s, there were repeated kidnappings 
in the province, some with political provocation. Fear of daco- 
its (bandits) gave rise to the perception that the interior of 
Sindh was unsafe for road and rail travel. Sectarian violence 
against Hindus erupted in the interior in 1992 in the wake of 
the destruction of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, India, by 
Hindu extremists who sought to rebuild a Hindu temple on the 
contested site. A travel advisory recommending that foreigners 
avoid the interior of the province remained in effect in early 
1994. 

Baloch 

The final major ethnic group in Pakistan is the Baloch. A 
comparatively small group, the Baloch, like the Pakhtuns, are a 
tribal population whose original territory extends beyond the 
national borders. Over 70 percent of the Baloch live in Paki- 
stan, with the remainder in Iran and Afghanistan. The Baloch 
trace their roots to tribes migrating eastward from around 
Aleppo, in Syria, before the Christian era. Sometime between 
the sixth century and the fourteenth century, they migrated to 
the region of present-day Balochistan. 

Baloch speak Balochi, part of the Iranian group of Indo- 
European languages. Linguistic evidence indicates the origin 
of Balochi to be in the pre-Christian Medean or Parthian civili- 
zations. The modern form has incorporated elements from 
Persian, Sindhi, Arabic, and a number of other languages. 
Beginning in the early nineteenth century, Baloch intellectuals 
used Persian and Urdu scripts to transcribe Balochi into writ- 
ten form. Since Pakistan's independence, and with the rise of 
Baloch nationalism, Baloch have favored the Nastaliq script, an 
adaptation of Arabic script. 

The land of Balochistan is exceedingly inhospitable; geolo- 
gists have even compared the landscape with Mars. A Pakhtu 
expression, reflecting on ethnic relations as well as on geogra- 
phy, describes Balochistan as "the dump where Allah shot the 
rubbish of creation." Subsistence is hard in this environment 
and is achieved by pastoral nomadism, dryland and irrigated 
agriculture, and fishing. Dryland farming is marginal, although 



113 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

it is a mainstay for many seminomadic herders. The Baloch 
plant drought-resistant grains in earthen embankments where 
scanty rainfall has accumulated. 

Irrigated farming is concentrated near oases in two kinds of 
systems: open channels that bring water from a few riverbeds, 
and subsurface drains (karez) that channel groundwater down- 
ward to planted fields. However, such irrigation and cultivation 
are extremely limited, forcing most Baloch to eke out a living 
by herding or farming in the marginal hinterland. 

Sheep and goats are the main herd animals. The herder typ- 
ically consumes the dairy products these animals produce and 
sells the meat and wool. Pastoralists organize themselves 
around water sources; wells are the property of specific camps. 

Kinship and social relations reflect the exigencies of dealing 
with the harsh physical environment. Like other Pakistanis, 
Baloch reckon descent patrilineally. Lineages, however, play a 
minimal role in the lives of most Baloch. They are notably flex- 
ible in arrangements with both family and friends. Ideally, a 
man should maintain close ties with relatives in his father's line, 
but in practice most relations are left to the discretion of the 
individual, and there is wide variation. It is typical for lineages 
to split and fragment, often because of disputes with close kin 
over matters such as inheritance and bad relations within mar- 
riages. Most Baloch treat both mother's and father's kin as a 
pool of potential assistance to be called on as the occasion 
demands. Again, the precariousness of subsistence favors hav- 
ing the widest possible circle of friends and relatives. 

Marriage patterns embody this kind of flexibility. As in many 
parts of West Asia, Baloch say that they prefer to marry their 
cousins. Actually, however, marriage choices are dictated by 
pragmatic considerations. Residence, the complex means of 
access to agricultural land, and the centrality of water rights, 
coupled with uncertain water supply, all favor flexibility in the 
choice of in-laws. The plethora of land tenure arrangements 
tends to limit the value of marrying one's cousin, a marriage 
pattern that functions to keep land in the family in other parts 
of Pakistan. 

The majority of Baloch are Hanafi Sunnis, but there is a 
community of an estimated 500,000 to 700,000 Zikri Baloch, 
who live in the coastal Makran area and in Karachi. The Zikris 
believe in the fifteenth-century teachings of a madhi, an Islamic 
messiah, named Nur Pak. These teachings, they believe, super- 
sede those of the Prophet Muhammad — a violation of one of 



114 



Girl from Chitral 
Courtesy Harvey Follender 



Women and children in 
Ziarat, Balochistan 
Courtesy Anita M. Weiss 



Islam's central tenets (see Basic Tenets of Islam, this ch.). Zikris 
have their own daily prayers and do not fast during Ramadan 
(known as Ramazan in Pakistan). By the Zikris' own self-estima- 
tion, they are devout Muslims. To the Sunni majority, however, 
their beliefs are heretical. 

Only among the coastal Baloch is marriage between cousins 
common; there, nearly two-thirds of married couples are first 
cousins. The coastal Baloch are in greater contact with non- 
Baloch and manifest a concomitantly greater sense of group 
solidarity. For them, being "unified amongst ourselves" is a par- 
ticularly potent cultural ideal. Because they are Zikris, they 
have a limited pool of eligible mates and do not generally 
marry outside of the group of Zikri Baloch. 

Baloch society is stratified and has been characterized as 
"feudal militarism." The significant social tie is that between a 
leader, the hakim, and his retinue, consisting of pastoralists, 
agriculturists, lower-level leaders, and lower-level tenant farm- 
ers and descendants of former slaves (hizmatkar) . Suprafamily 
groups formed through patrilineal descent are significant 



115 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

mostly for the elite hakim, whose concern for rivalry and poli- 
tics is not shared by other groups. 

The basic exchange traditionally underlying this elaborate 
system was the hakims offer of booty or property rights in 
return for support in battle. In more modern times, various 
favors are generally traded for votes, but the structure of the 
system — the participation of the lower-level leaders and the hiz- 
matkar through patron-client ties — remains much the same. 

In common with the neighboring Pakhtuns, Baloch are 
deeply committed to maintaining their personal honor, show- 
ing generous hospitality to guests, and giving protection to 
those who seek it of them. However, the prototypical relation- 
ship is that between the leader and his minions. A Baloch suf- 
fers no loss of status in submitting to another. Although 
competition for scarce water and land resources characterizes 
social relations between minor leaders and hizmatkar, competi- 
tion coexists with a deeply held belief in the virtues of sharing 
and cooperation. Sharing creates networks of obligation 
among herders, mutual aid being an insurance policy in the 
face of a precarious livelihood. 

Baloch tribal structure concentrates power in the hands of 
local tribal leaders. The British played local rivals against each 
other in a policy of indirect rule, as they did with the Pakhtun 
tribes to the north — and virtually throughout the subconti- 
nent. In essence, the British offered local autonomy and subsi- 
dies to rulers in exchange for access to the border with 
Afghanistan. In the early 1990s, local leaders maintained this 
policy to a large extent, continuing to exploit the endemic 
anarchy, whether local, provincial, or national. 

There have been sporadic separatist movements in 
Balochistan since independence. Baloch have long been accus- 
tomed to indirect rule, a policy that leaves local elites with a 
substantial measure of autonomy. The 1970s saw a precipitous 
deterioration in relations between Balochistan and the central 
government, however. The violent confrontation between 
Baloch insurgents and the Pakistani military in the mid-1970s 
was particularly brutal (see Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and a New Con- 
stitutional System, ch. 1). The conflict touched the lives of 
most Baloch and politicized those long accustomed to accept- 
ing the status quo. Original demands for greater regional 
autonomy escalated into a full-scale movement aimed at 
restructuring the government along confederal lines. By the 
mid-1980s, traditional cleavages among hakim, minor leaders, 



116 



The Society and Its Environment 



and hizmatkar had declined in importance as the Baloch 
increasingly thought of themselves as a unified group in oppo- 
sition to Pakistani, or Punjabi, hegemony. 

Zia ul-Haq's overthrow of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977 was 
welcomed by many in Balochistan, in contrast to popular senti- 
ment in the rest of the country, which was appalled by the 
extraconstitutional act. As relations with the central govern- 
ment began to smooth out, however, the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan in December 1979, placing nearly the entire 
northern border of Balochistan on alert as a frontline area. 

Balochistan's landscape in the 1980s changed markedly as 
Afghan refugee camps were established throughout the north- 
ern parts of the province. In many instances, temporary mud 
housing eventually became transformed into concrete struc- 
tures. The refugees also caused the demographic balance to 
change as ethnic Pakhtuns — many refugees from Afghani- 
stan — came to settle in Balochistan. 

Although social conditions in rural areas have changed little 
for most Baloch, two scandals in the early 1990s caused the 
region to receive much attention. The first grew out of reports 
that some owners of brick kilns in remote parts of the province 
had labor practices that resembled slavery, complete with 
indenturing workers to loans that were passed down through 
generations. The second was the charge that young boys were 
being recruited from the most remote parts of the province to 
be "camel boys" in races in the Persian Gulf states. The scream- 
ing of the young boys, who are tied to the backs of racing cam- 
els, supposedly scares the animals into running faster. The 
young boys often are maimed or killed in the process. Impover- 
ished parents unwittingly accepted payment on the promise 
that their sons would be employed as apprentices. 

Because of the area's limited population and its low popula- 
tion density levels, there has been little development in 
Balochistan except in Quetta, the capital of the province. The 
rural programs that exist stem mostly from the efforts of the 
Agha Khan Rural Support Development Project, an NGO that 
has expanded into rural Balochistan on the basis of its suc- 
cesses in the mountains around Gilgit, in the far north of the 
country. This project works on organizing disparate communi- 
ties into local support groups and has had particular success in 
reaching women in remote areas of Balochistan. 



117 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

Men, Women, and the Division of Space 

Gender relations in Pakistan rest on two basic perceptions: 
that women are subordinate to men, and that a man's honor 
resides in the actions of the women of his family. Thus, as in 
other orthodox Muslim societies, women are responsible for 
maintaining the family honor. To ensure that they do not dis- 
honor their families, society limits women's mobility, places 
restrictions on their behavior and activities, and permits them 
only limited contact with the opposite sex. 

Space is allocated to and used differently by men and 
women. For their protection and respectability, women have 
traditionally been expected to live under the constraints of pur- 
dah (purdah is Persian for curtain), most obvious in veiling. By 
separating women from the activities of men, both physically 
and symbolically, purdah creates differentiated male and 
female spheres. Most women spend the major part of their lives 
physically within their homes and courtyards and go out only 
for serious and approved reasons. Outside the home, social life 
generally revolves around the activities of men. In most parts of 
the country, except perhaps in Islamabad, Karachi, and wealth- 
ier parts of a few other cities, people consider a woman — and 
her family — to be shameless if no restrictions are placed on her 
mobility. 

Purdah is practiced in various ways, depending on family tra- 
dition, region, class, and rural or urban residence, but 
nowhere do unrelated men and women mix freely. The most 
extreme restraints are found in parts of the North-West Fron- 
tier Province and Balochistan, where women almost never 
leave their homes except when they marry and almost never 
meet unrelated men. They may not be allowed contact with 
male cousins on their mother's side, for these men are not 
classed as relatives in a strongly patrilineal society. Similarly, 
they have only very formal relations with those men they are 
allowed to meet, such as the father-in-law, paternal uncles, and 
brothers-in-law. 

Poor rural women, especially in Punjab and Sindh, where 
gender relations are generally somewhat more relaxed, have 
greater mobility because they are responsible for transplanting 
rice seedlings, weeding crops, raising chickens and selling eggs, 
and stuffing wool or cotton into comforters (razais). When a 
family becomes more prosperous and begins to aspire to 
higher status, it commonly requires stricter purdah among its 
women as a first social change. 



118 



The Society and Its Environment 



Poor urban women in close-knit communities, such as the 
old cities of Lahore and Rawalpindi, generally wear either a 
burqa (fitted body veil) or a chador (loosely draped cotton 
cloth used as a head covering and body veil) when they leave 
their homes. In these localities, multistory dwellings (havelis) 
were constructed to accommodate large extended families. 
Many havelis have now been sectioned off into smaller living 
units to economize. It is common for one nuclear family (with 
an average of seven members) to live in one or two rooms on 
each small floor. In less densely populated areas, where people 
generally do not know their neighbors, there are fewer restric- 
tions on women's mobility. 

The shared understanding that women should remain 
within their homes so neighbors do not gossip about their 
respectability has important implications for their productive 
activities. As with public life in general, work appears to be the 
domain of men. Rural women work for consumption or for 
exchange at the subsistence level. Others, both rural and 
urban, do piecework for very low wages in their homes. Their 
earnings are generally recorded as part of the family income 
that is credited to men. Census data and other accounts of eco- 
nomic activity in urban areas support such conclusions. For 
example, the 1981 census reported that 5.6 percent of all 
women were employed, as opposed to 72.4 percent of men; less 
than 4 percent of all urban women were engaged in some form 
of salaried work. By 1988 this figure had increased significantly, 
but still only 10.2 percent of women were reported as partici- 
pating in the labor force. 

Among wealthier Pakistanis, urban or rural residence is less 
important than family tradition in influencing whether women 
observe strict purdah and in determining the type of veil they 
wear. In some areas, women simply observe "eye purdah": they 
tend not to mix with men, but when they do, they avert their 
eyes when interacting with them. Bazaars in wealthier areas of 
Punjabi cities differ from those in poorer areas by having a 
greater proportion of unveiled women. In cities throughout 
the North-West Frontier Province, Balochistan, and the interior 
of Sindh, bazaars are markedly devoid of women, and when a 
woman does venture forth, she always wears some sort of veil. 

The traditional division of space between the sexes is perpet- 
uated in the broadcast media. Women's subservience is consis- 
tently shown on television and in films. And, although popular 
television dramas raise controversial issues such as women 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

working, seeking divorce, or even having a say in family politics, 
the programs often suggest that the woman who strays from tra- 
ditional norms faces insurmountable problems and becomes 
alienated from her family. 

The Status of Women and the Women's Movement 

Four important challenges confronted women in Pakistan in 
the early 1990s: increasing practical literacy, gaining access to 
employment opportunities at all levels in the economy, pro- 
moting change in the perception of women's roles and status, 
and gaining a public voice both within and outside of the polit- 
ical process. 

There have been various attempts at social and legal reform 
aimed at improving Muslim women's lives in the subcontinent 
during the twentieth century. These attempts generally have 
been related to two broader, intertwined movements: the social 
reform movement in British India and the growing Muslim 
nationalist movement. Since partition, the changing status of 
women in Pakistan largely has been linked with discourse 
about the role of Islam in a modern state. This debate con- 
cerns the extent to which civil rights common in most Western 
democracies are appropriate in an Islamic society and the way 
these rights should be reconciled with Islamic family law. 

Muslim reformers in the nineteenth century struggled to 
introduce female education, to ease some of the restrictions on 
women's activities, to limit polygyny, and to ensure women's 
rights under Islamic law. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan convened the 
Mohammedan Educational Conference in the 1870s to pro- 
mote modern education for Muslims, and he founded the 
Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College. Among the predomi- 
nantly male participants were many of the earliest proponents 
of education and improved social status for women. They advo- 
cated cooking and sewing classes conducted in a religious 
framework to advance women's knowledge and skills and to 
reinforce Islamic values. But progress in women's literacy was 
slow: by 1921 only four out of every 1,000 Muslim females were 
literate. 

Promoting the education of women was a first step in mov- 
ing beyond the constraints imposed by purdah. The nationalist 
struggle helped fray the threads in that socially imposed cur- 
tain. Simultaneously, women's roles were questioned, and their 
empowerment was linked to the larger issues of nationalism 
and independence. In 1937 the Muslim Personal Law restored 



120 



People sleeping on rooftops, Lohari Gate, Lahore 
Courtesy Anita M. Weiss 

rights (such as inheritance of property) that had been lost by 
women under the Anglicization of certain civil laws. As inde- 
pendence neared, it appeared that the state would give priority 
to empowering women. Pakistan's founding father, Moham- 
mad Ali Jinnah, said in a speech in 1944: 

No nation can rise to the height of glory unless your 
women are side by side with you; we are victims of 
evil customs. It is a crime against humanity that our 
women are shut up within the four walls of the 
houses as prisoners. There is no sanction anywhere 
for the deplorable condition in which our women 
have to live. 

After independence, elite Muslim women in Pakistan contin- 
ued to advocate women's political empowerment through legal 
reforms. They mobilized support that led to passage of the 
Muslim Personal Law of Sharia in 1948, which recognized a 
woman's right to inherit all forms of property. They were also 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

behind the futile attempt to have the government include a 
Charter of Women's Rights in the 1956 constitution. The 1961 
Muslim Family Laws Ordinance covering marriage and divorce, 
the most important sociolegal reform that they supported, is 
still widely regarded as empowering to women. 

Two issues — promotion of women's political representation 
and accommodation between Muslim family law and demo- 
cratic civil rights — came to dominate discourse about women 
and sociolegal reform. The second issue gained considerable 
attention during the regime of Zia ul-Haq (1977-88). Urban 
women formed groups to protect their rights against apparent 
discrimination under Zia's Islamization program. It was in the 
highly visible realm of law that women were able to articulate 
their objections to the Islamization program initiated by the 
government in 1979. Protests against the 1979 Enforcement of 
Hudood Ordinances focused on the failure of hudood (see 
Glossary) ordinances to distinguish between adultery (zina) 
and rape (zina-bil-jabr) . A man could be convicted of zina only if 
he were actually observed committing the offense by other 
men, but a woman could be convicted simply because she 
became pregnant. 

The Women's Action Forum was formed in 1981 to respond 
to the implementation of the penal code and to strengthen 
women's position in society generally. The women in the 
forum, most of whom came from elite families, perceived that 
many of the laws proposed by the Zia government were dis- 
criminatory and would compromise their civil status. In Kara- 
chi, Lahore, and Islamabad the group agreed on collective 
leadership and formulated policy statements and engaged in 
political action to safeguard women's legal position. 

The Women's Action Forum has played a central role in 
heightening the controversy regarding various interpretations 
of Islamic law and its role in a modern state, and in publicizing 
ways in which women can play a more active role in politics. Its 
members led public protests in the mid-1980s against the pro- 
mulgation of the Law of Evidence. Although the final version 
was substantially modified, the Women's Action Forum 
objected to the legislation because it gave unequal weight to 
testimony by men and women in financial cases. Fundamen- 
tally, they objected to the assertion that women and men can- 
not participate as legal equals in economic affairs. 

Beginning in August 1986, the Women's Action Forum 
members and their supporters led a debate over passage of the 



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The Society and Its Environment 



Shariat Bill, which decreed that all laws in Pakistan should con- 
form to Islamic law. They argued that the law would under- 
mine the principles of justice, democracy, and fundamental 
rights of citizens, and they pointed out that Islamic law would 
become identified solely with the conservative interpretation 
supported by Zia's government. Most activists felt that the Shar- 
iat Bill had the potential to negate many of the rights women 
had won. In May 1991, a compromise version of the Shariat Bill 
was adopted, but the debate over whether civil law or Islamic 
law should prevail in the country continued in the early 1990s. 

Discourse about the position of women in Islam and 
women's roles in a modern Islamic state was sparked by the 
government's attempts to formalize a specific interpretation of 
Islamic law. Although the issue of evidence became central to 
the concern for women's legal status, more mundane matters 
such as mandatory dress codes for women and whether females 
could compete in international sports competitions were also 
being argued. 

Another of the challenges faced by Pakistani women con- 
cerns their integration into the labor force. Because of eco- 
nomic pressures and the dissolution of extended families in 
urban areas, many more women are working for wages than in 
the past. But by 1990 females officially made up only 13 per- 
cent of the labor force. Restrictions on their mobility limit their 
opportunities, and traditional notions of propriety lead fami- 
lies to conceal the extent of work performed by women. 

Usually, only the poorest women engage in work — often as 
midwives, sweepers, or nannies — for compensation outside the 
home. More often, poor urban women remain at home and 
sell manufactured goods to a middleman for compensation. 
More and more urban women have engaged in such activities 
during the 1990s, although to avoid being shamed, few families 
willingly admit that women contribute to the family economi- 
cally. Hence, there is little information about the work women 
do. On the basis of the predominant fiction that most women 
do no work other than their domestic chores, the government 
has been hesitant to adopt overt policies to increase women's 
employment options and to provide legal support for women's 
labor-force participation. 

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) commis- 
sioned a national study in 1992 on women's economic activity 
to enable policy planners and donor agencies to cut through 
the existing myths on female labor-force participation. The 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

study addresses the specific reasons that the assessment of 
women's work in Pakistan is rilled with discrepancies and 
underenumeration and provides a comprehensive discussion 
of the range of informal-sector work performed by women 
throughout the country. Information from this study was also 
incorporated into the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1993-98). 

A melding of the traditional social welfare activities of the 
women's movement and its newly revised political activism 
appears to have occurred. Diverse groups, including the 
Women's Action Forum, the All-Pakistan Women's Association, 
the Pakistan Women Lawyers' Association, and the Business 
and Professional Women's Association, are supporting small- 
scale projects throughout the country that focus on empower- 
ing women. They have been involved in such activities as insti- 
tuting legal aid for indigent women, opposing the gendered 
segregation of universities, and publicizing and condemning 
the growing incidents of violence against women. The Pakistan 
Women Lawyers' Association has released a series of films edu- 
cating women about their legal rights; the Business and Profes- 
sional Women's Association is supporting a comprehensive 
project inside Yakki Gate, a poor area inside the walled old city 
of Lahore; and the Orangi Pilot Project in Karachi has pro- 
moted networks among women who work at home so they 
need not be dependent on middlemen to acquire raw materi- 
als and to market the clothes they produce. 

The women's movement has shifted from reacting to govern- 
ment legislation to focusing on three primary goals: securing 
women's political representation in the National Assembly; 
working to raise women's consciousness, particularly about 
family planning; and countering suppression of women's rights 
by defining and articulating positions on events as they occur 
in order to raise public awareness. An as yet unresolved issue 
concerns the perpetuation of a set number of seats for women 
in the National Assembly. Many women activists whose expecta- 
tions were raised during the brief tenure of Benazir Bhutto's 
first government (December 1988-August 1990) now believe 
that, with her return to power in October 1993, they can seize 
the initiative to bring about a shift in women's personal and 
public access to power 

Religious Life 

About 97 percent of all Pakistanis are Muslims. Official docu- 
mentation states that Sunni Muslims constitute 77 percent of 



124 



The Society and Its Environment 



the population and that adherents of Shia (see Glossary) Islam 
make up an additional 20 percent. Christians, Hindus, and 
members of other religions each account for about 1 percent 
of the population. 

Basic Tenets of Islam 

The central belief in Islam is that there is only one God, 
Allah, and that the Prophet Muhammad was his final messen- 
ger. Muhammad is held to be the "seal of the prophets." Islam 
is derived from the Judeo-Christian tradition and regards Abra- 
ham (Ibrahim) and Jesus (Isa) as prophets and recognizes the 
validity of the Old Testament and New Testament. 

Islam is held to be the blueprint for humanity that God has 
created. The word Islam comes from aslama (to submit), and 
the one who submits — a Muslim — is a believer who achieves 
peace, or salaam. God, the creator, is invisible and omnipres- 
ent; to represent God in any form is a sin. 

The Prophet was born in A.D. 570 and became a merchant 
in the Arabian town of Mecca. At the age of forty, he began to 
receive a series of revelations from God transmitted through 
the angel Gabriel. His monotheistic message, which disdained 
the idolatry that was popularly practiced at the Kaaba (now in 
the Great Mosque and venerated as a shrine of Muslim pilgrim- 
age) in Mecca at that time, was ridiculed by the town's leaders. 
Muhammad and his followers were forced to emigrate in 622 to 
the nearby town of Yathrib, later known as Medina, or "the 
city." This move, the hijra, marks the beginning of the Islamic 
era. In the ten years before his death in 632, the Prophet con- 
tinued preaching and receiving revelations, ultimately consoli- 
dating both the temporal and the spiritual leadership of 
Arabia. 

The Quran, the holy scripture of Islam, plays a pivotal role in 
Muslim social organization and values. The Quran, which liter- 
ally means "reciting," is recognized by believers as truly the 
word of God, and as such it is eternal, absolute, and irrevoca- 
ble. The fact that Muhammad was the last of the prophets and 
that no further additions to "the word" are allowed is signifi- 
cant; it closes the door to new revelations. 

That there can be no authorized translation of the Quran in 
any language other than the original, Arabic, is crucial to its 
unifying importance. Cultural differences such as those that 
exist among various Muslim groups throughout the world can- 
not compromise the unifying role that the religion plays. 



125 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

The Prophet's life is considered exemplary. His active 
engagement in worldly activities established precedents for 
Muslims to follow. These precedents, referred to as the hadith, 
include the statements, actions, and moods or feelings of the 
Prophet. Although many hadith are popularly accepted by 
most Muslims, there is no one canon accepted by all. Such 
things as the way in which Muhammad ran the state in Medina 
and the priority he placed on education remain important 
guidelines. The Quran and the hadith together form the sunna 
(see Glossary) , a comprehensive guide to spiritual, ethical, and 
social living. 

The five pillars of Islam consist of certain beliefs and acts to 
which a Muslim must adhere to affirm membership in the com- 
munity. The first is the shahada (testimony), the affirmation of 
the faith, which succinctly states the central belief of Islam: 
"There is no god but God (Allah), and Muhammad is his 
Prophet." To become a Muslim, one needs only to recite this 
statement. Second is salat, the obligation for a Muslim to pray 
at five set times during the day. Muslims value prayers recited 
communally, especially the midday prayers on Friday, the Mus- 
lim sabbath. Mosques have emerged as important social and 
political centers as a by-product of this unifying value. The 
third pillar of Islam is zakat, the obligation to provide alms for 
the poor and disadvantaged (see Zakat as a Welfare System, this 
ch.). The fourth is sawm, the obligation to fast from sunrise to 
sunset during the holy month of Ramadan, in commemoration 
of the beginning of the Prophet's revelations from Allah. The 
final pillar is the expectation that every adult Muslim physically 
and financially able to do so perform the hajj, the pilgrimage 
to Mecca, at least once in his or her lifetime. The pilgrimage 
occurs during the last month of the Muslim lunar calendar, just 
over a month after the end of Ramadan. Its social importance 
as a unifier of the greater Muslim umma (community of believ- 
ers) has led to the establishment of hajj committees for its regu- 
lation in every Muslim country. The pilgrimage of a Muslim to 
the sacred places at any other time of the year is referred to as 
umra (visitation). At various times of political crisis in Pakistan, 
almost every major leader has left for Saudi Arabia to perform 
umra. Performing umra may or may not increase the politician's 
reputation for moral standing. 

A number of other elements contribute to a sense of social 
membership whereby Muslims see themselves as distinct from 
non-Muslims, including prohibition on the consumption of 



126 



The Society and Its Environment 



pork and alcohol, the requirement that animals be slaughtered 
in a ritual manner, and the obligation to circumcise sons. 
Another element is jihad, the "striving." Jihad is often misun- 
derstood in the West, where people think of it as a fanatical 
holy war. There are two kinds of jihad: the far more important 
inner one is the battle each Muslim wages with his or her lower 
self; the outer one is the battle that each Muslim must wage to 
preserve the faith and its followers. People who fight the outer 
jihad are mujahidin. The Afghan rebels waging an insurrection 
against the Soviet-backed government in the 1980s deftly used 
this term to identify themselves and hence infused their strug- 
gle with a moral dimension. 

The concept of predestination in Islam is different from that 
in Christianity. Islam posits the existence of an all-powerful 
force (Allah) who rules the universe and knows all things. 
Something will happen — inshaallah — if it is God's will. The con- 
cept is not purely fatalistic, for although people are responsible 
to God for their actions, these actions are not predestined. 
Instead, God has shown the world the right way to live as 
revealed through the Quran; then it is up to individual believ- 
ers to choose how to live. 

There are two major sects in Islam — the Sunnis and the Shia. 
They are differentiated by Sunni acceptance of the temporal 
authority of the Rashudin Caliphate (Abu Bakr, Omar, Usman, 
and Ali) after the death of the Prophet and the Shia accep- 
tance solely of Ali, the Prophet's cousin and husband of his 
daughter, Fatima, and his descendants. Over time, the Sunni 
sect divided into four major schools of jurisprudence; of these, 
the Hanafi school is predominant in Pakistan. The Shia sect 
split over the matter of succession, resulting in two major 
groups: the majority Twelve Imam Shia believe that there are 
twelve rightful imams, Ali and his eleven direct descendants. A 
second Shia group, the numerically smaller Ismaili community, 
known also as Seveners, follows a line of imams that originally 
challenged the Seventh Imam and supported a younger 
brother, Ismail. The Ismaili line of leaders has been continuous 
down to the present day. The current leader, Sadr ad Din Agha 
Khan, who is active in international humanitarian efforts, is a 
direct descendant of Ali. 

Islam in Pakistani Society 

Islam was brought to the South Asian subcontinent in the 
eighth century by wandering Sufi (see Glossary) mystics known 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

as pir (see Glossary). As in other areas where it was introduced 
by Sufis, Islam to some extent syncretized with pre-Islamic 
influences, resulting in a religion traditionally more flexible 
than in the Arab world. Two Sufis whose shrines receive much 
national attention are Data Ganj Baksh in Lahore (ca. eleventh 
century) and Shahbaz Qalander in Sehwan, Sindh (ca. twelfth 
century). 

The Muslim poet-philosopher Sir Muhammad Iqbal first 
proposed the idea of a Muslim state in the subcontinent in his 
address to the Muslim League at Allahabad in 1930. His pro- 
posal referred to the four provinces of Punjab, Sindh, 
Balochistan, and the North-West Frontier Province — essentially 
what would became post-1971 Pakistan. Iqbal's idea gave con- 
crete form to the "Two Nations Theory" of two distinct nations 
in the subcontinent based on religion (Islam and Hinduism) 
and with different historical backgrounds, social customs, cul- 
tures, and social mores. 

Islam was thus the basis for the creation and the unification 
of a separate state, but it was not expected to serve as the 
model of government. Mohammad Ali Jinnah made his com- 
mitment to secularism in Pakistan clear in his inaugural 
address when he said, "You will find that in the course of time 
Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to 
be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the per- 
sonal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citi- 
zens of the State." This vision of a Muslim majority state in 
which religious minorities would share equally in its develop- 
ment was questioned shortly after independence. The debate 
continued into the 1990s amid questions of the rights of 
Ahmadiyyas (a small but influential sect considered by ortho- 
dox Muslims to be outside the pale of Islam), issuance of iden- 
tity cards denoting religious affiliation, and government 
intervention in the personal practice of Islam (see Constitu- 
tional Beginnings, ch. 1; Islamic Provisions, ch. 5). 

Politicized Islam 

From the outset, politics and religion have been intertwined 
both conceptually and practically in Islam. Because the 
Prophet established a government in Medina, precedents of 
governance and taxation exist. Through the history of Islam, 
from the Ummayyad (661-750) and Abbasid empires (750- 
1258) to the Mughals (1526-1858) and the Ottomans (1300- 
1923), religion and statehood have been treated as one. 



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The Society and Its Environment 



Indeed, one of the beliefs of Islam is that the purpose of the 
state is to provide an environment where Muslims can properly 
practice their religion. If a leader fails in this, the people have a 
right to depose him. 

In 1977 the government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto outlawed 
alcohol and changed the "day off from Sunday to Friday, but 
no substantive Islamic reform program was implemented prior 
to General Zia's Islamization program. Starting in February 
1979, new penal measures based on Islamic principles of justice 
went into effect. These carried considerably greater implica- 
tions for women than for men. A welfare and taxation system 
based on zakat and a profit-and-loss banking system were also 
established in accordance with Islamic prohibitions against 
usury (see Policy Developments since Independence, ch. 3). 

Zia's Islamization program was pursued within a rather com- 
plicated ideological framework. His stance was in contrast to 
the popular culture, in which most people are "personally" very 
religious but not "publicly" religious. An unexpected outcome 
was that by relying on a policy grounded in Islam, the state 
fomented factionalism: by legislating what is Islamic and what 
is not, Islam itself could no longer provide unity because it was 
then being defined to exclude previously included groups. Dis- 
putes between Sunnis and Shia, ethnic disturbances in Karachi 
among Pakhtuns, Sindhis, and muhajirs, increased animosity 
toward Ahmadiyyas, and the revival of Punjab-Sindh tensions 
can all be traced to the loss of Islam as a common vocabulary of 
public morality. More profoundly, in a move that reached into 
every home, the state had attempted to dictate a specific ideal 
image of women in Islamic society, an ideal that was largely 
antithetical to that existing in popular sentiment and in every- 
day life. 

A major component of the Islamization program, the Shariat 
Bill, was passed in May 1991. This bill required that all laws in 
the country conform to Islam. Women's groups in particular 
were concerned that the reforms in the Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinance of 1961 could be jeopardized by the new bill. 

A controversial law, Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal 
Code, drew a great deal of attention from critics associated with 
the Human Rights Commission in 1993-94. Introduced in 
1986 by Zia, the law, referred to as "the blasphemy trap," states 
that "whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible 
representation or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, 
directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Prophet 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

Muhammad shall be punished with death or imprisoned for 
life and shall be liable to fine." The law extends to Muslims and 
non-Muslims alike, but it has been indiscriminately used 
against members of minorities. According to Amnesty Interna- 
tional, several dozen people had been charged under Paki- 
stan's blasphemy laws by early 1994. In all cases, these charges 
appear to have been arbitrarily brought and to have been 
based on an individual's minority religious beliefs or on mali- 
cious accusations. The current government of Benazir Bhutto, 
sensitive to Pakistan's image in the world community, has 
attempted to approve changes in the blasphemy law in order to 
"curb abuses of the law" — especially those involving false accu- 
sations and fabricated cases. Critics claim, however, that Bena- 
zir, constantly under attack for being too liberal by the religious 
right, has been overly cautious and slow to introduce amend- 
ments to the law. 

Non-Muslim Minorities 

The most visible groups of non-Muslim minorities are Hin- 
dus and Christians. Hindus are found largely in the interior of 
Sindh and in the vicinity of Quetta in Balochistan. Christians, 
representing almost all West European dominations, are found 
throughout the country; many are engaged in menial work. 
Other minorities include Zoroastrians (also called Parsis), 
largely concentrated in Karachi, and members of groups rela- 
tively recently designated as non-Muslim, notably the Ahmadiy- 
yas. 

The Ahmadiyyas are followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (ca. 
1840-1908), who founded the sect in Qadian, India, in 1901. 
Ahmad's adherents are often called Qadianis. Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad claimed to have received a revelation from God, and 
such a claim, argue orthodox Muslims, violates a central tenet 
of Islam that Muhammad is the final prophet. Orthodox ulama 
therefore consider the Ahmadiyyas apostates. 

As a group, the Ahmadiyyas are highly organized and have a 
marked degree of community spirit. They are characteristically 
ascetic in their personal lives; they bring to their vision of Islam 
the reforming zeal of some of the fundamentalists. They seek 
to re-create the glories of the early caliphs. Ahmadiyyas strictly 
adhere to purdah. They are accustomed to running their own 
schools and welfare institutions. 

The Ahmadiyyas' high literacy rate, as well as their general 
industriousness, has won them a substantial measure of eco- 



130 



The Society and Its Environment 



nomic success and public prominence. As a result, they fre- 
quently have been the object of envy. In 1953 there were anti- 
Ahmadiyya riots, which resulted in the first imposition of mar- 
tial law, albeit local and temporary. Sunnis called for the firing 
of prominent Ahmadiyya officeholders and demanded that the 
sect be declared non-Muslim. Anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment 
stirred again in the mid-1970s. Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto capitulated to popular demands, and the sect was 
declared non-Muslim. In 1984 President Zia ul-Haq, reacting to 
calls for violence against the Ahmadiyyas by disaffected ulama, 
placed additional legal restrictions on the community. The 
Ahmadiyya question is likely to persist in the Islamic state of 
Pakistan, where the question of who is a Muslim is of such cru- 
cial importance. 

The various religious minority groups have secured separate 
representation in national and provincial assemblies but still 
have limited influence on national policy. They finally united 
around a common issue in October 1992 when the govern- 
ment of Mian Nawaz Sharif decreed that religious affiliation 
would be indicated on identity cards. These cards were needed 
for a range of activities, including attending school, opening a 
bank account, registering to vote, casting a vote, and obtaining 
a passport. Members of minority groups organized demonstra- 
tions to protest this discrimination, which they argued would 
demote them to the ranks of second-class citizens. They argued 
that safeguards existed for them both within Islamic law and in 
the promises that had been made to them in 1947 at indepen- 
dence. The government soon rescinded the decree. 

Education 

At independence, Pakistan had a poorly educated popula- 
tion and few schools or universities. Although the education 
system has expanded greatly since then, debate continues 
about the curriculum, and, except in a few elite institutions, 
quality remained a crucial concern of educators in the early 
1990s. 

Adult literacy is low, but improving. In 1992 more than 36 
percent of adults over fifteen were literate, compared with 21 
percent in 1970. The rate of improvement is highlighted by the 
50 percent literacy achieved among those aged fifteen to nine- 
teen in 1990. School enrollment also increased, from 19 per- 
cent of those aged six to twenty-three in 1980 to 24 percent in 
1990. However, by 1992 the population over twenty-five had a 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

mean of only 1.9 years of schooling. This fact explains the min- 
imal criteria for being considered literate: having the ability to 
both read and write (with understanding) a short, simple state- 
ment on everyday life. 

Relatively limited resources have been allocated to educa- 
tion, although there has been improvement in recent decades. 
In 1960 public expenditure on education was only 1.1 percent 
of the gross national product (GNP — see Glossary); by 1990 
the figure had risen to 3.4 percent. This amount compared 
poorly with the more than 30 percent being spent on defense 
in 1993. In 1990 Pakistan was tied for fourth place in the world 
in its ratio of military expenditures to health and education 
expenditures. Although the government enlisted the assistance 
of various international donors in the education efforts out- 
lined in its Seventh Five-Year Plan (1988-93), the results did 
not measure up to expectations. 

Structure of the System 

Education is organized into five levels: primary (grades one 
through five); middle (grades six through eight); high (grades 
nine and ten, culminating in matriculation); intermediate 
(grades eleven and twelve, leading to an F.A. diploma in arts or 
an F.S. in science); and university programs leading to under- 
graduate and advanced degrees. Preparatory classes (kachi, or 
nursery) were formally incorporated into the system in 1988 
with the Seventh Five-Year Plan. 

Academic and technical education institutions are the 
responsibility of the federal Ministry of Education, which coor- 
dinates instruction through the intermediate level. Above that 
level, a designated university in each province is responsible for 
coordination of instruction and examinations. In certain cases, 
a different ministry may oversee specialized programs. Univer- 
sities enjoy limited autonomy; their finances are overseen by a 
University Grants Commission, as in Britain. 

Teacher-training workshops are overseen by the respective 
provincial education ministries in order to improve teaching 
skills. However, incentives are severely lacking, and, perhaps 
because of the shortage of financial support to education, few 
teachers participate. Rates of absenteeism among teachers are 
high in general, inducing support for community-coordinated 
efforts promoted in the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1993-98). 

In 1991 there were 87,545 primary schools, 189,200 primary 
school teachers, and 7,768,000 students enrolled at the pri- 



132 



The Society and Its Environment 



mary level, with a student-to-teacher ratio of forty-one to one. 
Just over one-third of all children of primary school age were 
enrolled in a school in 1989. There were 11,978 secondary 
schools, 154,802 secondary school teachers, and 2,995,000 stu- 
dents enrolled at the secondary level, with a student-to-teacher 
ratio of nineteen to one. 

Primary school dropout rates remained fairly consistent in 
the 1970s and 1980s, at just over 50 percent for boys and 60 
percent for girls. The middle school dropout rates for boys and 
girls rose from 22 percent in 1976 to about 33 percent in 1983. 
However, a noticeable shift occurred in the beginning of the 
1980s regarding the postprimary dropout rate: whereas boys 
and girls had relatively equal rates (14 percent) in 1975, by 
1979 — -just as Zia initiated his government's Islamization pro- 
gram — the dropout rate for boys was 25 percent while for girls 
it was only 16 percent. By 1993 this trend had dramatically 
reversed, and boys had a dropout rate of only 7 percent com- 
pared with the girls' rate of 15 percent. 

The Seventh Five-Year Plan envisioned that every child five 
years old and above would have access to either a primary 
school or a comparable, but less comprehensive, mosque 
school. However, because of financial constraints, this goal was 
not achieved. 

In drafting the Eighth Five-Year Plan in 1992, the govern- 
ment therefore reiterated the need to mobilize a large share of 
national resources to finance education. To improve access to 
schools, especially at the primary level, the government sought 
to decentralize and democratize the design and implementa- 
tion of its education strategy. To give parents a greater voice in 
running schools, it planned to transfer control of primary and 
secondary schools to NGOs. The government also intended to 
gradually make all high schools, colleges, and universities 
autonomous, although no schedule was specified for achieving 
this ambitious goal. 

Female Education 

Comparison of data for men and women reveals a significant 
disparity in educational attainment. By 1992, among people 
older than fifteen years of age, 22 percent of women were liter- 
ate, compared with 49 percent of men. The comparatively slow 
rate of improvement for women is reflected in the fact that 
between 1980 and 1989, among women aged fifteen to twenty- 
four, 25 percent were literate. United Nations sources say that 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

in 1990 for every 100 girls of primary school age there were 
only thirty in school; among girls of secondary school age, only 
thirteen out of 100 were in school; and among girls of the third 
level, grades nine and ten, only 1.5 out of 100 were in school. 
Slightly higher estimates by the National Education Council for 
1990 stated that 2.5 percent of students — 3 percent of men and 
2 percent of women — between the ages of seventeen and 
twenty-one were enrolled at the degree level. Among all people 
over twenty-five in 1992, women averaged a mere 0.7 year of 
schooling compared with an average of 2.9 years for men. 

The discrepancy between rural and urban areas is even more 
marked. In 1981 only 7 percent of women in rural areas were 
literate, compared with 35 percent in urban areas. Among 
men, these rates were 27 and 57 percent, respectively. Paki- 
stan's low female literacy rates are particularly confounding 
because these rates are analogous to those of some of the poor- 
est countries in the world. 

Pakistan has never had a systematic, nationally coordinated 
effort to improve female primary education, despite its poor 
standing. It was once assumed that the reasons behind low 
female school enrollments were cultural, but research con- 
ducted by the Ministry for Women's Development and a num- 
ber of international donor agencies in the 1980s revealed that 
danger to a woman's honor was parents' most crucial concern. 
Indeed, reluctance to accept schooling for women turned to 
enthusiasm when parents in rural Punjab and rural 
Balochistan could be guaranteed their daughters' safety and, 
hence, their honor. 

Reform Efforts 

Three initiatives characterized reform efforts in education 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s: privatization of schools that 
had been nationalized in the 1970s; a return to English as the 
medium of instruction in the more elite of these privatized 
schools, reversing the imposition of Urdu in the 1970s; and 
continuing emphasis on Pakistan studies and Islamic studies in 
the curriculum. 

Until the late 1970s, a disproportionate amount of educa- 
tional spending went to the middle and higher levels. Educa- 
tion in the colonial era had been geared to staffing the civil 
service and producing an educated elite that shared the values 
of and was loyal to the British. It was unabashedly elitist, and 
contemporary education — reforms and commissions on 



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The Society and Its Environment 



reform notwithstanding — has retained the same quality. This 
fact is evident in the glaring gap in educational attainment 
between the country's public schools and the private schools, 
which were nationalized in the late 1970s in a move intended 
to facilitate equal access. Whereas students from lower-class 
backgrounds did gain increased access to these private schools 
in the 1980s and 1990s, teachers and school principals alike 
bemoaned the decline in the quality of education. Meanwhile, 
it appears that a greater proportion of children of the elites are 
traveling abroad not only for university education but also for 
their high school diplomas. 

The extension of literacy to greater numbers of people has 
spurred the working class to aspire to middle-class goals such as 
owning an automobile, taking summer vacations, and provid- 
ing a daughter with a once-inconceivable dowry at the time of 
marriage. In the past, Pakistan was a country that the landlords 
owned, the army ruled, and the bureaucrats governed, and it 
drew most of its elite from these three groups. In the 1990s, 
however, the army and the civil service were drawing a greater 
proportion of educated members from poor backgrounds than 
ever before. 

One of the education reforms of the 1980s was an increase 
in the number of technical schools throughout the country. 
Those schools that were designated for females included hos- 
tels nearby to provide secure housing for female students. 
Increasing the number of technical schools was a response to 
the high rate of underemployment that had been evident since 
the early 1970s. The Seventh Five-Year Plan aimed to increase 
the share of students going to technical and vocational institu- 
tions to over 33 percent by increasing the number of polytech- 
nics, commercial colleges, and vocational training centers. 
Although the numbers of such institutions did increase, a com- 
pelling need to expand vocational training persisted in early 
1994. 

Health and Welfare 

In 1992 some 35 million Pakistanis, or about 30 percent of 
the population, were unable to afford nutritionally adequate 
food or to afford any nonfood items at all. Of these, 24.3 mil- 
lion lived in rural areas, where they constituted 29 percent of 
the population. Urban areas, with one-third of the national 
population, had a poverty rate of 26 percent. 



135 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

Between 1985 and 1991, about 85 percent of rural residents 
and 100 percent of urban dwellers had access to some kind of 
Western or biomedical health care; but 12.9 million people 
had no access to health services. Only 45 percent of rural peo- 
ple had safe water, as compared with 80 percent of urbanites, 
leaving 55 million without potable water. Also in the same 
period, only 10 percent of rural residents had access to mod- 
ern sanitation while 55 percent of city residents did; a total of 
94.9 million people hence were without sanitary facilities. 

In the early 1990s, the leading causes of death remained gas- 
troenteritis, respiratory infections, congenital abnormalities, 
tuberculosis, malaria, and typhoid. Gastrointestinal, parasitic, 
and respiratory ailments, as well as malnutrition, contributed 
substantially to morbidity. The incidence of communicable 
childhood diseases was high; measles, diphtheria, and pertussis 
took a substantial toll among children under five years of age. 
Although the urban poor also suffered from these diseases, 
those in rural areas were the principal victims. 

Despite these discouraging facts, there has been significant 
improvement in some health indicators. For example, in 1960 
only 25 percent of the population had purportedly safe water 
(compared with 56 percent in 1992). In addition, average life 
expectancy at birth was 43.1 years in 1960; in 1992 it had 
reached 58.3 years. 

Maternal and Child Health 

The average age of marriage for women was 19.8 between 
1980 and 1990, and, with the rate of contraception use reach- 
ing only 12 percent in 1992, many women delivered their first 
child about one year later. Thus, nearly half of Pakistani 
women have at least one child before they complete their twen- 
tieth year. In 1988-90 only 70 percent of pregnant women 
received any prenatal care; the same proportion of births was 
attended by health workers. A study covering the years 1975 to 
1990 found that 57 percent of pregnant women were anemic 
and that many suffered from vitamin deficiencies. In 1988 
some 600 of every 100,000 deliveries resulted in the death of 
the mother. Among women who die between ages fifteen and 
forty-five, a significant portion of deaths are related to child- 
bearing. 

The inadequate health care and the malnutrition suffered 
by women are reflected in infant and child health statistics. 
About 30 percent of babies born between 1985 and 1990 were 



136 



The Society and Its Environment 



of low birth weight. During 1992 ninety-nine of every 1,000 
infants died in their first year of life. Mothers breast-feed for a 
median of twenty months, according to a 1986-90 survey, but 
generally withhold necessary supplementary foods until wean- 
ing. In 1990 approximately 42 percent of children under five 
years of age were underweight. In 1992 there were 3.7 million 
malnourished children, and 652,000 died. Poor nutrition con- 
tributes significantly to childhood morbidity and mortality. 

Progress has been made despite these rather dismal data. 
The infant mortality rate dropped from 163 per 1,000 live 
births in 1960 to ninety-nine per 1,000 in 1992. Immunization 
has also expanded rapidly in the recent past; 81 percent of 
infants had received the recommended vaccines in 1992. A net- 
work of immunization clinics — virtually free in most places — 
exists in urban areas and ensures that health workers are noti- 
fied of a child's birth. Word of mouth and media attention, 
coupled with rural health clinics, seem to be responsible for 
the rapid increase in immunization rates in rural areas. By 
1992 about 85 percent of the population had access to oral 
rehydration salts, and oral rehydration therapy was expected to 
reduce child mortality. 

Health Care Policies and Developments 

National public health is a recent innovation in Pakistan. In 
prepartition India, the British provided health care for govern- 
ment employees but rarely attended to the health needs of the 
population at large, except for establishing a few major hospi- 
tals, such as Mayo Hospital in Lahore, which has King Edward 
Medical College nearby. Improvements in health care have 
been hampered by scarce resources and are difficult to coordi- 
nate nationally because health care remains a provincial 
responsibility rather than a central government one. Until the 
early 1970s, local governing bodies were in charge of health 
services. 

National health planning began with the Second Five-Year 
Plan (1960-65) and continued through the Eighth Five-Year 
Plan (1993-98). Provision of health care for the rural populace 
has long been a stated priority, but efforts to provide such care 
continue to be hampered by administrative problems and diffi- 
culties in staffing rural clinics. In the early 1970s, a decentral- 
ized system was developed in which basic health units provided 
primary care for a surrounding population of 6,000 to 10,000 
people, rural health centers offered support and more com- 



137 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

prehensive services to local units, and both the basic units and 
the health centers could refer patients to larger urban hospi- 
tals. 

In the early 1990s, the orientation of the country's medical 
system, including medical education, favored the elite. There 
has been a marked boom in private clinics and hospitals since 
the late 1980s and a corresponding, unfortunate deterioration 
in services provided by nationalized hospitals. In 1992 there 
was only one physician for every 2,127 persons, one nurse for 
every 6,626 persons, and only one hospital for every 131,274 
persons. There was only one dentist for every 67,757 persons. 

Medical schools have come under a great deal of criticism 
from women's groups for discriminating against females. In 
some cities, females seeking admission to medical school have 
even held demonstrations against separate gender quotas. 
Males can often gain admission to medical schools with lower 
test scores than females because the absolute number for males 
in the separate quotas is much greater than that for females. 
The quota exists despite the pressing need for more physicians 
available to treat women. 

The government has embarked on a major health initiative 
with substantial donor assistance. The initial phase of an esti- 
mated US$140 million family health project, which would even- 
tually aid all four provinces, was approved in July 1991 by the 
government of Pakistan and the World Bank, the latter's first 
such project in Pakistan. The program is aimed at improving 
maternal health care and controlling epidemic diseases in 
Sindh and the North-West Frontier Province. It will provide 
help for staff development, particularly in training female para- 
medics, and will also strengthen the management and organi- 
zation of provincial health departments. The estimated 
completion date is 1999. The second stage of the project will 
include Punjab and Balochistan. 

In addition to public- and private-sector biomedicine, there 
are indigenous forms of treatment. Unani-Tibb (Arabic for 
Greek medicine), also called Islami-Tibb, is Galenic medicine 
resystematized and augmented by Muslim scholars. Herbal 
treatments are used to balance bodily humors. Practitioners, 
hakims, are trained in medical colleges or learn the skill from 
family members who pass it down the generations. Some manu- 
factured remedies are also available in certain pharmacies. 
Homeopathy, thought by some to be "poor man's Western 
medicine," is also taught and practiced in Pakistan. Several 



138 



The Society and Its Environment 



forms of religious healing are common too. Prophetic healing 
is based largely on the hadith of the Prophet pertaining to 
hygiene and moral and physical health, and simple treatments 
are used, such as honey, a few herbs, and prayer. Some religious 
conservatives argue that reliance on anything but prayer sug- 
gests lack of faith, while others point out that the Prophet 
remarked that Allah had created medicines in order that 
humans should avail themselves of their benefits. Popular 
forms of religious healing, at least protection from malign 
influences, are common in most of the country. The use of 
tawiz, amulets containing Quranic verses, or the intervention 
of a pir, living or dead, is generally relied upon to direct the 
healing force of Allah's blessing to anyone confronted with 
uncertainty or distress. 

Special Problems: Smoking, Drugs, and AIDS 

Smoking is primarily a health threat for men. Nearly half of 
all men smoked in the 1970s and 1980s, whereas only 5 percent 
of women smoked. Twenty-five percent of all adults were esti- 
mated to be smokers in 1985, with a marked increase among 
women (who still generally smoke only at home). The national 
airline, Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), instituted a no- 
smoking policy on all its domestic flights in the late 1980s. In 
an unusual departure from global trends, PIA reversed this pol- 
icy in mid-1992, claiming public pressure — despite no evident 
public outcry in newspapers or other media (see Transporta- 
tion, ch. 3) . Men also take neswar, a tobacco-based ground mix- 
ture including lime that is placed under the tongue. Both men 
and women chew pan, betel nut plus herbs and sometimes 
tobacco wrapped in betel leaf; the dark red juice damages teeth 
and gums. Both neswar and pan may engender mild depen- 
dency and may contribute to oral cancers or other serious 
problems. 

Opium smuggling and cultivation, as well as heroin produc- 
tion, became major problems after the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979. The war interrupted the opium pipeline 
from Afghanistan to the West, and Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini's crackdown on drug smuggling made shipment 
through Iran difficult. Pakistan was an attractive route because 
corrupt officials could easily be bribed. Although the govern- 
ment cooperated with international agencies, most notably the 
United States Agency for International Development, in their 
opium poppy substitution programs, Pakistan became a major 



139 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

center for heroin production and a transshipment point for 
the international drug market. 

Opium poppy cultivation, already established in remote 
highland areas of the North-West Frontier Province by the late 
nineteenth century, increased after World War II and 
expanded again to become the basis of some local economies 
in the mid-1980s. Harvesting requires intensive labor, but prof- 
its are great, and storage and marketing are easy. The annual 
yield from an entire village can be transported from an isolated 
area on a few donkeys. Opium poppy yields, estimated at 800 
tons in 1979, dropped to between forty and forty-five tons by 
1985 but dramatically rose to 130 tons in 1989 and then 180 
tons in 1990. Yields then declined slowly to 175 tons in 1992 
and 140 tons in 1993. The area under opium poppy cultivation 
followed the same pattern, from 5,850 hectares in 1989 to 
8,215 hectares in 1990. It reached 9,147 hectares in 1992 but 
dropped to 6,280 the following year. The caretaker govern- 
ment of Moeen Qureshi (July to mid-October 1993) was 
responsible for the reductions in production and area under 
cultivation; the succeeding government of Benazir Bhutto has 
perpetuated his policies and declared its intent to augment 
them. 

Use of heroin within Pakistan has expanded significantly. 
The Pakistan Narcotics Control Board estimates that although 
there were no known heroin addicts in Pakistan in 1980, the 
figure had reached 1.2 million by 1989; there were more than 2 
million drug addicts of all types in the country in 1991. This 
dramatic increase is attributed to the ready availability of drugs. 
There were only thirty drug treatment centers in Pakistan in 
1991, with a reported cure rate of about 20 percent. 

Acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) has not yet 
been much of a problem in Pakistan, probably as a result of cul- 
tural mores opposing premarital, extramarital, and openly 
homosexual relations. The effect of poor quality control on 
blood supplies and needle sharing among addicts is undeter- 
mined. The government has been slow to respond to the threat 
posed by AIDS. Cultural and religious restrictions prevent offi- 
cial policies encouraging "safe-sex" or other programs that 
would prevent the spread of the disease. State-run radio and 
television stations have made no attempt to educate the public 
about AIDS. In fact, the government has minimized the prob- 
lem of AIDS in the same way that it has dealt with potentially 
widespread alcoholism by labeling it as a "foreigners' disease." 



140 



The Society and Its Environment 



The Ministry of Health, however, has established the 
National AIDS Control Programme to monitor the disease and 
to try to prevent its spread. During 1993 twenty-five AIDS 
screening centers were established at various hospitals, includ- 
ing the Agha Khan University Hospital in Karachi, the National 
Institute of Health in Islamabad, and thejinnah Postgraduate 
Medical Centre. AIDS screening kits and materials are pro- 
vided free at these facilities. By early 1994, approximately 
300,000 people in Pakistan had been tested. 

A center for AIDS testing has also been established at the 
Port Health Office in Keamari Harbor in Karachi. Another is 
expected to open during 1994 at Quaid-i-Azam Karachi Inter- 
national Airport. Beginning in 1994, all foreigners and sailors 
arriving in Pakistan are required to have certificates stating that 
they are AIDS-free. Certificates of inspection are already 
required of Pakistani sailors. All imported blood, blood prod- 
ucts, and vaccines must also be certified. 

Zakat as a Welfare System 

Social security plans were first introduced in the 1960s but 
have never achieved much success. Traditionally, the family 
and bimdari have functioned as a welfare system that can be 
relied on in times of need based on reciprocal obligations. 

In 1980, as a part of his Islamization program, Zia intro- 
duced a welfare system, known as the Zakat and Ushr Ordi- 
nance. Based on the Islamic notion of zakat, the aim was to 
forge a national system to help those without kin. The Zakat 
and Ushr Ordinance combined elements of the traditional 
Islamic welfare institution with those of a modern public wel- 
fare system. The ordinance's moral imperative and much of its 
institutional structure were directly based on the Quran and 
the sharia. 

As a traditional religious institution, zakat involves both the 
payment and the distribution of an alms tax given by Muslims 
who enjoy some surplus to certain kinds of deserving poor 
Muslims (mustahaqeen — see Glossary). The traditional interpre- 
tation by the Hanafi school of religious law stipulates that zakat 
is to be paid once a year on wealth held more than one year. 
The rate varies, although it is generally 2.5 percent. Ushr is 
another form of almsgiving, a 5 percent tax paid on the pro- 
duce of land, not on the value of the land itself. Both zakat and 
ushr are paid to groups as specified in the Quran, such as the 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 



poor, the needy, recent converts to Islam, people who do the 
good works of God, and those who collect and disburse zakat. 

The Zakat and Ushr Ordinance set broad parameters for eli- 
gibility for zakat, which is determined by local zakat commit- 
tees. Priority is given to widows, orphans, the disabled, and 
students in traditional religious schools. Eligibility is broad and 
flexible and presumes great trust in the integrity, fairness, and 
good sense of the local zakat committees. Although the pro- 
gram initially focused on providing cash payments, it gradually 
has moved into establishing training centers, especially sewing 
centers for women. By 1983 the zakat program had disbursed 
more than Rs2.5 billion to some 4 million people. The pro- 
gram, however, has come under a great deal of criticism for the 
uneven manner in which funds are disbursed. 

Shia have vociferously criticized the program on the basis 
that its innate structure is built around Sunni jurisprudence. 
Shia leaders have successfully championed the right to collect 
zakat payments from members of their community and to dis- 
tribute them only among Shia mustahaqeen. 

Prospects for Social Cohesion 

Pakistan has been struggling to develop an all-encompassing 
identity since the founding of the state in 1947. The nation was 
created by Western-oriented professionals and bureaucrats as a 
homeland for Muslims, a place where they would no longer be 
a minority community in the Hindu-majority state of India. 
Enthusiasm and a sense of profound moral renaissance for 
Muslims in South Asia accompanied independence. Expecta- 
tions were high that Pakistan would flourish and that its citi- 
zens would be unified by their sense of social contract. It was 
hoped that Pakistanis would freely and vigorously engage in 
parliamentary debate, while creating new industries, all under 
the umbrella of Islam. 

This vision of promise and unity soon encountered the reali- 
ties of state building. Islamists and secularists disputed the cen- 
trality of Islam in the government. Pakhtun and Baloch tribes 
resisted relinquishing their autonomy to the new centralized 
state, which they regarded as an outside power. Partition also 
created new ethnic communities. The Urdu-speaking entrepre- 
neurs and industrialists who migrated to Karachi created a new 
self-identifying group, the muhajirs. Unlike the majority of Paki- 
stanis, who are tied emotionally and politically to a specific 
locality in the country, muhajirs did not have these ties. When 



142 



The Society and Its Environment 



the new state granted housing and land to the muhajirs to com- 
pensate them for what they had left behind in India, indige- 
nous Punjabis and Sindhis clashed with the newcomers. Also 
during the 1950s, language riots in East Pakistan and anti- 
Ahmadiyya protests in Punjab cast doubt on the unity of Paki- 
stanis under the rubric of Muslim brotherhood. 

In the 1950s and 1960s, Pakistan emphasized building its 
industrial base to ensure both economic and political survival. 
Western-educated professionals and industrialists, as well as for- 
ward-looking feudal landlords who valued education, were 
increasingly influential; more traditional leaders saw their 
power deteriorate. A fairly liberal interpretation of Islam was 
supported by the state, resulting in the passage of the Muslim 
Family Laws Ordinance in 1961. 

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto promoted "Islamic Socialism" in his 1971 
electoral campaign, raising the material expectations of the 
masses to an unprecedented level. Many people believed that 
life would improve significantly under Bhutto and the Pakistan 
People's Party (PPP), but from 1971 to 1977 there was little 
change in the standard of living. 

Intergroup tensions grew as members of the lower and mid- 
dle classes became disillusioned, as upper-class industrialists 
were alienated by the government's nationalization policies, 
and as wealthy landlords were threatened by Bhutto's land 
reform program. 

Ethnic groups in Balochistan and the North-West Frontier 
Province pressed for increased autonomy, while muhajirs, not 
yet organized as a political group, ran the city of Karachi and as 
non-Muslim minorities worried about the state's increasingly 
formal identification with Islam. 

Bhutto restructured the civil bureaucracy while increasing 
his personal authority, alienating many people at the highest 
echelons of power while creating opportunities for others. 
Under the first democratically elected government in twenty 
years, Bhutto made full use of his power by giving jobs and priv- 
ileges to supporters of the PPP. 

Under Zia ul-Haq, who governed from 1977 to 1988, nepo- 
tism continued: who one knew was much more important than 
what one knew. The leadership gave jobs, contracts, and privi- 
leges to its allies as it sought to undermine the PPP Traditional 
markers of ascribed identity, such as mother tongue, area of 
family origin, and kinship ties, increasingly dictated individu- 
als' opportunities as competition continued to block the devel- 



143 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



opment of citizenship based on shared, nationwide concerns. 
The common expression in Urdu and Punjabi, "the whole 
world knows (or believes) that . . .," reflects the small (usually 
family or neighborhood) social reference group of many Paki- 
stanis. This way of constructing a social world is not conducive 
to setting aside one's own kinship identity and ties in favor of a 
more abstract national one based on citizenship. 

In February 1979, Zia decreed that Islam — or, rather, a cer- 
tain interpretation of Islam — was to be the basis of Pakistan's 
legal system. Fearing discrimination, some non-Muslim minori- 
ties, especially Zoroastrians, began to emigrate from Karachi in 
unprecedented numbers. Shia Muslims marched on Islamabad 
in 1982 to protect their right to maintain their own system of 
social welfare. 

Zia employed his rhetoric of Islamic state building to dis- 
guise his political opportunism. He also exploited the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan to build his arsenal of weapons by 
diverting some that were shipped through Pakistan for the 
Afghans. Some experts have even argued that the massive 
explosion at the Ojhri munitions camp on the outskirts of Raw- 
alpindi in April 1988 was deliberately planned to justify 
"replacement" purchases in excess of the quantity actually lost. 

In the 1980s, Pakistan continued to place little emphasis on 
social programming despite growing problems, including a 
rapid rise in heroin addiction. The country has been criticized 
by international development organizations for ignoring social 
and human development. In the 1980s, the government's pri- 
orities were instead political, and it strengthened those 
regional political leaders who could contain the PPP in their 
localities. In addition, the central government declared that 
democratic principles would have to remain in abeyance while 
the state searched for the right Islamic guidelines. The govern- 
ment's decision allowed local officials to continue corrupt 
practices, such as hiring and firing people within the bureau- 
cracy at will and making significant commissions from con- 
tracts on projects they approved. 

To many Pakistanis already disillusioned with the economic 
and political functioning of the state, the fundamental social 
weaknesses of the nation came to the fore in the early 1990s. 
The most obvious of these — uneven distribution of wealth; the 
self-centeredness, nepotism, and greed of the privileged; and 
rapid population growth among the nation's poorest people — 
made the institutionalization of a nationwide concept of citi- 



144 



The Society and Its Environment 



zenship problematic. The failure to forge a widely understood 
social contract is reflected in increased tensions among ethnic 
groups, social classes, extended families, and religious factions. 

The way people interrelate with one another, the way they 
perceive national issues and their role in affecting them, and 
the priority they assign to personal ties and group identifica- 
tion are all parts of the matrix of a society and indicators of its 
social cohesion. Until Pakistanis can come up with an inner 
commitment to a cause — which in Pakistan's history has been 
fairly rare outside of kinship circles — little can be done or will 
be done to serve the wider society impartially, be it a national 
conservation strategy, education reform, opium poppy substi- 
tution programs, or the promotion of industrial growth. 
* * * 

General works pertaining to social change in Pakistan 
include Sabeeha Hafeez's The Changing Pakistan Society, Akbar S. 
Ahmed's Discovering Islam, Anita M. Weiss's Culture, Class, and 
Development in Pakistan, Hastings Donnan and Pnina Werbner's 
Economy and Culture in Pakistan, and Myron Weiner and Ali Ban- 
uazizi's The State and the Restructuring of Society in Afghanistan, 
Iran, and Pakistan. Shahidjaved Burki examines Pakistan's 
social development in Pakistan: A Nation in the Making, and 
Naseem Jaffer Quddus addresses education issues in Problems of 
Education in Pakistan. 

Khawar Mumtaz and Farida Shaheed's Women of Pakistan 
gives an overview of the Pakistan women's movement. The con- 
troversial report by the Pakistan Commission on the Status of 
Women became available in 1991, five years after it was pub- 
lished. For a composite of statistical information on women 
based on all four of Pakistan's official censuses, the Pakistan 
government's Federal Bureau of Statistics' Women's Division's 
Women in Pakistan: A Statistical Profile and Ann Duncan's Women 
in Pakistan: An Economic and Social Strategy are helpful. A recent 
study of women's lives, drawing on women's own words and 
views in the context of wider social changes, is Anita M. Weiss's 
Walls Within Walls. Islamic issues in Pakistan are analyzed in 
Anita M. Weiss's Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan and John L. 
Esposito's Islam and Politics. 

Environmental issues are addressed in the Pakistan govern- 
ment's National Conservation Strategy Report. Geographic infor- 
mation can be found in Ashok K. Dutt and M.M. Geib's Atlas of 
South Asia and in K.U. Kureshy's A Geography of Pakistan. The 
works of Frederick Barth and Akbar S. Ahmed analyze Pakhtun 



145 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

society, and an in-depth look at the Baloch is provided in A.H. 
Siddiqi's Baluchistan. 

The most important English-language magazines providing 
useful accounts of current social issues are the Herald and 
Newsline, both based in Karachi. Travel narratives that capture 
cultural features of Pakistani life include Geoffrey Moorhouse's 
To the Frontier, Richard Reeves's Passage to Peshawar, and Chris- 
tina Lamb's controversial Waiting for Allah. (For further infor- 
mation and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



146 



Chapter 3. The Economy 




Artist's rendition of tile mosaic of lion chasing deer from the Pictured Wall, 
Lahore Fort, Punjab. Artwork represents seventeenth-century tile work of the 
Mughal period. 



PAKISTAN'S CULTIVATION of the rich alluvial soil of the 
Indus River basin is its single most important economic activity. 
Because of extensions and improvements of the irrigation sys- 
tem, waters of the Indus River and its tributaries flow to the 
fields, a necessity because of scant rainfall. The Indus irrigation 
system is the world's largest, but there are many problems 
because of inadequate water management and use. Farmers 
continue to employ traditional cultivation practices, and sup- 
port services, such as research and development, are inade- 
quate, although high-yield seeds and fertilizers are fairly widely 
used. Yields of most crops, with the significant exception of cot- 
ton, are low by international standards and substantially below 
the area's potential. Many farms are too small to support a fam- 
ily using existing agricultural practices. The landless often 
sharecrop or work as agricultural laborers. A flood in Septem- 
ber 1992 temporarily displaced as many as 3 million people 
and destroyed many irrigation networks. Its effects are 
expected to limit agricultural production, particularly cotton, 
in the 1990s. 

Since Pakistan became independent in 1947, its leaders have 
generally sought to increase the role of industry in the nation's 
economy. They have achieved a remarkable degree of success 
toward this end. A broad industrial base is now in place, pro- 
ducing a wide range of products for both consumer and indus- 
trial use. Industrialization, however, has failed to create 
sufficient jobs for the rapidly expanding urban population. 
Construction and service-sector activities, especially in trade, 
transportation, and government, have expanded and now pro- 
vide more employment than industry. Nonetheless, underem- 
ployment remains prevalent throughout the economy. An 
outdated infrastructure is another problem facing the econ- 
omy. Frequent electricity shortages, for example, hamper 
industrial development and production. 

Most central government administrations have sought to 
raise the majority of the population's low standard of living 
through economic growth rather than through the redistribu- 
tion of wealth. The gross domestic product (GDP — see Glos- 
sary) in constant prices increased an average of 5.3 percent per 
year between 1950 and 1993, roughly 2 percent per year more 
than population growth. In fiscal year (FY — see Glossary) 1993, 



149 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

GDP amounted to the equivalent of US$50.8 billion, or 
roughly US$408 on a per capita basis. Income, however, has 
never been evenly distributed. Furthermore, the unequal 
income distribution pattern has been a political issue since the 
late 1960s and is expected to remain controversial throughout 
the 1990s. Social development indicators reflect long-standing 
problems in providing basic health and education services. 
Only just over-one third of all children of primary school age 
attended school in 1989, a rate well below the average for 
low-income countries (see Education, ch. 2). It was estimated 
in 1992 that 28 percent of the population lived below the offi- 
cial poverty line, which is based on the government's estimate 
of an income sufficient to provide basic minimum needs. 

A pressing problem facing the economy is the government's 
chronically high budget deficit, which has adverse implications 
for the nation's balance of payments, inflation and exchange 
rates, capital formation, and overall financial stability. The gov- 
ernment has been attempting to restore fiscal balance through 
a multiyear structural adjustment program designed to 
increase revenues, control spending, and stabilize monetary 
growth. In addition, the government has privatized public-sec- 
tor industrial enterprises, financial institutions, and utilities; 
eliminated state monopolies in banking, insurance, shipping, 
telecommunications, airlines, and power generation; and liber- 
alized investment and foreign-exchange regulations. As of early 
1994, not all these programs had been implemented as quickly 
as planned, however, and the deficit and the associated struc- 
tural problems persisted. 

Structure of the Economy 

Pakistan attained nationhood under difficult circumstances 
(see Problems at Independence, ch. 1). At the partition of Brit- 
ish India in 1947 resulting in the creation of the independent 
nations of India and Pakistan, Pakistan was an agrarian econ- 
omy in which a small number of powerful landowners with 
large holdings dominated the countryside. The majority of the 
population consisted of tenant farmers who cultivated small 
plots for a meager existence. Scant rainfall in West Pakistan 
(present-day Pakistan) forced farmers to rely on the extensive 
irrigation system developed by the British. The headwaters of 
the Indus River and its main tributaries, however, were under 
Indian control. Disputes arose between the two nations and 



150 



The Economy 



were not settled until the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 was 
signed (see Irrigation, this ch.). 

At partition Pakistan had almost no industry. Under British 
rule, the area had supplied agricultural products for process- 
ing to the territory that became independent India. Energy 
sources were rudimentary, with wood and animal dung furnish- 
ing the bulk of the energy consumed. Ports, transportation, 
and other services, such as banking and government, were 
underdeveloped. More than 1,600 kilometers of Indian terri- 
tory separated the East Wing and West Wing of Pakistan until 
the former became independent Bangladesh in 1971 (see 
Yahya Khan and Bangladesh, ch. 1). In 1949 a dispute over 
exchange rates halted the flow of goods between Pakistan and 
India, disrupting the complementary nature of their econo- 
mies that had developed under British colonial rule. 

Despite formidable problems, Pakistan achieved rapid eco- 
nomic expansion. From FY 1951 to FY 1986, the GDP growth 
rate measured at a constant FY 1960 factor averaged 5.2 per- 
cent. Rates of growth averaged 3.1 percent in the 1950s — when 
agriculture stagnated — but rose to 6.8 percent in the 1960s. 
They fell to 3.8 percent between FY 1971 and FY 1977 but 
rebounded to 6.8 percent between FY 1978 and FY 1986. From 
FY 1987 to FY 1991, growth averaged 5.8 percent, and a rate of 
7.8 percent was achieved in FY 1992. Provisional data indicate 
that GDP grew only 2.6 percent in FY 1993. This decline is 
mainly a result of the floods in September 1992, which reduced 
agricultural output. 

Rapid growth substantially altered the structure of the econ- 
omy. Agriculture's share (including forestry and fishing) 
declined from 53 percent of GDP in FY 1950 to 25 percent in 
FY 1993 (see table 3, Appendix). A substantial industrial base 
was added as industry (including mining, manufacturing, and 
utilities) became the fastest growing sector of the economy. 
Industry's share of GDP rose from 8 percent in FY 1950 to 21.7 
percent in FY 1993. Various services (including construction, 
trade, transportation and communications, and other services) 
accounted for the rest of GDP. 

Pakistan has an important "parallel," or "alternative," eco- 
nomic sector, but it is not well documented in official reports 
or most academic studies. This sector includes a thriving black 
market, a large illicit drug industry, and illegal payments to pol- 
iticians and government officials to ensure state contracts. Cor- 
ruption rose in the 1980s, partly as a result of the difficulty in 



151 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

monitoring the massive infusion of United States aid that 
flowed to Pakistan as a result of the Soviet occupation of neigh- 
boring Afghanistan. Some aid went to the Pakistani govern- 
ment to help defray the costs of supporting several million 
Afghan refugees. Other aid bolstered Pakistan's military capa- 
bility, necessary because Pakistan had become a "frontline" 
state. Finally, large amounts of aid were also funneled directly 
to Afghan resistance movements based in Pakistan. It was much 
of this money that reportedly was delivered illegally and 
invested in arms and drug enterprises. 

General allegations of corruption are routinely made in the 
Pakistani press, and politicians often accuse their opponents of 
corrupt practices. Asif Ali Zardari, the husband of Prime Minis- 
ter Benazir Bhutto, was accused of corruption after the fall of 
Benazir's first government in 1990, and former President Ghu- 
lam Ishaq Khan accused the government of former Prime Min- 
ister Mian Nawaz Sharif and especially its privatization program 
of corruption when dismissing his government in April 1993. 
In 1994 allegations of corruption were routinely traded 
between Benazir's government and the opposition headed by 
Nawaz Sharif. Political maneuvering aside, corruption has an 
altogether real and pervasive effect on Pakistani society. Indus- 
trialists consider bribery and other handouts a routine cost of 
production, and contractors and businessmen interviewed on 
television openly state that a significant percentage of their rev- 
enue is paid to government officers who allocate their con- 
tracts. Corruption is alleged to be prevalent in almost all 
official institutions, including the police, the judiciary, the rev- 
enue department, the passport office, customs and excise 
offices, telecommunications organizations, and electricity and 
gas boards. In each of these departments, the personnel 
involved range from low-level employees to top management. 
Some scholars believe that the low salaries of civil servants, 
compared with earnings from jobs of similar status in business 
and industry, explain the magnitude of corruption. In the mid- 
1980s, Mahbubul Haq, a former minister of finance, estimated 
that illegal payments to government officials were equivalent to 
about 60 percent of the total taxes collected by the govern- 
ment. 

The Role of Government 

Policy Developments since Independence 

Since 1947 Pakistani officials have sought a high rate of eco- 



152 



Quaid-i-Azam Karachi International Airport 
Courtesy Embassy of Pakistan, Washington 

nomic growth in an effort to lift the population out of poverty. 
Rapid industrialization was viewed as a basic necessity and as a 
vehicle for economic growth. For more than two decades, eco- 
nomic expansion was substantial, and growth of industrial out- 
put was striking. In the 1960s, the country was considered a 
model for other developing countries. The rapid expansion of 
the Pakistani economy, however, did not alleviate the wide- 
spread poverty. In the 1970s and 1980s, although a high rate of 
growth was sought, greater attention was given to income distri- 
bution. In the early 1990s, a more equitable distribution of 
income remained an important but elusive goal of government 
policy. 

At partition in 1947, the new government lacked the person- 
nel, institutions, and resources to play a large role in develop- 
ing the economy. Exclusive public ownership was reserved for 
military armaments, generation of hydroelectric power, and 



153 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

manufacture and operation of railroad, telephone, telegraph, 
and wireless equipment — fields that were unattractive, at least 
in the early years of independence, to private investors. The 
rest of the economy was open to private-sector development, 
although the government used many direct and indirect mea- 
sures to stimulate, guide, or retard private-sector activities. 

The disruptions caused by partition, the cessation of trade 
with India, the strict control of imports, and the overvalued 
exchange rate necessitated the stimulation of private industry. 
Government policies afforded liberal incentives to industrial- 
ization, while public development of the infrastructure com- 
plemented private investment. Some public manufacturing 
plants were established by government holding companies. 
Manufacturing proved highly profitable, attracting increasing 
private investments and reinvestment of profits. Except for 
large government investments in the Indus irrigation system, 
agriculture was left largely alone, and output stagnated in the 
1950s. The broad outline of government policy in the 1950s 
and early 1960s involved squeezing the peasants and workers to 
finance industrial development. 

Much of the economy, and particularly industry, was eventu- 
ally dominated by a small group of people, the muhajirs (see 
Glossary), who were largely traders who migrated to Pakistan's 
cities, especially Karachi, at partition. These refugees brought 
modest capital, which they initially used to start trading firms. 
Many of these firms moved into industry in the 1950s as a 
response to government policies. Largely using their own 
resources, they accounted for the major part of investment and 
ownership in manufacturing during the first two decades after 
independence. 

By the late 1960s, there was growing popular dissatisfaction 
with economic conditions and considerable debate about the 
inequitable distribution of income, wealth, and economic 
power — problems that had always plagued the country. Studies 
by economists in the 1960s indicated that the forty big indus- 
trial groups owned around 42 percent of the nation's industrial 
assets and more than 50 percent of private domestic assets. 
Eight of the nine major commercial banks were also controlled 
by these same industrial groups. Concern over the concentra- 
tion of wealth was dramatically articulated in a 1968 speech by 
Mahbubul Haq, then chief economist of the Planning Commis- 
sion. Haq claimed that Pakistan's economic growth had done 
little to improve the standard of living of the common person 



154 



The Economy 



and that the "trickle-down approach to development" had only 
concentrated wealth in the hands of "twenty-two industrial fam- 
ilies." He argued that the government needed to intervene in 
the economy to correct the natural tendency of free markets to 
concentrate wealth in the hands of those who already possessed 
substantial assets. 

Although Haq exaggerated the extent of the concentration 
of wealth, his speech struck a chord with public opinion. In 
response, the government enacted piecemeal measures 
between 1968 and 1971 to set minimum wages, promote collec- 
tive bargaining for labor, reform the tax structure toward 
greater equity, and rationalize salary structures. However, 
implementation was weak or nonexistent, and it was only when 
the government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (father of Benazir) 
came to power in 1971 that there was a major shift in govern- 
ment policy. 

Bhutto promised a new development strategy more equita- 
ble than previous policies. Yet he downplayed economic analy- 
sis and planning and relied instead on ad hoc decisions that 
created many inconsistencies. In May 1972, he promulgated a 
major act that devalued the rupee (R or Re, pi., Rs; for value of 
the rupee — see Glossary) by 57 percent and abolished the mul- 
tiple exchange-rate system. This act greatly stimulated exports 
and indicated that the removal of price distortions could spur 
the economy. But devaluation also completely altered the cost 
and price structure for industry and affected the level and 
composition of industrial investment and the terms of trade 
between the industrial and agricultural sectors. Devaluation 
helped agriculture, particularly larger farms that had market- 
able surpluses. Mechanization increased but had the adverse 
side effect of displacing farm laborers and tenants, many of 
whom migrated to cities seeking industrial jobs. 

In 1972 Bhutto's government nationalized thirty-two large 
manufacturing plants in eight major industries. The industries 
affected included iron and steel, basic metals, heavy engineer- 
ing, motor vehicle and tractor assembly and manufacture, 
chemicals, petrochemicals, cement, and public utilities. Subse- 
quently, domestically owned life insurance companies, privately 
owned banks, domestic shipping companies, and firms 
engaged in oil distribution, vegetable oil processing, grain mill- 
ing, and cotton ginning were nationalized. The result was a 
drop of nearly 50 percent in private investment in large-scale 
manufacturing between FY 1970 and FY 1973. By FY 1978 such 



155 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

investments were little more than one-third (in constant 
prices) of those in FY 1970. Private capital fled the country or 
went into small-scale manufacturing and real estate. Between 
1970 and 1977, industrial output slowed considerably. 

The public sector expanded greatly under the Bhutto gov- 
ernment. In addition to the nationalization of companies, 
plants were built by the government and additional public 
companies were created for various functions, such as the 
export of cotton and rice. Able managers and technicians were 
scarce, a situation that became worse after 1974, when many 
persons left to seek higher salaries in Middle East oil-producing 
states. Labor legislation set high minimum wages and fringe 
benefits, which boosted payroll costs for both public and pri- 
vate firms. Efficiency and profits in public-sector enterprises 
fell. Public industrial investment rose, surpassing private indus- 
trial investment in FY 1976. 

Many of the other economic measures undertaken by the 
Bhutto government were largely ineffective because of the 
power of vested interests and the inefficiency of the civil 
administration. Ceilings on the size of landholdings were low- 
ered, tenants were given greater security of tenure, and mea- 
sures were enacted to tax farm income (see Agriculture, this 
ch.). Bhutto also supported large, but inadequately planned, 
long-term projects that tied up the country's development 
resources for long periods. The largest projects were an inte- 
grated iron and steel plant, a major highway on the west bank 
of the Indus River, and a highway tunnel in the mountainous 
north. 

After 1977 the government of Mohammad Zia ul-Haq 
(1977-88) began a policy of greater reliance on private enter- 
prise to achieve economic goals, and successive governments 
continued this policy throughout the late 1980s and early 
1990s. Soon after Zia came to power, the government instituted 
constitutional measures to assure private investors that nation- 
alization would occur only under limited and exceptional cir- 
cumstances and with fair compensation. A demarcation of 
exclusive public ownership was made that excluded the private 
sector from only a few activities. Yet government continued to 
play a large economic role in the 1980s. Public-sector enter- 
prises accounted for a significant portion of large-scale manu- 
facturing. In FY 1991, it was estimated that these enterprises 
produced about 40 percent of industrial output. 



156 



The Economy 



Islamization of the economy was another policy innovation 
of the Zia government. In 1977 Zia asked a group of Islamic 
scholars to recommend measures for an Islamic economic sys- 
tem. In June 1980, the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance was promul- 
gated. Zakat is a traditional annual levy, usually 2.5 percent, on 
wealth to help the needy (see Zakat as a Welfare System, ch. 2). 
Ushr is a 5 percent tax on the produce of land, allowing some 
deductions for the costs of production, to be paid in cash by 
the landowner or leaseholder. Ushr replaced the former land 
tax levied by the provinces. Self-assessment by farmers is 
checked by local groups if a farmer fails to file or makes a very 
low estimate. Proceeds of ushr go to zakat committees to help 
local needy people. 

The government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (1990-93) 
introduced a program of privatization, deregulation, and eco- 
nomic reform aimed at reducing structural impediments to 
sound economic development. Top priority was given to dena- 
tionalizing some 115 public industrial enterprises, abolishing 
the government's monopoly in the financial sector, and selling 
utilities to private interests. Despite resistance from officials 
and labor unions and criticism that the government was mov- 
ing too quickly, by March 1992, control of twenty industrial 
units and two banks had been sold to private investors, and 
plans were under way to begin denationalizing several utilities. 
As of early 1994, proposals to end state monopolies in insur- 
ance, telecommunications, shipping, port operations, airlines, 
power generation, and road construction were also in various 
stages of implementation. Private investment no longer 
requires government authorization, except in sensitive indus- 
tries. Investment reforms eliminated government sanction 
requirements, eased restrictions on repatriable direct and port- 
folio investment from abroad, enabled foreign firms to issue 
shares in enterprises in Pakistan, and authorized foreign banks 
to underwrite securities on the same basis as Pakistani banks. 

Although the Nawaz Sharif government made considerable 
progress in liberalizing the economy, it failed to address the 
problem of a growing budget deficit, which in turn led to a loss 
of confidence in the government on the part of foreign aid 
donors. The caretaker government of July-October 1993 led by 
Moeen Qureshi, a former World Bank (see Glossary) vice pres- 
ident, asserted that the nation was near insolvency and would 
require a number of measures to impose fiscal discipline. The 
caretaker government thus responded with sharp increases in 



157 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



utility prices, new taxes, stiffer enforcement of existing taxes, 
and reductions in government spending. In early 1994, the 
government of Benazir Bhutto, elected in October 1993, 
announced its intention to continue the policies of both dereg- 
ulation and liberalization carried out by Nawaz Sharif and the 
tighter fiscal policies put in place by Qureshi. The government 
also said it intended to devote a greater proportion of the 
nation's resources to health and education, especially for 
women (see The Status of Women and the Women's Move- 
ment, ch. 2; Benazir Bhutto Returns, ch. 4) . 

Development Planning 

Pakistan's economic development planning began in 1948. 
By 1950 a six-year plan had been drafted to guide government 
investment in developing the infrastructure. But the initial 
effort was unsystematic, partly because of inadequate staffing. 
More formal planning — incorporating overall targets, assessing 
resource availability, and assigning priorities — started in 1953 
with the drafting of the First Five-Year Plan (1955-60). In prac- 
tice, this plan was not implemented, however, mainly because 
political instability led to a neglect of economic policy, but in 
1958 the government renewed its commitment to planning by 
establishing the Planning Commission. 

The Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65) surpassed its major 
goals when all sectors showed substantial growth. The plan 
encouraged private entrepreneurs to participate in those activi- 
ties in which a great deal of profit could be made, while the 
government acted in those sectors of the economy where pri- 
vate business was reluctant to operate. This mix of private 
enterprise and social responsibility was hailed as a model that 
other developing countries could follow. Pakistan's success, 
however, partially depended on generous infusions of foreign 
aid, particularly from the United States. After the Indo-Paki- 
stani War of 1965 over Kashmir, the level of foreign assistance 
declined. More resources than had been intended also were 
diverted to defense. As a result, the Third Five-Year Plan (1965- 
70), designed along the lines of its immediate predecessor, pro- 
duced only modest growth. 

When the government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto came to power 
in 1971, planning was virtually bypassed. The Fourth Five-Year 
Plan (1970-75) was abandoned as East Pakistan became inde- 
pendent Bangladesh. Under Bhutto, only annual plans were 
prepared, and they were largely ignored. 



158 



The Economy 



The Zia government accorded more importance to plan- 
ning. The Fifth Five-Year Plan (1978-83) was an attempt to sta- 
bilize the economy and improve the standard of living of the 
poorest segment of the population. Increased defense expendi- 
tures and a flood of refugees to Pakistan after the Soviet inva- 
sion of Afghanistan in December 1979, as well as the sharp 
increase in international oil prices in 1979-80, drew resources 
away from planned investments (see Pakistan Becomes a Front- 
line State, ch. 5). Nevertheless, some of the plan's goals were 
attained. Many of the controls on industry were liberalized or 
abolished, the balance of payments deficit was kept under con- 
trol, and Pakistan became self-sufficient in all basic foodstuffs 
with the exception of edible oils. Yet the plan failed to stimu- 
late substantial private industrial investment and to raise signif- 
icantly the expenditure on rural infrastructure development. 

The Sixth Five-Year Plan (1983-88) represented a significant 
shift toward the private sector. It was designed to tackle some of 
the major problems of the economy: low investment and sav- 
ings ratios; low agricultural productivity; heavy reliance on 
imported energy; and low spending on health and education. 
The economy grew at the targeted average of 6.5 percent dur- 
ing the plan period and would have exceeded the target if it 
had not been for severe droughts in 1986 and 1987. 

The Seventh Five-Year Plan (1988-93) provided for total 
public-sector spending of Rs350 billion. Of this total, 38 per- 
cent was designated for energy, 18 percent for transportation 
and communications, 9 percent for water, 8 percent for physi- 
cal infrastructure and housing, 7 percent for education, 5 per- 
cent for industry and minerals, 4 percent for health, and 11 
percent for other sectors. The plan gave much greater empha- 
sis than before to private investment in all sectors of the econ- 
omy. Total planned private investment was Rs292 billion, and 
the private-to-public ratio of investment was expected to rise 
from 42:58 in FY 1988 to 48:52 in FY 1993. It was also intended 
that public-sector corporations finance most of their own 
investment programs through profits and borrowing. 

In August 1991, the government established a working 
group on private investment for the Eighth Five-Year Plan 
(1993-98). This group, which included leading industrialists, 
presidents of chambers of commerce, and senior civil servants, 
submitted its report in late 1992. However, in early 1994 the 
eighth plan had not yet been announced, mainly because the 
successive changes of government in 1993 forced ministers to 



159 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



focus on short-term issues. Instead, economic policy for FY 
1994 was being guided by an annual plan. 

Finance 
Budget 

The federal budget has two main parts: the ordinary budget, 
which covers current expenditures, and the development bud- 
get (Public-Sector Development Programme), which covers 
capital investment and development programs (see table 4, 
Appendix) . Current expenditures accounted for 78 percent of 
planned spending in the FY 1994 budget. Defense accounted 
for 26 percent of all expenditures, and debt service took up 
another 36 percent. About 25 percent of federal income was 
earmarked to be transferred to the provinces as statutory and 
discretionary grants. The provinces have their own budgets 
and limited powers to impose taxes. In 1991 the National 
Finance Commission, which includes the prime minister and 
the four provincial chief ministers, agreed to raise the propor- 
tion of funds going to the provinces. In return, the federal gov- 
ernment is no longer responsible for financing provincial 
budget deficits. 

Tax collections historically have constituted a smaller pro- 
portion of GDP than that of many other countries — between 
FY 1984 and FY 1992, they averaged 13.8 percent. The 1993 
budget estimates called for an increase to 15.1 percent, up 
from 13.9 percent in FY 1992. Income and corporation taxes 
provided 12.9 percent of tax revenues in FY 1993. Tax evasion, 
however, is thought to be widespread. The agricultural sector 
was exempt from income tax until 1993, when a temporary levy 
on large landowners was introduced by the Qureshi govern- 
ment. In early 1994, it appeared unlikely that this tax would be 
reimposed by the new government led by Benazir, herself a 
large landowner in Sindh. 

Indirect taxes are the main source of revenue. They pro- 
vided 84 percent of tax revenues in FY 1991 and an estimated 
83 percent in FY 1992 and FY 1993. Customs duties were 
expected to account for 35.0 percent of all government taxes 
in FY 1993. Excise duties made up 17 percent of revenues, and 
sales taxes made up 10 percent. Potential foreign aid donors 
consider the heavy reliance on indirect taxes regressive and 
inflationary and an impediment to the general policy of trade 
liberalization. Under pressure from the International Mone- 



160 



The Economy 



tary Fund (IMF — see Glossary), the government reduced 
import duty rates in the FY 1992 and FY 1993 budgets. 

In a three-year (FY 1992-94) policy statement made in agree- 
ment with the World Bank and IMF in December 1991, the gov- 
ernment committed itself to important changes in the fiscal 
system. New measures extended the narrow base of both direct 
and indirect taxes, and administrative steps were taken to 
increase receipts of income and wealth taxes as well as general 
sales and federal excise taxes as a proportion of GDP. In FY 
1993, however, the Nawaz Sharif government failed to meet its 
fiscal targets, and relations with the World Bank and IMF 
became strained. After the Qureshi caretaker government 
came to power in July 1993, fiscal discipline was restored, and 
in November 1993, the World Bank and IMF made substantial 
aid commitments to the new government of Benazir Bhutto. 

Fiscal Administration 

Government tax and nontax receipts fell far short of total 
expenditures in the 1980s and early 1990s. Many economists 
believe that the increasing government debt is a growing threat 
to Pakistan's future economic growth. The overall deficit, as a 
percentage of GDP, was around 5.3 percent in the early 1980s 
and averaged 7.5 percent between FY 1984 and FY 1990. It 
reached 8.8 percent in FY 1991, but the provisional figure for 
FY 1992 was 6.5 percent. The FY 1993 budget forecast a deficit 
of 4.8 percent of GDP, but spending was higher and revenues 
lower than anticipated, and provisional data indicate that the 
deficit exceeded 9 percent. The continued gap between gov- 
ernment revenues and spending is a major concern to poten- 
tial donors of foreign aid, and in 1993 Qureshi's caretaker 
government raised taxes and cut spending. In 1994 the Benazir 
Bhutto government aimed to reduce the budget deficit to 4.5 
percent of GDP by FY 1996. The government relies on bond 
sales and on borrowing from the banking system to finance its 
deficit. Internal public debt was estimated at 49.9 percent of 
GDP in FY 1992. By contrast, in FY 1981 internal public debt 
had constituted 20.9 percent of GDP. 

Monetary Process 

The State Bank of Pakistan was established in 1948 and 
remains the country's central bank and financial adviser. It is 
the sole bank of issue, holder of gold and currency reserves, 
banker to the government, lender of last resort to other banks, 



161 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

supervisor of other banks, and overseer of national credit pol- 
icy. In October 1993, legislation reduced government control 
of the bank, but without giving it complete autonomy. 

From 1974, when all Pakistani banks were nationalized, until 
1991, all local banks were in the state sector. In 1991, as part of 
the government's general program of economic liberalization 
and the privatization of state enterprises, two small banks — the 
Muslim Commercial Bank and the Allied Bank — were priva- 
tized. In 1991 the government also instructed the State Bank of 
Pakistan to approve proposals for new private commercial 
banks. In early 1994, there were twenty-four commercial banks, 
including ten private banks that had opened since 1991, two 
privatized banks, and twelve banks that remained in the state 
sector. One of the new private banks, Mehran Bank, was closed 
in early 1994 amidst allegations of massive fraud. The number 
of new private banks was expected to increase in 1994. In 
March 1993, the total assets of all Pakistani banks amounted to 
Rsl,090 billion. Pakistani banks had 119 foreign branches and 
operated joint banking ventures in Malaysia, Oman, Saudi Ara- 
bia, and the United Arab Emirates. 

Twenty-one foreign banks operated in Pakistan in early 
1994. They had sixty-one branches, most of which were located 
in Karachi. United States banks with branches in Pakistan 
included Citibank, Chase Manhattan Bank, American Express 
Bank, and Bank of America. 

In the 1970s and 1980s, the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI) was an important foreign bank in Paki- 
stan. The bank had many close links with the Pakistani political 
and commercial elite. It was founded in 1972 by Agha Hasan 
Abedi, a leading Pakistani banker. Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif s family company, Ittefaq Industries, was a major bor- 
rower. BCCI's international operations were run from London, 
but there were three important branches in Pakistan. Abedi 
resigned as president of BCCI in 1990, when the ruling Al 
Nuhayyan family of Abu Dhabi obtained a majority share in the 
company. BCCI collapsed in July 1991 when the Bank of 
England closed BCCI's operations amid allegations of massive 
losses, fraud, racketeering, and laundering of drug money. The 
Pakistani branches continued to operate for some time after 
BCCI had been closed elsewhere, and there were many allega- 
tions that Pakistani businessmen and politicians had profited 
from the bank's illegal activities. Abedi was later indicted in the 



162 



The Economy 



United States for fraud and racketeering. In 1992 Pakistani 
operations of BCCI were amalgamated with Habib Bank. 

In 1991 four Punjab-based financial cooperatives, together 
known as the Pakistan Cooperative Societies, failed amidst alle- 
gations of misappropriation of public funds. Estimates of 
money lost by depositors ranged from RslO billion to Rs23 bil- 
lion, with up to 2.6 million accounts affected. Two of the four 
cooperatives were owned by relatives of then Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif, but an official inquiry cleared him and his family 
of any wrongdoing. 

From independence until the mid-1970s, the commercial 
banks were poor providers of long-term capital because the 
interest rate structure favored short-term over long-term 
financing and long-term deposits over long-term loans. As a 
result, the government encouraged the growth of nonbanking 
financial institutions to act as sources of long-term credit and 
equity finance. These institutions continued to play an impor- 
tant role in the early 1990s. 

The Industrial Development Bank, established in 1961, pro- 
vides medium- and long-term credit, primarily to small and 
medium-sized firms in the private sector, while the Pakistan 
Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation provides 
long-term assistance in local or foreign currency to private 
companies in the industrial sector, arranging foreign loans for 
large projects. The National Development Finance Corpora- 
tion, founded in 1973, provides similar services for the public 
sector and in the early 1990s also began to provide financing 
for the private sector. The Agricultural Development Bank 
gives credit to agriculture and to cottage industries, while the 
House Building Finance Corporation provides interest-free 
housing finance, taking a percentage of the property's rental 
income. Other specialized financial institutions include the 
Investment Corporation of Pakistan, the Small Business 
Finance Corporation, the National Investment Trust, and 
Bankers Equity. All these organizations, with the exception of 
the Pakistan Industrial Credit Corporation, which is 35 percent 
foreign owned, are government owned, although they often act 
as channels for foreign aid. 

In the 1980s, three new financing corporations — 
Pakistan-Libya Holding, Pakistan-Kuwait Investment, and 
Saudi-Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment — were estab- 
lished. These three institutions are jointly owned by the Paki- 



163 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

stan government and the respective foreign governments; most 
of their funding comes from the foreign governments. 

The adoption of Zia's policy of Islamization led to changes in 
the practices of financial institutions because of the Islamic 
prohibition against usury. In July 1979, the Investment Corpo- 
ration of Pakistan, the National Investment Trust, and the 
House Building Finance Corporation opened interest-free 
accounts that operate on a profit-and-loss-sharing basis. In 1981 
the commercial banks followed suit. Under this system, profits 
and losses on projects financed with deposit sums are shared in 
an agreed-on proportion between lender and borrower. In 
1985 regulations prohibited new interest-bearing loans and 
interest-bearing rupee deposits. These regulations cover rupee 
deposits in foreign banks but not deposits made in foreign cur- 
rencies. In 1990 more than 63 percent of funds on deposit 
were held in profit-and-loss-sharing schemes. 

In addition to the profit-and-loss-sharing system, lending 
takes two other forms. Banks make interest-free loans but assess 
service charges at rates determined by the State Bank of Paki- 
stan. Banks also provide financing for the purchase of goods or 
real estate according to a system whereby the bank purchases 
the item and agrees to resell it to the client at an increased 
price. All these modes of finance are subject to criticism by 
some advocates of Islamization on the grounds that they con- 
tain a provision for a guaranteed rate of return that can be con- 
strued as the equivalent of interest. 

In November 1991, the Federal Shariat Court declared all 
laws pertaining to the payment or receipt of interest and 
markup contrary to Islam. It also ruled against the indexation 
of financial assets for inflation. The federal and provincial gov- 
ernments were ordered to amend all relevant laws by June 30, 
1992, but appeals by banks and the central government ren- 
dered the deadline inoperative. As of early 1994, no higher 
court decision had been announced (see Politicized Islam, ch. 
2). 

The National Credit Consultative Council formulates annual 
credit plans. The council includes members from government, 
financial institutions, and the private sector. The credit plan 
sets a limit on the expansion of the money supply, taking into 
account the targets of the development plan and the govern- 
ment's fiscal objectives, as well as prevailing rates of growth and 
projections for GDP. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, money 
growth tended to run well ahead of plan targets. 



164 



The Economy 



Rapid expansion of the money supply, coupled with the 
impact of the 1991 Persian Gulf War on domestic energy 
prices, pushed up the consumer price index by 13 percent dur- 
ing FY 1991. Although energy prices fell in FY 1992, heavy gov- 
ernment borrowing from the central bank kept inflation 
relatively high in FY 1992 and FY 1993, at around 9 percent. 
Some independent observers, including the World Bank, 
believed that the official inflation statistics understated the real 
rate in FY 1993, which they put at about 13 percent. 

The principal stock market is the Karachi Stock Exchange, 
although there are also small stock markets in Lahore and 
Islamabad. The stock market expanded greatly during the 
1980s. In 1991 there were almost 550 companies listed, with a 
market capitalization of US$4.3 billion. The turnover ratio was 
12.6 percent, which represented a traded value of US$542 mil- 
lion. In 1991, as part of the government's deregulation policies, 
restrictions on foreign investment in shares of listed Pakistani 
companies were lifted, as were constraints on the repatriation 
of investment proceeds, gains, and dividends. Initially, most 
foreign investment was carried out by portfolio managers and 
institutional investors based in Hong Kong and Singapore. 

Foreign Economic Relations 
Foreign Aid 

Since independence Pakistan has had to depend on foreign 
assistance in its development efforts and to balance its interna- 
tional debt payments. In 1960 the World Bank organized the 
Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium to facilitate coordination among 
the major providers of international assistance. The consor- 
tium held 92 percent of Pakistan's outstanding disbursed debt 
at the end of June 1991. The consortium's members include 
the United States, Canada, Japan, Britain, Germany, France, 
and international organizations such as the World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The World Bank 
accounted for 26 percent of the outstanding debt, and the 
ADB, which was the largest lender in the early 1990s, 
accounted for 15 percent. Most nonconsortium funding comes 
from Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing Middle Eastern 
countries. Most aid is in the form of loans, although the pro- 
portion of grants increased from around 12 percent in the late 
1970s to around 25 percent in the 1980s, mainly because of 
food aid and other funds directed toward Afghan refugees. 



165 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

With the decline in this aid after 1988, the proportion of grants 
decreased to 16 percent in FY 1992. 

The United States has been a major provider of aid since 
independence and was the largest donor in the 1980s (see For- 
eign Policy, ch. 4) . All United States military aid and all new 
civilian commitments, however, ended in October 1990 after 
the United States Congress failed to receive the required 
annual presidential certification that Pakistan was not develop- 
ing a nuclear bomb. As of early 1994, United States aid had not 
resumed, but Agency for International Development projects 
already under way in October 1990 continued to receive funds 
(see The Armed Forces in a New World Order, ch. 5) . 

Foreign Trade 

Foreign trade is important to the economy because of the 
country's need to import a variety of products. Imports have 
exceeded exports in almost every year since 1950, and Pakistan 
had a deficit in its balance of trade each year from FY 1973 
through FY 1992 (see table 5, Appendix). In FY 1991, exports 
were US$5.9 billion, compared with imports of US$8.4 billion, 
which resulted in a deficit of US$2.5 billion. In FY 1992, 
exports rose to an estimated US$6.9 billion, but imports 
reached an estimated US$9.3 billion, resulting in a trade deficit 
of US$2.4 billion. Economists forecast a trade deficit of around 
US$2.5 billion for FY 1993. Pakistan's terms of trade, expressed 
in an index set at 100 in FY 1981, were 78.0 in FY 1991 and 82.7 
in FY 1992. 

Crude oil and refined products are significant imports (see 
table 6, Appendix) . Their value varies with internal demand 
and changes in the world oil price. In FY 1982, oil products 
accounted for around 30 percent of Pakistan's imports, falling 
to an annual average of 15 percent from FY 1987 to FY 1990, 
rising to over 21 percent in FY 1991, but dropping back to 15 
percent in FY 1992. Other important categories of imports in 
FY 1992 included nonelectrical machinery (24 percent), chem- 
icals (10 percent), transportation equipment (9 percent), and 
edible oils (4 percent). 

Although import-substitution industrialization policies 
favored domestic manufacturing of substitutes for imports, offi- 
cials also encouraged manufactured exports in the 1950s and 
1960s. In the early 1980s, incentives were again provided to 
industrialists to increase manufactured exports. Nonetheless, 
in the early 1990s the export base remained primarily depen- 



166 



The Economy 



dent on two agricultural products, cotton and rice, which are 
subject to great variations in output and demand. In FY 1992, 
raw cotton, cotton yarn, cotton cloth, and cotton waste 
accounted for 37 percent of all exports (see table 7, Appen- 
dix). Other important exports were ready-made garments (15 
percent), synthetic textiles (6 percent), and rice (6 percent). 
There was some diversification during the late 1980s as the 
share of manufactured goods rose. The share of primary goods 
fell from 35 percent to 16 percent between FY 1986 and FY 
1993. During the same period, the share of semimanufactures 
rose from 16 percent to 20 percent, and that of manufactured 
goods rose from 49 percent to 64 percent. 

In the early 1990s, Pakistan's balance of trade remained par- 
ticularly vulnerable to changes in the world economy and bad 
weather. Sharp increases in crude oil prices, such as those of 
1979-81 and 1990, raised the nation's import bill signifi- 
cantly. Total exports, on the other hand, are more sensitive to 
agricultural production. The decline in cotton production in 
FY 1993, for instance, seriously affected the export level. 

Sources for imports and markets for exports are widely scat- 
tered, and they fluctuate from year to year. In the early 1990s, 
the United States and Japan were Pakistan's most important 
trading partners. In FY 1993, the United States accounted for 
13.7 percent of Pakistan's exports and 11.2 percent of its 
imports. Japan accounted for 6.6 percent of exports and 14.2 
percent of imports. Germany, Britain, and Saudi Arabia are 
also important trading partners. Hong Kong is an important 
export market and China a significant supplier of imports. 
Trade with the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Malaysia 
is small but not unimportant. Trade with India is negligible. 

Because of Pakistani fears of protectionism in developed 
countries and the increasing importance of regional blocs in 
international trade, the government in the 1980s and early 
1990s placed new importance on developing trade links with 
nearby nations. In the early 1990s, new trading initiatives were 
being pursued through membership in two regional organiza- 
tions, the Economic Co-operation Organization (ECO) and 
the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC— see Glossary). 

The ECO was formed in 1985 with Pakistan, Iran, and Tur- 
key as its only members, but Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kyr- 
gyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan joined in 
1992. Some politicians in the member nations see the ECO as a 



167 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



potential Muslim common market, but political rivalries, espe- 
cially between Iran and Turkey, limit its effectiveness. In 1994 
most of the concrete measures being taken by the ECO con- 
cerned the improvement of transportation and communica- 
tions among the member nations, including the construction 
of a highway from Turkey to Pakistan through Iran. 

SAARC was founded in the mid-1980s, primarily as a vehicle 
to increase trade within South Asia by delinking the region's 
political conflicts from economic cooperation. Its seven mem- 
ber states — Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Paki- 
stan, and Sri Lanka — adopted the principle of unanimity in 
selecting multilateral questions for debate. Despite frequent 
consultative committee meetings, progress toward increased 
trade remained limited in 1994. At the annual SAARC summit 
in April 1993, members agreed to negotiate a South Asian Pref- 
erential Trade Agreement by 1996 that would lower or abolish 
tariffs among members. 

During the first four decades after independence, controls 
on imports were used to ensure priority use of foreign 
exchange and to assist industrialization. In the 1980s, the gov- 
ernment maintained lists of permissible imports and also used 
quantitative restrictions and regulations on foreign exchange 
to control imports. The most extensive list covers consumer 
goods as well as raw materials and capital goods that can be 
imported by commercial and industrial users. A second list, 
mostly of raw materials, can only be imported by industrial 
users. A third list covers commodities only the public sector can 
import. 

In 1991 and 1992, the government announced various mea- 
sures to liberalize trade. Import licensing was ended for most 
goods, many products were removed from the lists of restricted 
imports, and import duties were cut. In addition, foreign com- 
panies were allowed into the export trade. The government 
also promised to convert the remaining non tariff barriers into 
tariffs, incorporate various ad hoc import taxes into customs 
duties, and reduce the numerous exemptions and concessions 
on duties. 

External Debt 

Pakistan frequentiy encounters balance of payments difficul- 
ties, requiring emergency funding and rescheduling of debt 
payments (see table 8, Appendix). The main reason for the 
negative balance of payments is the chronic trade deficit. How- 



168 



Cinema in Karachi 
Courtesy Sheila Ross 
craftsman creating beautiful patterns on Namdas 
Courtesy Embassy of Pakistan, Washington 



169 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

ever, remittances from Pakistanis employed overseas have com- 
pensated for a portion of the trade deficit. Remittances sent 
home from these workers increased from US$339 million in FY 
1976 to US$2.9 billion in FY 1983, when they exceeded total 
commodity export earnings. After FY 1983, remittances gradu- 
ally declined, although they averaged US$2.3 billion between 
FY 1984 and FY 1990. Remittances totaled US$1.8 billion in FY 
1991 but then fell to US$1.5 billion in FY 1992, in part because 
of the disruption caused by the Persian Gulf War. In FY 1992, 
Pakistanis in the Middle East accounted for 67.1 percent of all 
remittances; 45.3 percent came from Saudi Arabia alone. Work- 
ers in Kuwait provided around 9 percent in the late 1980s, but 
that proportion fell to 3.6 percent in FY 1992. Pakistanis also 
send significant remittances from the United States (10.2 per- 
cent) and Britain (9.3 percent). 

At the end of June 1993, Pakistani officials estimated the 
public and publicly guaranteed external debt at US$18.4 bil- 
lion. The World Bank, however, estimated the total external 
debt at US$24.1 billion at the end of 1992, up from US$16.7 
billion at the end of 1987. Total external debt was 48 percent of 
the gross national product (GNP — see Glossary). Commercial 
borrowing is a small proportion of debt; at the end of 1992, it 
accounted for only 0.4 percent of long-term debt. 

Labor 

Between independence and the early 1990s, the labor force 
grew rapidly, reflecting the high population growth and the 
subsequently burgeoning proportion of the population under 
twenty years of age. The data available concerning employment 
are only estimates because few concrete facts are available. Offi- 
cial labor force figures represent orders of magnitude and are 
not precise. Observers agree, however, that relatively few 
women participate in the formal nonagricultural labor force. 

In FY 1992, the civilian labor force was estimated at 33.8 mil- 
lion, compared with 26.3 million in FY 1982 and only 10.4 mil- 
lion in 1951 (see table 9, Appendix). In FY 1993, about 48 
percent of the civilian labor force was engaged in agriculture, 
13 percent in industry, 7 percent in construction, 13 percent in 
trade, 5 percent in transportation and communications, and 14 
percent in other services. Only about 25 percent of the official 
labor force are wage earners, which reflects the high levels of 
casual enterprise, family businesses, and self-employment. 



170 



The Economy 



Agricultural employment, although increasing, has 
expanded at a slower rate than the total labor force for most of 
the period since independence. In the 1960s and 1970s, own- 
ers of mid-sized farms turned increasingly to managing their 
own holdings, displacing former tenants. Increased mechaniza- 
tion displaced agricultural laborers. Industry, the major growth 
sector of the economy, was unable to absorb sufficient workers. 
From the early 1960s until the early 1990s, the proportion of 
the labor force employed in the industrial sector remained 
steady, while the proportion working in trade, construction, 
and transportation rose. Official estimates placed unemploy- 
ment at around 3 percent in the late 1980s, but this rate rose in 
the early 1990s to around 6 percent. Underemployment is a 
greater problem and is particularly evident in agriculture, con- 
struction, and trade. 

Overseas employment partially compensates for the insuffi- 
cient job market. Since the mid-1970s, a growing number of 
Pakistanis, both skilled and unskilled men, have gone to 
labor-deficient, oil-exporting countries in the Middle East, 
where wages are much higher than at home. By the mid-1980s, 
this exodus of manpower had reached more than 2 million. 
Pakistanis working in the Persian Gulf states sent back remit- 
tances of more than US$3 billion a year through official chan- 
nels. An equal amount may have come in through unofficial 
channels. Significantly, these remittances meant that for the 
first time, wealth flowed directly to ordinary Pakistanis rather 
than to bankers, landlords, or army officers. 

Employment opportunities in the Persian Gulf states were 
reduced in the early 1990s. The Persian Gulf War forced many 
workers to return abruptly to Pakistan. Workers only slowly 
returned to the Gulf after the war. Remittances, however, 
although below the peak levels of the mid-1980s, nonetheless 
accounted for between US$1.5 billion and US2.0 billion a year, 
or over 30 percent of Pakistan's foreign-currency earnings and 
almost 5 percent of GNP. 

Over 1 million Pakistanis (some estimates are much higher) 
continued to work in the Middle East in the early 1990s, mostly 
in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These workers 
range from unskilled laborers to highly skilled professionals 
such as engineers, accountants, teachers, physicians, and 
nurses. In addition, significant numbers of Pakistanis live and 
work in other countries, especially Britain and the United 
States. 



171 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



Agriculture 

Farming is Pakistan's largest economic activity. In FY 1993, 
agriculture and small-scale forestry and fishing contributed 25 
percent of GDP and employed 48 percent of the labor force. 
Agricultural products, especially cotton yarn, cotton cloth, raw 
cotton, and rice, are important exports. Although there is agri- 
cultural activity in all areas of Pakistan, most crops are grown in 
the Indus River plain in Punjab and Sindh. Considerable devel- 
opment and expansion of output have occurred since the early 
1960s; however, the country is still far from realizing the large 
potential yield that the well-irrigated and fertile soil from the 
Indus irrigation system could produce. The floods of Septem- 
ber 1992 showed how vulnerable agriculture is to weather; agri- 
cultural production dropped dramatically in FY 1993. 

Land Use 

Pakistan's total land area is about 803,940 square kilometers. 
About 48 million hectares, or 60 percent, is often classified as 
unusable for forestry or agriculture consists mostly of deserts, 
mountain slopes, and urban settlements (see Topography and 
Drainage, ch. 2). Some authorities, however, include part of 
this area as agricultural land on the basis that it would support 
some livestock activity even though it is poor rangeland. Thus, 
estimates of grazing land vary widely — between 10 percent and 
70 percent of the total area. A broad interpretation, for exam- 
ple, categorizes almost all of arid Balochistan as rangeland for 
foraging livestock. Government officials listed only 3 million 
hectares, largely in the north, as forested in FY 1992. About 
21.9 million hectares were cultivated in FY 1992. Around 70 
percent of the cropped area was in Punjab, followed by perhaps 
20 percent in Sindh, less than 10 percent in the North-West 
Frontier Province, and only 1 percent in Balochistan. 

Since independence, the amount of cultivated land has 
increased by more than one-third. This expansion is largely the 
result of improvements in the irrigation system that make water 
available to additional plots. Substantial amounts of farmland 
have been lost to urbanization and waterlogging, but losses are 
more than compensated for by the addition of new land. In the 
early 1990s, more irrigation projects were needed to increase 
the area of cultivated land. 

The scant rainfall over most of the country makes about 80 
percent of cropping dependent on irrigation (see Climate, ch. 



172 



The Economy 



2). Fewer than 4 million hectares of land, largely in northern 
Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province, are totally 
dependent on rainfall. An additional 2 million hectares of land 
are under nonirrigated cropping, such as plantings on flood- 
plains as the water recedes. Nonirrigated farming generally 
gives low yields, and although the technology exists to boost 
production substantially, it is expensive to use and not always 
readily available. 

Irrigation 

In the early 1990s, irrigation from the Indus River and its 
tributaries constituted the world's largest continuous irrigation 
system, capable of watering over 16 million hectares. The sys- 
tem includes three major storage reservoirs and numerous bar- 
rages, headworks, canals, and distribution channels. The total 
length of the canal system exceeds 58,000 kilometers; there are 
an additional 1.6 million kilometers of farm and field ditches. 

Partition placed portions of the Indus River and its tributar- 
ies under India's control, leading to prolonged disputes 
between India and Pakistan over the use of Indus waters. After 
nine years of negotiations and technical studies, the issue was 
resolved by the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960. After a ten-year 
transitional period, the treaty awarded India use of the waters 
of the main eastern tributaries in its territory — the Ravi, Beas, 
and Sutlej rivers. Pakistan received use of the waters of the 
Indus River and its western tributaries, the Jhelum and Chenab 
rivers. 

After the treaty was signed, Pakistan began an extensive and 
rapid irrigation construction program, partly financed by the 
Indus Basin Development Fund of US$800 million contributed 
by various nations, including the United States, and adminis- 
tered by the World Bank. Several immense link canals were 
built to transfer water from western rivers to eastern Punjab to 
replace flows in eastern tributaries that India began to divert in 
accordance with the terms of the treaty. The Mangla Dam, on 
the Jhelum River, was completed in 1967. The dam provided 
the first significant water storage for the Indus irrigation sys- 
tem. The dam also contributes to flood control, to regulation 
of flows for some of the link canals, and to the country's energy 
supply. At the same time, additional construction was under- 
taken on barrages and canals. 

A second phase of irrigation expansion began in 1968, when 
a US$1.2 billion fund, also administered by the World Bank, 



173 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

was established. The key to this phase was the Tarbela Dam on 
the Indus River, which is the world's largest earth-filled dam. 
The dam, completed in the 1970s, reduced the destruction of 
periodic floods and in 1994 was a major hydroelectric generat- 
ing source. Most important for agriculture, the dam increases 
water availability, particularly during low water, which usually 
comes at critical growing periods. 

Despite massive expansion in the irrigation system, many 
problems remain. The Indus irrigation system was designed to 
accommodate the availability of water in the rivers, to supply 
the largest area with minimum water needs, and to achieve 
these objectives at low operating costs with limited technical 
staff. This system design has resulted in low yields and low crop- 
ping intensity in the Indus River plain, averaging about one 
crop a year, whereas the climate and soils could reasonably per- 
mit an average of almost 1.5 crops a year if a more sophisti- 
cated irrigation network were in place. The urgent need in the 
1960s and 1970s to increase crop production for domestic and 
export markets led to water flows well above designed capaci- 
ties. Completion of the Mangla and Tarbela reservoirs, as well 
as improvements in other parts of the system, made larger 
water flows possible. In addition, the government began install- 
ing public tube wells that usually discharge into upper levels of 
the system to add to the available water. The higher water flows 
in parts of the system considerably exceed design capacities, 
creating stresses and risks of breaches. Nonetheless, many 
farmers, particularly those with smallholdings and those 
toward the end of watercourses, suffer because the supply of 
water is unreliable. 

The irrigation system represents a significant engineering 
achievement and provides water to the fields that account for 
90 percent of agricultural production. Nonetheless, serious 
problems in the design of the irrigation system prevent achiev- 
ing the highest potential agricultural output. 

Water management is based largely on objectives and opera- 
tional procedures dating back many decades and is often 
inflexible and unresponsive to current needs for greater water 
use efficiency and high crop yields. Charges for water use do 
not meet operational and maintenance costs, even though 
rates more than doubled in the 1970s and were again increased 
in the 1980s. Partly because of its low cost, farmers often waste 
water. 



174 



Powerhouse of Tarbela Dam, the largest earth-filled dam in the world 
Courtesy Embassy of Pakistan, Washington 



Good water management is not practiced by government 
officials, who often assume that investments in physical aspects 
of the system will automatically yield higher crop production. 
Government management of the system does not extend 
beyond the main distribution channels. After passing through 
these channels, water is directed onto the fields of individual 
farmers, whose water rights are based on long-established 
social and legal codes. Groups of farmers voluntarily manage 
the watercourses between main distribution channels and their 
fields. In effect, the efficiency and effectiveness of water man- 
agement rely on the way farmers use the system. 

The exact amounts of water wasted have not been deter- 
mined, but studies suggest that losses are considerable and per- 
haps amount to one-half of the water entering the system. Part 
of the waste results from seepages in the delivery system. Even 
greater amounts are probably lost because farmers use water 



175 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

whenever their turn comes even if the water application is det- 
rimental to their crops. The attitude among almost all farmers 
is that they should use water when available because it may not 
be available at the next scheduled turn. Moreover, farmers 
have little understanding of the most productive applications 
of water during crop-growing cycles because of the lack of 
research and extension services. As a result, improvements in 
the irrigation system have not raised yields and output as 
expected. Some experts believe that drastic changes are 
needed in government policies and the legal and institutional 
framework of water management if water use is to improve and 
that effective changes can result in very large gains in agricul- 
tural output. 

Drainage 

The continuous expansion of the irrigation system over the 
past century significantly altered the hydrological balance of 
the Indus River basin. Seepage from the system and percola- 
tion from irrigated fields caused the water table to rise, reach- 
ing crisis conditions for a substantial area. Around 1900 the 
water table was usually more than sixteen meters below the sur- 
face of the Indus Plain. A 1981 survey found the water table to 
be within about three meters of the surface in more than 
one-half the cropped area in Sindh and more than one-third 
the area in Punjab. In some locations, the water table is much 
closer to the surface. Cropping is seriously affected over a wide 
area by poor drainage — waterlogging — and by accumulated 
salts in the soil. 

Although some drainage was installed before World War II, 
little attention was paid to the growing waterlogging and salin- 
ity problems. In 1959 a salinity control and reclamation project 
was started in a limited area, based on public tube wells, to 
draw down the water table and leach out accumulated salts 
near the surface, using groundwater for irrigation. By the early 
1980s, some thirty such projects had been started that when 
completed would irrigate nearly 6.3 million hectares. By 1993 
the government had installed around 15,000 tube wells. Private 
farmers, however, had installed over 200,000 mostly small tube 
wells, mainly for irrigation purposes but also to lower the water 
table. Private wells probably pumped more than five times as 
much water as public wells. 

Officials were aware of the need for additional spending to 
prevent further deterioration of the existing situation. Empha- 



176 



The Economy 



sis in the 1980s and early 1990s was on rehabilitation and main- 
tenance of existing canals and watercourses, on improvements 
on the farms themselves (including some land leveling to con- 
serve water) , and on drainage and salinity in priority areas. 
Emphasis was also placed on short-term projects, largely to 
improve the operation of the irrigation system in order to raise 
yields. Part of the funding would come from steady increases in 
water use fees; the intention is to gradually raise water charges 
to cover operation and maintenance costs. Considerable time 
and money are needed to realize the full potential of the irriga- 
tion system and bring it up to modern standards. 

Farm Ownership and Land Reform 

At independence Pakistan was a country with a great many 
small-scale farms and a small number of very large estates. Dis- 
tribution of landownership was badly skewed. Less than 1 per- 
cent of the farms consisted of more than 25 percent of the total 
agricultural land. Many owners of large holdings were absentee 
landlords, contributing little to production but extracting as 
much as possible from the sharecroppers who farmed the land. 
At the other extreme, about 65 percent of the farmers held 
some 15 percent of the farmland in holdings of about two hect- 
ares or less. Approximately 50 percent of the farmland was cul- 
tivated by tenants, including sharecroppers, most of whom had 
little security and few rights. An additional large number of 
landless rural inhabitants worked as agricultural laborers. Farm 
laborers and many tenants were extremely poor, uneducated, 
and undernourished, in sharp contrast to the wealth, status, 
and political power of the landlord elite. 

After independence the country's political leaders recog- 
nized the need for more equitable ownership of farmland and 
security of tenancy. In the early 1950s, provincial governments 
attempted to eliminate some of the absentee landlords or rent 
collectors, but they had little success in the face of strong oppo- 
sition. Security of tenancy was also legislated in the provinces, 
but because of their dependent position, tenant farmers bene- 
fitted only slightly. In fact, the reforms created an atmosphere 
of uncertainty in the countryside and intensified the animosity 
between wealthy landlords and small farmers and sharecrop- 
pers. 

In January 1959, accepting the recommendations of a spe- 
cial commission on the subject, General Mohammad Ayub 
Khan's government issued new land reform regulations that 



177 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

aimed to boost agricultural output, promote social justice, and 
ensure security of tenure (see The Ayub Khan Era, ch. 1). A 
ceiling was placed on individual landownership; compensation 
was paid to owners for land surrendered. Numerous exemp- 
tions, including title transfers to family members, limited the 
impact of the ceilings. Slightly fewer than 1 million hectares of 
land were surrendered, of which a little more than 250,000 
hectares were sold to about 50,000 tenants. The land reform 
regulations made no serious attempt to break up large estates 
or to lessen the power or privileges of the landed elite. How- 
ever, the measures attempted to provide some security of ten- 
ure to tenants, consolidate existing holdings, and prevent 
fragmentation of farm plots. An average holding of about five 
hectares was considered necessary for a family's subsistence, 
and a holding of about twenty to twenty-five hectares was pro- 
nounced as a desirable "economic" holding. 

In March 1972, the Bhutto government announced further 
land reform measures, which went into effect in 1973 (see 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and a New Constitutional System, ch. 1). 
The landownership ceiling was officially lowered to about five 
hectares of irrigated land and about twelve hectares of nonirri- 
gated land; exceptions were in theory limited to an additional 
20 percent of land for owners having tractors and tube wells. 
The ceiling could also be extended for poor-quality land. Own- 
ers of expropriated excess land received no compensation, and 
beneficiaries were not charged for land distributed. Official sta- 
tistics showed that by 1977 only about 520,000 hectares had 
been surrendered, and nearly 285,000 hectares had been redis- 
tributed to about 71,000 farmers. 

The 1973 measure required landlords to pay all taxes, water 
charges, seed costs, and one-half of the cost of fertilizer and 
other inputs. It prohibited eviction of tenants as long as they 
cultivated the land, and it gave tenants first rights of purchase. 
Other regulations increased tenants' security of tenure and 
prescribed lower rent rates than had existed. 

In 1977 the Bhutto government further reduced ceilings on 
private ownership of farmland to about four hectares of irri- 
gated land and about eight hectares of nonirrigated land. In an 
additional measure, agricultural income became taxable, 
although small farmers owning ten hectares or fewer — the 
majority of the farm population — were exempted. The military 
regime of Zia ul-Haq that ousted Bhutto neglected to imple- 
ment these later reforms. Governments in the 1980s and early 



178 



The Economy 



1990s avoided significant land reform measures, perhaps 
because they drew much of their support from landowners in 
the countryside. 

Government policies designed to reduce the concentration 
of landownership had some effect, but their significance was 
difficult to measure because of limited data. In 1993 the most 
recent agricultural census was that of 1980, which was used to 
compare statistics with the agricultural census of 1960. Between 
1960 and 1980, the number of farms declined by 17 percent, 
and farms decreased in area by 4 percent, resulting in slightly 
larger farms. This decline in the number of farms was confined 
to marginal farms of two hectares or fewer, which in 1980 rep- 
resented 34 percent of all farms, constituting 7 percent of the 
farm hectarage. At the other extreme, the number of very 
large farms of sixty hectares or more was 14,000 — both in 1960 
and in 1980 — although the average size of the biggest farms 
was smaller in 1980. The number of farms between two and ten 
hectares increased during this time. Greater use of higher- 
yielding seeds requiring heavier applications of fertilizers, 
installation of private tube wells, and mechanization accounted 
for much of the shift away from very small farms toward 
mid-sized farms, as owners of the latter undertook cultivation 
instead of renting out part of their land. Observers believed 
that this trend had continued in the 1980s and early 1990s. 

In early 1994, land reform remained a controversial and 
complex issue. Large landowners retain their power over small 
farmers and tenants, especially in the interior of Sindh, which 
has a feudal agricultural establishment. Tenancy continues on 
a large scale: one-third of Pakistan's farmers are tenant farm- 
ers, including almost one-half of the farmers in Sindh. Tenant 
farmers typically give almost 50 percent of what they produce 
to landlords. Fragmented holdings remain a substantial and 
widespread problem. Studies indicate that larger farms are usu- 
ally less productive per hectare or unit of water than smaller 
ones. 

Cropping Patterns and Production 

In the early 1990s, most crops were grown for food (see table 
10; table 11, Appendix). Wheat is by far the most important 
crop in Pakistan and is the staple food for the majority of the 
population. Wheat is eaten most frequently in unleavened 
bread called chapati. In FY 1992, wheat was planted on 7.8 mil- 
lion hectares, and production amounted to 14.7 million tons. 



179 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

Output in FY 1993 reached 16.4 million tons. Between FY 1961 
and FY 1990, the area under wheat cultivation increased nearly 
70 percent, while yields increased 221 percent. Wheat produc- 
tion is vulnerable to extreme weather, especially in nonirri- 
gated areas. In the early and mid-1980s, Pakistan was self- 
sufficient in wheat, but in the early 1990s, more than 2 million 
tons of wheat were imported annually. 

Rice is the other major food grain. In FY 1992, about 2.1 mil- 
lion hectares were planted with rice, and production 
amounted to 3.2 million tons, with 1 million tons exported. 
Rice yields also have increased sharply since the 1960s, follow- 
ing the introduction of new varieties. Nonetheless, the yield 
per hectare of around 1.5 tons in FY 1991 was low compared 
with many other Asian countries. Pakistan has emphasized the 
production of rice in order to increase exports to the Middle 
East and therefore concentrates on the high-quality basmati 
variety, although other grades also are exported. The govern- 
ment has increased procurement prices of basmati rice dispro- 
portionately to encourage exports and has allowed private 
traders into the rice export business alongside the public-sec- 
tor Rice Export Corporation. 

Other important food grains are millet, sorghum, corn, and 
barley. Corn, although a minor crop, gradually increased in 
area and production after independence, partly at the expense 
of other minor food grains. Chick-peas, called gram in Pakistan, 
are the main nongrain food crop in area and production. A 
number of other foods, including fruits and vegetables, are 
also grown. 

In the early 1990s, cotton was the most important commer- 
cial crop. The area planted in cotton increased from 1.1 mil- 
lion hectares in FY 1950 to 2.1 million hectares in FY 1981 and 
2.8 million hectares in FY 1993. Yields increased substantially in 
the 1980s, partly as a result of the use of pesticides and the 
introduction in 1985 of a new high-yielding variety of seed. 
During the 1980s, cotton yields moved from well below the 
world average to above the world average. Production in FY 

1992 was 12.8 million bales, up from 4.4 million bales ten years 
earlier. Output fell sharply, however, to 9.3 million bales in FY 

1993 because of the September 1992 floods and insect infesta- 
tions. 

Other cash crops include tobacco, rapeseed, and, most 
important, sugarcane. In FY 1992, sugarcane was planted on 
880,000 hectares, and production was 35.7 million tons. Except 



180 



The Economy 



for some oil from cottonseeds, the country is dependent on 
imported vegetable oil. By the 1980s, introduction and experi- 
mentation with oilseed cultivation was under way. Soybeans 
and sunflower seeds appear to be suitable crops given the 
country's soil and climate, but production was still negligible in 
the early 1990s. 

Livestock 

Livestock provides the draft power available to most farmers 
as well as food, fuel, manure, wool, and hides. Livestock con- 
tributed about 30 percent of the value added by agriculture in 
FY 1993. In Balochistan raising sheep and goats on the arid 
rangeland is an important source of cash to a considerable part 
of the population, although many areas are overgrazed. 

In FY 1993, the livestock population was estimated at 17.8 
million cattle, 18.7 million water buffalo, 27.7 million sheep, 
40.2 million goats, and 5.4 million other animals, including 
camels, horses, and mules. Production of animal products in 
FY 1993 was estimated to include 17 million tons of milk, 
844,000 tons of beef, 763,000 tons of mutton, 50,500 tons of 
wool, and 42.6 million tons of hides and skins. Despite substan- 
tial increases in livestock production in the 1980s, the country 
faces shortages because of the limited amount of feed and graz- 
ing areas. In the 1980s, the government increased the size of 
cross-breeding programs and took other measures to increase 
productivity, but production still fell short of demand. 

Commercial chicken farming has shown exceptional prom- 
ise because production using modern methods has expanded 
rapidly since the 1960s. Although many farmers raise some 
poultry, the commercial chicken farms account for most of the 
increased availability of eggs and poultry. Poultry meat produc- 
tion increased from 14,000 tons in FY 1972 to 75,000 tons in FY 
1983 and 188,000 tons in FY 1993. Egg production increased 
from 14 million in FY 1972, to 4.2 billion in FY 1983, and 5.4 
billion in FY 1992. 

Forestry 

Forests cover about 3 million hectares, less than 4 percent of 
the country. Many forests are in the Northern Areas and Azad 
Kashmir, where coniferous trees predominate, but the manage- 
ment and exploitation of these forests are hampered by the 
remoteness of the land. Elsewhere, most of the native forest 
was destroyed before independence by population pressure, 



181 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

overcultivation, and overgrazing. The lack of tree cover con- 
tributes to many of the problems the agricultural sector has 
experienced since independence, including soil erosion, the 
silting of streams, flooding, and a shortage of timber and fire- 
wood. 

In the mid-1990s, government efforts to increase the extent 
of forests have had little success, but tree-planting programs 
continue. Many of the nation's forests, including some irri- 
gated tree plantations in the Indus River basin, are under gov- 
ernment control. These forests produced 321,000 cubic meters 
of timber and 534,000 cubic meters of firewood in FY 1993, but 
production was far short of demand. Imports filled part of the 
requirement for timber, while cutting trees and shrubs on pri- 
vate land met part of the need for firewood. In October 1993, 
however, the government imposed a two-year nationwide ban 
on the private felling of trees. This action was taken because of 
concerns that Pakistan was fast losing the little tree cover that 
existed (see Pollution and Environmental Issues, ch. 2). 

Fishing 

Fishing is a small sector of the economy, accounting for 
around 0.6 percent of GDP in FY 1992. Nevertheless, fishing 
had increased sharply in the 1970s and 1980s and seemed well- 
positioned for further expansion in the 1990s. The fish catch 
was 173,000 tons in FY 1970, approximately 301,000 tons in FY 
1982, and 510,000 tons in FY 1992. The bulk of the catch is 
taken offshore in the Arabian Sea. Much of the catch, espe- 
cially prawns and shrimp, is exported to the Middle East. Fish 
accounted for 1.7 percent of export earnings in FY 1992. The 
country is considered to have a large potential in fishing, 
reportedly as high as 14 million tons a year if sufficient invest- 
ment and market expansion occur. 

Industry 

In 1947 only 5 percent of the large-scale industrial facilities 
in British India were located in what became Pakistan. The 
country started with virtually no industrial base and no institu- 
tional, financial, or energy resources. Three small hydroelec- 
tric power stations provided limited electricity to a few urban 
areas. Firewood and dung were the main sources of energy; 
commercial energy sources supplied only about 30 percent of 



182 



The Economy 



the energy consumed. Further, there was a shortage of manage- 
ment personnel and skilled labor. 

Manufacturing 

The pace of industrialization since independence has been 
rapid, although it has fluctuated in response to changes in gov- 
ernment policy and to world economic conditions. During the 
1950s, manufacturing expanded at about 16 percent annually; 
during the first half of the 1960s, it expanded at around 11 per- 
cent a year. The pace slowed to under 7 percent a year in the 
second half of the 1960s. Between FY 1970 and FY 1977, the 
index of manufacturing output increased an average of only 
2.3 percent a year. Between FY 1977 and FY 1982, the index 
rose an average of 9.9 percent a year. Growth averaged 7.7 per- 
cent during the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1983-88) and 5.4 percent 
from FY 1989 through FY 1992. In FY 1993, manufacturing 
accounted for 17.3 percent of GDP at current factor cost, of 
which large-scale manufacturing accounted for 61 percent and 
small-scale manufacturing for 39 percent. Manufactured goods 
accounted for 64 percent of all exports by value in FY 1993, but 
the bulk of these exports came in the relatively low-technology 
areas of cotton textiles and garments. 

Total fixed capital formation in manufacturing was esti- 
mated at Rs57 billion in FY 1993. During the 1980s, private 
investment became much more important than public invest- 
ment. In FY 1982, private investment was 53.9 percent of the 
total, but in FY 1993 the proportion was 96.1 percent. Total 
investment in manufacturing was 5.1 percent of GNP in FY 
1993. 

In the early 1990s, the manufacturing sector was dominated 
by food processing and textiles (see table 12, Appendix). Provi- 
sional figures for FY 1992 indicated that sugar production was 
2.1 million tons, vegetable ghee 819,000 tons, cotton yarn 
862,000 tons, and cotton cloth 234 million square meters. 
Other industrial products included motor tires (647,000 units), 
cycle tires (2.2 million units), cement (6.1 million tons), urea 
(1.4 million tons), soda ash (147,000 tons), bicycles (364,000 
units), and paperboard (13,000 tons). 

Pakistan has one steel mill, located near Karachi, with a pro- 
duction capacity of 1.1 million tons per year. A major undertak- 
ing, the mill required the bulk of public industrial investment 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, although the plant was 
designed and partly financed by the Soviet Union. It produced 



183 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

at 81 percent of capacity in FY 1993, and it was dependent on 
imports of iron ore and coking coal. As of early 1994, the mill 
had not achieved sustained profitability, but there were plans 
to expand it. 

Public-sector firms produced about 40 percent of the total 
manufacturing value added in FY 1991, and they absorbed 
about 48 percent of gross fixed investment. The total value of 
public-sector industrial output in FY 1991 was Rs36 billion (in 
constant FY 1988 prices), but pretax profits were only Rsl.3 bil- 
lion, reflecting the inefficiencies and overstafnng prevalent in 
these enterprises. 

To improve the efficiency and competitiveness of public-sec- 
tor firms and end federal subsidies of their losses, the govern- 
ment launched a privatization program in FY 1991. Majority 
control in nearly all public-sector enterprises will be auctioned 
off to private investors, and foreign investors are eligible buy- 
ers. In March 1992, twenty units had been privatized, but by 
1993 only about 30 percent of the government's target number 
of firms had been sold because some of the enterprises were 
unattractive for private investors. In 1994 the government led 
by Benazir Bhutto was committed to continuing the policy of 
privatization. 

Construction 

Construction is one of the more vigorous sectors of the 
economy, growing at a rate of 5.9 percent in FY 1992. Construc- 
tion of nouses and the associated infrastructure was a major 
element in the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1988-93), which pro- 
posed the provision of 650,000 urban housing sites and 2.2 mil- 
lion plots for the rural poor to construct their own houses. The 
plan also sought to provide a rural water supply to an addi- 
tional 31.2 million people and sanitation facilities for 17 mil- 
lion people. Total planned construction expenditure was 
Rs29.7 billion over the five-year period. Much of the invest- 
ment in housing came from the remittances of Pakistani work- 
ers in the Middle East. Some economists felt that this 
investment distorted the market for land on which to build in 
some areas and made the position of poor people more diffi- 
cult. 

Energy 

From 1947 to the early 1990s, the economy made consider- 
able progress in the transformation from a wood-burning base 



184 



The Pak-Arab Fertilizer Factory in Multan 
Courtesy Embassy of Pakistan, Washington 

to modern energy sources. The process remains incomplete. 
Bagasse (the woody residue left over from crushed sugarcane), 
dung, and firewood furnished about 32 percent of all energy in 
FY 1988. Some localities had been denuded of firewood, forc- 
ing the local population to use commercial energy sources, 
such as kerosene or charcoal. Domestic sources of commercial 
energy accounted for 77 percent of all commercial energy in 
FY 1990. The major domestic energy resources are natural gas, 
oil, and hydroelectric power. The remainder of energy require- 
ments are met by imports of oil and oil products. 

Crude oil production increased sharply in the 1980s, from 
almost 4.0 million barrels in FY 1982 to 22.4 million barrels in 
FY 1992. This increase was the result of the discovery and devel- 
opment of new oil fields. Despite this expanded production, 
however, about 28 million barrels of crude oil were imported 
annually in the early 1990s. The production from domestic oil 



185 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

refineries also rose in the 1980s, reaching 42 million barrels 
annually in the early 1990s. However, oil products imports 
accounted for about 30 percent of the value of all oil imports. 

Pakistan vigorously pursued oil exploration in the 1980s and 
early 1990s and made a number of new discoveries. In the early 
1990s, the most productive oil field was at Dhurnal in Punjab, 
accounting for 21 percent of total output in FY 1993. The 
Badin area in southern Sindh was the site of a number of dis- 
coveries in the 1980s, and its proportion of total output has 
continued to increase over the years. In the early 1990s, more 
favorable terms on pricing and repatriation of profits stimu- 
lated the interest of foreign oil companies. About twenty for- 
eign companies are engaged in oil exploration, but poor 
security for workers and property in remote areas of 
Balochistan and Sindh remains a significant constraint on for- 
eign investment. 

The large Sui natural gas field in Balochistan was discovered 
after independence. Production at Sui began in 1955 and 
peaked in 1985. In the early 1990s, it remained the nation's 
most productive gas field, accounting for 46 percent of produc- 
tion in FY 1993. The second largest gas field, also located in 
Balochistan at Mari, accounted for 20 percent of all produc- 
tion. Twenty-five gas fields were operational in FY 1993. Natural 
gas recoverable reserves were estimated at 662.0 billion cubic 
meters, with an extraction rate in the early 1990s of around 
14.0 billion cubic meters, up from 9.3 billion cubic meters in 
FY 1982 and 1.3 billion cubic meters in FY 1970. 

Natural gas pipelines, in which the government owns con- 
trolling shares, link the Sui gas field and a few others to the 
main population centers and the major crude oil production 
areas. The southern pipeline leads from Sui to Hyderabad and 
Karachi, and a spur supplies Quetta. The northern pipeline 
branches at Faisalabad. One branch goes a little farther north 
of Lahore; the other branch is connected to the crude oil fields 
and supplies gas to Islamabad and Peshawar. There are plans 
for a new gas pipeline through which Iran would export natu- 
ral gas to Pakistan. 

Coal reserves were boosted substantially in May 1992 when a 
large coal field was discovered in the Thar Desert in Sindh. In 
early 1993, these reserves were estimated at 17 billion tons. 
However, much of Pakistan's coal has a low calorific value and a 
high ash and sulfur content, which limits its value. Output was 
1.3 million tons in FY 1992, down from 1.8 million tons in FY 



186 



The Economy 



1982. The bulk of production is from small, privately owned 
mines whose owners generally lack funds, expertise, and inter- 
est in expanding output. A public-sector firm, the Pakistan 
Mineral Development Corporation, accounted for about one- 
fifth of output in the early 1990s. The corporation has six oper- 
ational mines — at Degari, Sor Range, and Sharigh in 
Balochistan; Lakhra and Meting in Sindh; and the Makerwal/ 
Gullakhel complex straddling the border between Punjab and 
the North-West Frontier Province. 

Hydroelectric power is an important domestic primary 
energy resource, and hydroelectric potential is estimated at 
around 10,000 megawatts. A large number of additional sites 
with major potential exist in the mountainous north, but the 
difficulty of access and the high cost of transmission to the pop- 
ulous south make development a distant prospect. A large pro- 
portion of hydrogenerators are located at two large 
multipurpose dams. The Tarbela Dam located on the Indus 
River in the North-West Frontier Province has an installed 
capacity of 2,164 megawatts, and the Mangla Dam situated on 
the Jhelum River in Azad Kashmir has an installed capacity of 
800 megawatts. 

In 1965 Pakistani officials contracted with the Canadian gov- 
ernment for the supply of a 125-megawatt pressurized, 
heavy-water nuclear reactor, which in 1972 became operational 
near Karachi. This was Pakistan's only nuclear power plant in 
1994, and its operating record is poor. In 1983 plans for a 
nuclear plant at Chashma, on the Indus River in Punjab, about 
240 kilometers south of Islamabad, were announced. The con- 
struction of this plant was delayed, in part because of the reluc- 
tance of foreign governments to supply needed fuel and 
technology because of concern over possible military use of the 
atomic energy program. In 1993 Pakistani officials expected 
the plant to open in 1997 with a capacity of 300 megawatts. 
China is providing the necessary technology and materials for 
the Chashma plant. Pakistani officials expect that fuel for the 
plant will be provided by the uranium enrichment plant at 
Kahuta near Islamabad. Some observers, however, believe it is 
unlikely that the plant will be ready in 1997. 

In FY 1992, the country had a total installed generating 
capacity of 9,293 megawatts, of which approximately 62.7 per- 
cent was thermal, 35.9 percent hydroelectric, and 1.5 percent 
nuclear. In FY 1991, industry consumed 34.2 percent of elec- 
tricity, households 31.7 percent, agriculture 21.4 percent, com- 



187 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

mercial businesses 4.3 percent, and other users 8.3 percent. A 
rural electrification program increased the number of villages 
having electricity from around 14,000 in FY 1983 to nearly 
41,000 in FY 1992, leaving only about 5,000 villages without 
electricity. Beginning in the 1980s, considerable improvements 
were made in transmission facilities. By 1983 a grid connected 
generators and urban centers of the more populous areas, 
largely in Punjab and Sindh. Installations of high-voltage trans- 
mission lines and other facilities helped reduce power losses. 
Nonetheless, in 1993 the World Bank estimated that 28 percent 
of electricity generated in Pakistan was diverted illegally in 
transmission and distribution, and even the government puts 
this figure at 12 percent. 

In 1993 the government planned a rapid increase of gener- 
ating capacity, in part through the expansion of existing hydro- 
electric and thermal units and in part through the 
construction of new plants. Nonetheless, observers expected 
shortages of electricity to continue in the early 1990s and prob- 
ably longer. In much of 1993, both urban and rural areas expe- 
rienced three power cuts a day, lasting a total of around two 
hours. Industrial and commercial users are required to reduce 
consumption by an even greater amount, and they risk being 
disconnected if they violate "agreed-on levels." Peak demand 
for electricity is estimated to exceed the supply by around 30 
percent. 

In 1991 the power sector was opened to private capital, both 
foreign and domestic. In that year, a World Bank consortium 
that included investors from Britain, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United States agreed to finance a project for a new US$1.3 bil- 
lion, 1,292-megawatt oil-fired power station at Hub Chowki in 
Balochistan, forty-eight kilometers west of Karachi. Construc- 
tion began in September 1992, and the station is scheduled to 
go into operation in 1996. The consortium is responsible for 
the construction and operation of the power station, while its 
output is sold to the national grid. In 1992 the government 
announced plans to privatize the Water and Power Develop- 
ment Authority's thermal plants and area electricity boards, but 
in 1994 legal and political obstacles prevented implementation 
of this policy. 

Some development of renewable energy sources has been 
undertaken, primarily for rural areas so isolated they would not 
otherwise have electricity in the foreseeable future. The aim is 
to upgrade village life while lowering urban migration, reduc- 



188 



The Economy 



ing reliance on firewood, and providing power to pump water 
for irrigation where possible. For example, a small family- 
owned biogas plant uses human and animal waste (from three 
or four water buffalo, for example) to produce around 2.8 to 
4.2 cubic meters of gas a day for heating and lighting. Larger 
biogas plants serve a number of homes or a village. Construc- 
tion costs are too high for most villagers unless the government 
underwrites installation. 

Mining and Quarrying 

Through the 1980s, development of mining was discouraged 
by the absence of venture capital and the limited demand for 
many minerals from domestic industries. The slow develop- 
ment of mining was due in part to the remoteness of the areas 
where most minerals are found, which adds greatly to the costs 
of exploration, production, and transportation. Moreover, 
some of these areas have a poor reputation for law and order. 
By the early 1990s, mining was of little importance to the econ- 
omy, despite the presence of fairly extensive mineral resources. 
Foreign companies have been invited to bid for concessions for 
mineral extraction. 

Minerals include antimony, bauxite, chromite, copper, gyp- 
sum, iron ore, limestone, magnesite, marble, molybdenum, 
rock salt, and sulfur. Much of the mineral wealth is found in 
Balochistan. In FY 1992, mineral production included 8.5 mil- 
lion tons of limestone, 833,000 tons of rock salt, 471,000 tons of 
gypsum, and 6,333 tons of magnesite. Some iron-ore deposits 
are of good enough quality for use in the country's steel plant, 
but in FY 1992 production was only 937,000 tons. 

The Saindak Integrated Mineral Project, managed by the 
state-owned Resource Development Corporation, was devel- 
oped in the 1980s and early 1990s, but in 1993 there were as yet 
few results. Located in Balochistan, the project area contains 
three separate large deposits of copper ore, gold, iron ore, 
molybdenum, silver, and sulfur. 

Services 
Transportation 

The domestic transportation system was not well developed 
at independence. Railroads were the main means of transpor- 
tation, but the network in West Pakistan had been constructed 
under the assumption that the area formed part of a larger sub- 



189 



Pakistan: A Country Study 




Figure 8. Transportation System: Roads, 1 994 

continental economic and political entity and was not suited to 
the needs of the new nation. Considerable development was 
necessary to improve links between Karachi, Pakistan's first 
capital and the country's principal port and commercial cen- 
ter, and Punjab, where Islamabad was established as the new 
administrative capital in 1962. 

In the 1970s and 1980s, road and air networks grew consid- 
erably faster than the railroads. Between FY 1978 and FY 1992, 



190 



The Economy 



^_ 7 

'^UZBEKISTAN 



TURKMENISTAN 



TAJIKISTAN 



IRAN 



AFGHANISTAN 



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/ 

• M 
hr 



CHINA 



Indian 
\ claim 



j* * * * - . . ' as? \ 

Cease-*** . / 



Chinese 



C Martian 
Peshawar • i 

• _ - 'i ... , ,. control 
*> Kohat t \ Rawalpindi 




^Bannu[ 

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,<^>.y Dora * /"* n ^» S 

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Zhob f Khan Faisalabad y s *j 

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Multan ■ C' 




Figure 9. Transportation System: Railroads, Airports, and Ports, 1994 



the volume of freight and the number of passengers carried by 
rail increased only slightly, whereas road-borne freight and the 
number of air passengers more than doubled. In 1994 trans- 
portation policy was aimed at shifting more of the traffic back 
to the rail system, with a long-term goal of a rail-to-road freight 
traffic ratio of 33:67 by 2000. However, it appears unlikely that 
this target will be met. 

In June 1992, the road system covered 179,752 kilometers, of 



191 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

which asphalt roads made up 51.2 percent (see fig. 8). The 
number of motor vehicles more than doubled during the 
1980s. Their number was estimated at nearly 2 million in 1992, 
including 932,000 motorcycles, 454,000 automobiles, 220,000 
tractors, 157,000 trucks and vans, and 37,000 buses. In March 
1992, the government approved a five-year Rs73 billion pro- 
gram of road construction and rehabilitation. This plan 
included building a four-lane 339-kilometer highway between 
Lahore and Islamabad, scheduled for completion in mid-1995. 
Road transport is mostly in the private sector, but some passen- 
ger and freight services are provided by public-sector corpora- 
tions. 

The railroad system is government owned and covers 8,775 
kilometers (see fig. 9). In FY 1992 there were 753 locomotives 
and 34,851 freight wagons. The system usually runs at a loss. In 
mid-1992, the most profitable route, that between Lahore and 
Faisalabad, was privatized. It is expected that the government 
will attempt to privatize other rail routes, but the Lahore-Faisal- 
abad line was renationalized in September 1993 when the pri- 
vate operator failed to make a profit. 

Shipping capacity decreased in the 1980s. The merchant 
fleet, almost all operated by the Pakistan National Shipping 
Corporation (PNSC), consisted in 1992 of twenty-two vessels, 
down from fifty vessels in 1982. Approximately half the fleet is 
more than fifteen years old and is unsuited to present needs. 
The PNSC handled 2.74 million tons of cargo in the last six 
months of 1991, compared with 2.77 million tons during the 
corresponding period in 1990. In 1992, in line with its privati- 
zation policy, the government invited applications for setting 
up a private shipping sector and promised to operate the PNSC 
on a commercial basis. 

There are two international ports — Karachi and Port 
Muhammad bin Qasim. In the early 1990s, Karachi handled 
the bulk of the maritime traffic. During the nine months end- 
ing in March 1992, Karachi handled 14.7 million tons of cargo, 
of which 11.0 million tons were imports and 3.7 million tons 
exports. This was 4.2 percent more cargo than was handled 
during the corresponding period of 1990-91. Port Qasim, 
which is fifty-three kilometers south of Karachi, handled 5.8 
million tons of cargo in the first nine months of FY 1992. 

In early 1994, the major airline was Pakistan International 
Airlines (PIA), controlled by the government. PIA had a fleet 
of forty-seven aircraft in March 1993, of which fifteen were 



192 




Motorized rickshaw stand on Circular Road, Lahore 

Courtesy Anita M. Weiss 
Truck in the North-West Frontier Province 
Courtesy Harvey Follender 



193 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

wide-bodied Boeing 747s and A300-B4s. The PIA network 
includes forty-five international and thirty-five domestic air- 
ports. There are international airports at Karachi, Islamabad, 
Lahore, Peshawar, and Quetta. Several small private airlines 
began operating domestic routes in 1993. One of these carri- 
ers, Shaheen Air International, also operates international 
cargo routes and plans to provide international passenger ser- 
vice in 1994 or 1995. 

Telecommunications 

In the 1980s, considerable effort was made to upgrade the 
telecommunications system. The Sixth Five-Year Plan, for 
instance, called for a public-sector investment of RslO.l billion 
to improve and expand the telephone and telex systems. In the 
mid-1990s, all overseas telecommunications used the Intelsat- 
VI satellite of the International Telecommunications Satellite 
Organization. There were also plans to launch a Pakistani satel- 
lite based on very small aperture earth stations, which would 
provide nationwide coverage for domestic telecommunica- 
tions. The number of telephone connections increased from 
461,000 in June 1984 to 1.6 million in March 1993, when the 
government announced that the Pakistan Telecommunications 
Corporation would be privatized. A new entity, the National 
Telecommunications Network, was planned to assume respon- 
sibility for the government's own network. 

Radio and television are dominated by government corpora- 
tions. The Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation (PBC) has a 
monopoly on radio broadcasting. In March 1992, there were 
705,000 licensed radios, but the actual number of radios in use 
was estimated at 10 million. The PBC operates twenty-four 
medium-wave and three short-wave transmitters for its domes- 
tic programs and two medium-wave and eight short-wave trans- 
mitters for its external service. There are six networks for 
domestic service — one national network and regional networks 
for Balochistan, the Islamabad Capital Territory, the North- 
West Frontier Province, the Northern Areas, Punjab, and 
Sindh. The external service broadcasts in fifteen languages — 
Arabic, Burmese, Bengali, Dari, English, Farsi, French, Guja- 
rati, Hindi, Indonesian, Swahili, Tamil, Turkmen, Turkish, and 
Urdu. An important target audience is Pakistanis working in 
the Middle East. Azad Kashmir Radio, a separate government- 
run organization, broadcasts in Azad Kashmir. 



194 



The Economy 



In early 1994, the government-controlled Pakistan Television 
Corporation (PTV) carried programs produced in five cen- 
ters — Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, and Quetta. Pro- 
gramming comes under the purview of the Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting, and goals include providing 
wholesome entertainment, promoting national solidarity, and 
projecting an Islamic way of life. In November 1992, PTV 
began broadcasting on a second channel made possible by Jap- 
anese financing and technology. This channel is intended 
mainly for educational purposes. A commercial station was also 
established in the early 1990s and competes with PTV. In 1993 
it was estimated that there were over 2 million television sets, 
and the number is expected to climb steeply in the 1990s. The 
main PTV channel is capable of reaching 87 percent of the 
population, while the second channel is accessible to 56 per- 
cent of the population. 

Tourism 

As of early 1994, foreign tourism remained relatively unde- 
veloped. Annual tourist arrivals averaged 442,136 for the 
period 1985-89 but fell to 284,779 in 1990 because of uncer- 
tainties generated by the Persian Gulf War. The number of 
tourist arrivals rose to 415,529 in 1991. Many of the arrivals are 
visitors of Pakistani origin who have settled in Europe and 
North America. Pakistan has considerable tourist potential, but 
the generally poor law and order situation in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s discouraged rapid growth. Hotels meeting interna- 
tional standards are concentrated in the larger cities, especially 
Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, and Rawalpindi. 

In early 1994, the immediate future of the economy 
appeared uncertain. Although the economy is responding well 
to the government's liberalization program, and many sectors 
appear poised to achieve healthy rates of growth, economic 
prospects are constrained by the government's large budget 
deficits, the continued absorption of public expenditures by 
defense and interest payments, and the perception of wide- 
spread corruption. Pakistan remains heavily dependent on for- 
eign aid donors. The failure to address more adequately the 
nation's low levels of education and health is also likely to act as 
a constraint on economic growth in the remainder of the 
1990s. 

* * * 



195 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



Two publications from the Economist Intelligence Unit, the 
annual Country Profile: Pakistan, Afghanistan and the quarterly 
Country Report: Pakistan, Afghanistan, provide up-to-date infor- 
mation on the economy. More detailed analysis is found in two 
annual publications of Pakistan's Ministry of Finance, the Eco- 
nomic Survey and the Economic Survey: Statistical Supplement. Two 
monthly periodicals, the National Bank of Pakistan Monthly Eco- 
nomic Letter and the Economic Outlook are also useful. Shahid 
Javed Burki deserves special mention as one of the most astute 
writers on the Pakistani economy, especially as it relates to the 
nation's historical and social legacy. His Pakistan: A Nation in the 
Making and Pakistan: The Continuing Search for Nationhood 
include important essays pertinent to the economy, as does 
Pakistan under the Military, coauthored by Craig Baxter. Other 
recent general accounts of the economy include Nadeem 
Qasir's Pakistan Studies, B.M. Bhatia's Pakistan' s Economic Devel- 
opment, 1948-88, and Anita M. Weiss's Culture, Class, and Devel- 
opment in Pakistan. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



196 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 




Artist's rendition of tile mosaic of man withjezzil (musket) from the Pictured 
Wall, Lahore Fort, Punjab. Artwork represents seventeenth-century tile work 
art of the Mughal period. 



NATION BUILDING REMAINS a difficult process in Pakistan. 
But although the country has undergone a succession of trau- 
matic sociopolitical experiences since achieving independence 
in 1947, it continues to demonstrate its resilience and its capac- 
ity to survive and adapt to changing circumstances. Joining the 
community of nations as a bifurcated state, with its two wings 
separated by 1,600 kilometers of foreign soil, Pakistan was 
faced with the immediate task of absorbing large numbers of 
refugees from India in the months immediately following parti- 
tion. The new nation struggled with severe economic disadvan- 
tages made acutely painful by a shortage of both administrative 
personnel and the material assets necessary to establish and 
sustain its fledgling government. With the death of Moham- 
mad Ali Jinnah — the revered Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader) — 
only thirteen months after independence, the nation was dealt 
another severe blow. 

Created to provide a homeland for the Muslims of the 
Indian subcontinent, Pakistan was heir to a government struc- 
ture and a political tradition that were essentially Western and 
secular. From its inception, Pakistan has worked to synthesize 
Islamic principles with the needs of a modern state. The young 
nation was immediately challenged by a host of other factors 
affecting national development, including ethnic and provin- 
cial tensions, political rivalries, and security considerations. 
The country subsequently survived civil war and the resultant 
loss of its East Wing, or East Pakistan, which became the inde- 
pendent nation of Bangladesh in December 1971, and has 
accommodated an influx of refugees resulting from the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan (December 1979-February 1989), 
which over the course of the conflict exceeded 3.2 million peo- 
ple. 

Pakistan has had difficulty in establishing stable, effective 
political institutions. The country has experimented with a 
variety of political systems, has endured periods of martial law, 
and has had five constitutions, one inherited from the British 
and four indigenous ones since independence. Its political par- 
ties have suffered from regionalism, factionalism, and lack of 
vision. Power has shifted between the politicians and the civil- 
military establishment, and regional and ethnic forces have 
threatened national unity. However, the impulse toward cohe- 



199 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

sion has been stronger than the impetus toward division, and 
the process of nation building has continued. The return to 
democracy in 1988, and the peaceful, constitutional transfer of 
power to new governments in 1990 and 1993 testify to Paki- 
stan's progress in the quest for political stability. 

Constitutional and Political Inheritance 
Independence 

Pakistan, in its comparatively short history, has tried various 
forms of parliamentary, military, and presidential governments 
in its efforts to achieve political stability. At independence Paki- 
stan was governed by the Government of India Act of 1935 as 
amended by the authority of the India Independence Act of 
1947. The amended act provided at the center for a governor 
general (as successor to the British viceroy) as head of state and 
for a Constituent Assembly with two separate functions — to 
prepare a constitution and to be a federal legislature until the 
constitution came into effect. 

At the outset, however, this structure of governor general 
and parliamentary legislature took on singular characteristics 
tailored to the personality, prestige, and unique position occu- 
pied by Jinnah, Pakistan's first governor general (see table 13, 
Appendix). At independence, he was the supreme authority, 
the founder of the state, and the chief political leader. As head 
of the All-India Muslim League, in 1940 he mobilized the polit- 
ical effort that in just seven years won Pakistan's independence. 
His ultimate authority came not from military power, not from 
the support of the bureaucracy, and not from constitutional 
prerogatives but from the political support of the people. In 
these circumstances, Jinnah chose to unite in himself the func- 
tions of head of state and the power of chief executive and 
party boss. In addition to his position as governor general, he 
was elected president of the Constituent Assembly. 

For the office of governor general to be held by an active 
party politician who continued as political leader was an inno- 
vation. Initially, the arrangement may have seemed necessary 
to preserve national unity after independence and to facilitate 
the work of the new government. When Jinnah died, the prime 
minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, and the cabinet assumed increased 
power, in more traditional roles, and Khwaja Nazimuddin, as 
the new governor general, became a more traditional, nonpo- 
litical head of state. Liaquat, however, found it difficult to 



200 



Government and Politics 



establish his political authority. Whether the transfer of effec- 
tive power to Liaquat while Jinnah was still alive might have cre- 
ated a precedent for future political stability in Pakistan is a 
moot point. Liaquat's assassination, three years later in Octo- 
ber 1951, was the catalyst for a series of constitutional and polit- 
ical crises that over the years seemed almost endemic. 

Role of Islam 

Pakistan has provided a unique setting for experiments in 
synthesizing Islamic principles with the needs of a modern 
state. Although Pakistan's independence movement was articu- 
lated in Western terminology and centered on the right of 
national self-determination, it was also rooted in the Islamic 
concept of society and of what constitutes legitimate political 
authority for a Muslim. The basis of the ideal Muslim polity is 
the sharia (see Glossary), the sacred law of Islam as embodied 
in the Quran. Efforts to apply Quranic law in a modern politi- 
cal context have had a direct impact on Pakistan's political his- 
tory and have also complicated the nation's constitutional 
evolution (see Politicized Islam, ch. 2). 

Regional and Ethnic Factors 

Government and politics bear the imprint of Pakistan's 
diversity. Despite the loss of the country's East Wing in 1971, 
the body politic remains a varied and volatile mix of ethnic, lin- 
guistic, and regional groups, and provincialism and ethnic 
rivalries continue to impede the progress of national integra- 
tion. Although Islam is a unifying force, and the majority of 
Pakistanis are Sunni (see Glossary) Muslims, there is consider- 
able cultural diversity within and among the country's four 
provinces, and coreligionists' identification as Sindhis, Pun- 
jabis, Baloch, or Pakhtuns (see Glossary) is strong. 

Added to the indigenous human mosaic are the more than 7 
million muhajirs (refugees or immigrants from India and their 
descendants) from various parts of India. Economic and politi- 
cal rivalries persist between the muhajirs and the indigenous 
populations of the provinces of Pakistan. These contests often 
turn violent and have contributed significantly to national 
unrest and instability (see Subversion and Civil Unrest, ch. 5). 
Ethnic riots have cost hundreds of lives and destroyed millions 
of dollars worth of property. A further challenge to national 
stability results from the approximately 1.4 million Afghan ref- 
ugees who in early 1994 still had not returned to their country. 



201 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



Linguistic diversity is also a divisive force. Some twenty lan- 
guages are spoken, and although Urdu is the official language, 
it is not the native tongue of the majority of the population. 
Islam provides a tenuous unity in relation to such diversity. 
Efforts to build national consensus in the face of these obsta- 
cles remains central to effective government in Pakistan. 

The Civil Service 

The bureaucracy, particularly the higher civil service, has 
been a continuing source of stability and leadership and a 
counterweight to political upheaval and government instabil- 
ity. This cadre originated in the prepartition Indian Civil Ser- 
vice, whose members were well educated, well trained, and 
dedicated to a tradition of efficiency and responsibility. In 
time, the British recruited indigenous people, who were 
among India's best and brightest, into the Indian Civil Service 
ranks. 

At partition, out of more than 1,100 Indian Civil Service 
officers, scarcely 100 were Muslims, and eighty-three of them 
opted to go to Pakistan. Because none of them held a senior 
rank equivalent to that of a secretary (and administrators were 
urgently needed to staff senior posts in the new state), this ini- 
tial group was augmented by quick promotions in the Civil Ser- 
vice of Pakistan (CSP) through ad hoc appointments from 
other services and through retention, for a time, of some Brit- 
ish officers. The CSP prided itself on being the backbone of 
the nation, the "steel frame" as it was sometimes called, and 
played a key role in Pakistan's survival in the difficult years fol- 
lowing independence. Although Jinnah commended its contri- 
bution, he also warned CSP cadres to stay out of politics and to 
discharge their duties as public servants. After Jinnah's death, 
however, in the subsequent absence of strong political leader- 
ship, members of the CSP assumed an extraordinary role in 
the country's policy-making process. When the CSP was dis- 
banded in 1973 and the various services were amalgamated 
into one administrative system, the expertise of its former 
members was much valued, and they continued to hold critical 
positions in the country's administrative apparatus through 
subsequent transitions in government. It is not surprising, 
then, that a later president of Pakistan, Ghulam Ishaq Khan 
(1988-93) was once a member of the CSP. 



202 



Government and Politics 



The Military 

Another significant aspect of Pakistan's political legacy is its 
military forces and, in particular, the role of the largest of these 
forces, the army (see Role and Structure of the Security Forces, 
ch. 5). The military remains one of the country's most cohesive 
national institutions. Since independence it has oscillated 
between indirect and direct political control, remaining a 
major power. The military's sense of mission in defending and 
preserving the Islamic state of Pakistan has always been strong. 
For Muslim members of the British Indian Army, the transfer 
of loyalties from the colonial to the ideological state was not 
difficult. Successors to the historical legacy of the Muslim 
armies of the once powerful Mughal Empire, Muslim soldiers 
could relate to a new role of protecting the faith and the state 
embodied in Pakistan. The military also provided alternative 
political leadership in times of crisis. Military regimes in Paki- 
stan have legitimized their actions by the doctrine of necessity, 
stepping in temporarily when political crises have reached a 
deadlock and threatened the state (see Constitutional Basis 
and Missions, ch. 5). 

Early Political Development 

Early Constitution Building, 1947-58 

The path to the current constitution and government was 
often tortuous and accompanied by successive upheavals in the 
nation's political life. The years between 1947 and 1958 were 
marked by political chaos moderated by the administrative 
power and acumen of the CSP. They were also years in which 
the armed forces, especially the army, expanded its mission 
and assumed political influence alongside the CSP. Initially, the 
country was governed by a Constituent Assembly (see Indepen- 
dent Pakistan, ch. 1). The Constituent Assembly had dual func- 
tions: to draft a constitution and to enact legislation until the 
constitution came into effect. It was nine years before Pakistan 
adopted its first constitution in 1956. Conflicts in the Constitu- 
ent Assembly included the issues of representation to be given 
to major regional groups (particularly the East Wing) and reli- 
gious controversy over what an Islamic state should be. 

The first major step in framing a constitution was the pas- 
sage by the Constituent Assembly of the Objectives Resolution 
of March 1949, which defined the basic principles of the new 



203 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

state. It provided that Pakistan would be a state "wherein the 
principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and 
social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed; 
wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the 
individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teach- 
ings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran 
and Sunna; [and] wherein adequate provision shall be made 
for the minorities freely to progress and practice their religions 
and develop their cultures." Seven years of debate, however, 
failed to produce agreement on fundamental issues such as 
regional representation or the structure of a constitution. This 
impasse prompted Governor General Ghulam Mohammad to 
dismiss the Constituent Assembly in 1954. The Supreme Court 
of Pakistan upheld the action of the governor general, arguing 
that he had the power to disband the Constituent Assembly 
and veto legislation it passed. This preeminence of the gover- 
nor general over the legislature has been referred to as the 
viceregal tradition in Pakistan's politics. 

The revived Constituent Assembly promulgated Pakistan's 
first indigenous constitution in 1956 and reconstituted itself as 
the national legislature — the Legislative Assembly — under the 
constitution it adopted. Pakistan became an Islamic republic. 
The governor general was replaced by a president, but despite 
efforts to create regional parity between the East Wing and the 
West Wing, the regional tensions remained. Continuing 
regional rivalry, ethnic dissension, religious debate, and the 
weakening power of the Muslim League — the national party 
that spearheaded the country's founding — exacerbated politi- 
cal instability and eventually led President Iskander Mirza to 
disband the Legislative Assembly on October 7, 1958, and 
declare martial law. General Mohammad Ayub Khan, Pakistan's 
first indigenous army commander in chief, assisted Mirza in 
abrogating the constitution of 1956 and removing the politi- 
cians he believed were bringing Pakistan to the point of col- 
lapse. Ayub Khan, as Mirza's chief martial law administrator, 
then staged another coup also in October 1958, forced Mirza 
out of power, and assumed the presidency, to the relief of large 
segments of the population tired of the politicians' continued 
machinations. 

Ayub Khan, 1958-69 

Although Ayub Khan viewed himself as a reformer, he was 
predisposed to the benevolent authoritarianism of the Mughal 



204 



Field Marshal Mohammad 
Ayub Khan 
Courtesy Embassy of 
Pakistan, Washington 



General Agha Mohammad 
Yahya Khan 
Courtesy Embassy of 
Pakistan, Washington 



and viceregal traditions. He also relied heavily on the country's 
civilian bureaucrats, who formed the majority of his advisers 
and cabinet ministers. Ayub Khan initiated a plan for Basic 
Democracies, a measure to create a system of local government 
from the grass roots (see Basic Democracies, ch. 1). The Basic 
Democracies system consisted of a mulitiered pyramidal hierar- 
chy of interlocking tiers of legislative councils from the village 
to the provincial level. The lowest but most important tier was 
composed of union councils, one each for groups of villages 
having an approximate population of 10,000. The members of 
these union councils were called Basic Democrats. The union 
councils were responsible for local government, including agri- 
cultural and community development, maintaining law and 
order through rural police, and trying minor cases in concilia- 
tion courts. 

In 1960 the Basic Democrats were asked to endorse Ayub 
Khan's presidency and to give him a mandate to frame a new 



205 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

constitution. Ayub's constitution, promulgated in 1962, ended 
martial law, established a presidential form of government with 
a weak legislature (now called the National Assembly), and 
gave the president augmented executive, legislative, and finan- 
cial powers. Adult franchise was limited to the election of Basic 
Democrats, who constituted an electoral college for the presi- 
dent and members of the national and provincial assemblies. 
This constitution was abrogated in 1969 when Ayub, who by 
then had lost the people's confidence, resigned, handing over 
the responsibility for governing to the army commander in 
chief, General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan (see The Ayub 
Khan Era, ch. 1). Yahya Khan assumed the title of president 
and also became chief martial law administrator. 

Yahya Khan, 1969-71 

Although Yahya Khan established a semi-military state, he 
also introduced changes that led to the return of parliamen- 
tary democracy. These changes ultimately resulted in the divi- 
sion of the country in two. Yahya held national elections in 
December 1970 for the purpose of choosing members of the 
new National Assembly who were to be elected directly by the 
people. However, the results of these elections, which brought 
the politicians once more to the fore, led to the secession of 
East Pakistan and the creation of an independent Bangladesh 
in 1971. 

Yahya accepted the demand of East Pakistan for representa- 
tion in the new assembly on the basis of population. As a result, 
Bengali leader Sheikh Mujibur ("Mujib") Rahman's Awami 
League won all but two of the 162 seats allotted East Pakistan 
out of the 300 directly elected seats in the assembly (thirteen 
indirectly elected seats for women were added), and Mujib 
wanted considerable regional autonomy for East Pakistan. 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and his Pakistan People's Party (PPP) 
emerged as the political victors in West Pakistan in the 1970 
elections. Bhutto's intransigence — he refused to participate in 
the discussions to frame the new constitution — led to the con- 
tinuation of martial law and the eventual political and military 
confrontation between East Pakistan and West Pakistan, which 
precipitated civil war and the country's dismemberment in 
December 1971. With Pakistan's military in disarray, Yahya 
resigned, and Bhutto was appointed president and civilian 
chief martial law administrator of a truncated Pakistan. 



206 



Government and Politics 



Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 1971-77 

Bhutto lifted martial law within several months, and after an 
"interim constitution" granting him broad powers as president, 
a new constitution was promulgated in April 1973 and came 
into effect on August 14 of that year, the twenty-sixth anniver- 
sary of the country's independence. This constitution repre- 
sented a consensus on three issues: the role of Islam; the 
sharing of power between the federal government and the 
provinces; and the division of responsibility between the presi- 
dent and the prime minister, with a greatly strengthened posi- 
tion for the latter. Bhutto stepped down as president and 
became prime minister. In order to allay fears of the smaller 
provinces concerning domination by'Punjab, the constitution 
established a bicameral legislature with a Senate, providing 
equal provincial representation, and a National Assembly, allo- 
cating seats according to population. Islam was declared the 
state religion of Pakistan. 

Bhutto had the opportunity to resolve many of Pakistan's 
political problems. But although the country finally seemed to 
be on a democratic course, Bhutto lost this opportunity 
because of a series of repressive actions against the political 
opposition that made it appear he was working to establish a 
one-party state. In a final step, he suddenly called national elec- 
tions in March 1977, hoping to catch the opposition unpre- 
pared and give his party total control of the National Assembly. 
When Bhutto's party overwhelmingly won the election, the 
opposition charged voting irregularities and launched mass 
disturbances requiring action by the army to restore law and 
order. Bhutto was ousted by the military, which again took con- 
trol. This action resulted not solely from sheer political ambi- 
tion but from the military's belief that the law and order 
situation had dangerously deteriorated. 

Zia ul-Haq, 1977-88 

General Zia ul-Haq, chief of the army staff, became chief 
martial law administrator in July 1977 and president in Septem- 
ber 1978. He suspended the constitution, with the army's stated 
objective being to create an environment in which fair elec- 
tions could be held. However, Bhutto, his primary opponent, 
was tried and sentenced to death in 1978 on the charge of con- 
spiring to murder a political opponent. The Supreme Court 
upheld the sentence, and Bhutto was hanged in April 1979. Zia 



207 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

cancelled the elections that had been promised and kept the 
country under martial law until 1985. During this time, Zia 
pressed the policy that Pakistan's survival and progress were 
dependent on building an Islamic state. A number of measures 
were taken to implement this policy, including the introduc- 
tion of the Federal Shariat Court. A referendum held in 1984 
confirmed Zia's policy of Islamization. In this referendum, a 
"yes" vote agreeing with Zia's Islamization policy was also inter- 
preted as a vote for Zia to remain in office as president for 
another five years. According to the results reported by the gov- 
ernment but contested by the opposition, Zia obtained 98 per- 
cent of total votes cast. 

Zia's government also adapted Ayub's Basic Democracies 
structure to institute a new system of local government. Local 
councils were organized into tiers with union councils at the 
base, tehsil (subdistrict) councils above them, and zilla (district) 
councils at the apex. The system also included municipal com- 
mittees and municipal corporations in the larger metropolitan 
centers. Councillors were elected for four-year terms and could 
stand for reelection. The councils were designed to meet a 
need for grass-roots expression. Elections were conducted with- 
out formal political party affiliation or involvement. The coun- 
cils were to concentrate on improving local development, 
including agricultural production, education, health, roads, 
and water supply. 

In 1985 elections were held for both the national and the 
provincial assemblies, an amended version of the 1973 consti- 
tution was reinstated, and martial law was ended. Zia remained 
president, and the amended constitution, including the con- 
troversial Eighth Amendment passed by the National Assembly 
in November 1985, gave predominant political authority to the 
president (see President, this ch.). The president could 
appoint and dismiss the prime minister and the provincial gov- 
ernors and could dissolve both the national and the provincial 
assemblies. A significant feature of the 1973 constitution as 
amended in 1985, insofar as the Islamization process was con- 
cerned, was that the Objectives Resolution, adopted by the first 
Constituent Assembly in 1949 and made a preamble to the 
1956, 1962, and 1973 constitutions, was incorporated as a sub- 
stantive part (Article 2-A) of this restored constitution. The 
Objectives Resolution provided, in part, that Pakistan would be 
a state "wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their 
lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with 



208 



Zulfiqar All Bhutto 
Courtesy Embassy of 
Pakistan, Washington 



General Mohammad 
Zia ul-Haq 
Courtesy Embassy of 
Pakistan, Washington 



the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy 
Quran and the Sunna." 

Political parties were not allowed to participate in the 1985 
elections, and the PPP, led by Benazir Bhutto (Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto's daughter), boycotted them. After the elections, Zia 
picked Mohammad Khan Junejo, a politician from Sindh and a 
minister in one of his earlier cabinets, as his prime minister. 
The Zia-Junejo period lasted three years until Zia dismissed the 
prime minister and dissolved the National Assembly and the 
four provincial assemblies. Zia cited incompetence, corrup- 
tion, and failure to further the Islamization process as reasons 
for his actions. In addition, Zia came to regard Junejo as too 
independent, and the two men clashed on a number of issues 
including differences on policy relating to Afghanistan and 
promotions in the armed services. Zia also announced that 
new elections would be held. 



209 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

Zia's sudden death in an airplane crash in August 1988 near 
Bahawalpur, a town in central Punjab, left Pakistan without a 
president, prime minister, or national or provincial assemblies. 
In a demonstration of the country's resilience, Ghulam Ishaq 
Khan, the chairman of the Senate — which had not been dis- 
solved by Zia — and next in the constitutional line of succession, 
became interim president in December. Elections were held, 
Benazir became prime minister, and Ishaq Khan was subse- 
quently elected president. 

Constitution and Government Structure 

Pakistan's independence was won through a democratic and 
constitutional struggle. Although the country's record with par- 
liamentary democracy has been mixed, Pakistan, after lapses, 
has returned to this form of government. The constitution of 
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan adopted in 1985 provides for a 
federal parliamentary system with a president as head of state 
and a popularly elected prime minister as head of government. 

President 

The president, in keeping with the constitutional provision 
that the state religion is Islam, must be a Muslim. Elected for a 
five-year term by an electoral college consisting of members of 
the Senate and National Assembly and members of the provin- 
cial assemblies, the president is eligible for reelection. No indi- 
vidual may hold the office for more than two consecutive 
terms. The president may resign or be impeached and may be 
removed from office for incapacity or gross misconduct by a 
two-thirds vote of the members of the parliament. The presi- 
dent generally acts on the advice of the prime minister but has 
important residual powers. One of the most important — a leg- 
acy of Zia — is contained in the Eighth Amendment, which gives 
the president the power to dissolve the National Assembly "in 
his discretion where, in his opinion ... a situation has arisen in 
which the Government of the Federation cannot be carried on 
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and an 
appeal to the electorate is necessary." 

Parliament and Federal Government 

The bicameral federal legislature is the Majlis-i-Shoora 
(Council of Advisers), consisting of the Senate (upper house) 
and National Assembly (lower house) (see fig. 10). Members of 



210 



Government and Politics 



the National Assembly are elected by universal adult suffrage 
(over twenty-one years of age in Pakistan). Seats are allocated 
to each of the four provinces, the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas, and Islamabad Capital Territory on the basis of 
population. National Assembly members serve for the parlia- 
mentary term, which is five years, unless they die or resign 
sooner, or unless the National Assembly is dissolved. Although 
the vast majority of the members are Muslim, about 5 percent 
of the seats are reserved for minorities, including Christians, 
Hindus, and Sikhs. Elections for minority seats are held on the 
basis of separate electorates at the same time as the polls for 
Muslim seats during the general elections. 

The prime minister is appointed by the president from 
among the members of the National Assembly. The prime min- 
ister is assisted by the Federal Cabinet, a council of ministers 
whose members are appointed by the president on the advice 
of the prime minister. The Federal Cabinet comprises the min- 
isters, ministers of state, and advisers. As of early 1994, there 
were thirty-three ministerial portfolios: commerce; communi- 
cations; culture; defense; defense production; education; envi- 
ronment; finance and economic affairs; food and agriculture; 
foreign affairs; health; housing; information and broadcasting; 
interior; Kashmiri affairs and Northern Areas; law and justice; 
local government; minority affairs; narcotics control; parlia- 
mentary affairs; petroleum and natural resources production; 
planning and development; railroads; religious affairs; science 
and technology; social welfare; special education; sports; state 
and frontier regions; tourism; water and power; women's devel- 
opment; and youth affairs. 

The Senate is a permanent legislative body with equal repre- 
sentation from each of the four provinces, elected by the mem- 
bers of their respective provincial assemblies. There are 
representatives from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
and from Islamabad Capital Territory. The chairman of the 
Senate, under the constitution, is next in line to act as presi- 
dent should the office become vacant and until such time as a 
new president can be formally elected. Both the Senate and the 
National Assembly can initiate and pass legislation except for 
finance bills. Only the National Assembly can approve the fed- 
eral budget and all finance bills. In the case of other bills, the 
president may prevent passage unless the legislature in joint sit- 
ting overrules the president by a majority of members of both 
houses present and voting. 



211 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



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212 



Government and Politics 



Other offices and bodies having important roles in the fed- 
eral structure include the attorney general, the auditor gen- 
eral, the Federal Land Commission, the Federal Public Service 
Commission, the Central Election Commission, and the Wafaqi 
Mohtasib (Ombudsman). 

Provincial Governments 

Pakistan's four provinces enjoy considerable autonomy. Each 
province has a governor, a Council of Ministers headed by a 
chief minister appointed by the governor, and a provincial 
assembly. Members of the provincial assemblies are elected by 
universal adult suffrage. Provincial assemblies also have 
reserved seats for minorities. Although there is a well-defined 
division of responsibilities between federal and provincial gov- 
ernments, there are some functions on which both can make 
laws and establish departments for their execution. Most of the 
services in areas such as health, education, agriculture, and 
roads, for example, are provided by the provincial govern- 
ments. Although the federal government can also legislate in 
these areas, it only makes national policy and handles interna- 
tional aspects of those services. 

Judiciary 

The judiciary includes the Supreme Court, provincial high 
courts, and other lesser courts exercising civil and criminal 
jurisdiction. The chief justice of the Supreme Court is 
appointed by the president; the other Supreme Court judges 
are appointed by the president after consultation with the chief 
justice. The chief justice and judges of the Supreme Court may 
remain in office until age sixty-five. The Supreme Court has 
original, appellate, and advisory jurisdiction. Judges of the pro- 
vincial high courts are appointed by the president after consul- 
tation with the chief justice of the Supreme Court, as well as 
the governor of the province and the chief justice of the high 
court to which the appointment is being made. High courts 
have original and appellate jurisdiction. 

There is also a Federal Shariat Court consisting of eight Mus- 
lim judges, including a chief justice appointed by the presi- 
dent. Three of the judges are ulama, that is, Islamic Scholars, 
and are well versed in Islamic law. The Federal Shariat Court 
has original and appellate jurisdiction. This court decides 
whether any law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. When 
a law is deemed repugnant to Islam, the president, in the case 



213 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

of a federal law, or the governor, in the case of a provincial law, 
is charged with taking steps to bring the law into conformity 
with the injunctions of Islam. The court also hears appeals 
from decisions of criminal courts under laws relating to the 
enforcement of hudood (see Glossary) laws, that is, laws pertain- 
ing to such offenses as intoxication, theft, and unlawful sexual 
intercourse (see Islamic Provisions, ch. 5). 

In addition, there are special courts and tribunals to deal 
with specific kinds of cases, such as drug courts, commercial 
courts, labor courts, traffic courts, an insurance appellate tribu- 
nal, an income tax appellate tribunal, and special courts for 
bank offenses. There are also special courts to try terrorists 
(see Courts and Criminal Procedure, ch. 5). Appeals from spe- 
cial courts go to high courts except for labor and traffic courts, 
which have their own forums for appeal. Appeals from the tri- 
bunals go to the Supreme Court. 

A further feature of the judicial system is the office of Wafaqi 
Mohtasib (Ombudsman), which is provided for in the constitu- 
tion. The office of Mohtasib was established in many early Mus- 
lim states to ensure that no wrongs were done to citizens. 
Appointed by the president, the Mohtasib holds office for four 
years; the term cannot be extended or renewed. The Mohta- 
sib's purpose is to institutionalize a system for enforcing admin- 
istrative accountability, through investigating and rectifying any 
injustice done to a person through maladministration by a fed- 
eral agency or a federal government official. The Mohtasib is 
empowered to award compensation to those who have suffered 
loss or damage as a result of maladministration. Excluded from 
jurisdiction, however, are personal grievances or service mat- 
ters of a public servant as well as matters relating to foreign 
affairs, national defense, and the armed services. This institu- 
tion is designed to bridge the gap between administrator and 
citizen, to improve administrative processes and procedures, 
and to help curb misuse of discretionary powers. 

Political Dynamics 

Pakistan has had considerable difficulty developing stable, 
cohesive political organizations because they have suffered 
long periods of repression. Further, political parties, with few 
exceptions, have been founded as vehicles for one person or a 
few individuals, or to achieve specifically defined goals. When 
these individuals die or abandon their parties, or after party 
goals have been met, many organizations have lost their raison 



214 



Government and Politics 



d'etre and have lacked the ability to carry on. In addition, polit- 
ical parties have been handicapped by regional and ethnic fac- 
tors that have limited their national appeal and have also been 
torn by personal and class rivalries. 

Muslim League 

The Muslim League was founded in 1906 as the All-India 
Muslim League to protect the interests of Muslims in British 
India and to counter the political growth of the Indian 
National Congress, founded in 1885. Under the leadership of 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the Muslim League adopted the 
Lahore Resolution (often referred to as the "Pakistan Resolu- 
tion") in March 1940 and successfully spearheaded the move- 
ment for the creation of an independent homeland for Indian 
Muslims. At independence the Muslim League was the only 
major party in Pakistan and claimed the allegiance of almost 
every Muslim in the country. However, with the deaths of its 
two principal leaders, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, shortly 
after independence and its central goal of creating Pakistan 
achieved, the party failed to develop a coherent, postindepen- 
dence ideology. The Muslim League gradually came under the 
influence of West Pakistani, and particularly Punjabi, landlords 
and bureaucrats more concerned with increasing their per- 
sonal influence than with building a strong national organiza- 
tion. 

The Muslim League was further weakened by the constitu- 
tional impasse in the 1950s resulting from difficulties in resolv- 
ing questions of regional representation as well as the problem 
of reaching a consensus on Islamic issues. Regional loyalties 
were intensified during the constitutional debates over the 
respective political representation of the country's west and 
east wings. In addition, East Pakistan had a larger Hindu popu- 
lation, and some strong provincial leaders believed their power 
depended on developing broad-based secular institutions. The 
Muslim League, however, pressed for provisions to establish 
Pakistan as an Islamic state. 

Two powerful Bengali leaders and former Muslim League 
members, Hussain Shahid Suhrawardy and Fazlul Haq, used 
their own parties, the Awami League and the Krishak Sramik 
Party (Workers and Peasants), respectively, in a joint effort in 
1954 to defeat the Muslim League in the first election held in 
East Pakistan after partition. Fazlul Haq had made the motion 
to adopt the historic "Pakistan Resolution" in 1940, and 



215 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

Suhrawardy, subsequently the last chief minister of undivided 
Bengal, had seconded it. But both men were alienated by West 
Pakistani domination of the Muslim League. Suhrawardy was 
elected leader of the opposition in the second Constituent 
Assembly and in 1956 was appointed prime minister, a further 
loss for the Muslim League because he was the first non-Mus- 
lim League politician to hold this position. By this time, the 
Muslim League had lost its influence in both East Pakistan and 
West Pakistan, having also lost its majority in the West Pakistan 
Legislative Assembly to the Punjab-centered Republican Party. 
The promulgation of martial law in 1958 and the dissolution of 
all political parties finally resulted in the demise of the Muslim 
League after its fifty-two-year existence. 

General Ayub Khan formed a party called the Pakistan Mus- 
lim League (PML) in 1962, andjunejo established a party with 
the same name (PML-J) in 1986, but these two parties had little 
in common with the 1906-58 Muslim League in terms of their 
objectives and composition. After Junejo died in March 1993, 
Mian Nawaz Sharif took over the party and it became the Paki- 
stan Muslim League (PML-N) for Nawaz Sharif. The death of 
Junejo signified the end to an uneasy coalition that had existed 
between the feudal lobby under Junejo and the representatives 
of the new business and industrialist classes who, under the 
guidance of Nawaz Sharif, were running the Islamic Demo- 
cratic Alliance (Islami Jamhoori Ittehad — IJI) government of 
1990-93. 

Islami Jamhoori Ittehad 

The Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) was formed in September 
1988 to oppose the PPP in elections that year. The alliance 
comprised nine parties, of which the major components were 
the PML and the Islamic Organization (Jamaat-i-Islami — JI). 
The IJI won only fifty-three seats in the National Assembly, 
compared with ninety-two won by the PPP. Most IJI seats were 
won in Punjab. Nawaz Sharif emerged from the 1988 elections 
as the most powerful politician outside the PPP. In December 
1988, he succeeded in forming an IJI administration in Punjab 
and became the province's chief minister. It was from this 
power base that he waged the political battles that eventually 
led to his becoming prime minister in 1990. In the super- 
charged atmosphere of the 1990 elections, the electorate sur- 
prised observers. Neither the IJI nor the PPP was expected to 
come up with a firm mandate to rule. Yet the IJI received a 



216 



Government and Politics 



strong mandate to govern, winning 105 seats versus forty-five 
seats for the Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA) — of which 
the PPP was the main component in the National Assembly. 

In the 1993 national elections, the IJI coalition no longer 
existed to bring together all the anti-PPP forces. The religious 
parties expended most of their energies trying to form a work- 
able electoral alliance rather than bolstering the candidacy of 
Nawaz Sharif, the only person capable of challenging Benazir. 

Jamaat-i-lslami 

The Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), the largest and most articulate of 
Pakistan's religious parties, was founded in 1941 by Maulana 
Abul Ala Maududi as an ideological movement to promote 
Islamic values and practices in British India. It initially opposed 
the Pakistan movement, arguing that Islam was a universal reli- 
gion not subject to national boundaries. It changed its posi- 
tion, however, once the decision was made to partition India 
on the basis of religion. In 1947 Maududi redefined the JI's 
purpose as the establishment of an Islamic state in Pakistan. In 
order to achieve this objective, thejl believed it was necessary 
to purge the community of deviant behavior and to establish a 
political system in which decision making would be undertaken 
by a few pious people well versed in the meaning of Islam. 
Maududi's writings also gained a wide audience. He retired as 
head of the party in 1972. 

In order to rid the community of what it considered to be 
deviant behavior, the JI waged a campaign in 1953 against the 
Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan that resulted in some 2,000 
deaths, brought on martial law rule in Punjab, and led Gover- 
nor General Ghulam Mohammad to dismiss the Federal Cabi- 
net. The anti-Ahmadiyya movement resulted in 1974 in a bill 
successfully piloted through the National Assembly by then 
Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto declaring the Ahmadiyyas a 
non-Muslim minority. 

The JTs views on Islamization and limited political participa- 
tion were opposed by those people who saw the party's plat- 
form as advocating religious dictatorship. The question of 
whether the JI was a political party or an organization working 
to subvert legitimate political processes was raised in the 
courts. The Supreme Court ultimately decided in favor of the 
JI as a lawful political organization. Prominent in political life 
since independence, the JI was the dominant voice for the 
interests of the ulama in the debates leading to the adoption of 



217 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

Pakistan's first constitution. The JI participated in opposition 
politics from 1950 to 1977. 

Under party chief Mian Tufail Muhammad, thejl supported 
the Zia regime's Islamization program, but it clashed with him 
over the 1984 decision to ban student unions because this ban 
affected the party's student wing, the Jamiat-i-Tulaba-i-Islam 
(Islamic Society of Students). The Jamiat-i-Tulaba-i-Islam had 
become increasingly militant and had been involved in clashes 
with other student groups on Pakistani campuses. Aspiring stu- 
dent activists, supportive of religious issues, have flocked to the 
Jamiat-i-Tulaba-i-Islam as a means of having an impact on 
national politics. The Jamiat-i-Tulaba-i-Islam also has been a 
major source of new recruits for the JI; it is thought that one- 
third of JI leaders come from the Jamiat-i-Tulaba-i-Islam. The JI 
envisions a state governed by Islamic law and opposes Western- 
ization — including capitalism, socialism, and such practices as 
bank interest, birth control, and relaxed social mores. 

The JI's influence has been far greater than its showing at 
the polls suggests. In 1986, for example, two JI senators success- 
fully piloted the controversial Shariat Bill through the Senate, 
although it did not become law at that time. In addition, the 
movement of student recruits from the Jamiat-i-Tulaba-i-Islam 
into the JI has created a new bloc of Islamist voters. Through 
the Jamiat-i-Tulaba-i-Islam, the JI is working to leave a perma- 
nent mark on the political orientation of the country's future 
leaders. However, the Pakistani electorate has been resistant to 
making religion a central factor in determining statecraft. In 
1990 the JI was an important component of the IJI but never- 
theless won only four seats. Furthermore, in the 1993 national 
elections, the Islamization factor was even more muted because 
the religious parties — spearheaded by the JI — were not aligned 
with the two main contenders, the PML-N and the PPP. The JI 
and its political umbrella group, the Pakistan Islamic Front, 
captured only three seats in the National Assembly. 

Pakistan People's Party 

The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) represents another part 
of Pakistan's political spectrum. The PPP was a vehicle for the 
political ambitions of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. His immediate aim 
was to bring down the government of his former political men- 
tor, Ayub Khan. The party's inaugural convention was held in 
Lahore in 1967. The PPP adopted the slogan "Islam our Faith, 
Democracy our Polity, Socialism our Economy." The party, like 



218 




Pakistan People's Party 
sign in Karachi 
Courtesy Sheila Ross 



Former prime minister and 
leading politician, Mian 
Nawaz Sharif 
Courtesy Embassy of 
Pakistan, Washington 



219 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

its founder, was enigmatic and full of contradictions. A left- 
leaning populist movement, the PPP attempted to blend Islam 
with socialism. The PPP espoused such policies as land reform 
to help the peasants; nationalization of industries to weaken 
the industrialists; and administrative reforms to reduce the 
power of the bureaucrats. The party, however, was built on the 
foundations of the wealthy, landed elite, Pakistan's traditional 
ruling class. 

The PPP came to power in December 1971 after the loss of 
East Pakistan, when Bhutto was sworn in as president and chief 
martial law administrator. Bhutto lifted martial law in April 
1972 and in 1973 stepped down as president and became 
prime minister. The PPP did little to advance the first two 
tenets of its platform, Islam and democracy, but promoted 
socialism with a vengeance. Bhutto nationalized large-scale 
industries, insurance companies, and commercial banks, and 
he set up a number of public corporations to expand the role 
of the government in commerce, construction, and transporta- 
tion. The heavy hand with which Bhutto and the PPP exerted 
their power aroused widespread resentment. Matters came to a 
head in 1977 when the PPP won 155 of the 200 seats in the 
National Assembly with 58 percent of the total votes cast. The 
Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), a coalition of nine opposi- 
tion parties and with 35 percent of the votes, won only thirty-six 
seats. The PNA charged widespread electoral fraud, and the 
resulting PPP-PNA confrontation and the accompanying civil 
unrest precipitated the imposition of martial law. 

The survival of Bhutto's party after his execution in 1979 was 
facilitated by dynastic politics. His widow Nusrat and his daugh- 
ter Benazir led the party as cochairpersons. During martial law, 
the PPP joined with ten other parties in the Movement for the 
Restoration of Democracy (MRD) to pressure the Zia govern- 
ment to hold free elections under the 1973 constitution. Four 
of the MRD's component parties were members of the PNA, 
which had been formed to oppose the PPP in the 1977 elec- 
tions. The PPP joined the MRD coalition, hoping the military 
would be prepared to negotiate with the MRD if it were part of 
a larger political alliance. 

The MRD campaign launched in February 1981 appeared to 
gain momentum. In March 1981, however, a Pakistan Interna- 
tional Airlines aircraft was hijacked by terrorists demanding the 
release of political prisoners. The hijacking was the work of an 
organization — Al-Zulfiqar — allegedly run by Bhutto's son, Mur- 



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Government and Politics 



taza. Although the PPP dissociated itself from the episode, the 
hijacking was a major setback for both the PPP and the MRD. 
Another MRD agitation failed in 1983. After Zia's death in 
1988, the MRD was dissolved, and the PPP, the largest party in 
the alliance, contested the 1988 elections on its own. Although 
the PPP emerged as the single largest party in the National 
Assembly as a result of the 1988 elections, it won a narrow plu- 
rality, and only with the support of the Refugee People's Move- 
ment (Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz — MQM) and other parties was it 
able to form a government. After a troubled period in power, 
the PPP government was dismissed by President Ishaq Khan in 
1990. The PPP was the principal member of the PDA, which 
lost the 1990 elections to the IJI. The PDA blamed its defeat on 
alleged tampering with the vote. The National Democratic 
Institute for International Affairs, an international observer 
team, did note irregularities in the election but declared that 
the ultimate outcome was in general accordance with the pop- 
ular will. 

In the October 1993 general elections that returned Benazir 
to power, the PPP won eighty-six of the 217 seats in the 
National Assembly, while Nawaz Sharif's PML-N won seventy- 
two. The PPP was successful in forming a coalition with other 
parties to control a block of 121 seats. 

Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz 

The Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM) , a party formed to rep- 
resent the interests of the muhajir community in Pakistan, had a 
meteoric rise in the political life of the country. Founded by 
Altaf Hussain in 1984, the MQM won thirteen (out of 207) 
seats in the National Assembly in the 1988 elections, making it 
the third largest party in the assembly after the PPP and the IJI. 
MQM support of the PPP made it possible for Benazir to form 
a government and become prime minister. Shortly after the 
election, however, the coalition between the PPP and the MQM 
broke down, and the two parties' subsequently troubled rela- 
tions contributed greatly to the instability of Benazir's first gov- 
ernment. In the 1990 general elections, the MQM won fifteen 
seats in the National Assembly, remaining the third largest 
party. The MQM boycotted the 1993 National Assembly elec- 
tions but won twenty-seven seats in the provincial assembly of 
Sindh. 

The MQM had its origin in the All-Pakistan Muhajir Stu- 
dents Organization at Karachi University. At a large public 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

meeting in Karachi in 1986, the MQM expressed the political 
and economic demands of the muhajir community. The MQM's 
political strength came primarily from the urban areas of 
Sindh, and its main emphasis was on securing better job oppor- 
tunities for muhajirs. The MQM played an active role in the eth- 
nic riots in Karachi in the winter of 1986-87. These 
disturbances brought prominence and notoriety to the MQM 
and its leader, Altaf Hussain. It was after these riots that the 
MQM leadership converted the movement into a political 
party. The MQM's full political weight was first felt in the 1988 
elections. 

Awami National Party 

The Awami National Party (awami means "people's"), which 
depends on Pakhtuns of the North-West Frontier Province and 
northern Balochistan as its political base, won six seats in the 
National Assembly in the 1990 elections. In the 1993 national 
elections, the party won three seats in the National Assembly. 
The Awami National Party was formed in 1986 by the merger of 
several left-leaning parties including the Awami Tehrik and the 
National Democratic Party. Khan Abdul Wali Khan was 
appointed its first president. Wali Khan's political career had 
been built on the tradition of intense Pakhtun nationalism 
inherited from his father, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Both 
men were opposed to the creation of Pakistan, and after parti- 
tion they were imprisoned. In 1956 Wali Khan joined the 
National Awami Party (NAP), led by a charismatic Bengali 
socialist, Maulana Bhashani. In 1965 the NAP split into two fac- 
tions, with Wali Khan becoming president of the pro-Moscow 
faction. In 1972 the party was strong enough to form coalition 
provincial governments, with its partner the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i- 
Islam (JUI) in the North-West Frontier Province and 
Balochistan. These governments were short-lived. Wali Khan 
was again jailed, and his party was barred from politics when 
the Supreme Court upheld the finding of Bhutto that the NAP 
was conspiring against the state of Pakistan. General Zia subse- 
quently withdrew the charges against the NAP. Wali Khan was 
released, joined the National Democratic Party, and ultimately 
formed the Awami National Party. 

Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-lslam 

The Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) , led by Maulana Fazlur 
Rahman, had its origins in the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind (JUH), 



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Government and Politics 



founded by a group of ulama of the Deoband Movement in 
prepartition India. The JUH argued that Muslims could coexist 
with other religions in a society where they were not the major- 
ity. In 1945, however, a group of JUH ulama, led by Maulana 
Shabir Ahmad Usmani, split off from the JUH, formed theJUI, 
and gave their support to the movement for an independent 
Pakistan. Since 1947 theJUI has undergone a number of orga- 
nizational and program changes. It developed strong support 
in the North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan. In 1972 it 
joined the NAP to form governments in those two provinces. In 
1977 theJUI contested the National Assembly elections as a 
component of the Pakistan National Alliance. TheJUI did not 
sympathize with General Zia's Islamization program, and in 
1981 the JUI joined the MRD to pressure Zia to hold free elec- 
tions. TheJUI won six seats in the National Assembly in the 
1990 elections. In the 1993 national elections, theJUI was the 
main component of the Islami Jamhoori Mahaz, which won 
four seats in the National Assembly. 

Tehrik-i-lstiqlal 

The Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (Solidarity Movement) was founded by 
retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan in 1969. The party's aim was 
to provide a vehicle, in the center of the political spectrum, for 
the growing middle class. Although the party acquired sizable 
support among the professional classes, including lawyers and 
doctors, it did not develop significant grassroots strength. In an 
effort to gain increased status, in 1981 the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal 
joined a number of other parties in the MRD, but it left the 
movement in 1986. The Tehrik-i-Istiqlal did not fare well in the 
elections of 1988, and Asghar Khan resigned as the party's 
chairman in 1989. In the elections of 1990, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal 
allied itself with the PPP in the Pakistan Democratic Alliance. 
In the elections of 1993, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal did not win any 
seats. 

Political Developments since Zia 

The First Government of Benazir Bhutto 

Benazir Bhutto, the first woman prime minister of a modern 
Muslim state, is clearly the beneficiary of dynastic politics and 
of the emotional ties of a large section of the electorate to her 
charismatic family. However, this legacy as the daughter of 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto has proven to be a mixed political blessing. 



223 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

Although she inherited her father's party, the PPP, and has led 
it to victory, the party won a very narrow plurality in the 1988 
elections and was therefore forced to enter into a coalition with 
the MQM (representing Pakistan's muhajir community) and 
several other parties in order to form a government. Benazir 
wanted to repeal the Eighth Amendment in order to 
strengthen her position as prime minister but could not muster 
sufficient political support and soon abandoned the effort. 
Benazir also had to address several long-standing problems: 
how to cope with an intrusive and politicized military; how to 
resolve the power play between the central and provincial gov- 
ernments; and how to fashion an appropriate role for Islam in 
government. In addition to these problems, Benazir had to 
face pressing new ones, including a large budget deficit and 
growing ethnic violence. 

Several early actions appeared to strengthen Benazir's ability 
to deal with these problems. In choosing her cabinet, for exam- 
ple, Benazir kept the portfolios of finance and defense for her- 
self but appointed a seasoned bureaucrat, Wasim Jafari, as her 
top adviser on finance and economic affairs. Her retention of 
Zia's foreign minister, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, signaled conti- 
nuity in the country's policy on Afghanistan. Also, when work- 
ing out their political coalition, the MQM agreed to support 
the PPP government at both federal and provincial levels. The 
agreement, signed by the Sindh-based MQM and the head of 
the PPP in Sindh, pledged to protect and safeguard the inter- 
ests of all the people of Sindh, regardless of language, religion, 
or origin of birth, as well as to stamp out violence and to sup- 
port the rule of law. The agreement — short-lived, as it turned 
out — was an effort to achieve peace and cooperation between 
the indigenous population and the muhajirs in Benazir's trou- 
bled home province. 

Benazir's assumption of office brought great expectations 
from inside as well as outside Pakistan. In her first address to 
the nation, Benazir pledged to work for a progressive and dem- 
ocratic Pakistan — one guided by Islamic principles of brother- 
hood, equality, and tolerance. At the same time, she invoked 
the Quaid-i-Azam's vision for a Pakistan that would grow as a 
modern state. Benazir's rhetoric promised much to an expect- 
ant nation: strengthened relations with the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and China; protected minority rights; increased 
provincial autonomy; improvement of education; introduction 
of a comprehensive national health policy; enhanced rights for 



224 



Government and Politics 



women, with equal pay for equal work; and so on. When faced 
with the hard realities of government, however, most of Bena- 
zir's rhetoric did not translate into action. Although she was 
successful in advancing the democratization process in Paki- 
stani politics and was able to achieve warmer relations with the 
United States and, for a short while, with India as well, Bena- 
zir's first term in office is usually looked upon, by both foreign 
and domestic observers, as ineffectual — a period of govern- 
mental instability. Within months she had lost much of her 
political support. 

The scion of the feudal elite of Sindh, the Harvard- and 
Oxford-educated Benazir was often described as autocratic dur- 
ing her first term. Although she spoke of healing wounds and 
putting an end to the past, she was inexorably tied to her 
father's political legacy, which included harsh repression of 
political opposition. Further, her appointment of her mother, 
Nusrat, as a senior minister without portfolio, followed by the 
selection of her father-in-law as chairman of the parliamentary 
Public Accounts Committee, was viewed in some quarters as ill- 
advised nepotism. Benazir's government also set up the contro- 
versial Placement Bureau, which made political appointments 
to the civil bureaucracy, although the bureau was later abol- 
ished. Benazir let the political legacy of her family intrude, for 
example, when able public servants, who had earlier harbored 
disagreements with her father, were dismissed for reasons 
other than job performance. 

Benazir also had to contend with growing political opposi- 
tion. As a political power broker, she was in the late 1980s no 
match for her main rival, then chief minister of Punjab, Nawaz 
Sharif. In the 1988 elections that brought Benazir to power, her 
party had won the largest number of seats in the National 
Assembly but controlled only one of the four provinces. Pun- 
jab, the most populous province, with over half of Pakistan's 
population, came under the control of the opposition IJI and 
of its leader, Nawaz Sharif, who was the only major political fig- 
ure from the Zia era to survive the reemergence of the PPP. To 
maintain her power and implement her programs, Benazir 
would have needed to maneuver successfully between a power- 
ful president and the military elite and to reach a political 
accommodation with Nawaz Sharif. Instead, she pursued a 
course of confrontation, including unsuccessful efforts to over- 
throw him in the provincial assembly. In addition, the failure of 
the PPP to share power and spoils with its coalition partners 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

caused further alienation, including the withdrawal of the 
MQM from the government in October 1989. 

The public's sense of disillusionment deepened as the gov- 
ernment failed to deliver its promised employment and eco- 
nomic development programs. Inflation and unemployment 
were high, and the country's burgeoning population put 
increased pressure on already overburdened education and 
health systems. The government also failed to deal with the 
country's growing drug abuse problem, and there was opposi- 
tion from religious conservatives who distrusted the degree of 
Benazir's commitment to the state's Islamic principles. Despite 
tensions, disagreements, and mutual misgivings, however, 
Benazir continued to be supported by the armed forces. The 
chief of the army staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, publicly 
stated his intention to maintain a politically neutral army. 

Benazir narrowly survived a no-confidence motion in the 
National Assembly. Her government did not compile a record 
of accomplishment that might have offset her other difficulties. 
Instead, she found herself constrained by the military and by 
the constitutional structure her government inherited. During 
her tenure, no significant legislation was passed. Fewer than a 
dozen bills — all minor amendments to existing legislation — 
passed the National Assembly. Benazir complained that legisla- 
tion was stymied because the Senate was dominated by her 
opposition. 

Benazir's problems were further accentuated in February 
1990 when an MQM-directed strike in Karachi escalated into 
rioting that virtually paralyzed the city. The strike had been 
called to protest the alleged abduction of MQM supporters by 
the PPP. The resulting loss of life and property forced Benazir 
to call in the army to restore order. In addition to the violence 
in Sindh and elsewhere, she had to cope with increasing 
charges of corruption leveled not only at her associates, but at 
her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, and father-in-law. On the inter- 
national front, Pakistan faced heightened tensions with India 
over Kashmir and problems associated with the unresolved 
Afghan war. 

Finally, on August 6, 1990, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan 
dismissed Benazir's government, dissolved the National Assem- 
bly as well as the Sindh and North-West Frontier Province pro- 
vincial assemblies, and appointed a caretaker government 
headed by Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, the leader of the Combined 
Opposition Parties in the National Assembly. In accordance 



226 



Government and Politics 



with the constitution, the president scheduled national and 
provincial elections for October 1990. Ishaq Khan said his 
actions were justified because of corruption, incompetence, 
and inaction; the release of convicted criminals under the 
guise of freeing political prisoners; a failure to maintain law 
and order in Sindh; and the use of official government 
machinery to promote partisan interests. A nationwide state of 
emergency was declared, citing both "external aggression and 
internal disturbance." Benazir called her dismissal "illegal, 
unconstitutional, and arbitrary" and implied that the military 
was responsible. She added that the PPP would not take to the 
streets to avoid giving Ghulam Ishaq Khan's regime any pretext 
for not holding scheduled elections. The military proclaimed 
that its only interest was in maintaining order. 

The Caretaker Government of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi 

Ironically, Benazir's successor, the caretaker prime minister, 
was one of Pakistan's largest landowners, also from Benazir's 
Sindh Province. Jatoi had joined the PPP when Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto had founded it in the late 1960s, was in Bhutto's first 
cabinet, and was later chief minister of Sindh until Zia over- 
threw Bhutto in 1977. Jatoi had remained supportive of the 
PPP during the martial law period and had spearheaded the 
campaign organized by the MRD against Zia's government. Fol- 
lowing Benazir's return to Pakistan in 1986, however, Jatoi was 
removed as chairman of the Sindh PPP and subsequently 
formed his own political organization, the National People's 
Party. Known as a moderate, Jatoi said that his party's objective 
was to make Pakistan a modern, democratic, and progressive 
Islamic welfare state. 

Jatoi's caretaker government instituted accountability pro- 
ceedings against persons charged with corruption and, under 
the authority of laws enacted by both the Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 
and the Zia regimes, set up special courts to handle account- 
ability cases. The accountability process had traditionally been 
used to disqualify from public office those found guilty of cor- 
ruption and wrongdoing. It had also been used as a weapon by 
politicians in power against their opponents. The period for 
accountability defined by the Jatoi government was limited to 
the twenty months of Benazir's regime. The PPP demand that 
Nawaz Sharif s Punjab government during that same time be 
subjected to similar scrutiny was rejected. Nevertheless, the 
Jatoi government defended the proceedings as fair and neu- 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

tral. Although several charges were brought against Benazir, 
and her appearance before the accountability tribunals was 
required, she remained free and was able to lead her party in 
the October 1990 elections. 

The Central Election Commission, consisting of three mem- 
bers of the senior judiciary, supervised preparation of the elec- 
toral rolls and the conduct of the 1990 elections as well as 
processing complaints and issuing reports. Although Pakistan 
has a large number of political parties, the two main contend- 
ers in the elections were both broad-based coalitions. One con- 
tender was the PDA, established during the campaign by 
Benazir's dominant PPP, together with the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, 
headed by Asghar Khan, and two smaller parties. Asghar Khan 
had been Pakistan's first commander in chief of the air force 
and later became chairman of Pakistan International Airlines, 
before entering the political arena in 1969 and founding his 
own party. In the 1970s, Asghar Khan was one of Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto's harshest critics. Having helped to oust Bhutto, how- 
ever, he did not benefit from the Zia military government, and 
in 1989 he resigned as Tehrik-i-Istiqlal's chairman. Political 
observers were surprised when the party joined the PDA. 

The other major contender in opposition to the PDA was 
the IJI, the coalition that had also competed with the PPP in 
the 1988 elections. The Pakistan Muslim League was a major 
component of the IJI, as was the JI. The three chief competitors 
for leadership in the IJI and specifically in the Pakistan Muslim 
League were Nawaz Sharif, former Prime Minister Mohammad 
Khan Junejo, and Ejaz ul-Haq, son of the late President Zia ul- 
Haq. These three men represented key groups in Pakistan's 
political culture. Junejo belonged to a major Sindhi landown- 
ing family and represented the feudal classes. Ejaz appealed 
particularly to Zia's Islamic fundamentalist supporters. His can- 
didacy was weakened, however, by his relative lack of political 
experience. Nawaz Sharif, the ultimate victor, represented the 
country's growing business classes. The caretaker prime minis- 
ter also aspired to remain in power, but his party was not a 
member of the IJI, and so he lacked sufficient political 
strength. 

Other important parties included Altaf Hussain's MQM, rep- 
resenting the refugee community in urban Sindh, and Khan 
Abdul Wali Khan's Awami National Party, based in the North- 
west Frontier Province and northern Balochistan. Although in 
1990 the PDA and the IJI were the major election contenders 



228 



Government and Politics 



in Pakistan's largest provinces (Punjab, Sindh, and the North- 
West Frontier Province) , they had only a limited presence in 
Balochistan, compared with regional and religious parties, 
such as the JUI and the Jamhoori Watan Party. 

The central campaign issue in 1990 for the IJI was the Bena- 
zir government's alleged corruption and wrongdoing in office. 
The principal issue for the PDA was the alleged unconstitution- 
ality of her dismissal from office and the subsequent treatment 
of her, and her family and associates, by the caretaker govern- 
ment. The campaign was heated and included incidents of vio- 
lence, harassment, and political kidnappings. Media coverage 
played an active role. During the campaign, the government 
no longer held a monopoly on television news because a sec- 
ond network, People's Television Network (PTN), had been 
started, to compete with Pakistan Television Corporation 
(PTV). The new network introduced Cable News Network 
(CNN) in Pakistan. The PPP filed a complaint against PTV, 
charging biased network election coverage, but the complaint 
was rejected by the Lahore High Court. Print media coverage 
offered more variety. Although government-controlled newspa- 
pers tended to be anti-Benazir, the larger private sector of print 
media provided more diversity of opinion. Both the PDA and 
the IJI predicted victory, but at least one detailed public opin- 
ion poll gave the edge to the PDA. 

The election results were disastrous for the PDA, as the IJI 
won 105 of the 207 contested seats in the National Assembly. 
The PDA won only forty-five seats. The IJI attributed its success 
to holding its coalition together as well as establishing electoral 
alliances nationwide to ensure that PDA candidates would not 
run unopposed. The PDA blamed the defeat on alleged rig- 
ging of the elections. Although the elections were certainly not 
free of irregularities, observation teams both from inside the 
country and from outside, including a team from member 
countries of the South Asian Association for Regional Coopera- 
tion (SAARC — see Glossary), concluded that the elections had 
been generally free and fair. Despite their problems, the 1990 
elections were another step forward in the quest for political 
stability and democratic government. The constitutional trans- 
fer of power was achieved without direct military intervention. 

The Government of Nawaz Sharif 

When Nawaz Sharif became prime minister in November 
1990, his political coalition, the IJI, had more than a two-thirds 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

majority in the National Assembly. The IJI alliance, a grouping 
of parties whose chief components were the PML and the JI, 
had been formed in 1988 to oppose the PPP in the elections of 
that year. In the 1988 elections, the PPP emerged as the single 
largest group in the National Assembly, and its leader, Benazir, 
became prime minister. At the same time, however, Nawaz 
Sharif emerged as the most powerful politician outside the 
PPP. Just two years later, the IJI under Nawaz Sharif s leadership 
achieved victory at the polls, and Nawaz Sharif took over in a 
peaceful, constitutional transfer of power — the third prime 
minister since Zia's death in 1988 — and ushered in a return to 
democracy. Nawaz Sharif s ascendancy also marked a transition 
in the political culture of Pakistan — a power shift from the tra- 
ditional feudal aristocracy to a growing class of modern entre- 
preneurs. This transition mirrored the socioeconomic changes 
that had been at work in Pakistan, moving the country gradu- 
ally from a feudal to an industrial society. 

Nawaz Sharif, born in Lahore in 1949, belongs to a postinde- 
pendence generation of politicians. Scion of a leading indus- 
trial family, he is a practicing Muslim, an ardent capitalist, and 
a political moderate. A graduate of the Government College 
Lahore, with a degree from Punjab University Law College, 
also in Lahore, he rose to prominence representing an urban 
constituency seeking its own political identity. His family, along 
with other major industrial families, had suffered from the 
nationalization of large industrial enterprises during Bhutto's 
regime (1971-77). Nawaz Sharif had worked to build a political 
constituency that would favor private industrial and commer- 
cial entrepreneurship. He served in Punjab, first as finance 
minister and then as chief minister, before coming to national 
office. As finance minister, he presented development-oriented 
budgets. As chief minister, he stressed welfare and develop- 
ment activities and the maintenance of law and order. 

In his first address to the nation after taking office as prime 
minister, Nawaz Sharif announced his government's compre- 
hensive national reconstruction plan and said that its imple- 
mentation would ensure the successful march of Pakistan into 
the twenty-first century. He stressed that proper use of the 
country's natural resources would be made, the pace of indus- 
trialization expedited, and the best use of talented manpower 
identified. Under his development policy, investment would be 
encouraged, and restrictions on setting up new industries 
would be lifted. 



230 



Government and Politics 



Early assessments of Nawaz Sharif and his government noted 
his initiative, youthful energy, and already proven ability and 
popularity in his home province, the country's power base. The 
newspaper Dawn pointed out, however, that his Punjab connec- 
tion was both an asset and a liability and that "to acquire a gen- 
uinely all-Pakistan stature, he will have to have ingenuity, and 
acumen, magnanimity and vision, and the strength to take bold 
decisions." 

Nawaz Sharif s cabinet initially included eighteen ministers: 
nine from Punjab, two from the Islamabad Capital Territory, 
six from Sindh, and one from Balochistan. His cabinet was later 
expanded to include representation from the North-West Fron- 
tier Province. Of paramount importance to the new govern- 
ment was implementation of Nawaz Sharif's program for 
strengthening the economy. Goals of the program included 
self-reliance, deregulation and denationalization, tax reform, 
foreign-exchange and payment reform, administrative and law 
reform, and increases in agricultural productivity and exports. 
The government's economic strategy rested on streamlining 
the institutional framework for industrialization and on start- 
ing a new partnership with the private sector in order to pro- 
mote common objectives. Nawaz Sharif regarded 
unemployment as Pakistan's major problem and believed it 
could be solved only by rapid industrialization. He said his gov- 
ernment was considering special incentives for rural industrial- 
ization and agro-based industries and was fully committed to a 
policy of deregulation. 

The IJI government was third in a line representing a dyar- 
chical arrangement of shared power between Pakistan's civil- 
military and political forces. Nawaz Sharif and his predeces- 
sors, Junejo and Benazir, came to power under a constitutional 
framework in which, under the controversial Eighth Amend- 
ment introduced by Zia, the president was empowered to dis- 
solve the parliament and dismiss the government. Both Junejo 
and Benazir had earlier been unceremoniously dismissed from 
office, and the constitutional framework limited Nawaz Sharif s 
ability to govern despite the support of a majority in the parlia- 
ment. He, too, would be dismissed under the constitutional 
framework in 1993. 

Pakistan's emerging two-party system was strengthened by 
the 1988 and 1990 elections and the constitutional transfer of 
power in 1990 from Benazir to Nawaz Sharif. In these elections, 
the two political alliances, the IJI and the PDA (headed by the 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

PPP), became the main contenders for power. Although both 
alliances agreed on Pakistan's need for a liberal democracy and 
a market economy, the PDA opposition represented a real 
political challenge to the government, and Benazir conducted 
a relentless campaign to oust Nawaz Sharif. 

From the outset, the Nawaz Sharif government's record was 
mixed. On the one hand, it achieved passage in May 1991 of 
the Shariat Bill, which declared the Quran and the sunna (see 
Glossary) to be the law of the land. Islamic fundamentalists, on 
the other hand, did not think the bill went far enough. The 
more secular-minded Pakistanis feared that a theocracy was 
being established. A working group was set up to monitor and 
make recommendations for enforcing Islamic laws in the coun- 
try. The working group adopted a nineteen-point plan that 
included calls for the implementation of all Islamic legislation, 
especially the laws creating sharia courts; transformation of the 
education system to reflect Islamic teaching; controls on the 
print and electronic media designed to ensure Islamic moral 
values; uniform and enforced prayer schedules; and the estab- 
lishment of an Islamic banking system and the total abolition 
of interest. 

Additionally, in November 1991, the Federal Shariat Court, 
Pakistan's supreme religious court, declared the provisions of 
some twenty federal and provincial laws repugnant to Islam. A 
particular problem was the ruling that payment of interest 
( riba) was prohibited by Islam even if the loan involved was for 
productive purposes. Although the government had publicly 
committed itself to Islamization, its major domestic policy ini- 
tiative was the liberalization of the economy. If the ruling on 
riba were fully implemented, this new economic policy likely 
would fail. With no consensus in Pakistan regarding either the 
content or the pace of Islamic reform, Nawaz Sharif sought to 
strike an acceptable balance to enable his government to 
remain in power. 

The government also had to contend with rampant crime 
and terrorism, which continued to be a cause for alarm in the 
country, particularly in Sindh. Kidnappings, bombings, and 
murders persisted despite concerted efforts by the police and 
the military to stem lawlessness. Pakistanis called this state of 
affairs the "Kalashnikov culture" because the flood of available 
automatic weapons gave long-standing ethnic and political 
rivalries a deadly new significance (see Prospects for Social 
Cohesion, ch. 2). The arms were largely a legacy from the war 



232 



Government and Politics 



in neighboring Afghanistan. The police were increasingly out- 
gunned, and even foreigners were not immune from attack. In 
the summer of 1991, the prime minister was forced to cancel 
an important trip to Japan in quest of investment in order to 
calm a population shaken by a particularly savage string of 
murders in Punjab. In an effort to stem the violence, the gov- 
ernment decreed that Pakistanis turn in their weapons, but, 
predictably, few of them did. The government also passed the 
Twelfth Amendment to the constitution, which provided for 
the further jurisdictional authority of Speedy Trial Courts to 
dispense summary justice. The opposition, however, criticized 
the law as suppressing fundamental rights. 

Nawaz Sharif held to his conviction that the solution to Paki- 
stan's political problems was free-market reform and economic 
growth, so he liberalized foreign-exchange regulations and 
denationalized public-sector industrial enterprises and finan- 
cial institutions. Furthermore, government approval was no 
longer required for the establishment of new industrial enter- 
prises (with some exceptions, particularly in relation to arms 
and explosives). A number of important industries such as elec- 
tricity generation, shipping, airlines, highway construction, 
and telecommunications were opened up to the private sector. 
Although there was support for liberalizing and privatizing the 
economy, there was considerable criticism of the process of 
implementation. Some critics feared that moving too fast could 
produce turmoil, with the resultant demand for ^nationaliza- 
tion. Other critics asked for protection for the more vulnerable 
groups in society who would not be able to compete in a free 
market. The government's ability to focus effectively on and 
deal with these problems was weakened by its involvement with 
the Pakistan Cooperative Societies and the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International (BCCI) financial scandals (see 
Finance, ch. 3). 

In keeping with his goals of consolidating economic growth 
and overcoming the country's regional divisions, Nawaz Sharif 
was convinced of the need for a modern national infrastruc- 
ture, regardless of cost. As a result, he launched the construc- 
tion of a US$1 billion highway project, which National 
Highway Authority chairman Hidayat Niazi described as a step 
toward building a nation (see Transportation, ch. 3). 

Nawaz Sharif s government continued to be under pressure 
from within and without, and his ruling coalition, the IJI, was 
plagued by internal dissention. Tensions, disagreements, and 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

political rivalries were present within the IJI's largest compo- 
nent, the Pakistan Muslim League. In May 1992, the funda- 
mentalist JI, the second largest member of the coalition, 
formally left the IJI. Since its inception, the IJI had been an alli- 
ance of varied right-of-center and Islamic parties in a marriage 
of convenience to oppose the PPR However, the PML and the 
JI had long been antagonists, and their disagreements 
mounted over a number of issues. The JI was unhappy with the 
IJI government's support of Saudi Arabia and the United States 
during the Persian Gulf War (1990-91), fearing that the defeat 
of Iraq would transform Shia (see Glossary) Iran into a major 
regional power. The JI also criticized the mainstream PML for 
what it perceived to be foot-dragging on Islamization, includ- 
ing the matter of riba, as well as its abandonment of support for 
the Afghan mujahidin in favor of efforts to establish a neutral, 
United Nations-sponsored government in Kabul. The JI also 
criticized the government's policy on Kashmir as not evidenc- 
ing sufficient commitment to Islamic "freedom fighters" there. 

The government's chief opposition, Benazir and the PPP, 
criticized Nawaz Sharif s efforts at privatization, calling them 
the "loot and plunder" of Pakistan and saying his plan favored 
large investors and ran roughshod over labor. Benazir was also 
critical of the government's Islamization policies and contin- 
ued to allege that the 1990 elections, which brought Nawaz 
Sharif s government to power, were fraudulent. In late 1992, 
she tried to organize widespread protest marches against the 
government. In response, Nawaz Sharif banned Benazir from 
two of the country's largest cities and ordered police measures 
against her supporters. 

Benazir ultimately did not muster enough demonstrators 
throughout the country to threaten the government. However, 
Nawaz Sharif s actions, in the eyes of some, made him appear 
too willing to espouse repressive measures rather than adhere 
to democratic principles. Subsequently, relations between 
Nawaz Sharif and Benazir appeared to soften somewhat. He 
reportedly ceased calling her an "enemy of Pakistan," and 
Benazir abandoned her demonstrations designed to topple 
Nawaz Sharif s government through street power. 

The ruling coalition appeared to weaken by early 1993. The 
four major powers in Pakistan continued to be the president, 
the military, Nawaz Sharif s IJI government, and the PPP oppo- 
sition led by Benazir. Reports of a growing rift between Nawaz 
Sharif and Ishaq Khan became more commonplace. The mili- 



234 



Government and Politics 



tary — which never had an overt constitutional role in the gov- 
ernment but which had historically been a key player in the 
formation and dismissal of governments — was closely and ner- 
vously monitored by observers. 

President Ghulam Ishaq Khan as Power Broker 

A powerful player in the political equation was President 
Ishaq Khan. The president, under the constitution, is elected 
by a majority of the members of the national and provincial 
assemblies. Ishaq Khan was a seasoned senior bureaucrat- 
turned politician who had been a key figure in Pakistan for 
more than three decades. Born in 1915 in the North-West 
Frontier Province, he was appointed to the prestigious Civil 
Service of Pakistan after independence in 1947. After holding 
various regional posts, including being chairman of the West 
Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (1961-66), 
he was appointed to several positions in the central govern- 
ment — first as secretary, Ministry of Finance (1966-70) and 
later as governor of the State Bank of Pakistan (1971-75). In 
the latter position, he questioned the wisdom of a number of 
the economic policies of then Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto. He was subsequently moved from the bank and made 
secretary general at the Ministry of Defence. Although an 
unusual post for a senior economics expert, it proved to be for- 
tuitous in that it brought him into close contact with the senior 
officers of the armed forces. Among them was General Zia, 
who later ousted Bhutto and turned the management of the 
economy over to Ishaq Khan. During the martial law period 
(1977-85), Ishaq Khan's titles changed, but he was responsible 
for all important economic decisions (see Zia ul-Haq and Mili- 
tary Domination, 1977-88, ch. 1). Among other things, he sup- 
ported the Zia government's efforts to Islamize the economy 
through changes in the fiscal and banking systems. 

In 1985 Ishaq Khan was elected to the Senate and later 
became chairman of the Senate. The death of Zia in 1988 
thrust Ishaq Khan to the center of the political stage. When the 
military decided to use the constitution to handle the issue of 
succession, Ishaq Khan, as chairman of the Senate and there- 
fore next in the line of succession, became acting president. 
He and the emergency council he instituted decided to hold 
general elections and to allow political parties to participate. 
Thus, the country was guided back to democracy, Benazir 



235 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



became prime minister, and Ishaq Khan was subsequently 
elected president by the national and provincial assemblies. 

Ishaq Khan's position was considerably strengthened by the 
Eighth Amendment to the constitution, introduced by Presi- 
dent Zia, which allows the president to dismiss the government 
and to override the government's choice of army chief. When 
the previous army chief died unexpectedly, President Ishaq 
Khan reportedly turned down the government's choice and 
named General Abdul Waheed to head the army. General 
Waheed, who is not known to have any political ambitions, is 
from the same ethnic group as Ishaq Khan — the Pakhtuns of 
the North-West Frontier Province (see Linguistic and Ethnic 
Groups, ch. 2). 

Intermittent and conflicting signals of rapprochement, 
realignment, and behind-the-scenes alliances among the vari- 
ous political players heightened the political tension in late 
1992 and early 1993. There was speculation that the opposition 
and the government might join forces to muster a two-thirds 
majority in the parliament to repeal the Eighth Amendment or 
even that they might field a candidate against the president. 
However, it was also noticeable that Benazir had stopped 
openly attacking the president, and some observers considered 
that she might be playing for time, hoping to use the differ- 
ences between the president and the prime minister to her 
own advantage. The army, however, always a key ingredient in 
the mix, continued to support the president as well as the con- 
tinuation of the Eighth Amendment. Against this backdrop, 
Pakistan's developing democracy continued to be tested by eco- 
nomic problems, persistent violence, and corruption, as well as 
the power struggles of its leaders. 

The "Silent Revolution": A Year of Political Struggle 

In 1993 a protracted power struggle between Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif and President Ishaq Khan played out as Pakistan's 
two leading politicians maneuvered each other out of power. 
This period of behind-the-scenes struggle was described by a 
Pakistani daily as a "Silent Revolution" and was watched with 
some concern by the international community, which feared 
that Pakistan could once again fall under military rule. 

On April 18, 1993, the power struggle seemed to be resolved 
when President Ishaq Khan, exercising the extraordinary con- 
stitutional powers afforded the president by the Eighth Amend- 
ment, dismissed the government of Prime Minister Nawaz 



236 



Government and Politics 



Sharif. Once again Ishaq Khan had invoked the Eighth Amend- 
ment to bring down an elected government. The charges of 
corruption and mismanagement of the economy that he lev- 
eled against Nawaz Sharif were almost identical to those he had 
earlier brought against Benazir in 1990. President Ishaq Khan 
appointed Balakh Sher Mazari as caretaker prime minister and 
announced a new timetable for elections. 

On May 26, 1993, the Supreme Court voted that Ishaq 
Khan's dissolution of the National Assembly and his dismissal 
of the prime minister were unconstitutional. The Supreme 
Court's action was a sharp rebuke of Ishaq Khan's heavy- 
handed exercise of presidential powers and was widely hailed 
as a victory for the advocates of democratization. Yet, although 
the Supreme Court was able to reinstate the Nawaz Sharif gov- 
ernment, the status quo ante was not restored, and the struggle 
between the president and the prime minister continued 
unabated, making the pursuit of regular government workings 
impossible. Noting the mounting impatience of the Pakistani 
military with the endless machinations of the country's politi- 
cians, the United States and the European Community com- 
municated their concern, warning against a military takeover. 

The continuing political crisis in Pakistan came to an abrupt 
halt when the prime minister and president both resigned after 
two weeks of intense negotiations among the Nawaz Sharif gov- 
ernment, Benazir, and the army. The resolution of the crisis 
was unique because for the first time in the nation's history a 
government had voluntarily stepped down in order to avoid a 
possible military intervention. Interestingly, the negotiations 
had been mediated by General Waheed, the chief of the army 
staff. The resultant agreement and its implementation followed 
strict constitutional procedure. Ishaq Khan was replaced by the 
chairman of the Senate, Wasim Sajjad, who functioned as act- 
ing president until the elections. More important, Moeen 
Qureshi, a former civil servant and senior World Bank (see 
Glossary) official, agreed to serve as caretaker prime minister. 
Qureshi, a Pakistani national, had left the World Bank in 1992, 
obtained permanent residence status in the United States, and 
established his own company, Emerging Markets Corporation. 

The Caretaker Government of Moeen Qureshi 

During his three-month tenure as caretaker prime minister, 
Moeen Qureshi initiated a substantial number of strong reform 
measures. He devalued the currency and cut farm subsidies, 



237 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

while raising the prices of wheat, electricity, and gasoline — 
strategies to reduce Pakistan's huge budget deficit — 7.5 per- 
cent of the gross national product (GNP — see Glossary). 
Qureshi also cut public-sector expenditures by instituting aus- 
terity measures, including closing down ten embassies and 
abolishing fifteen ministries. Qureshi's most daring innovation, 
however, was a temporary levy on agricultural output — a mea- 
sure resisted by powerful landed interests (see Farm Owner- 
ship and Land Reform, ch. 3). 

Qureshi next proceeded to single out those politicians who 
had outstanding loans obtained from state banks and institu- 
tions — loans received under easy terms in return for past polit- 
ical favors — a total estimated at US$2 billion. In a move 
calculated to shame these individuals, Qureshi added their 
names to a published list of 5,000 individuals who had not ful- 
filled their loan obligations. Approximately 15 percent of the 
individuals on the list had planned to run for office in the com- 
ing elections. These candidates included Benazir, Benazir's 
husband, and Nawaz Sharif s brother. Most candidates quickly 
repaid their loans; those who did not were barred from contest- 
ing the October 1993 elections. Drug-trafficking barons, a 
small but powerful group including some members of the par- 
liament, were permanently barred from running in the elec- 
tions. Anticipating a further crackdown, several of the drug 
barons fled the country. 

In his three months in power, Qureshi exhibited an admira- 
ble degree of technocratic efficiency tempered by dogged 
determination. Yet it remained to be seen whether his achieve- 
ments would be accepted without reversal by the subsequent 
administration. Indeed, some argue that the Qureshi caretaker 
government, because of its temporary nature, was not much 
constrained by the realpolitik of Pakistani society that the suc- 
ceeding government would have to face. The Qureshi govern- 
ment had, nonetheless, set a standard — one with which past 
governments and the succeeding government of Benazir would 
no doubt be compared. 

Benazir Bhutto Returns 

In the National Assembly elections of October 6-7, 1993, 
Benazir's PPP won a plurality — eighty-six seats — but not the 
absolute majority needed to immediately form a government 
in the 217-seat National Assembly. Nawaz Sharif s Pakistan Mus- 
lim League ran a close second in gaining seventy-two seats. 



238 



Women voters at poll in Pishin, Balochistan, during national elections 

of October 1993 
Courtesy Anita M. Weiss 

Over the next two weeks, Benazir was successful in mustering 
the allegiance of a number of small regional parties and inde- 
pendent members of the assembly and on October 19, 1993, 
was able to reclaim power with 121 seats in her coalition gov- 
ernment. The October elections were hailed as the fairest in 
Pakistan's history and were, according to international observ- 
ers, held "without hindrance or intimidation." Voter turnout, 
however, was lower than usual, as only about 40 percent of reg- 
istered voters participated. 

Benazir benefitted in the 1993 national elections from the 
MQM's boycott. In the 1990 national elections, the MQM, 
which had captured fifteen seats, supported Nawaz Sharif s IJI 
coalition. Benazir also benefitted by the poor showing of the 
religious parties. 

After only one month in office, Benazir was able to 
strengthen her position considerably. On November 13, 1993, 
Benazir's candidate for president, Farooq Leghari, an Oxford- 
educated PPP stalwart, easily defeated acting President Wassim 
Sajjad, who was backed by Nawaz Sharif. In a vote by the two 
parliamentary chambers — the National Assembly and the Sen- 
ate — and the four provincial assemblies, Leghari won 273 votes 



239 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

to Sajjad's 167. Bhutto hailed Leghari's election as a triumph 
for democracy and predicted that he would contribute to the 
country's stability. 

Although the new president retained the constitutional 
authority vested in the Eighth Amendment to dismiss the pop- 
ularly elected National Assembly as well as the prime minister, 
he appeared willing to support Benazir in curbing the power of 
his office. Leghari promised not only to support a constitu- 
tional amendment to annul the extraordinary presidential 
powers granted by the Eighth Amendment but also to chal- 
lenge restrictive laws that related to Islamic religious courts and 
to women's rights. In order to amend the constitution, how- 
ever, a three-quarters majority in the parliament is needed — a 
formidable task, considering the strength of Benazir's opposi- 
tion and the unproven staying power of her coalition. Leghari's 
victory, nonetheless, was expected to end the pattern of disrup- 
tive power struggles between prime minister and president that 
had so undermined previous governments. 

Early in her term, Benazir declared that she would end Paki- 
stan's isolation and, in particular, that she would strive to 
improve her country's troubled relations with the United 
States. At the same time, however, she vowed to maintain Paki- 
stan's nuclear program and not allow the "national interest to 
be sacrificed." Relations between the United States and Paki- 
stan had deteriorated sharply during 1992 when the former 
threatened to classify the latter as a terrorist state because of its 
aid to militants fighting in Indian-controlled Kashmir. 
Although the United States withdrew its threat in mid-July 
1993, the Kashmir issue still loomed large and threatened to 
complicate Pakistan's relations with both India and the United 
States (see the United States and the West, this ch.). 

Benazir faced another, personal challenge. As her adminis- 
tration settled into office, a bitter Bhutto family feud played 
out on the front pages of the Pakistani press. The feud pitted 
Benazir against her younger brother Murtaza and her mother, 
Nusrat, over dynastic control of the PPP. Nusrat organized Mur- 
taza's election campaign for the Sindh provincial assembly, in 
which her son contested (in absentia) more than twenty con- 
stituencies as an anti-Benazir candidate. Although he could 
only occupy one seat in the assembly, Murtaza contested multi- 
ple seats because if he had won more than one, his political 
stature would have risen. The electorate gave Murtaza only one 
victory, however, and as he returned to Pakistan from years in 



240 



Prime Minister Benazir 
Bhutto 
Courtesy Embassy of 
Pakistan, Washington 




exile in Damascus, he was jailed by the government on long- 
standing terrorist charges. In retaliation for her mother's 
championing of Murtaza's political ambitions over her own, 
Benazir ousted Nusrat from her position as cochairperson of 
the PPP, further deepening the family rift. These family squab- 
bles were a distraction for the new government, but Benazir 
was expected to make progress on a wide variety of social, edu- 
cational, and cultural issues. 

The Media 

The press, television, and radio are vital forces in Pakistan's 
political life. The importance of the press was evident even 
before independence. In prepartition India, Muslim journal- 
ism flourished until the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-58, when 
many Muslim newspapers were shut down (see The Seeds of 
Muslim Nationalism, ch. 1). Between 1857 and the Govern- 
ment of India Act of 1935, which gave a large measure of self- 
government to Indians, none of the major newspapers were 
owned or edited by Muslims. However, when Indian Muslims 
began to organize and rally to the political platform of the All- 
India Muslim League, concerted efforts were made to develop 
a strong press to support the Muslim national cause. A number 
of Muslim-owned newspapers were established, including Azad, 



241 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

a Bengali-language daily founded in Calcutta in 1936. Two 
English-language newspapers, Morning News in Calcutta and 
Dawn in Delhi, began publishing in 1942. In the late 1930s, the 
first Indian Muslim news agency, the Orient Press of India, was 
founded. 

On the eve of independence, however, only four major Mus- 
lim-owned newspapers existed in the area constituting the new 
state of Pakistan: Pakistan Times, Zamindar, Nawa-i-Waqt, and 
Civil and Military Gazette, all located in Lahore. A number of 
Muslim newspapers moved to Pakistan. Dawn began publica- 
tion as a daily in Karachi, then the federal capital, on the day of 
independence in 1947. Other publications were also shifted to 
Pakistan including the Morning News and the Urdu-language 
dailies, Jang and Anjam. 

In the early 1990s, there were over 1,500 newspapers and 
journals in the country, including publications in Urdu, 
English, and in regional languages. The major national daily 
newspapers in Urdu are Jang, Nawa-i-Waqt, Jasarat, Masawat, 
Mashriq, and Hurriyat. The major national dailies in English are 
Dawn, Pakistan Times, Muslim, Morning News, Nation, Frontier 
Post, and News. Herald is an important English-language maga- 
zine. 

Newspapers and periodicals are owned by either private indi- 
viduals, joint-stock companies, or trusts. The National Press 
Trust, a nonprofit organization that is a major newspaper pub- 
lisher, was established by businessmen in 1964 and taken over 
by the government in 1972. There are several other large news- 
paper and journal publishers. The two major news agencies in 
Pakistan are the Associated Press of Pakistan and Pakistan Press 
International. The Associated Press of Pakistan was taken over 
by the government in 1960. Pakistan Press International is a 
private joint-stock company. 

Radio also has been an effective method of communication 
because the literacy rate is low and other methods of communi- 
cation are sometimes not available. The Pakistan Broadcasting 
Corporation has played a key role in disseminating informa- 
tion and transmitting government policies as well as promoting 
Islamic principles and their application. Another state-run 
organization, Azad Kashmir Radio, broadcasts in Azad Kash- 
mir. Television, although newer, has also been effective, with 
coverage in the mid-1990s reaching more than 80 percent of 
the population. Until August 1990, the only television channel 
was the government-owned Pakistan Television Corporation 



242 



Government and Politics 



(PTV) . At that time, however, another television channel, Peo- 
ple's Television Network was established (see Telecommunica- 
tions, ch. 3) . People's Television Network brought Cable News 
Network (CNN) to Pakistan. 

The media played an active role in all three national elec- 
tions from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s. Although the gov- 
ernment-owned radio and PTV presented a progovernment 
line, the establishment of People's Television Network ended 
the government monopoly of television news. In the case of the 
print media, government-controlled newspapers tended to 
express the government's viewpoint, but the large private sec- 
tor of print journalism furnished a much greater variety of 
opinion. 

The imposition of regulations based on the sharia was also 
reflected in the media. For example, the government required 
all women to wear dupattas, or scarves, over their heads on 
newscasts and other PTV programs. Such restrictions, for 
instance, prevented the women's swimming events of the 1992 
Barcelona Olympic Games from being telecast in Pakistan 
because the swimsuits were regarded as immodest. Radio cen- 
sors also ordered a number of controversial songs dropped 
from broadcasting. 

Foreign Policy 

Pakistan's foreign policy has been marked by a complex bal- 
ancing process — the result of its history, religious heritage, and 
geographic position. The primary objective of that policy has 
been to preserve Pakistan's territorial integrity and security, 
which have been in jeopardy since the state's inception. 

A new era began with the partition of British India in 1947 
and the formation of two independent, sovereign states — India 
and Pakistan. Both nations searched for their place in the 
world order and aspired to leadership roles beyond the sub- 
continent. 

India and Pakistan became adversaries at independence 
and have so remained. The two countries fought each other 
shortly after partition, in 1965, and in 1971, causing the dis- 
memberment of Pakistan and the creation of still another new 
sovereign entity — Bangladesh. India-Pakistan rivalry intensified 
rather than diminished after the Cold War, and the Kashmir 
territorial dispute remains dangerous and recurrent. 

Pakistan sought security through outside alliances. The new 
nation painstakingly worked on building a relationship with 



243 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

the United States, in which the obligations of both sides were 
clearly defined. The Western-oriented, anticommunist treaties 
and alliances Pakistan joined became an important part of its 
foreign policy. Pakistan also saw itself as a vanguard of indepen- 
dent Muslim states. 

India 

A major focus in Pakistan's foreign policy is the continuing 
quest for security against India, its larger, more powerful, and 
generally hostile neighbor. Pakistan was created despite the 
opposition of the most powerful political party in prepartition 
India, the Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress, and 
the suspicion remains among Pakistanis that India has never 
reconciled itself to the existence of an independent Pakistan. 
Several events further soured the relationship. One of these 
was the massive transfer of population between the two coun- 
tries at partition, with its attendant bloodshed as Muslims left 
India and Hindus and Sikhs left Pakistan. There was also bitter- 
ness over the distribution of financial assets left by the British, 
with India initially blocking payments to Pakistan from the 
joint sterling account. An even more complex issue was the sov- 
ereignty of Kashmir, a concern arising from the accession of 
the princely states to India or Pakistan at partition. Although 
almost all of these states made the choice quickly, based on 
geographic location and the religious majority of their popula- 
tion, several delayed. One of these was Hyderabad, with a pre- 
dominantly Hindu population and a Muslim ruler who did not 
want to accede to India. Hyderabad was a landlocked state in 
the south of India, and Indian military intervention was used 
to incorporate it into India. 

The princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (usually referred 
to as Kashmir) , however, had a Hindu ruler and boundaries 
with both Pakistan and India. Although Muslims constituted a 
majority of the state's population, the Hindu-Sikh community 
made up the majority in the province of Jammu, and Buddhists 
predominated around Ladakh. After a popular uprising 
against the Hindu ruler in late 1947, supported by Pakistani 
tribesmen and some military units, the ruler panicked and 
acceded to India. The subsequent Indo-Pakistani War of 1947- 
48 over control of Kashmir concluded with a cease-fire bro- 
kered by the United Nations (UN), which took effect on Janu- 
ary 1, 1949. Kashmir was divided by a UN line between the 
areas held by the two countries, and a 1949 UN Security Coun- 



244 



Government and Politics 



cil resolution provided for a plebiscite to be held under UN 
auspices to decide the issue of accession. India has refused to 
hold the plebiscite, and the dispute has continued. In 1965 war 
broke out again between the two countries over Kashmir, end- 
ing in another cease-fire in September. The Tashkent Declara- 
tion, signed on January 10, 1966, under the auspices of the 
Soviet Union, provided for restoration of the India-Pakistan 
international boundary and the Kashmir cease-fire line but did 
not result in a permanent solution to the problem. 

Relations between the two countries reached a new low in 
1971, when India intervened militarily in support of secession- 
ist forces in East Pakistan, thus playing an instrumental role in 
the creation of independent Bangladesh. Although the Indo- 
Pakistani War of 1971 was fought over East Pakistan, heavy 
fighting also occurred along the Kashmir cease-fire line. Conse- 
quently, under the Simla Agreement of 1972 following the end 
of that war, the cease-fire line in Kashmir was redefined (it is 
now usually referred to as the Line of Control) , and India and 
Pakistan agreed not to use force in Kashmir. The agreement 
also improved relations sufficiently for India to release some 
90,000 prisoners of war taken when Pakistan's army had surren- 
dered in East Pakistan (see Yahya Khan and Bangladesh, ch. 1) . 

The circumstances surrounding the conflict over Kashmir 
have changed considerably over the years, as have the levels of 
UN involvement in the dispute. The military balance between 
India and Pakistan after the latter's defeat in the 1971 war 
heavily favored India. Another changed circumstance is that 
beginning in 1989, India has had to face a virtual "Kashmiri 
intifada" in its repressive efforts to keep a sullen and predomi- 
nantly Muslim Kashmiri populace under control. This insurrec- 
tion, India claims, is supported by the "hidden hand" of 
Pakistan. Furthermore, the situation became even more com- 
plex with a growing movement among certain factions of Kash- 
miri militants for an independent Kashmiri state, precluding 
accession to either India or Pakistan. The volatile and poten- 
tially explosive situation in Kashmir continued to be monitored 
in 1994 by a team of UN observers, who operate under signifi- 
cant constraints. The Kashmir dispute remains the major deter- 
rent to improved relations between the two countries. 

Pakistan's suspicions of Indian intentions were further 
aroused by India's entry into the nuclear arena. India's explo- 
sion of a nuclear device in 1974 persuaded Pakistan to initiate 
its own nuclear program. The issue has subsequently influ- 



245 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

enced the direction of Pakistan's relations with the United 
States and China. United States-Pakistan relations over the 
nuclear issue are particularly prickly. Pakistan's relations with 
China on this issue, however, have been influenced by both 
countries' suspicions of India. In 1991 China called on India to 
accept Pakistan's proposal of a nuclear-free weapons zone in 
South Asia. In the same year, Pakistan and China signed a 
nuclear cooperation treaty reportedly intended for peaceful 
purposes. This agreement included provision by China of a 
nuclear power plant to Pakistan. 

An added source of tension in Indo-Pakistani relations con- 
cerned the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in Decem- 
ber 1979 (see Other South Asian Countries, this ch.). India 
refused to condemn the Soviet action, while Pakistan provided 
sanctuary for Afghan refugees and was a conduit for supplying 
arms from the United States and others to the Afghan mujahi- 
din. During the Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghan- 
istan, therefore, Pakistan felt an increased threat on both its 
eastern and northwestern borders. The rise of militant Hindu- 
ism in India, and the accompanying violence against Muslims 
there, is a further source of uneasiness between the two coun- 
tries. 

Other South Asian Countries 

Pakistan seeks to expand its relations with other South Asian 
states, particularly Bangladesh. After an initial period of under- 
standable coolness following the civil war that created Bang- 
ladesh in 1971, relations between the two countries have 
improved considerably. Although Pakistan initially refused to 
recognize Bangladesh, formal relations between the two coun- 
tries were established in 1976. Trade revived between Pakistan 
and its former East Wing, and air links were reestablished. The 
presidents of the two countries have exchanged visits. Both 
countries often agree on international issues, sometimes in 
opposition to India's views. Pakistan also joined the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which 
was founded through the efforts of Bangladesh's President 
Ziaur Rahman. SAARC generally avoids political issues, instead 
addressing social, economic, technological, and environmental 
matters. However, SAARC's annual summit meetings provide 
an opportunity for private discussions among the heads of gov- 
ernment. 



246 



Government and Politics 



Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan, its Muslim neighbor to 
the northwest, have never been easy. When Pakistan was admit- 
ted to the UN, only Afghanistan cast a negative vote, the result 
of Afghanistan's refusal to accept the Durand Line as its border 
with Pakistan. This border, established in 1893, divides the 
Pakhtu or Pash to-speaking people of the region. Afghanistan 
promoted secessionist movements among the Pakhtuns in Paki- 
stan, calling for the creation of an independent Pakhtunistan 
or, alternatively, for Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province to 
join Afghanistan. 

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, had a profound 
effect on Pakistan's geopolitical situation. Pakistan became a 
frontline state in the Cold War. Altogether more than 3 million 
Afghan refugees fled to Pakistan, and the country became a 
base for mujahidin fighting against the Soviet forces and the 
Afghan communists. Pakistan also became a conduit for mili- 
tary assistance by the United States and others to the mujahidin. 

After the Soviet Union completed its troop withdrawal from 
Afghanistan in February 1989, warfare continued between the 
mujahidin and the Afghan communist government in Kabul. 
The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, 
however, resulted in a reassessment of Pakistan's foreign policy, 
particularly in light of the sweeping restructuring of central 
and southwest Asia. The Afghan resistance had been unable to 
unseat the Kabul regime. The heavy burden of the Afghan ref- 
ugees continued, and Pakistan wanted to be in a position to 
establish linkages with the newly emerging Central Asian 
republics of the former Soviet Union. Pakistan decided in early 
1992 to press for a political settlement. The communist govern- 
ment in Kabul was ousted in May 1992 and replaced by a fragile 
coalition of various mujahidin factions. But the coalition did 
not include the most radical of the Islamist mujahidin leaders, 
Gulbaddin Hikmatyar. 

In March 1993, the government of Nawaz Sharif brokered 
an agreement between President Burhanuddin Rabbani of 
Afghanistan and Hikmatyar, Rabbani's longtime enemy, to 
share power in Afghanistan for eighteen months and then hold 
elections. Under the agreement, Rabbani would remain presi- 
dent, Hikmatyar would become prime minister, and they would 
choose government ministers together. A cease-fire was also to 
be implemented. It remains, however, for the agreement to be 
ratified by the leaders of all Muslim groups involved in the war. 



247 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

In 1994 fighting between mujahidin groups escalated in Kabul, 
and a flood of refugees moved toward the Pakistani border. 

The Former Soviet Union 

In November 1992, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, and 
the five former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Kyr- 
gyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan created an extended 
Muslim economic block linking Asia and Europe. As a result, 
the expanded Economic Co-operation Organization (ECO), in 
terms of geographic territory covered, became the largest eco- 
nomic bloc after the European Community. Then Prime Minis- 
ter Nawaz Sharif noted in a speech marking the occasion that 
the ECO "now corresponds to the boundaries of the ancient 
area, which brought prosperity and civilization . . . through 
fruitful exchanges along the historic silk route. The people of 
these lands have a shared history and common spiritual and 
cultural values." Nawaz Sharif added his belief that extensive 
investment in infrastructure and encouragement of the private 
sector were the most important immediate objectives. He 
noted that Pakistan was building a major highway network to 
link Central Asia to the Arabian Sea and that its railroads were 
"poised to link not only member states but also [the] ECO with 
Europe, Russia, and South Asia." He added that "peace in 
Afghanistan is essential for political harmony and fruitful coop- 
eration in our entire region." 

China 

Pakistan's desire for maximum balance and diversification in 
its external relations has also led to close relations with 
China — a valuable geopolitical connection. In 1950 Pakistan 
recognized the People's Republic of China, the third noncom- 
munist state and the first Muslim country to do so. The deterio- 
ration in Sino-Indian relations that culminated in the 1962 
border war provided new opportunities for Pakistan's relations 
with China. The two countries reached agreement on the bor- 
der between them, and a road was built linking China's Xin- 
jiang-Uygur Autonomous Region with the Northern Areas of 
Pakistan. China supported Pakistan diplomatically in both its 
1965 and 1971 wars with India and provided Pakistan with eco- 
nomic and military assistance. Pakistan's China connection 
enabled it to facilitate the 1971 visit of United States secretary 
of state Henry Kissinger to that country, and in the 1980s 
China and the United States supplied military and economic 



248 



Government and Politics 



assistance through Pakistan to the Afghan mujahidin fighting 
the Soviet occupation forces. Pakistan's ties with China remain 
strong, and friendly relations between the two countries con- 
tinue to be an important factor in Pakistan's foreign policy. 

Middle East 

Pakistan also maintains close relations with the Islamic coun- 
tries of the Middle East. These ties are important for religious, 
strategic, political, and economic reasons. In 1955 Pakistan, 
together with Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, joined the Baghdad Pact, 
a security arrangement later called the Central Treaty Organi- 
zation (CENTO) after Iraq's withdrawal. CENTO was but- 
tressed in 1964 by a regional arrangement among Pakistan, 
Iran, and Turkey called the Regional Cooperation for Develop- 
ment (RCD), and economic cooperation activities overshad- 
owed the security aspects of the countries' relations. CENTO 
was disbanded in 1979 with the overthrow of Shah Muhammad 
Reza Pahlavi's government in Iran, and the RCD was dissolved. 
The RCD was effectively revived in 1985 as the ECO. 

Pakistan's foreign policy fostered stronger ties with the Mid- 
dle East through expanded trade. In addition, Pakistani work- 
ers employed in the Persian Gulf states, Libya, and Iran 
provided remittances to Pakistan that were a major source of 
foreign-exchange earnings. The loss of remittances caused by 
the 1991 Persian Gulf War was a serious concern to Pakistan. 
During the war, Pakistani units were sent to Saudi Arabia as 
components of the multinational forces. Pakistan has also con- 
tributed to the defense systems of several Arab states, supplying 
both officers and enlisted personnel. Pakistan has strength- 
ened its Islamic ties by playing a leading role in the Organiza- 
tion of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and has also supported 
the Palestinian cause by withholding recognition of Israel. 

Pakistan's ties with Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states 
were strained during the 1990-91 crisis in the gulf. Although a 
member of the United States-led international coalition, Paki- 
stan played only a limited role, sending a force of 11,000 troops 
tasked with "protecting" religious sites in Saudi Arabia. Never- 
theless, during the war a vocal segment of public opinion in 
Pakistan supported ousting the Kuwaiti monarch and approved 
of Saddam Husayn's defiance of the United States-led coalition. 
The then chief of the army staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, 
openly expressed support for Iraq, resulting in further embar- 
rassment for Pakistan's government. Following the Persian Gulf 



249 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

War, Pakistan undertook diplomatic efforts to recover its posi- 
tion in the region. In addition, many Pakistani expatriate work- 
ers returned to their jobs, and cooperative defense training 
activities continued. As a result, Pakistan largely restored its 
position as an influential player in the region. 

The United States and the West 

Although Pakistan's foreign policy has been dominated by 
problems with India as well as by efforts to maximize its own 
external support, its relationship with the West, particularly 
Britain and the United States, is of major importance. At inde- 
pendence in 1947, Pakistan became a member of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations. After independence Pakistan 
retained Britons in high administrative and military positions. 
Britain also was the primary source of military supplies and 
officer training. Many of Pakistan's key policy makers, includ- 
ing the nation's founding father, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, had 
studied in Britain and had great faith in the British sense of jus- 
tice. Over the years, however, there was disillusionment at what 
Pakistanis perceived as Britain's indifference toward Pakistan 
and its failure to treat Pakistan fairly in dealings where India 
was involved. Nevertheless, Pakistan remained in the Common- 
wealth even after the country became a republic under the 
constitution of 1956. Pakistan withdrew its membership in the 
Commonwealth in 1972 to protest the recognition of Bang- 
ladesh by Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, but rejoined in 
October 1989 under Benazir's first government. 

Pakistan's relations with the United States developed against 
the backdrop of the Cold War. Pakistan's geostrategic position 
made it a valuable partner in Western alliance systems to con- 
tain the spread of communism. In 1954 Pakistan signed a 
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States 
and subsequently became a member of the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization (SEATO) and CENTO. These agreements 
placed Pakistan in the United States sphere of influence. Paki- 
stan was also used as a base for United States military recon- 
naissance flights over Soviet territory. During the Cold War 
years, Pakistan was considered one of Washington's closest 
allies in Asia. 

Pakistan, in return, received large amounts of economic and 
military assistance. The program of military assistance contin- 
ued until the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War when President Lyndon 
B. Johnson placed an embargo on arms shipments to Pakistan 



250 



Government and Politics 



and India. The United States embargo on arms shipments to 
Pakistan remained in place during the Indo-Pakistani War of 
1971 and was not lifted until 1975, during the administration of 
President Gerald R. Ford. 

United States-Pakistani relations preceding the 1971 war 
were characterized by poor communications and much confu- 
sion. The administration of President Richard M. Nixon was 
forced to formulate a public stance on the brutal crackdown 
on East Pakistanis by West Pakistani troops that began in March 
25, 1971, and it maintained that the crackdown was essentially 
an internal affair of Pakistan in which direct intervention of 
outside powers was to be avoided. The Nixon administration 
expressed its concern about human rights violations to Paki- 
stan and restricted the flow of assistance — yet it stopped short 
of an open condemnation. 

Despite the widely publicized United States "tilt" toward 
Pakistan during the 1971 war, Pakistan's new leader, Zulfiqar 
Ali Bhutto, felt betrayed. In his opinion, the United States 
could have prevented India from intervening in Pakistan's civil 
war, thereby saving his country the trauma of defeat and dis- 
memberment. Bhutto strove to lessen Pakistan's dependence 
on the United States. 

The foreign policy Bhutto envisioned would place Pakistan 
at the forefront of Islamic nations. Issues central to the devel- 
oping world would take precedence in foreign affairs over 
those of the superpowers. Bhutto called this policy "bilateral- 
ism," which implied neutrality in the Cold War with equal treat- 
ment accorded both superpowers. Bhutto's distancing of 
Islamabad from Washington and other Western links was 
accompanied by Pakistan's renewed bid for leadership in the 
developing world. 

Following the loss of the East Wing, Pakistan withdrew from 
SEATO. Pakistan's military links with the West continued to 
decline throughout Bhutto's tenure in power and into the first 
years of the Zia regime. When CENTO was disbanded in March 
1979, Pakistan joined the Nonaligned Movement. Zia also con- 
tinued Bhutto's policy of developing Pakistan's nuclear capabil- 
ity. This policy had originated as a defensive measure in 
reaction to India's explosion of a nuclear device in 1974. In 
April 1979, President Jimmy Carter cut off economic assistance 
to Pakistan, except for food assistance, as required under the 
Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 
This amendment called for ceasing economic assistance to 



251 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

nonnuclear weapon countries that imported uranium-enrich- 
ment technology. Relations between the United States and 
Pakistan were further strained in November 1979 when protest- 
ers sacked the United States embassy in Islamabad, resulting in 
the death of four persons. The violence had been sparked by a 
false report that the United States was involved in a fire at the 
Grand Mosque in Mecca. 

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 
revived the close relationship between Pakistan and the United 
States. Initially, however, the Carter administration's offer the 
following month of US$400 million in economic and military 
aid to Pakistan was spurned by Zia, who termed it "peanuts." 
Under President Ronald Reagan, the United States agreed in 
1981 to provide US$3.2 billion to Pakistan over a period of six 
years, equally divided between economic and military assis- 
tance. However, although the Symington Amendment was 
waived, the amount was subject to the annual appropriation 
process. A second economic and military assistance program 
was announced in 1986, this time for over US$4.0 billion, with 
57 percent for economic assistance. The continuation of the 
war in Afghanistan led to waivers — in the case of Pakistan — of 
legislative restrictions on providing aid to countries with 
nuclear programs. The Pressler Amendment of 1985 required 
that if the United States president could not certify to Congress 
on an annual basis that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear 
weapon, United States assistance to that country would be cut 
off. For several years, the United States president, with Paki- 
stan's assurances that its nuclear program was for peaceful uses, 
was able to make this certification. However, with the Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and the end of the Cold 
War, the United States took a harder position on the nuclear 
weapons issue. In 1990 President George Bush refused to make 
the certification required under the Pressler Amendment, and 
assistance to Pakistan was subsequently terminated. 

After 1990 Pakistan's retention of the nuclear option 
became a defining issue in its relations with the United States. 
Pakistan, like India, considered the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty to be discriminatory — allowing the five acknowledged 
nuclear states to keep their weapons while banning others from 
joining the club. Pakistan declared that it would sign the treaty 7 
only in the unlikely event that India did so first. India refused 
to join any regional accord as long as China possessed nuclear 
weapons. Although the United States government continued 



252 



Government and Politics 



to push both India and Pakistan for a regional solution to the 
threat of nuclear weapons proliferation, Pakistan complained 
that it bore the brunt of United States antiproliferation poli- 
cies. 

The long and close security relationship between the United 
States and Pakistan persisted in 1994, although the 1954 
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement on which the relation- 
ship was based was increasingly regarded by some in the United 
States government as outdated — and thus less pertinent to the 
post-Cold War period. Moreover, despite Pakistan's differences 
with the position of the United States on nuclear and other 
issues, both countries were determined to maintain friendly 
relations. 

International Organizations 

Pakistan joined the UN on September 30, 1947, and since 
then has been an active participant in the UN and its special- 
ized agencies and other bodies, as well as in various specialized 
UN conferences. In 1993 Pakistan was elected to a two-year 
term on the UN Security Council. In addition, Pakistani 
nationals have contributed their skills within the UN itself. For 
example, in 1987 Nafis Sadik, a Pakistani woman physician, 
became executive director of the United Nations Population 
Fund (UNFPA) with the rank of undersecretary general. Paki- 
stan has also been the recipient of assistance from UN develop- 
ment organizations, including the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the Food and Agricul- 
ture Organization (FAO) in a variety of fields such as agricul- 
ture, water and sanitation, national planning, and human 
development. The UNDP, for example, allocated more than 
US$87 million for assistance to Pakistan for the 1992-96 pro- 
gram period. 

Pakistan's view of the UN has necessarily been conditioned 
by its own needs and experience. Although recognizing the 
shortcomings and powerlessness of the UN in many situations, 
Pakistan has seen no alternative to the UN as a forum where 
weaker countries could appeal to the world's conscience 
against the actions of stronger powers. Consequently, Pakistan 
has called for solutions to international problems through UN 
auspices, most notably for resolution of the Kashmir issue. 
Pakistan also has played a highly visible role in UN peacekeep- 
ing efforts, contributing more than 7,000 troops to the United 
Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) — the largest single 



253 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

national contingent to any peacekeeping force in 1994. Paki- 
stan had troops serving with the United Nations Protection 
Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNPROFOR BH) and had 
participating observers in a number of other UN missions (see 
Foreign Security Relationships, ch. 5). 

Pakistan's participation in other international organizations, 
including SAARC and the ECO, reflects its desire to be an 
influential player in the geographic region of which it is a part. 
In addition, Pakistan has played a leading role in the OIC, and 
President Zia was instrumental in revitalizing the OIC as a 
forum for periodic meetings of the heads of Islamic states. 
Pakistan thus appears firmly committed to the utility of broad- 
based international cooperation. 

* # # 

Political developments are examined in considerable detail 
in Lawrence Ziring's Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Develop- 
ment. For studies of Islam in Pakistan, Leonard Binder's Religion 
and Politics in Pakistan and Hafeez Malik's Moslem Nationalism in 
India and Pakistan are useful. For Pakistan's formative period, 
Richard Symonds's The Making of Pakistan, Khalid B. Sayeed's 
Pakistan: The Formative Phase, and Wayne Ayres Wilcox's Paki- 
stan: The Consolidation of a Nation are excellent. 

Pakistan's first ten years or so are expertly covered in Keith 
Callard's Political Forces in Pakistan, 1947-1959 and G.W. 
Choudhury's Constitutional Development in Pakistan. The Paki- 
stani bureaucracy is described by Ralph Braibanti in Bureau- 
cracy and Political Development, edited by Joseph LaPalombara. 

The Pakistani army and its political role are described in 
Fazal Muqeem Khan's The Story of the Pakistan Army. The dis- 
memberment of Pakistan is investigated in G.W. Choudhury's 
The Last Days of United Pakistan. Useful accounts of Pakistan's 
foreign policy are Latif Ahmed Sherwani's Pakistan, China, and 
America and S.M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring's Pakistan's Foreign 
Policy. An overview of politics and government in Pakistan from 
independence through 1990 is provided in Craig Baxter et al., 
Government and Politics in South Asia. An analysis of political 
developments in the early 1990s is provided by Pakistan: 1992, 
edited by Charles H. Kennedy. (For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



254 



Chapter 5. National Security 




Artist's rendition of tile mosaic of horseman with lance from the Pictured Wall, 
Lahore Fort, Punjab. Artwork represents seventeenth-century tile work of the 
Mughal period. 



THE ARMED FORCES OF PAKISTAN have traditionally played 
a distinctive role in the life of the nation. As in many other 
developing countries, they are an important modernizing force 
in society and a key tool of national integration. As defenders 
of the nation's interests in Pakistan's troubled and volatile geo- 
political neighborhood, the armed forces are accorded a par- 
ticularly high status in public opinion. Less welcome, however, 
has been the repeated interference of the armed forces in the 
internal affairs and politics of the country. The military has fre- 
quently been called in to gain control of unrest that has gone 
beyond the ability of the police to cope; some of these intru- 
sions have had a major impact and have been of fairly long 
duration. The military has assumed control of the entire coun- 
try three times under proclamations of martial law. Indeed, 
since it became an independent state in 1947, Pakistan has 
been under military control for much of its existence. 

At the same time, however, democracy has always been seen 
as the "natural" state of the Pakistani polity, and the military 
has ultimately returned power to civilian hands. Thus, 
although the armed forces have dominated the country to a 
certain extent, they have not perpetuated a military dictator- 
ship. The military has been a permanent factor in the life of 
the country, but in a role that has ranged from complete con- 
trol to vigilant observer. As political scientist Leonard Binder 
has observed, "Even [Pakistan's] dependence upon the mili- 
tary does not necessarily make of it a praetorian state, because 
there is little evidence that the state works in the sole interest of 
the military. Rather, it was the military which intervened in 
order to prevent the breakdown of the patrimonial system." 
Much of the political history of Pakistan has been set in this 
drama of contending influences, and the military in early 1994 
was still searching for a role that would reconcile its interests 
and the broader needs of a country whose politicians were 
struggling to establish a credible authority of their own. 

The Armed Services: A Historical Perspective 

The Colonial Background 

At its creation in 1947, Pakistan looked back on two tradi- 
tions while seeking to reject a third. One was the more than 



257 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

100 years of British colonial rule that radically reshaped the 
superstructure of the subcontinent and was the door to moder- 
nity. The other inheritance, the Muslim conquest and domi- 
nance from the thirteenth century to the nineteenth century, 
provided the Islamic factor that led to the partition of India 
and shaped modern-day Pakistan. The Muslim conquest also 
offered a useful mythology of exaggerated Islamic military 
prowess and dominance. The tradition that the new nation 
rejected and sought to leave behind was that of largely Hindu 
India. Indeed, differentiation from that heritage was the raison 
d'etre of Pakistan; yet it remains important, for much of Paki- 
stan's cultural heritage is shared with India. India also remains 
the primary preoccupation of Pakistan's foreign policy and 
security concerns. 

The country's British heritage has played the greatest role in 
transforming the often amorphous military tradition of the 
Muslim period into streamlined modern forces. Beginning in 
the earliest days of the East India Company (chartered in 
1600), native guards were hired by the British to protect trad- 
ing posts. As time went by, these troops were given additional 
training and were organized under British officers into the 
armies of the company's presidencies at Calcutta (Fort Will- 
iam), Madras (Fort St. George), and Bombay. In 1748 the pres- 
idency armies were brought under the command of Major 
Stringer Lawrence, who subsequently became known as the 
father of the British Indian Army. A series of military reforms, 
first undertaken by Robert Clive in the mid-eighteenth century, 
continued through the first half of the nineteenth century as 
the British Parliament asserted increasing control over the East 
India Company and its military arm. Part of the legacy that 
shaped the British Indian Army was the growing understanding 
that civil and military spheres of activity were distinct, that each 
must respect the other, but that ultimate control rested with 
the civilian power, whether in later times the governor general 
or the local district magistrate. The role of the military was to 
give "aid-to-the-civil power." 

The critical event in the evolution of the British Indian Army 
was the uprising of 1857-58 — known as the Indian Mutiny or 
Sepoy Rebellion by British historians and sometimes as the 
First War of Independence by later Indian nationalists — when 
troops in north-central India, Muslim and Hindu alike, rose up 
against the British (see The Seeds of Muslim Nationalism, ch. 
1). Some bonds of loyalty held, but many Indian troops slaugh- 



258 



National Security 



tered both their British leaders and hapless civilians. With the 
help of Indian troops who did not join the rebellion — espe- 
cially Sikhs and Muslims from the Punjab — the mutineers were 
put down with a violence that matched the atrocities that they 
had committed. 

The bond between Indian and Briton had been broken, and 
a rethinking of British military policy in India was set in 
motion. East India Company rule was abolished, and direct 
British rule — the British Raj — was instituted in 1858. Emphasis 
was put on recruiting in areas where disaffection was least and 
where the British discerned the existence of "martial races" 
(ethnic groups) noted for their military tradition, lack of polit- 
ical sophistication, and demonstrated loyalty. By these criteria, 
the most fertile area for recruitment was in the Punjab region 
of northwestern India. The Punjabization of the British Indian 
Army and the assumptions that underlay it would weigh heavily 
on both the international and the domestic politics of Pakistan 
once it was created as an independent entity. 

Pakistan's military structure in the early 1990s in many ways 
bore a close resemblance to the British Indian Army structure 
at the end of the nineteenth century. During that period, 
recruitment into individual, homogeneous regiments 
depended on class and caste, rather than on territory. Over 
time, these regiments became sources of immense pride to the 
men who served in them and to the ethnic group from which 
they were frequently recruited. Service in a specific regiment 
passed from father to son; the eventual shift from British to 
Pakistani rule went with hardly a ripple in the structure except 
for the change in nationality of the senior officer corps. 

The British experimented with various forms of recruitment 
and of elevation to officer rank. During the period between the 
two world wars (1919-39), the British trained Indian officers to 
command Indian troops, and training establishments were set 
up to produce an indigenous officer corps. A small number of 
officer candidates were sent to Britain to the Royal Military 
Academy at Sandhurst; after 1932 the majority of candidates 
were trained at the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun. 

A rank that predated that of the native officer was the vice- 
roy's commissioned officer — an Indian who had risen from the 
ranks and performed officer functions (except for command- 
ing officer), especially at the company level. The viceroy's com- 
missioned officer came from the same social background as did 
the troops in his unit and performed a dual function: for the 



259 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

troops, he was a role model and figure of respect to whom they 
could turn for advice; he was also an invaluable intermediary 
between the troops and the British officer who commanded 
them. 

The British Indian Army came under immense stress during 
both world wars, when it was rapidly expanded and deployed 
abroad to wherever the British Empire appeared threatened. 
During World War I, nearly 750,000 Indian troops were 
recruited for service; some 36,000 were killed, and twice as 
many were wounded. The troops generally acquitted them- 
selves well, and their contribution was used as an arguing point 
by Indian nationalist politicians who sought greater autonomy 
for their country. 

The army encountered a different kind of stress during the 
interwar period and beyond, when it was called on to suppress 
the growing wave of nationalist resistance. This use of Indian 
personnel alienated the nationalist leaders, especially those of 
the Indian National Congress, who would become the leaders 
of India in 1947. The problem was much less serious in what 
was to become Pakistan. Indeed, during the "Quit India" move- 
ment during World War II, when the British sought to crush 
Congress with special vigor because of its resistance to the war, 
the All-India Muslim League and the army supported the Brit- 
ish cause (see Toward Partition, ch. 1). 

During World War II, the British Indian Army (together with 
the small Royal Indian Navy and Royal Indian Air Force) grew 
to meet imperial requirements, expanding from essentially a 
constabulary force of 175,000 to a mass army of more than 2 
million. This growth meant appointing many Indians as offic- 
ers, who received only short training courses, and general 
recruitment in areas of the country where "martial" spirit had 
not been discerned before. Once again, Indian troops per- 
formed loyally and effectively, even while the country was in 
political turmoil. 

The Formation of Pakistan 

The Indian military had no role in the relinquishment of 
control by the British and the division of India into two parts — 
India and Pakistan. Under their British commanders, the 
Indian military had resisted the nationalist tide, and then, 
when London changed its course, Indian military personnel 
obediently shifted their allegiance to new masters. After parti- 
tion and independence, the relationship between the military 



260 




i "S 




Soldiers on parade 
Courtesy Embassy of Pakistan, Washington 



and the new nationalist government in India was at first prob- 
lematic. India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, deliber- 
ately limited the expansion and modernization of his country's 
armed forces, fearing that an excessive emphasis on the mili- 
tary would lead to the militarization of society and undermine 
the nation's fledgling democratic institutions. 

The Pakistani military, however, immediately became a cen- 
tral part of the national consciousness. Unlike their Indian 
counterparts, Pakistani soldiers did not bear the stigma of 
being antinational. The main base of army recruitment, Pun- 
jab, was at the heart of Pakistan, and the army was immediately 
called upon to defend the interests of the nation against a per- 
ceived security threat from "Hindu India." 

The Pakistani army was fortunate in its political position, but 
less so in regard to the experience and technical expertise 
required to field an effective military force. Muslims had been 
significantly underrepresented in the Indian officer corps, and 
when partition occurred, there was a severe shortage of person- 
nel. To lead the planned army of 150,000 men, 4,000 officers 
were needed, but there were only 2,500, and many of those, 
especially in the technical services, were underqualified. Only 
one major general, two brigadiers, and six colonels were avail- 
able, and in the middle officer ranks the situation was equally 
bad. The first two commanders in chief of the army were Brit- 
ish. The first Pakistani commander in chief — General Moham- 
mad Ayub Khan — did not become commander in chief of the 
army until 1951. In the small Pakistani navy and air force, the 
situation was even worse: there were only nine regular officers 
in the navy and sixty-five pilots in the air force. Both forces had 
to be commanded by British officers: the navy until 1953 and 



261 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

the air force until 1957. Overall, some 500 British officers were 
retained on contract to ease the transition of the armed forces 
until Pakistanis could be qualified and promoted. In the 
interim, training underqualified officers for rapid promotion 
was a matter of top priority. 

The lack of equipment presented further problems. Most of 
the depots and virtually all of the military production facilities 
were located in areas that became India, which was less than 
forthcoming in handing over the share of military materiel 
that was due Pakistan under the partition agreement. Pakistan 
received little or nothing in the way of ships and only two of the 
ten squadrons of the former Royal Indian Air Force. Pakistani 
military historian Fazl Muqeem Khan records: "It is no exagger- 
ation to say that for its first few months the infant state of Paki- 
stan was without an organized army." 

Units with a majority of Muslims (as well as individual Mus- 
lims in other units who opted for Pakistan) that were located in 
India had to find their way to Pakistan. These men formed new 
units based on common traditions and class affiliation; the 
remaining service gaps were gradually filled by recruitment. 
Intercommunal violence at partition took a huge toll of lives, 
and the role played by the army in protecting the citizens of 
the new Pakistan created an important initial bond between 
army and people. 

The crucial challenge to the new Pakistani military was the 
outbreak of hostilities with India over the disputed state of 
Jammu and Kashmir immediately after partition (see Problems 
at Independence, ch. 1). Unlike most of the rulers of the other 
princely states of India, the Hindu ruler of Kashmir (as it is 
usually called) hesitated in declaring the allegiance of his 
largely Muslim realm to one or the other of the new nations. 
Bands of Muslim tribesmen from Pakistan — together with "vol- 
unteers" from the Pakistani army — entered the state in early 
October 1947 to force the issue and, after joining up with 
insurgents within Kashmir, were soon threatening to over- 
whelm the Kashmiri forces. As the price for protection, the 
ruler acceded to India, and elements of the Indian army 
arrived on October 27. They soon routed the Pakistani irregu- 
lars and moved westward to consolidate control over all of the 
state. Pakistan committed regular military formations to com- 
bat in May 1948 to ensure its borders and stabilize the situa- 
tion. Fighting continued until January 1, 1949, when a United 
Nations (UN) -sponsored cease-fire took effect. The cease-fire 



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did not, however, settle the underlying conflict. The dispute 
flared up several times again, most notably in 1965, and 
remained unresolved as of early 1994. The Indian and Paki- 
stani armies remained deployed along much the same line as 
they had in 1949. The Pakistani army, however, performed 
credibly in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-48 and won 
immense admiration and support among Pakistanis, on which 
it drew heavily as Pakistan began to pay the price of developing 
a military capability to offset that of India. 

Pakistan's Evolving Security Dilemma 

Survival in a Harsh Environment 

Pakistan is located in a critical and historically contentious 
part of the world. At the time of independence, it was the 
world's fifth largest nation. Yet three of its close neighbors 
(China, India, and the Soviet Union) were larger, more popu- 
lous, and not necessarily well-intentioned. Pakistan was divided 
into two wings, East Pakistan (renamed Bangladesh when it 
became independent in 1971) and West Pakistan. It would 
soon become apparent that the country, divided by 1,600 kilo- 
meters of a hostile India, was also divided by competing ethnic 
groups with only Islam serving as a tenuous link. Furthermore, 
West Pakistan was geographically a fairly narrow country, lack- 
ing in strategic depth — its main cities and communications 
arteries lay close to the border with India and thus were vulner- 
able to attack. Additionally, the headwaters of Pakistan's rivers 
and vital irrigation systems were largely controlled by India. 
East Pakistan, except for its Bay of Bengal coast, was also virtu- 
ally surrounded by India. 

There were other security complications. Pakistan's borders 
with India were new and hence were totally unfortified and, in 
most places, were drawn in ways that made them almost inde- 
fensible. Because the borders were also undemarcated, there 
was ample opportunity for conflict. Although the military gave 
border control over to paramilitary forces, the armed forces 
remained ready for deployment in case of emergency. 

Almost all of Pakistan's ethnic groups extended into neigh- 
boring countries. This situation caused particular problems 
with the Afghans, who did not recognize the border as valid 
and hoped that their new neighbor would be unable to assert 
its interests. 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

Security concerns were not limited to the outside world. 
Despite the euphoria of nationhood, Pakistan was increasingly 
subject to the same kinds of internal stresses that had charac- 
terized British India — fractious tribesmen, dacoits (armed 
gangs of robbers) , and restive cities — and required the army to 
render aid-to-the-civil power. Even the need to repress national- 
ist movements recurred as regional groups within Pakistan 
sought greater autonomy from central control. 

Although Pakistan perceived in India a threat to its security, 
initially it was not able to defend itself against that perceived 
threat because of limited personnel and materiel. Pakistan 
therefore had to develop a comprehensive military strategy 
that would offset at least some of its weaknesses. High hopes 
were placed on support from other Muslim nations, some of 
which could help financially and others of which would pro- 
vide through alliances some of the geostrategic territorial 
depth that Pakistan lacked. But the emergence of the first state 
created on the basis of Islam was of relatively little interest to 
the nations of the Arab world. Britain helped significantly in 
supplying officers and equipment, but it was itself in an eco- 
nomic crisis and would not alienate India. 

In 1951, during a period of heightened tension with India 
along the frontier, Mohammad Ayub Khan was appointed the 
first Pakistani commander in chief of the army. Ayub Khan 
immediately concentrated on reshaping the Pakistani military, 
putting special emphasis on training and operational planning, 
two critical areas in which Pakistan did not depend completely 
on foreign resources. These tasks, plus reorganization, occu- 
pied the attention of the army well into the 1950s. Critical 
shortages of equipment, however, remained, requiring that 
Pakistan look abroad for its provisioning. The selection of Ayub 
Khan as the commander in chief of the army was of seminal 
importance. Perhaps more than any other Pakistani, he was 
responsible for seeking and securing military and economic 
assistance from the United States and for aligning Pakistan 
with the United States in international affairs. 

The United States Alliance 

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, it was natural 
for Pakistan to covet the wealth and surplus military equipment 
of the United States. United States-Pakistan relations were cor- 
dial, and throughout the late 1940s, Pakistan sought to nurture 



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those close relations and gain access to United States military 
support; initially, these attempts were rebuffed. 

As the new decade opened, however, a series of events put 
new hope into the possibility of United States-Pakistan cooper- 
ation. First was the reassessment of Pakistan's military position 
undertaken by Ayub Khan. The second event was the outbreak 
of the Korean War (1950-53), which drew United States atten- 
tion toward Asia and marked the point of no return of the glo- 
balization of United States security policy. The third factor was 
the advent of the Eisenhower-Dulles team, which set to work 
building a ring of containment around the Sino-Soviet bloc. 
India, committed to nonalignment, had come into sharp dis- 
agreement with the United States in the UN when it refused to 
censure China as an aggressor in the Korean War and thus was 
viewed by the United States as a voice for communist appease- 
ment. India's refusal to join the United States-sponsored 1951 
Treaty of Peace with Japan — a pact among nations designed, 
among other purposes, to recruit Japan as an ally against com- 
munist inroads in Asia — further divided the two countries. 
India was not available as an ally; Pakistan was the inevitable 
alternative (see Foreign Policy, ch. 4) . 

Pakistan and the United States drew closer together, high- 
level visits were exchanged, and the groundwork was laid for a 
security relationship that seemed to meet Pakistan's political 
needs and equipment deficit. At United States prompting, 
Pakistan and Turkey concluded a security treaty in 1954 — the 
Turko-Pakistan Pact — which immediately enabled United 
States military assistance to Pakistan under the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Agreement signed the same year. Pakistan also 
became a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO) in 1954 and joined the Baghdad Pact, later renamed 
the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1959. Pakistan 
had little interest in SEATO and discerned no danger to its 
interests from China, joining mainly to oblige Washington. 
Even CENTO, which offered the advantage of a new approach 
to the Muslim world, was problematic because it drove a wedge 
between Pakistan and the Arab countries that remained out- 
side it and was seen by Pakistanis as institutionally weak 
because the United States was never willing to become a full 
member. None of these arrangements addressed Pakistan's 
main concern, however — India. 

At Pakistan's insistence, an additional agreement (the Agree- 
ment of Cooperation) on security was concluded with the 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

United States in March 1959, by which the United States com- 
mitted itself to the "preservation of the independence and 
integrity of Pakistan" and agreed to take "appropriate action, 
including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed 
upon ... in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its 
request." The Agreement of Cooperation also said nothing 
about India and was cast in the context of the Eisenhower Doc- 
trine, which dealt with communist threats to the Middle East. 
Pakistan saw the agreement as representing a high level of 
United States commitment, however, and some United States 
officials apparently encouraged an interpretation that saw 
more in the agreement than was actually there. There was con- 
siderable self-deception on both sides — Pakistan believed that 
it had secured an ally in its rivalry with India, and the United 
States focused on Pakistan as an adherent to the anticommu- 
nist cause. 

Tangible gains to Pakistan from the relationship were sub- 
stantial. Between 1954 and 1965, the United States provided 
Pakistan with US$630 million in direct-grant assistance and 
more than US$670 million in concessional sales and defense- 
support assistance. The army received equipment for one addi- 
tional armored division, four infantry divisions, and one 
armored brigade and received support elements for two corps. 
The air force received six squadrons of modern jet aircraft. 
The navy received twelve ships. The ports of Karachi (in West 
Pakistan) and Chittagong (in East Pakistan) were modernized. 
The program did not, however, provide for the wholesale mod- 
ernization of the military, much less its expansion. Forces in 
Kashmir and East Pakistan were excluded, and there was a con- 
tinuing tug-of-war between the United States and Pakistan as 
Pakistan sought to extend the scope of the program and wring 
more benefits out of it. 

The impact on the military of this new relationship was 
intense. Pakistanis embraced the latest concepts in military 
organization and thinking with enthusiasm and adopted 
United States training and operational doctrine. The army and 
the air force were transformed into fairly modern, well- 
equipped fighting forces. In the course of the rearmament pro- 
gram, the military was substantially reorganized along United 
States lines, and hundreds of Pakistani officers were trained by 
United States officers, either in Pakistan or in schools in the 
United States. Although many British traditions remained, 



266 



National Security 



much of the tone of the army, especially the officer corps, was 
Americanized. 

Pakistan's hopes for an equitable settlement of its disputes 
with India, especially over Kashmir, were probably small in any 
event, but by bringing the United States directly into the South 
Asian security equation, rapprochement with India became vir- 
tually impossible. More important, India responded to Paki- 
stan's new alignment by turning to the Soviet Union for 
military and political support — and the Soviet leader at the 
time, Nikita S. Khrushchev, was only too happy to oblige. As a 
result, Pakistan not only incurred Soviet hostility but also ulti- 
mately triggered a Soviet military supply program in India that 
more than offset the United States assistance to Pakistan. Soviet 
displeasure was further heightened by Pakistan's decision to 
grant facilities at Peshawar for the United States to conduct U- 
2 aerial reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union. 

The Army Assumes Control 

The developing relationship with the United States was only 
one of the dramatic experiences that the military underwent in 
the late 1950s. The political system had been performing very 
poorly, especially since the assassination of Prime Minister 
Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951 (see Constitutional and Political 
Inheritance, ch. 4). There was increasing public disillusion- 
ment with the system and little respect for political leaders, 
who were seen as incompetent and corrupt. In fact, decision- 
making power had been moving inexorably away from the lead- 
ers of the political parties and into the hands of the two 
national institutions that were seen as competent and honest — 
the bureaucracy and the army. 

On October 7, 1958, President Iskander Mirza annulled the 
1956 constitution by proclamation, dissolved the national and 
provincial assemblies, and banned political parties. Asserting 
that if Pakistan were to be saved, the army would have to 
assume political control. Mirza then declared martial law and 
appointed General Ayub Khan chief martial law administrator. 
Twenty days later, Ayub moved against Mirza, sending him into 
exile, and assumed the office of president himself. Thus began 
the second role of the military — self-appointed guardian of 
domestic affairs of state as well as defender against external 
enemies. The results were mixed, both for Pakistan and for its 
soldiers. The military continued to enjoy preferred access to 
resources in Pakistan, and an elaborate system of quasi-govern- 



267 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

mental bodies provided economic opportunities for military 
personnel, especially after retirement. The country as a whole 
welcomed army rule, which brought a period of stability and 
rapid economic growth and vigorously attacked the corruption 
that beset the country. The army ruled with a firm but light 
hand, retaining ultimate control but working largely through 
the bureaucracy. 

Economic gains, however, were so badly distributed that 
they seemed hollow to many Pakistanis. The involvement of 
military personnel in governing detracted from their primary 
mission. Although the military remained popular, it became 
associated with the political divisions of the country and was no 
longer solely the symbol of national unity. Opposition began to 
develop, especially among intellectuals and politicians. 

Ayub Khan lifted martial law in 1962, replacing it with an 
authoritarian constitution under which he was elected presi- 
dent (see Basic Democracies, ch. 1; Ayub Khan, 1958-69, ch. 
4) . While the new system had some constructive features, it 
failed to gain public support, and even though the army was no 
longer governing the country, Ayub Khan and his system were 
seen as unpopular manifestations of military rule. 

Collapse of Pakistan's Security System 

Pakistan's tie to the United States was a product of the post- 
World War II communist containment strategy and the fear of 
Soviet expansionism. By the end of the 1950s, a number of fac- 
tors had changed — some to Pakistan's advantage, others not. 
The positive factor was the emergence of China as an indepen- 
dent international actor at odds with both the Soviet Union 
and India, thereby creating new policy options for Pakistan. 
Less favorable was a decline in international tensions that 
reduced the United States preoccupation with containment 
and, hence, Pakistan's value. At the same time, the Eisenhower 
administration was seeking to reclaim some of the ground it 
had lost with India, and this trend was strengthened as tensions 
grew between New Delhi and Beijing, Washington's principal 
bete-noire of the time. 

Pakistan was able to profit from Sino-Indian hostility by 
securing China as an additional source of support, but ties to 
Beijing were anathema to Washington and caused serious prob- 
lems in United States-Pakistan relations during the 1960s. Rap- 
prochement between New Delhi and Washington also caused 
deep concern to Pakistanis. Pakistan was appalled when, at the 



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time of the Sino-Indian War in 1962, the United States rushed 
to rearm India without meeting Pakistan's demands that assis- 
tance be coupled with effective pressure to force India to settle 
the Kashmir dispute. The United States reassured Pakistan that 
India was not arming against Pakistan, but Pakistan realized 
that the external equalizer it had brought into the subconti- 
nent to make up its security deficit would now be devalued as 
the United States, at best, played an even-handed role or, at 
worst, shifted its principal attention to India. 

The security situation deteriorated still further as India, 
which had hitherto spent relatively little on defense, engaged 
in a major buildup of forces that were primarily aimed at China 
but could as readily be turned against Pakistan. In addition, 
after 1964 India took a series of steps to incorporate Kashmir 
more closely into the Indian union, rendering less likely any 
negotiations on the matter with Pakistan. Under the circum- 
stances, Pakistan decided that its chances of gaining Kashmir 
would only deteriorate; hence, it opted for early action. 

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 

In mid-1965, Pakistan sent guerrilla forces into the Indian- 
held territory of Kashmir in the hope of stirring up a rebellion 
that would either oust the Indians or at least force the issue 
back onto the international agenda. Pakistani forces did not 
find as much support among the Kashmiri population as they 
had hoped, but fighting spread by August, and a process of 
escalation culminated in a full-scale Indian offensive toward 
Lahore on September 6. Fighting, frequently very bitter, con- 
tinued until a UN-sponsored cease-fire took hold on Septem- 
ber 23. Both sides had tacitly agreed not to let the war spread to 
the East Wing of Pakistan. 

The war was militarily inconclusive; each side held prisoners 
and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were rela- 
tively heavy — on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, 
and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand 
Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only 
have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. 
Most Pakistanis, schooled in the belief of their own martial 
prowess, refused to accept the possibility of their country's mil- 
itary defeat by "Hindu India" and were, instead, quick to blame 
their failure to attain their military aims on what they consid- 
ered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government. 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

Pakistan was rudely shocked by the reaction of the United 
States to the war. Judging the matter to be largely Pakistan's 
fault, the United States not only refused to come to Pakistan's 
aid under the terms of the Agreement of Cooperation, but 
issued a statement declaring its neutrality while also cutting off 
military supplies. The Pakistanis were embittered by what they 
considered a friend's betrayal, and the experience taught them 
to avoid relying on any single source of support. For its part, 
the United States was disillusioned by a war in which both sides 
used United States-supplied equipment. The war brought 
other repercussions for the security relationship as well. The 
United States withdrew its military assistance advisory group in 
July 1967. In response to these events, Pakistan declined to 
renew the lease on the Peshawar military facility, which ended 
in 1969. Eventually, United States-Pakistan relations grew mea- 
surably weaker as the United States became more deeply 
involved in Vietnam and as its broader interest in the security 
of South Asia waned. 

Iran, Indonesia, and especially China gave political support 
to Pakistan during the war, thus suggesting new directions in 
Pakistan that might translate into support for its security con- 
cerns. Most striking was the attitude of the Soviet Union. Its 
post-Khrushchev leadership, rather than rallying reflexively to 
India's side, adopted a neutral position and ultimately pro- 
vided the good offices at Tashkent, which led to the January 
1966 Tashkent Declaration that restored the status quo ante. 

The aftermath of the 1965 war saw a dramatic shift in Paki- 
stan's security environment. Instead of a single alignment with 
the United States against China and the Soviet Union, Pakistan 
found itself cut off from United States military support, on 
increasingly warm terms with China, and treated equitably by 
the Soviet Union. Unchanged was the enmity with which India 
and Pakistan regarded each other over Kashmir. The result was 
the elaboration of a new security approach, called by Ayub 
Khan the "triangular tightrope" — a tricky endeavor to maintain 
good ties with the United States while cultivating China and 
the Soviet Union. Support from other developing nations was 
also welcome. None of the new relationships carried the weight 
of previous ties with the United States, but, taken together, they 
at least provided Pakistan with a political counterbalance to 
India. 

Pakistan needed other sources of military supply, most 
urgently because of its wartime losses and the United States 



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National Security 



embargo. After 1965 China became Pakistan's principal mili- 
tary supplier, providing materiel to all three services in substan- 
tial quantity and at attractive prices. Submarines and Mirage 
aircraft were also purchased from France. The Soviet Union 
sought to woo Pakistan with military equipment, but that pro- 
gram never really developed because of Moscow's concern not 
to jeopardize its more important relationship with India. The 
United States gradually relaxed its embargo; however, it was 
only in 1973 that substantial supplies again flowed to Pakistan. 

The late 1960s were politically turbulent times for Pakistan; 
by 1969 conditions had deteriorated to the point where the 
army once again felt called on to intervene. On March 25, an 
ailing and discredited Ayub Khan transferred power to army 
commander in chief General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, 
who declared himself president as well as chief martial law 
administrator (CMLA) and announced that Pakistan would 
have national general elections — for the first time since inde- 
pendence — and a new constitution. The elections in December 
1970 were fair but led to the breakup of Pakistan (see Yahya 
Khan and Bangladesh, ch. 1). In the process, the army and 
Pakistan's security situation deteriorated still further. 

The largely Punjabi army was in a politically untenable posi- 
tion in East Pakistan, which had voted overwhelmingly for an 
autonomist party. Once it became clear that a compromise 
between the civilian leaders of West Pakistan and East Pakistan 
was unattainable, Yahya Khan was forced to choose between 
the two sides, and his actions were seen by the Bengalis of the 
East Wing as favoring the interests of West Pakistan, which were 
hardly distinguishable from those of the armed forces. Yahya 
decided to postpone indefinitely the convening of the new 
National Assembly, which would have been controlled by Ben- 
galis. It was feared that a government dominated by East Paki- 
stani interests would cut back sharply on military prerogatives 
and roll back the dominance of Punjab in national affairs. 
Within days, unrest spread throughout East Pakistan. Bengalis 
went on strike and stopped paying taxes. Bengali autonomists 
became separatists. 

Army elements in East Pakistan were strengthened in the 
spring of 1971 and were used to suppress Bengali recalcitrance. 
The task was undertaken with ferocity; killing, rape, looting, 
and brutality were widespread and resulted in the flight of 
nearly 10 million refugees to India over six months. Interna- 
tional outrage grew and forced the Richard M. Nixon adminis- 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

tration in the United States to halt its attempts to reopen 
military supply lines to Pakistan. 

The army was generally successful during the spring and 
summer of 1971 in restoring order in East Pakistan, but 
increasing Indian support of the antigovernment Bengali guer- 
rillas known as the Mukti Bahini (Liberation Force) began to 
shift the balance. When Indian troops finally intervened 
directly in December, there was no hope of stopping them. 
Even though the garrison in East Pakistan had been rein- 
forced, national strategy was still based on the assumption that 
Pakistan could not simultaneously defend both wings of the 
country against an Indian attack; hence, an attack in the east 
would be countered in the west. On December 3, Pakistani 
forces began hostilities in the west with attacks on Indian air- 
fields. They had little success, and within twenty-four hours 
India had gained air superiority, launched attacks against West 
Pakistan, and blockaded the coast. Pakistani forces in East Paki- 
stan surrendered to the Indian army on December 16, and 
India offered a cease-fire. In the face of superior force on all 
fronts, Pakistan had little choice but to accept the breakup of 
the country. 

The armed forces were shattered and their equipment 
destroyed; 9,000 troops were lost, and 90,000 prisoners of war 
were in the hands of Indians and Bengalis in Bangladesh (the 
former East Pakistan). Yahya Khan resigned in disgrace, and 
the winner of the elections in West Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto, succeeded him as CMLA and president. Pakistan, a 
country originally created in the name of religion, lost its rai- 
son d'etre as the homeland of Muslims in the subcontinent and 
was much reduced in size. Although the politicians were ulti- 
mately responsible for the events of 1971, the army and its lead- 
ers were the obvious villains. 

The security situation of the nation also changed. Any illu- 
sions of parity vis-a-vis India were demolished. Although both 
China and the United States had tilted toward Pakistan politi- 
cally, it was abundantly clear that neither of those superpowers 
was in a position to offset Indian primacy in the region, espe- 
cially in view of the friendship treaty that India had signed with 
the Soviet Union in August 1971, just before the outbreak of 
hostilities. The Soviet Union, forced to choose sides, opted for 
India, and the rapprochement that had taken place between 
Pakistan and the Soviet Union evaporated. Pakistan stood 
largely alone and at the mercy of India. The 1972 bilateral 



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National Security 



Simla Agreement restored most of the status quo that existed 
before the 1971 war in the relations between the two nations. 
The agreement states that "the two countries are resolved to 
settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral 
negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed 
upon between them." Although India maintained the more 
narrow interpretation that disputes be settled bilaterally, Paki- 
stan in subsequent years favored a looser interpretation — one 
that did not exclude a multilateral settlement of the Kashmir 
dispute. 

Yet the loss of East Pakistan also had positive implications for 
Pakistan's security. The loss of the East Pakistani population as 
a recruitment pool was of only minor significance. By shedding 
its most dissident and poorest province, Pakistan emerged 
stronger and was able to focus its energies more effectively. A 
major strategic problem — the geographic division of the coun- 
try — was eliminated. The loss of East Pakistan also removed the 
need for a Pakistani role in Southeast Asia. Pakistan withdrew 
from SEATO, and Bhutto refocused national attention toward 
Muslrn West Asia. He apparently tried to develop ways of put- 
ting the Kashmir issue to rest so that Pakistan could greatly 
reduce its preoccupation with South Asia. No longer closely 
tied to the United States, Bhutto sought a larger role for Paki- 
stan among the nonaligned countries and, especially, within 
the Islamic world. A brilliant diplomat, he was able in a very 
few years to restore Pakistan's prestige, stake out a leading role 
for Pakistan among Muslim nations, court the superpowers, 
and even establish cordial relations with Bangladesh. 

These triumphs were not shared with the military, as Bhutto 
moved to create a "professional but docile" military. Senior 
officers were dismissed, and their replacements were chosen by 
Bhutto. The military establishment was reorganized so that it 
would be under more effective civilian control. Bhutto's 1973 
constitution narrowly defined the role of the military as 
defending Pakistan against external aggression and "subject to 
law" acting in aid-to-the-civil power when called on so to do. 
Any attempt to abrogate the constitution was deemed high 
treason (see Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and a New Constitutional Sys- 
tem, ch. 1). 

In 1972 Bhutto established the Federal Security Force of 
some 18,000 men to provide assistance to the civil administra- 
tion and police and to do civic-action work. Not under military 
control, the Federal Security Force was, in effect, Bhutto's pri- 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

vate political army. The military, beaten and demoralized, had 
no choice but to accept this further setback, even as it har- 
bored deep concerns over the impact Bhutto was having on the 
integrity of the army and its ability to defend Pakistan. 

In 1973 Bhutto began to focus on rebuilding the tamed mili- 
tary because Pakistan continued to face serious security threats 
from abroad, highlighted by the Indian nuclear test in 1974, 
and at home — a major insurgency from 1973 to 1977 in 
Balochistan, which ultimately required the involvement of 
80,000 army troops. New military production facilities and a 
navy air wing were established. Bhutto's diplomacy resulted in a 
partial lifting of the United States embargo on military sales to 
Pakistan in 1973 and a complete removal of the embargo in 
1977. He also used diplomacy to tap into the burgeoning oil 
revenues of the Middle East; still, Pakistan could not afford to 
buy much, and its inventories of weapons were increasingly 
made up of outdated and ill-matched equipment from a variety 
of sources. Nonetheless, the army's self-confidence again began 
to grow. Expenditures on defense by 1974 had reattained the 
1969 level — even though the gross national product (GNP — 
see Glossary) was little more than half of the amount that had 
been produced before Bangladesh became independent. The 
defense budget continued to increase over the next several 
years, supporting a somewhat expanded strength — 428,000 
personnel in 1976. Pakistan's nuclear program was also estab- 
lished by Bhutto. 

Bhutto's domestic position, however, eroded rapidly in the 
mid-1970s, and, as his charisma waned, he turned to the army 
to deal with domestic unrest. The elections of March 1977 — 
widely thought to be rigged — resulted in mass demonstrations 
demanding Bhutto's resignation. General Mohammad Zia 
ul-Haq, chief of the army staff — a new title for service chiefs 
replacing the former title of commander in chief — saw that the 
army was unwilling to engage in the violence that would be 
necessary to put down the unrest. In a stunning move, Zia 
arrested Bhutto and other political leaders on July 5, 1977, and 
declared Pakistan's third period of martial law. 

The Military Reasserts Itself 

General Zia asserted that this military intervention in poli- 
tics would be brief and that there would be new elections 
within ninety days, but he had the longest tenure of any Paki- 
stani ruler. Although he came to power more as a spokesman 



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National Security 



of military interests — a first among equals — and was thought to 
be a political naif, he was highly skilled in gathering power into 
his own hands. 

On assuming power, Zia named himself chief martial law 
administrator and suspended parts of the 1973 constitution. 
(Zia assumed the presidency as well in September 1978.) 
Because it appeared that Bhutto, if freed and available as a can- 
didate, might easily win the elections, Zia postponed them and 
undertook a campaign to discredit his predecessor politically. 
Zia's initial assumption of power was peaceful; even his subse- 
quent decision to allow Bhutto to be hanged, after Bhutto's 
conviction as an accomplice to murder a political opponent, 
did not bring disturbances severe enough to threaten his 
regime. There was, however, continued opposition to military 
rule, and Zia was able to maintain himself in power only 
through a combination of political luck, skill, and authoritari- 
anism. 

Although the military regime was often repressive, state vio- 
lence was downplayed, and some observers believe that human 
rights conditions were better than during the Bhutto years. Zia 
also emphasized the corruption in political life and the need 
for reform. Ethnic resistance in Balochistan and the North- 
West Frontier Province was dealt with adroitly; only the ethnic 
Sindhis remained profoundly alienated (see Zia ul-Haq and 
Military Domination, 1977-88, ch. 1). Zia also proved politi- 
cally skillful in employing a strategy of continually holding out 
the promise of free elections when circumstances permitted, 
making political concessions that would strengthen rather than 
undermine his position and, especially after 1979, co-opting 
influential political groups among orthodox Muslims. 

The first years of Zia's tenure marked another low point in 
the security situation. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 over- 
threw the Shah, one of Pakistan's staunchest friends, and the 
missionary zeal of its new Islamist regime did not bode well for 
Pakistan-Iran relations. The Saur Revolution (April Revolu- 
tion) in Afghanistan in 1978 ousted a government that had 
become conciliatory in its relations with Pakistan, replacing it 
with a group that also preached radical change — this time, 
Marxist. When the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan in Decem- 
ber 1979, Pakistan found itself in a security nightmare — for the 
first time, the Soviet Union posed a potentially immediate 
threat. 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

Relations with the United States were also at a low point. The 
administration of President Jimmy Carter had adopted an 
extremely hard line on Pakistan's nuclear program and sus- 
pended all military and economic assistance in April 1979. In 
March 1979, after the Iranian Revolution, Pakistan withdrew 
from a moribund CENTO. Tensions with the United States 
peaked when a Pakistani mob burned the United States 
embassy in Islamabad in November 1979, killing two Ameri- 
cans and two Pakistani employees, in response to a British 
radio broadcast of Ayatollafi Ruhollah Khomeini's speech, in 
which he falsely accused the United States of invading the 
Grand Mosque in Mecca. Although China remained a good 
friend, political scientist Robert G. Wirsing's assessment proved 
accurate: "Never before had Pakistan been quite so isolated 
and quite so threatened at the same time." 

Pakistan Becomes a Frontline State 

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made Pakistan a country 
of paramount geostrategic importance. In a matter of days, the 
United States declared Pakistan a "frontline state" against 
Soviet aggression and offered to reopen aid and military assis- 
tance deliveries. For the remainder of Zia's tenure, the United 
States generally ignored Pakistan's developing nuclear pro- 
gram. Other donors also rallied to Pakistan as it stood firm 
against Soviet blustering, hospitably received over 3 million 
Afghan refugees who poured across the borders, provided a 
conduit for weapons and other support, and gave a safe haven 
to the Afghan mujahidin (see Glossary) . Pakistan's top national 
security agency, the army's Directorate for Inter-Services Intelli- 
gence, monitored the activities of and provided advice and sup- 
port to the mujahidin, and commandos from the army's Special 
Services Group helped guide the operations inside Afghani- 
stan. In the Muslim world, Pakistan increasingly assumed a 
leading role. As a long-term goal, Zia envisioned the emer- 
gence of an Islamic government in Kabul that would provide 
Pakistan with geostrategic depth, facilitate access to Muslim 
West Asia, and forswear a revision of the contentious Pakistan- 
Afghanistan boundary. 

Pakistan paid a price for its activities. The refugee burden, 
even if offset in part by foreign assistance, created dangerous 
pressures within Pakistani society. Afghan and Soviet forces 
conducted raids against mujahidin bases inside Pakistan, and a 
campaign of terror bombings and sabotage in Pakistan's cities, 



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guided by Afghan intelligence agents, caused hundreds of 
casualties. In 1987 some 90 percent of the 777 terrorist inci- 
dents recorded worldwide took place in Pakistan. The actual 
danger to Pakistan, however, was probably never very great. 
There is no concrete evidence to support the revitalized "Great 
Game" argument that the Soviet invasion was a modern mani- 
festation of Russia's historical drive to garner access to a warm- 
water port and that it was but a first step on a road through 
Pakistan to the Arabian Sea. Nor was it likely that the Soviet 
Union would have conducted major military operations against 
Pakistan as long as Islamabad did not flaunt its support for the 
mujahidin. 

The Soviet invasion enabled Pakistan's army to present itself 
as the defender of the nation in times of trouble, making criti- 
cism of military rule almost unpatriotic. Zia used the situation 
to strengthen his grip on internal affairs by appealing to 
national unity and pointing to Pakistan's growing international 
stature. In addition, the substantial amounts of aid money com- 
ing from various sources boosted the economy and, in the 
short run at least, more than offset the costs of the refugees 
and rearming the military. Overall, the economy grew rapidly 
in the Zia years, in large part because of remittances from 
many Pakistanis who worked abroad (see Impact of Migration 
to the Persian Gulf Countries, ch. 2; Labor, ch. 3). 

Zia's ability to obtain high levels of support and modern 
weaponry strengthened his position within the military estab- 
lishment and enabled Pakistan once again to build up a credi- 
ble military capability. Under the United States assistance 
program, Pakistan bought F-16 aircraft; upgraded M-48 tanks, 
Harpoon naval missiles, helicopters, and artillery; and received 
second-hand frigates on loan. In the four years after the inva- 
sion, Pakistan's armed forces grew by nearly 12 percent, from 
428,000 to 478,000 persons. A substantial amount of the costs 
of modernization and expansion were covered by United States 
aid and financial contributions from Saudi Arabia and Persian 
Gulf countries. 

Zia was extremely skillful in protecting his base in the mili- 
tary. To ensure control, he was concurrently chief of the army 
staff, chief martial law administrator, and president, and he 
carefully juggled senior military appointments. The satisfaction 
of the military was also enhanced by arrangements under 
which Pakistani service personnel were seconded to the armed 
forces of Persian Gulf countries, where emoluments were 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

much more generous than in Pakistan. Retiring officers 
received generous benefits, sometimes including land alloca- 
tions, and often found lucrative positions in government ser- 
vice or in parastatal economic enterprises. The assignment of 
serving officers to approximately 10 percent of the senior posts 
in the civilian administration also provided opportunities for 
economic gain, sometimes in ways that were ultimately harmful 
to the army's image of itself. For example, some military per- 
sonnel reportedly participated in the rapidly growing narcotics 
business. 

Zia had learned well the lesson of 1965 and was careful not 
to allow the nation to return to the status of a client state of the 
United States. Even as Pakistan faced the Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan, it kept that threat in perspective. Immediately 
after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Zia 
declined the Carter administration's assistance package offer of 
US$400 million as "peanuts." It was not until 1981 that Pakistan 
concluded an assistance agreement with the United States, 
which provided for US$3.2 billion over six years, divided 
equally between economic and military aid. This agreement 
was extended in 1986 to provide an additional US$4.0 billion 
over the next six years. Zia was careful to avoid the trappings of 
a formal alliance, preferring continued involvement in the 
Nonaligned Movement — which Pakistan joined in 1979 — and 
with the Islamic nations of the Middle East through his leading 
role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (see Paki- 
stan and the World During the Zia Regime, ch. 1). 

Credit for the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan lay mainly with 
the mujahidin and their Pakistani mentors, but would hardly 
have come about had Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev not 
decided to cut back drastically on Soviet foreign entangle- 
ments. After tedious negotiations, an agreement was reached 
in April 1988, providing for the withdrawal of Soviet troops by 
February 15, 1989. 

Zia's policies inevitably led to a worsening of relations with 
India, which was disturbed by the reentry of the United States 
into the South Asian security equation and by what India saw as 
the impetus to a new arms race. India responded with large- 
scale arms purchases of its own, primarily from the Soviet 
Union, which more than matched anything that the United 
States provided to Pakistan. Zia took considerable pains to 
reduce tensions and launched several peace initiatives, which 
New Delhi, however, failed to accept. Whether Zia saw his own 



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efforts merely as diplomatic maneuvers was unclear, but they 
reflected a growing realization in Pakistan that unconstrained 
enmity with India was simply too dangerous and beyond Paki- 
stan's means. 

There were periods of considerable tension between Paki- 
stan and India. In November 1986, India launched its largest 
maneuver ever, Operation Brass Tacks, menacingly close to the 
Pakistan border. The Pakistani army responded with threaten- 
ing countermovements, and in early 1987 there was serious 
concern that war might break out. The India-Pakistan hot line 
was brought into use, and Zia skillfully seized the initiative by 
traveling to India to view a cricket game, using the opportunity 
to meet with Indian leaders to defuse the situation. 

Among the major disputes between the two countries, only 
that over the Siachen Glacier, which is located in a remote area 
of northern Kashmir where boundaries are ill defined, has led 
to fighting in recent years. The two armies had been in desul- 
tory but very costly (primarily because of exposure to the ele- 
ments) high-altitude combat there since 1984, when Indian 
forces moved into previously unoccupied territory at the 
extreme northern end of the Kashmir Line of Control. 

Aside from Afghanistan, the most problematic element in 
Pakistan's security policy was the nuclear question. Zia inher- 
ited an ambitious program from Bhutto and continued to 
develop it, out of the realization that, despite Pakistan's newly 
acquired weaponry, it could never match India's conventional 
power and that India either had, or shortly could develop, its 
own nuclear weapons. Even after the invasion of Afghanistan, 
Pakistan almost exhausted United States tolerance, including 
bungled attempts to illegally acquire United States nuclear-rel- 
evant technology and a virtual public admission in 1987 by the 
head of Pakistan's nuclear program that the country had devel- 
oped a weapon. As long as Pakistan remained vital to United 
States interests in Afghanistan, however, no action was taken to 
cut off United States support. Pakistani attempts to handle the 
problem bilaterally with India led nowhere, but a significant 
step was taken with a nonformalized 1985 agreement that nei- 
ther India nor Pakistan would attack the other's nuclear facili- 
ties. 

Zia showed a remarkable ability to keep himself in power, to 
promote Pakistan's international position, and to bring a mod- 
est degree of economic prosperity to Pakistan. His problem was 
how to devolve power. Beginning in 1985, a process of demilita- 



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rization of the regime was launched, and Zia was elected civil- 
ian president of Pakistan through some highly dubious 
maneuvering (see Zia ul-Haq, 1978-88, ch. 4). In late 1985, he 
ended martial law and revised the 1973 constitution in ways 
that legitimized all actions taken by the martial law govern- 
ment since 1977 and strengthened his position as president. 
Mohammad Khan Junejo, whom Zia appointed prime minister 
in March 1985, managed to develop some degree of autonomy 
from Zia and persuaded him to allow political parties to orga- 
nize; Junejo also watered down some of Zia's constitutional pro- 
posals, notably blocking the creation of the National Security 
Council, which would have institutionalized the role of the mil- 
itary. 

The experiment in controlled democracy floundered in May 
1988, when Zia abruptly dismissed the Junejo government for 
reasons that were not altogether clear but may have involved 
Junejo's attempt to gain a voice in security matters. Zia prom- 
ised new elections, but most observers assumed that he would 
once again postpone them rather than take the risk that Bena- 
zir Bhutto, Zulfiqar's daughter, who had returned from exile 
abroad to a tumultuous welcome in Pakistan in 1986, would 
come to power. Benazir's program included revenge for her 
father's death and punishment of Zia for staging the 1977 
coup, which, under the 1973 constitution, rendered him liable 
to the death sentence. The crisis facing Pakistan resolved itself 
suddenly, however, when Zia was killed in a mysterious airplane 
crash in August 1988. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a senior bureaucrat 
who was president of the Senate, succeeded to the presidency, 
and after consultations with the new chief of the army staff, 
General Mirza Aslam Beg, rather surprisingly decided to let the 
elections proceed as scheduled. 

The Armed Forces in a New World Order 

The Zia era ended as it had begun, with a Bhutto in power, 
for Benazir's party emerged with a narrow victory. Her position 
was much different from that of her father. She became prime 
minister under a constitution that left great power in the hands 
of the president, her parliamentary majority was narrow, and 
the army was strong, self-confident, and unwilling to renounce 
its political role. As the price of power, Benazir had to negoti- 
ate an arrangement with President Ishaq Khan and General 
Beg by which she reportedly promised to keep Zia's constitu- 
tional changes and to limit her involvement in military affairs, 



280 



Two F- 16 fighters on patrol 
Artillery crew on duty in Siachen Glacier, close to India-Pakistan border 

Courtesy Embassy of Pakistan, Washington 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

including management of the fighting in Afghanistan and 
nuclear weapons policy. 

Several times Benazir ineffectually challenged the armed 
forces and the president on military matters. She was never 
able to find a comfortable relationship with these two other 
major players of the triangle of political power in Pakistan. She 
showed interest in improving relations with India but had little 
room to take concrete steps. She skillfully cultivated her good 
ties to Washington, but overall her performance as prime min- 
ister was disappointing, and when the president — with the obvi- 
ous backing of the army — dismissed her in August 1990 and 
called for new elections, there was little opposition. 

The elections brought to power the Islamic Democratic Alli- 
ance (Islami Jamhoori Ittehad — IJI), a coalition that enjoyed 
the implicit support of both the president and the armed 
forces. Punjab's chief minister, Mian Nawaz Sharif, a business- 
man and protege of Zia, became prime minister. Although the 
dismissal of Benazir had been against the spirit, if not the letter, 
of the constitution, the new power arrangement seemed to 
offer Pakistan favorable prospects for stable representative rule 
because the three power centers were all in apparent align- 
ment, and Nawaz Sharif represented the interests of the Pun- 
jabi majority. The arrangement worked adequately for some 
time, and when General Beg's time for retirement as chief of 
the army staff came, he did not attempt to force an extension 
of his tour of duty. 

Beg's replacement, General Asif Nawaz Janjua, was a much 
lower-profile leader and sought to lead the army away from cor- 
ruption and toward a renewed emphasis on professionalism 
and a sensible adaptation to the post-Cold War realities of Paki- 
stan's strategic position. The army, however, was drawn into 
politics in May 1992 when the law-and-order situation in Sindh 
deteriorated so badly that the provincial government invited 
the army to restore public order under Article 147 of the con- 
stitution. Although the army could not solve Sindh's many 
problems, it made significant progress in combatting the cycle 
of terror, banditry, and kidnapping that had plagued the prov- 
ince. The army stopped short of imposing martial law, but it 
intervened in the politics of the province and, in the process, 
moved against political allies of Nawaz Sharif, the IJI coalition 
prime minister, who was already at odds with the president. 

General Janjua died suddenly in January 1993, and Presi- 
dent Ishaq Khan used his prerogative to reach well down the 



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list of lieutenant generals to appoint Abdul Waheed, a highly 
regarded officer without apparent political aspirations. 
Waheed seemed to fit Pakistani political scientist Mohammad 
Waseem's description as "the transition from a group of conser- 
vative generals led by Zia who were inspired by Islamic ideals to 
a relatively liberal and modernist generation of military offic- 
ers who have positive attitudes toward Western-style democ- 
racy." 

Waheed was quickly called upon to demonstrate his commit- 
ment to the democratic process. When a power struggle 
between the president and the prime minister in April 1993 
resulted in Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif s ouster, the military 
resisted the temptation to take charge during the ensuing 
period of political turmoil. In July Waheed brokered a settle- 
ment in which both the prime minister and the president 
resigned, a neutral caretaker government was appointed, and 
new elections were scheduled for October (see "The Silent Rev- 
olution": A Year of Political Struggle, ch. 4). 

There remained different points of view among officers, 
almost all of whom had little respect for politicians and feared 
that an incompetent civilian leader might irreparably damage 
their core values — the integrity of the military and the security 
of Pakistan. Some officers were politically ambitious and had 
found their period of power under Zia rewarding — financially 
and otherwise. Many, however, believed that any political activ- 
ity, whether in the context of martial law or in the context of 
helping deal with crises caused by politicians' ineptitude, 
undermined discipline and morale and detracted from the 
ability of the armed forces to perform military missions. 
Retired General Shaukat Riza, describing an earlier period of 
martial law, observed: "After a short period of hot, righteous 
action, military men succumb to setting their mark on what- 
ever is served up to them. Martial Law is disarmed, leaving in 
its wake a debris of shattered dreams and wasting social order." 

On balance, the army preferred to avoid direct involvement 
unless the political order threatened to collapse completely. 
The crucial question for Pakistan's political future was in the 
shaping of the middle ground. Should the armed forces simply 
be recognized as having a voice in Pakistan's politics, or should 
their role be formally institutionalized? Zia's attempts to do the 
latter through creation of a National Security Council had 
been successfully resisted byjunejo, but the question remained 
central to Pakistan's security as well as to its politics. 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

The external relations of the military deteriorated sharply in 
the post-Zia period because of the collapse of Pakistan's rela- 
tionship with the United States. President George Bush deter- 
mined in October 1990 that he could no longer certify that 
Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons and, as required by 
the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, termi- 
nated all United States assistance to Pakistan that was not 
already in the pipeline. Pakistan handled the cutoff with little 
public rancor and committed itself to freezing the nuclear pro- 
gram in an attempt to placate the United States. Washington 
permitted such commercial purchases as spare parts for air- 
craft and the continued joint naval and special forces exercises, 
but such key items as fighter aircraft on order were kept in 
abeyance. Further, the United States moved to reclaim nine 
ships that were on loan — about half of Pakistan's surface fleet. 

The impact on Pakistan's military readiness by the United 
States decision to halt assistance has been described by observ- 
ers as near catastrophic, but even more important than the 
money and equipment involved was the strategic signal sent by 
the aid cutoff. As long as Pakistan was in the front line of oppo- 
sition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States 
found ways of continuing its aid despite Pakistan's nuclear pro- 
gram. Once the Soviet forces left Afghanistan and the Soviet 
Union itself ceased to exist, Pakistan's importance dwindled. 
Whatever limited successes Pakistan may have had in salvaging 
parts of the relationship with the United States, it was clear that 
the end of the Cold War marked the end of Pakistan's strategic 
role. 

The loss of United States support came at a difficult time. 
Unrest in Indian Kashmir had developed rapidly after 1989, 
and Pakistan inevitably supplied moral and covert materiel sup- 
port, thus raising the specter of a new conflict with India. 
There were serious concerns in early 1990 that a war might 
break out. At United States prompting, both sides took effec- 
tive steps to reduce the danger. Neither country wanted a con- 
flict, but Pakistan remained in a quandary because it could not 
ignore events in Kashmir although it did not have substantial 
international support for its position. The United States and 
China made clear their unwillingness to provide political or 
materiel support to Pakistan, thus increasing still further the 
latter's sense of isolation. 

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan removed a potential 
threat to Pakistan, and the substantial retreat of Russia from 



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National Security 



the security affairs of the subcontinent offset somewhat the 
withdrawal of the United States. For the first time since 1947, 
Pakistan was not concerned about a two-front threat. Further, 
the emergence of five independent Muslim republics in Cen- 
tral Asia raised hopes that they might become allies and offer 
Pakistan both the political support and the strategic depth it 
lacked. As long as Afghanistan was in chaos, Pakistan would 
lack direct access to the new republics. However, it was still far 
from certain in the early 1990s whether or not the republics 
would find Pakistan a desirable political partner. 

Approaching the next century, Pakistan faces yet another 
reconfiguration of the forces that determine its security envi- 
ronment. As Russia, China, and the United States stand back 
from South Asia, there are fewer constraints on India. Yet other 
sweeping changes are under way in the international environ- 
ment. Pakistan remains engaged in its search for outside help 
to ensure its security. The end of the Cold War only changed 
the parameters of the problem. 

The Armed Services 

Constitutional Basis and Missions 

Article 243 of the 1973 constitution states that the federal 
government controls the armed forces and gives the president 
power to raise and maintain active and reserve forces, grant 
commissions, and appoint the chiefs of staff of the three ser- 
vices (see President, ch. 4). Under Article 242, the president is 
commander in chief of the armed forces. The original intent 
was that the president act according to the guidance of the 
prime minister. However, the Eighth Amendment to the nomi- 
nally "revived" but fundamentally altered 1973 constitution, 
promulgated in 1985 by President Zia, specifies in Article 90 
that national executive power is vested in the president. 

Article 245 prescribes the functions of the armed forces as 
defense of the nation against external aggression or threat of 
war and, subject to law, aid-to-the-civil power when called upon. 
This article is intended to keep the military from acting inde- 
pendently of the elected political leadership in domestic 
affairs. It was notably unsuccessful in protecting Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto from Zia's demand for "accountability," culminating in 
Bhutto's trial, conviction, and eventual execution on a charge 
of conspiring to murder one of his political opponents. Article 
244 prescribes the oath taken by the armed forces, including 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

the pledge "not to engage myself in any political activities what- 
soever." This requirement is not, however, meant to restrict 
members of the armed forces from voting. 

Article 39 enjoins the state to enable people from all parts of 
Pakistan to join the armed forces. It does not, however, require 
proportional representation of provinces, and only modest 
progress has been made in making the military more geo- 
graphically representative. 

In addition to the constitutionally prescribed missions of 
defending the country (including protecting the borders and 
coastline) and continuing the traditional aid-to-the-civil power, 
the army has an unstated, self-appointed mission of guarding 
the domestic order — "guardian of the family silver," as Paki- 
stani journalist Mushahid Hussain puts it. It is this concept of 
its mission that has led the military to assume power on three 
separate occasions. 

The military engages in a broad range of public service and 
economic activities and plays a leading role in dealing with nat- 
ural disasters. The armed services do not, however, have a 
record of participating in foreign disaster relief. The military 
has engaged in civic-action work in strategically sensitive areas, 
especially Balochistan, but does not see itself as having a gener- 
alized role in civic action and economic development. General 
Waheed even resisted a military role in antinarcotics work, 
probably fearing its temptation as well as its distraction from 
the military's primary role as the defender of the country. 

Defense Strategy 

Pakistan remains, despite its substantial military force, a 
nation with a gaping security deficit. India has forces some- 
times almost three times as large as Pakistan's, and this dispar- 
ity is only partially offset by India's need to defend its border 
with China. Senior Pakistani officers are well aware of the fact 
that their forces are not equal to India's, and few would will- 
ingly provoke a test of strength. Further, although Pakistan had 
built up its fuel and ammunition reserves to forty-five days' sup- 
plies by 1992, past experience has taught the nation not to 
count on replenishment. War avoidance has been the primary 
goal of Pakistani security policy, especially since the Zia years. 
At the same time, the military accepts the fact that war is possi- 
ble and is determined to acquit itself well. 

Pakistan, like virtually every other nation, proclaims that its 
forces and strategy are defensive. Faced with a much superior 



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enemy, uncertain sources of supply, and little strategic depth, 
Pakistan cannot expect to absorb an initial attack and to suc- 
cessfully fight a protracted defensive war. Thus, in terms of con- 
ventional strategy, Pakistan has emphasized a doctrine of 
"offensive defense," which provides for quick preemptive 
strikes once a war begins in order to disrupt an enemy advance 
and inflict high costs. In addition, such actions are designed to 
gain salients in enemy territory, which can be used as trade-offs 
in peace negotiations. Navy and air force roles would be mainly 
defensive. The large-scale exercise Zarb-e-Momin (Sword of 
the Faithful), which took place in late 1989, was held far 
enough away from the border not to frighten India, and, 
indeed, foreign observers were invited. Its scenario and the 
publicity that attended it were, however, meant to illustrate the 
offensive-defense doctrine and to make sure that India under- 
stood it. 

Ministry of Defence 

The minister of defense is a civilian member of the cabinet, 
chairs the Defence Council, and is in turn a member of the 
higher-level Cabinet Defence Committee. The Ministry of 
Defence has a permanent staff of civil servants headed by the 
defense secretary general. Of particular importance to the 
Ministry of Defence is the adviser for military finance, who 
heads the Military Finance Division in the Ministry of Finance 
but is attached to the Ministry of Defence. The adviser func- 
tions as the principal financial officer of the defense ministry 
and the subordinate services. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee deals with all problems 
bearing on the military aspects of state security and is charged 
with integrating and coordinating the three services. In peace- 
time, its principal function is planning; in time of war, its chair- 
man is the principal staff officer to the president in the 
supervision and conduct of the war. The secretariat of the com- 
mittee serves as the principal link between the service head- 
quarters and the Ministry of Defence in addition to 
coordinating matters between the services. The three branches 
within the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee deal with planning, 
training, and logistics. Affiliated with the committee are the 
offices of the engineer in chief, the director general of medical 
service, the director of inter-services intelligence, and the 
director of inter-services public relations. The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Committee supervises the National Defence College, the 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

Joint Services Staff College, and the Inter-Service Selection 
Board. 

The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence is of particu- 
lar importance at the joint services level. The directorate's 
importance derives from two sources. First, it is the agency 
charged with managing covert operations outside of Pakistan — 
whether in Afghanistan, Kashmir, or farther afield. Second, in 
the past it was deeply involved in domestic politics and kept 
track of the incumbent regime's opponents. In addition, when 
the regime was unpopular with the military and the president 
(as was Benazir Bhutto's first government), the agency helped 
topple it by working with opposition political parties. 

Army and Paramilitary Forces 

The key holder of power in the armed forces and, along with 
the president and the prime minister, one of the triumvirate 
that runs the country is the chief of the army staff (COAS) — 
formerly called the commander in chief. In 1994 this post was 
held by General Abdul Waheed. The COAS operates from 
army headquarters in Rawalpindi, near Islamabad. From this 
position, both Ayub Khan and Zia seized power. Other senior 
staff positions, at the lieutenant general level, include a chief of 
general staff, who supervises army intelligence and operations; 
the master general of ordnance; the quartermaster general; 
the adjutant general; the inspector general for evaluation and 
training; and the military secretary. The headquarters function 
also includes the chief of the Corps of Engineers, the judge 
advocate general, and the comptroller of civilian personnel, all 
of whom report to the vice chief of the army staff. 

The army is organized into nine corps: First Corps at 
Mangla; Second Corps at Multan; Fourth Corps at Lahore; 
Fifth Corps at Karachi; Tenth Corps at Rawalpindi; Eleventh 
Corps at Peshawar; Twelfth Corps at Quetta; Thirtieth Corps at 
Gujranwala; and Thirty-first Corps at Bahawalpur. There is also 
the Northern Area Command, headquartered at Gilgit, directly 
responsible to army general headquarters. 

Active army strength in 1994 was 520,000. In addition, there 
were 300,000 reserve personnel. Reserve status lasts for eight 
years after leaving active service or until age forty-five for 
enlisted men and age fifty for officers. 

In 1994 major weapons included nearly 2,000 tanks (mainly 
Chinese but also 120 M-47s and 280 M-48A5s of United States 
origin); 820 M-113 armored personnel carriers; 1,566 towed 



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artillery pieces; 240 self-propelled artillery pieces; forty-five 
multiple rocket launchers; 725 mortars; 800 Cobra, TOW, and 
Green Arrow antitank guided weapons; eighteen Hatf surface- 
to-surface missiles; 2,000 air defense guns; and 350 Stinger and 
Redeye missiles and 500 Anza surface-to-air missiles. The 
army's combat aircraft inventory consisted of twenty AH-1F air- 
planes equipped with TOW missiles (see table 14, Appendix). 

Paramilitary organizations, which are mainly of symbolic 
importance, include the 185,000-member National Guard, 
comprising the Janbaz Force — locally recruited militia mainly 
charged with air defense — and two programs similar to the 
United States Reserve Officers Training Corps, the National 
Cadet Corps and the Women Guard. The Women Guard, 
unlike the National Cadet Corps, includes individuals trained 
in nursing, welfare, and clerical work. There are also some 
women in the Janbaz Force, and a very small number of 
women are recruited into the regular service in limited num- 
bers to perform medical and educational work. 

Paramilitary internal security forces are organized on the 
provincial level but are subordinate to the Ministry of Interior 
and are commanded by seconded army generals. These forces 
are in effect an extension of the army for internal security 
duties. The Pakistan Rangers, headquartered in Lahore, deal 
with unrest in Punjab, while the Mehran Force performs simi- 
lar functions in Sindh. In 1994 their strengths were 25,000 and 
24,000, respectively, divided into "wings" of approximately 800 
men each. The Frontier Corps, with a strength of 65,000, is 
based in Peshawar and Quetta with responsibility for the North- 
West Frontier Province and Balochistan. The corps is responsi- 
ble to both the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions and to 
army headquarters. The corps is divided into twenty-seven local 
units — fourteen in the North- West Frontier Province and thir- 
teen in Balochistan — and includes the Chitral Scouts, the Khy- 
ber Rifles, the Kurram Militia, the Tochi Scouts, the South 
Waziristan Scouts, the Zhob Militia, and the Gilgit Scouts. 
There is also a Coast Guard, subordinate to the Ministry of 
Interior and staffed by army personnel. 

In times of natural disaster, such as the great floods of 1992, 
army engineers, medical and logistics personnel, and the 
armed forces play a major role in bringing relief and supplies. 
The army also engages in extensive economic activities. Most of 
these enterprises, such as stud and dairy farms, are for the 
army's own use, but others perform functions beneficial to the 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

local civilian economy. Army factories produce such goods as 
sugar, fertilizer, and brass castings and sell them to civilian con- 
sumers. 

Several army organizations perform functions that are 
important to the civilian sector across the country. For exam- 
ple, the National Logistics Cell is responsible for trucking food 
and other goods across the country; the Frontier Works Orga- 
nization built the Karakoram Highway to China; and the Spe- 
cial Communication Organization maintains communications 
networks in remote parts of Pakistan. 

Navy 

In 1994 the navy had some 22,000 personnel. The force 
includes a small Naval Air Arm and the approximately 2,000- 
member paramilitary Maritime Security Agency, charged pri- 
marily with protecting Pakistan's exclusive economic zone. The 
naval reserve consists of about 5,000 personnel. 

In 1994 the navy had four commands: COMPAK — the fleet; 
COMLOG— logistics; COMFORNAV— naval installations in the 
north of Pakistan; and COMKAR — naval headquarters and the 
only major base at Karachi. There are long-range plans to build 
a new naval base at Ormara, 240 kilometers west of Karachi, 
and to improve harbors at Gwadar and Pasni to help alleviate 
overdependence on Karachi. 

The navy's principal combatants in 1994 were six submarines 
of French origin equipped with United States Harpoon mis- 
siles; negotiations with the French for three additional subma- 
rines have been reported. The navy had three active old 
destroyers (one of British and two of United States origin), 
four United States-made guided missile frigates, six other frig- 
ates (two from Britain and four from the United States), and 
two United States-made and one French-made mine warfare 
craft. One destroyer and four frigates carried Harpoon mis- 
siles; the navy had acquired an unknown number of Mistral 
close-in surface-to-air missiles from France. There were eight 
missile craft, and thirteen coastal combatant and patrol craft, 
all of Chinese origin. The Naval Air Ar m had four combat air- 
craft flown by air force personnel and armed with Exocet mis- 
siles and sixteen armed helicopters. The delivery of three P-3C 
Orion long-range reconnaissance aircraft from the United 
States had been suspended since 1990 (see table 15, Appen- 
dix). 



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In 1991 a naval special warfare marine commando unit, with 
a strength of between 150 and 200 men, was established. Its 
functions, in addition to hull inspection and special opera- 
tions, included operating three midget submarines. 

Although the navy clearly needs to grow, its immediate 
future is threatened by a reduction in equipment brought 
about by the Pressler Amendment imposed in 1990 (see The 
Armed Forces in a New World Order, this ch.) . The navy had to 
return four Brooke (Badr) -class and four Garcia (Saif) -class 
frigates to the United States at the end of their five-year lease. 
In addition, one British-made destroyer, the Babur, was retired 
in 1994. At the same time, all three United States destroyers 
became fully operational, and an additional six Amazon-class 
frigates purchased from Britain were to be delivered in late 
1994. 

Air Force 

In 1994 the air force had 45,000 active personnel and 8,000 
reserve personnel. Headquartered in Rawalpindi, it comprises 
directorates for operations, maintenance, administration, and 
electronics. There are three air defense districts — north, cen- 
tral, and south. 

In 1994 the air force was organized into eighteen combat 
squadrons, with a total of 430 combat aircraft. The mainstay of 
the air force was the F-l 6 fighter. Of the forty aircraft originally 
acquired, thirty-four were in service, divided among three 
squadrons. Some were reportedly grounded because of a lack 
of spare parts resulting from the 1990 United States suspension 
of military transfers to Pakistan (see The United States and the 
West, ch. 4). Pakistan had an additional seventy-one F-l 6s on 
order, but delivery has been suspended since 1990. Other 
interceptors included 100 Chinese J-6s (which were scheduled 
to be phased out) and eighty J-7s, organized into four squad- 
rons and two squadrons, respectively. Air-to-air missiles 
included the Sparrow, Sidewinder, and Magic (see table 16, 
Appendix) . 

To fulfill its ground-attack role, the air force had three 
squadrons of Chinese Q-5s (a total of fifty aircraft) as well as 
one squadron of eighteen Mirage Ills (EP and DP) and three 
squadrons (fifty-eight aircraft) of Mirage 5s, one squadron of 
which was equipped with Exocet missiles and was deployed in 
an antiship role. The Mirage 5s are scheduled to be upgraded 
with French assistance. 



291 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

In 1994 Pakistan also took out of storage thirty of forty-eight 
Mirage III-Os that it had originally acquired from Australia. 
They were grouped into a fighter squadron. 

The backbone of the transport fleet was formed by twelve C- 
130 Hercules, which had recently been upgraded; plans to 
acquire more were stymied by the dispute with the United 
States over Pakistan's nuclear program. There were also smaller 
transport aircraft and a variety of reconnaissance and training 
aircraft. 

Personnel and Training 

The manpower base of Pakistan, with its population of more 
than 120 million, is more than adequate to maintain force lev- 
els that the country can afford. In 1994 there were an esti- 
mated 6.4 million men and 5.7 million women between the 
ages of eighteen and twenty-two and another 10 million men 
and 9 million women between the ages of twenty-three and 
thirty-two. About two-thirds of the individuals in these groups 
were estimated to be physically fit for service. Although there is 
provision for conscription, it has not proven necessary because 
there are more than enough volunteers for a profession that is 
both honored and, by Pakistani standards, financially reward- 
ing. 

Although recruitment is nationwide and the army attempts 
to maintain an ethnic balance, most recruits, as in British 
times, come from a few districts in northern Punjab Province 
and the adjacent North-West Frontier Province. Most enlisted 
personnel come from rural families, and although they must 
have passed the sixth-grade level in school, many have only 
rudimentary literacy skills and very limited awareness of the 
modern-day skills needed in a contemporary army (see Educa- 
tion, ch. 2). Recruits are processed gradually through a pater- 
nalistically run regimental training center, perhaps learning to 
wear boots for the first time, taught the official language, 
Urdu, if necessary, and given a period of elementary education 
before their military training actually starts. In the thirty-six- 
week training period, they develop an attachment to the regi- 
ment they will remain with through much of their careers and 
begin to develop a sense of being a Pakistani rather than pri- 
marily a member of a tribe or a village. Stephen P. Cohen, a 
political scientist specializing in military affairs, has noted that 
the army "encourages the jawan (basic private) to regard his 
regiment and his unit as his home or substitute village; and it 



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National Security 



invests a great deal of time and effort into . . . 'man manage- 
ment,' hoping to compensate in part for generally inferior mil- 
itary technology by very highly disciplined and motivated 
soldiers." Enlisted men usually serve for fifteen years, during 
which they participate in regular training cycles and have the 
opportunity to take academic courses to help them advance. 

About 320 men enter the army annually through the Paki- 
stan Military Academy at Kakul (in Abbotabad) in the North- 
West Frontier Province; a small number — especially physicians 
and technical specialists — are directly recruited, and these per- 
sons are part of the heart of the officer corps. They, too, are 
overwhelmingly from Punjab and the North-West Frontier 
Province and of middle-class, rural backgrounds. The product 
of a highly competitive selection process, members of the offi- 
cer corps have completed ten years of education and spend two 
years at the Pakistan Military Academy, with their time divided 
about equally between military training and academic work to 
bring them up to a baccalaureate education level, which 
includes English-language skills. There are similar programs 
for the navy at Rahbar (in Karachi) and for the air force at 
Sarghoda. 

The army has twelve other training establishments, includ- 
ing schools concentrating on specific skills such as artillery, 
intelligence, or mountain warfare. Plans are being drawn up 
for the National University of Science and Technology, which 
would subsume the existing colleges of engineering, signals, 
and electrical engineering. At the apex of the army training sys- 
tem is the Command and Staff College at Quetta, one of the 
few institutions inherited from the colonial period. The college 
offers a ten-month course in tactics, staff duties, administra- 
tion, and command functions through the division level. Stu- 
dents from foreign countries, including the United States, have 
attended the school but reportedly have been critical of its nar- 
row focus and failure to encourage speculative thinking or to 
give adequate attention to less glamorous subjects, such as 
logistics. The air force has an advanced technical training facil- 
ity at Korangi Creek near Karachi for courses in aeronautical 
engineering, and the navy's technical training is carried out at 
Karsaz Naval Station in Karachi. 

The senior training institution for all service branches is the 
National Defence College at Rawalpindi, which was established 
in 1978 to provide training in higher military strategy for 
senior officers. It also offers courses that allow civilians to 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

explore the broader aspects of national security. In a program 
begun in the 1980s to upgrade the intellectual standards of the 
officer corps and increase awareness of the wider world, a small 
group of officers has been detailed to academic training, 
achieving master's degrees and even doctorates at universities 
in Pakistan and abroad. 

Pakistani officers were sent abroad during the 1950s and 
into the 1960s for training in Britain and other Commonwealth 
countries, and especially to the United States, where trainees 
numbering well in the hundreds attended a full range of insti- 
tutions ranging from armored and infantry schools to the 
higher command and staff institutions. After 1961 this training 
was coordinated under the International Military Education 
and Training (IMET) program, but numbers varied along with 
vicissitudes in the United States-Pakistan military relationship. 
Of some 200 officers sent abroad annually in the 1980s, over 
two-thirds went to the United States, but the cessation of 
United States aid in 1990 halted the IMET program. In 1994 
virtually all foreign training was in Commonwealth countries. 

Pay scales and benefits for enlisted personnel are attractive 
by Pakistani standards. Officer pay is substantially higher, but 
with inflation and a generally expanding economy, officers 
find it harder to make do and feel that they are falling well 
behind their civilian counterparts in the civil service, where sal- 
aries are somewhat higher and the opportunities for gain con- 
siderably greater. 

Officers retire between the ages of fifty-two and sixty, 
depending on their rank. The retirement age for enlisted per- 
sonnel varies similarly according to grade. Retirement pay is 
modest, especially for enlisted men, but the armed services 
find ways to make the retiree's lot easier. Especially during peri- 
ods of martial law, retired senior officers have found second, 
financially rewarding careers in government-controlled organi- 
zations. Land grants to retired officers have been common, 
and scholarships and medical care are available on a relatively 
generous basis. In the event of an officer's death on active duty, 
certain provisions, including grants of free housing, are often 
extended to his family. 

The Fauji Foundation is a semiautonomous organization 
run for the benefit of active and, especially, retired military 
personnel and their families. It engages in a variety of lucrative 
businesses throughout Pakistan and annually produces a sur- 
plus of US$30 million for its beneficiaries. The Baharia Foun- 



294 



National Security 



dation provides a similar service to navy families, as does the 
Shaheen Foundation to those of the air force. 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 

Pakistani military uniforms closely resemble those of the 
British armed services. The principal colors are greenish 
brown for the army, navy blue for the navy, and light blue for 
the air force. Brown and black camouflage fatigues are com- 
monly worn by army troop units. Rank insignia also are similar 
to those used by the British (see fig. 11; fig. 12). 

The rank structure is also patterned on the British model. 
Following the British Indian tradition, there are three junior 
commissioned officer (JCO) grades between enlisted and offi- 
cer rank for those who rise by promotion from among enlisted 
recruits. The junior commissioned officer is a continuation of 
the former viceroy's commissioned officer rank. During the 
early days of the army, there was a large cultural gap between 
officers and enlisted personnel. In the early 1990s, JCOs had 
wide responsibilities in the day-to-day supervision of lower 
grades, but they were a group that may have outlived its useful- 
ness because officers have become "more Pakistani" and less 
dependent on British models and because the education level 
of enlisted men has risen. Promotion to JCO rank, however, 
remains a powerful incentive for enlisted personnel; thus, if 
JCO ranks are ever phased out, it will likely be a slow process. 

Military Production 

Pakistan began with virtually no military production capabil- 
ity, and, because of its limited economic means and lack of for- 
eign markets, there is little prospect of the country's ever 
developing industrial facilities that could cover its equipment 
needs. However, it has taken a series of partial steps in some of 
the most crucial fields and aspired to become self-sufficient, at 
least in such basic areas as aircraft overhaul and modernization 
and tank and helicopter sales. Symbolic of Pakistan's determi- 
nation to move to a degree of self-sufficiency was the creation 
of the Ministry of Defence Production in September 1991. 

The Ministry of Defence Production has been responsible 
for promoting and coordinating a patchwork of military pro- 
duction facilities that have developed since independence. The 
oldest of these facilities is the Pakistan Ordnance Factory at 
Wah Cantonment, near Rawalpindi, established in 1951, to 
produce small arms, ammunition, and explosives. During the 



295 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



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National Security 




297 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

period of reliance on United States supply, there was little 
attention given to domestic production, but after the assistance 
cutoffs in 1965 and 1971, Pakistan — with China's help — set 
about expanding its facilities, including the modernization of 
Wah. The Heavy industries facility at Taxila was established in 
1971 as an equipment rebuilding facility, followed in 1973 by 
the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex at Kamra, north of Islama- 
bad. The air force assembled Chinese F-6s and French 
Mirages; produced the Mushshak trainer, which was based on 
the Swedish SAAB Safari/Supporter; maintained radar and avi- 
onics equipment; and in the mid-1990s was in the process of 
developing the Karakorum jet trainer in a joint project with 
China. 

The ministry also includes seven other specialized organiza- 
tions devoted to research and development, production, and 
administration. Total personnel strength in 1993 was more 
than 50,000, including 2,600 professionals. The government 
estimated annual production in the early 1990s at US$500 mil- 
lion including about US$30 million in exports. For example, 
Mushshaks were provided to Iran as light trainers and observa- 
tion aircraft. Exports ranked high among the ministry's goals. 

The navy is supported mainly by a facility at the Karachi 
Shipyard, which has limited production capacity and in 1994 
had to its credit only an 831-ton tanker and a prototype 200-ton 
coastal patrol vessel. In 1987 development of a submarine 
repair and rebuild facility at Port Qasim was begun. 

Pakistan's nuclear program is shrouded in secrecy, but there 
is little doubt that nuclear weapons have been produced or at 
least have reached the developmental stage of a final "turn of a 
screw"; and, although the program is believed to have been 
technically arrested in 1992, the capability to produce weapons 
exists. Estimates put the inventory at between seven and fifteen 
weapons, at least some of which are deliverable by airdrop from 
C-130 or F-16 aircraft. Although F-16s supplied by the United 
States had the electronic wiring removed (necessary for 
launching nuclear weapons), some United States observers 
reported that Pakistanis could easily overcome this technologi- 
cal obstacle. 

In the early 1990s, Pakistan was also engaged in a missile 
development program, for which it had received substantial 
Chinese assistance. The Hatf-1 surface-to-surface missile, 
which can carry a payload of up to 500 kilograms as far as 
eighty kilometers, was introduced in 1992; the Hatf-2, which 



298 



National Security 



could be in service by 1995, also carries a 500-kilogram payload 
but has a 300-kilometer range. In 1994 there were uncon- 
firmed reports of a longer range Hatf-3 missile under develop- 
ment. 

Budget 

Faced with the problem of defense against a much larger 
enemy from a relatively weak resource base, the military must 
lay claim to a disproportionate share of the nation's resources 
even to maintain a minimally effective defensive capability. The 
military was fortunate in that successive governments — with 
the exception of the early Bhutto years — believed it necessary 
to support the armed services as much as possible. This atti- 
tude also persisted among the public at large, who accepted 
the danger from India as real and present. 

From 1958 until 1973, the published defense budget 
accounted for between 50 and 60 percent of total government 
expenditures. After that time, the proportions were much 
lower, falling to 40 and even 30 percent levels and ranging 
between 5 and 7 percent of GNP. At the same time, however, 
because of an expanding economy, actual expenditures — even 
allowing for inflation — showed considerable increases. The 
defense budget for fiscal year (FY — see Glossary) 1993 was set 
at Rs94 billion (for value of the rupee — see Glossary), or 
US$3.3 billion, which represented 27 percent of government 
spending and almost 9 percent of the gross domestic product 
(GDP — see Glossary). The published budget understated 
expenditures by excluding procurement and defense-related 
research and development as well as funds spent on such activi- 
ties as intelligence and the nuclear program. 

Military Justice 

The military justice system rests on three similar service laws: 
the Pakistan Army Act (1952), the Pakistan Air Force Act 
(1953), and the Pakistan Navy Ordinance (1961). The acts are 
administered by the individual services under the central 
supervision of the Ministry of Defence. 

The army has a four-tier system; the air force and navy, three- 
tier systems. The top two levels of all three systems are the gen- 
eral courts-martial and district courts-martial; the third level 
comprises the field general courts-martial in the army and air 
force and the equivalent summary general courts-martial in the 



299 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

navy. The army also has a further level, the summary courts- 
martial. 

The differences in court levels reflect whether their compe- 
tence extends to officers or only to enlisted men and the sever- 
ity of the punishment that may be imposed. Sentences of 
military courts must be approved by the convening authority, 
that is, the commanding general of the organization con- 
cerned. Every decision of a court-martial higher than summary 
court-martial level must be concurred in by a majority of the 
members of the court; where a vote is split evenly, the law pro- 
vides that the "decision shall be in favor of the accused." There 
is a right of appeal within the military court system, but no civil- 
ian court has the right to question the judgment of a military 
court. In cases where a military person is alleged to have com- 
mitted a crime against a civilian, the central government deter- 
mines whether military or civilian courts have jurisdiction. 
Double jeopardy is prohibited. Former servicemen in civilian 
life who are accused of felonies committed while on active duty 
are liable for prosecution under the jurisdiction of military 
courts. These courts are empowered to mete out a wide range 
of punishments — including death. All sentences of imprison- 
ment are served in military prisons or detention barracks. 

In contrast to the civilian court system, the introduction of 
Islamic law (sharia — see Glossary) has had little effect on the 
military justice system. The Federal Shariat Court has, however, 
ordered the military to make more liberal provisions to appeal, 
to confront witnesses, and to show just cause (see Judiciary, ch. 
4). It was not clear in early 1994 what practical effect these 
directives have had. 

Foreign Security Relationships 

Pakistan must look abroad for both material assistance and 
political support. Its principal tie has been with the United 
States. When relations were good, this connection meant 
access to funds, sophisticated weaponry, training, and an 
enhanced sense of professionalism. When relations were bad, it 
meant bitter disillusionment and the severing of support at 
critical junctures. These wide swings of fortune are something 
to which Pakistanis have become accustomed, and they recog- 
nize that, whatever the provocation, the tie to the United States 
has too much potential benefit to be discarded lightly. 

Relations with China in the early 1990s were less emotionally 
intense and much more stable. China has been a steady source 



300 



National Security 



of military equipment and has cooperated with Pakistan in set- 
ting up weapons production and modernization facilities. 
Within months of the 1965 and 1971 wars, China began to 
resupply the depleted Pakistani forces. Between 1965 and 1982, 
China was Pakistan's main military supplier, and materiel has 
continued to be transferred. In 1989 Pakistan and China dis- 
cussed the transfer of a nuclear submarine, and China was 
helpful in developing Pakistan's missile and, allegedly, nuclear 
weapons programs. But Chinese weaponry was inferior to that 
supplied by the West and also to what India received from the 
former Soviet Union and hoped to continue to receive from 
Russia. The Pakistanis dispatched a military mission to Moscow 
in October 1992, probably to explore the possibilities of acquir- 
ing surplus Russian and East European equipment at low 
prices. 

The Pakistani military's close ties to the nations of the Mid- 
dle East are based on a combination of geography and shared 
religion. The closest ties are with Saudi Arabia — a sporadically 
generous patron; much of the equipment bought from the 
United States during the 1980s, for example, was paid for by 
the Saudis. The smaller Persian Gulf states also have been 
sources of important financial support. The flow of benefits 
has been reciprocated. Beginning in the 1960s, Pakistanis have 
been detailed as instructors and trainers in Saudi Arabia, Jor- 
dan, Syria, Libya, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. Paki- 
stani pilots, sailors, and technicians have played key roles in 
some Persian Gulf military forces, and Arabs have been trained 
both in their home countries and in military training establish- 
ments in Pakistan. After unrest in Saudi Arabia in 1979, Paki- 
stan assigned two combat divisions there as a low-profile 
security force. This unofficial arrangement ended in 1987, 
however, reportedly when Pakistan refused the Saudi demand 
to withdraw all Shia (see Glossary) troops. Some 500 advisers, 
however, remained behind. These exchanges had built up 
close contacts between the forces of Pakistan and the Arab host 
countries and were profitable to Pakistan and to the individual 
Pakistanis assigned abroad, who were paid at much higher 
local pay scales. 

Pakistan has a particular interest in cooperating with neigh- 
boring Iran, with which it had occasionally difficult relations 
after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. In more recent years, 
however, delegations have been exchanged, and Pakistan has 
sold military equipment to Iran. Pakistan also has military ties 



301 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

with Turkey and would like to use these, as well as its Iranian 
connections, as a bridge to the new Muslim states of Central 
Asia. When the situation in Afghanistan again becomes nor- 
mal, Pakistan will no doubt attempt to capitalize on the sup- 
port it gave the mujahidin by forging close military links to its 
second-most-important neighbor to the west. 

Pakistan has sent troops abroad as part of United Nations 
(UN) peacekeeping efforts. The first such troops served in 
West Irian (as Indonesia's Irian Jaya Province was then called) 
in the 1962-63 period. In early 1994, Pakistan contributed two 
infantry battalions to the United Nations Protection Force in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNPROFOR BH) and two infantry 
brigades to the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNO- 
SOM). Pakistan's contribution of 7,150 troops to UNOSOM 
was the largest single national contingent in any UN peace- 
keeping force as of early 1994. At the time, Pakistan also had 
participating observers in a number of other UN missions in 
Croatia, the Iraq-Kuwait demilitarized border zones, Liberia, 
Mozambique, and Western Sahara. Pakistan also dispatched an 
armored brigade to Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War. However, it was assigned well away from the front — osten- 
sibly to defend the holy cities of Mecca and Medina — thus 
reducing the possibility that any Pakistani troops might have 
somehow become involved in actual combat with Iraqi troops. 
Such an eventuality could have proven explosive in Pakistan 
and could have caused uncontrollable unrest. Pakistani senti- 
ment in favor of Iraq was widespread, and even the COAS, 
General Beg, spoke out in support of Saddam Husayn. 

The Role of Islam 

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto introduced certain Islamic practices, 
notably prohibition of alcoholic beverages, into the army, and 
Zia encouraged still more, including the assignment of mullahs 
(see Glossary) as chaplains, some of whom reportedly go into 
combat with the troops. Modest mosques have been built in 
military training areas, Islamic texts are being introduced into 
training courses, mid-grade officers must take courses and 
examinations on Islam, and there are serious attempts under 
way to define an Islamic military doctrine, as distinct from the 
Western doctrines that the Pakistanis have been following. 

In the early 1990s, Islamic military doctrine had not 
replaced more traditional military doctrines, and it probably 
never will. Stephen P. Cohen has, however, highlighted several 



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National Security 



interesting points that have emerged. For instance, Islam has 
traditionally been identified with the concept of jihad, a righ- 
teous religious "striving" against unbelievers, and Islamic gov- 
ernments have been assiduous in describing whatever wars they 
fight — even against other Muslims — as jihad. Recent thinking, 
however, has emphasized that jihad is not a perpetual invita- 
tion to wage war against nonbelievers and, indeed, that it need 
not necessarily entail violence. More specifically, Pakistani writ- 
ers have rejected as un-Islamic the idea of total war that 
emerged in Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
They emphasize the Quranic injunctions to conciliation and 
persuasion and see force only as a last resort. 

Further, these Pakistani theorists see the function of force 
less as a capability for combat than as something that strikes 
terror into the hearts of enemies and thus can actually prevent 
war. There is an obvious parallel here to the idea that the most 
terrifying of all weapons, nuclear ordnance, can act as a deter- 
rent to war. Many Western military writers have portrayed the 
era of United States-Soviet mutual deterrence in these terms, 
and some have even applied this view as a rationale for Paki- 
stani and Indian nuclear capabilities. Pakistani writers find this 
approach a convenient justification for their nuclear programs, 
and, indeed, most of the "Islamic" thinking on war still looks 
more like retroactive rationalizations for strategies already 
adopted rather than guideposts to new departures. Further- 
more, Pakistanis are well aware that air combat tactics or at-sea 
replenishment techniques are not determined by religion, and 
the armed forces will continue to look for secular guidance. 

At the personnel level, the generation of cosmopolitan 
officers who were trained in British and United States tradi- 
tions and consider religion a purely personal matter is passing 
from the scene. The new generation of officers is less exposed 
to foreign influences and is, increasingly, a product of a society 
that has been much more influenced by "orthodox" Islam, in 
which the primacy of Islam is continually emphasized and 
accepted. 

Relatively few Pakistanis have turned to Islamic fundamen- 
talism, and, because of the demands of their profession, Paki- 
stani officers and soldiers seem likely to keep at least one foot 
in the modernist camp. Senior generals are reportedly con- 
cerned about religion looming too large in military affairs, but 
unless there are major changes in society and politics, the 



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Pakistan: A Country Study 

armed forces may increasingly see itself as an Islamic as well as 
a nationalist force. 

Internal Security 

Role and Structure of the Security Forces 

Before independence, the security forces of British India 
were primarily concerned with the maintenance of law and 
order but were also called on to perform duties in support of 
the political interests of the government. The duties of the 
police officer in a formal sense were those of police the world 
over: executing orders and warrants; collecting and communi- 
cating upward intelligence concerning public order; prevent- 
ing crime; and detecting, apprehending, and arresting 
criminals. These duties were specified in Article 23 of the 
Indian Police Act of 1861, which (together with revisions dat- 
ing from 1888 and the Police Rules of 1934), is still the basic 
document for police activity in Pakistan. 

The overall organization of the police forces remained 
much the same after partition. Except for centrally adminis- 
tered territories and tribal territories in the north and north- 
west, basic law and order responsibilities have been carried out 
by the four provincial governments. The central government 
has controlled a series of specialized police agencies, including 
the Federal Investigative Agency, railroad and airport police 
forces, an anticorruption task force, and various paramilitary 
organizations such as the Rangers, constabulary forces, and the 
Frontier Corps. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto established the Federal 
Security Force and gave it wide-ranging powers, but the force 
was abolished when the military regime of Zia ul-Haq seized 
power in 1977. 

Under the constitution, criminal law and procedure are 
listed as subjects that are the concurrent responsibility of the 
central and provincial governments. The federal government, 
however, has extensive power to assert its primacy, especially in 
any matter relating to national security. The police forces of 
the four provinces are independent, and there is no nation- 
wide integration; nevertheless, the federal minister of interior 
provides overall supervision. 

Senior positions in the police are filled from the Police Ser- 
vice of Pakistan (PSP) . The Police Service of Pakistan is not an 
operational body; rather, it is a career service similar to the 
Civil Service of Pakistan, from which officers are assigned to 



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National Security 



the provincial services or, on rotation, to central government 
agencies where their skills are needed. Recruitment to the PSP 
is through an annual national examination that is common for 
several centrally recruited services, including the civil service 
and the foreign and the customs services. Because the PSP is a 
relatively well-paid and powerful service, it attracts students 
who rank highest in the selection process. Successful candi- 
dates receive two years of training at the Police Training Col- 
lege in Sihala, near Islamabad, and are then assigned to duty 
with one of the provincial forces. 

The PSP is overwhelmingly male in composition, but the 
October 1993 return of Benazir Bhutto to power may result in 
some bold changes. In January 1994, Benazir announced the 
opening of Pakistan's first all-female police station. About fifty 
female officers of the Rawalpindi police station will supple- 
ment Punjab's provincial police force of 85,000 men. As part of 
her campaign for equal rights for women, Benazir also prom- 
ised to place women in 10 percent of top police posts, to 
appoint women to the Supreme Court, and to establish special 
courts for cases against women. 

The senior officer ranks in the police service are the inspec- 
tor general, who heads a provincial police force, and a deputy 
inspector general, who directs the work of a division or "range," 
which coordinates police work within various parts of a prov- 
ince. There are also assistant inspectors general in each prov- 
ince. The principal focus of police activity is at the district level, 
which is headed by a superintendent, and the subdistrict level, 
usually under the direction of an assistant or deputy superin- 
tendent. The latter is not necessarily drawn from the Police 
Service of Pakistan. At each level, police officials report to the 
political or civil service heads of the respective administrative 
level; the inspectors general, however, have direct links to the 
federal Ministry of Interior. Larger municipalities have their 
own police forces, but these are responsible to the provincial 
structure of police authority. 

The great majority of police personnel are assigned to sub- 
districts and police stations and are not at the officer level. 
Their ranks are inspector, sergeant, subinspector, assistant sub- 
inspector, head constable, and constable. As one descends the 
rank hierarchy, education levels, skills, and motivation decrease 
precipitously — even dramatically at the lower levels. Although 
constables are supposed to have a modest amount of educa- 
tion, their wages are comparable to those of an unskilled 



305 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

laborer (about US$40 per month), and a head constable — the 
height of aspiration for many policemen — is paid only at the 
level of a semiskilled worker. 

Police in Pakistan are generally unarmed. For crowd control, 
police are trained to use a lathi, a five-foot wooden staff that 
may be weighted. Lathi are used either to hold crowds back or 
as clubs. Tear gas and firearms are available, and police forma- 
tions hunting down armed bands of robbers, or dacoits, have 
adequate firepower available. 

Character of the Security Forces 

Independence had little impact on the police forces, which, 
like the military, simply switched their allegiance from the Brit- 
ish to a new, indigenous regime. The great mass of police work 
remained the same, and the political role of the police in sup- 
porting the British soon found a parallel in independent Paki- 
stan, as the regime was itself beset by political disturbances and 
extended the definition of crime to include such antistate activ- 
ities as terrorism and subversion. Even though the forces of law 
and order had become the instruments of an indigenous gov- 
ernment, any significant advantages that had accrued from the 
changeover have largely been dissipated. 

Public attitudes toward the police, historically regarded with 
distrust and fear, have not changed; indeed, the police are held 
in low esteem. In British times, the Indian Police Service — the 
predecessor of the PSP — was nearly incorruptible and was 
fairly immune from political pressure that did not emanate 
from London. Since independence, however, politicization of 
the police has become increasingly pervasive. Corruption in 
the lower ranks has proliferated and permeated the PSP; in the 
frequent periods when Pakistan was under oppressive rule, the 
police were as repressive as they were in British times. 

Police tactics in British India were never gentle, but in con- 
temporary Pakistan, according to the Herald, a magazine pub- 
lished in Karachi, "The police have institutionalized torture to 
a point where it is viewed as the primary method of crime 
detention. Police torture has become so commonplace that it 
has slowly lost the capacity to shock and disgust." These charges 
were echoed by Amnesty International's especially bleak 
appraisal of Pakistan's human rights situation in its June 1992 
"International News Release" report. The report, reflecting the 
law-and-order breakdown in Sindh and the government's reac- 
tion to it, stated that government opponents often are 



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National Security 



harassed, placed under arrest, and detained for unspecified 
periods of time. Scores of prisoners of conscience have been 
held for their political activities or religious beliefs. The prac- 
tice of repeatedly bringing false charges against members of 
the political opposition is a widely used tactic in Pakistani poli- 
tics and has been used to arrest thousands of opposition party 
activists. According to the United States Department of State's 
Country Reports on Human Eights Practices for 1993, there were no 
significant efforts in 1992 or 1993 to reform either the police 
or the judicial system, and authorities continued to be lax in 
their prosecution of abuses in these areas. Pakistani and inter- 
national human rights organizations have demanded that steps 
be taken to reverse the trend by bringing torturers to justice 
and by taking such procedural steps as reducing the time pris- 
oners spend in places of first arrest, where most torture takes 
place. 

Torture is a particularly acute problem in cases in which the 
suspect is thought to have committed a political crime, but it is 
not uncommon in serious criminal cases. General police bru- 
tality in handling all suspects is routine. Police frequently act 
without warrants or other proper authorization, and individu- 
als disappear into the criminal justice process for weeks before 
they can be found and, through writs of habeas corpus, be 
brought into regular judicial channels. Rape of prisoners, both 
male and female, is common. Prisoners often die in detention 
but are reported as killed in the course of armed encounters. 
Police also are alleged to extort money from families of prison- 
ers under threat of ill treatment. The performance of the 
police and their failure to act against political groups that run 
their own torture machinery are especially bad in Sindh, but 
there is no Pakistani who looks on an encounter with the police 
with equanimity. 

Amnesty International and other human rights groups wel- 
comed the establishment in 1993 of a Human Rights Commis- 
sion by the interim government of Moeen Qureshi and 
recommended to his successor, Benazir Bhutto, that the new 
government investigate past torture cases and enforce safe- 
guards against the use of torture. Despite continued trouble in 
Sindh, observers have discerned what appears to be a genuine 
interest by the current government in addressing some of the 
more egregious human rights problems endemic in Pakistan 
today. 



307 



Pakistan: A Country Study 
Crime 

Part of the responsibility for the deterioration of police per- 
formance has been a widespread increase in the amount of 
crime. New kinds of crime have developed — especially those 
related to illegal drugs — and criminals have substantially 
greater firepower (see Narcotics, this ch.). Since the war in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan has been awash in guns. Kalashnikov 
automatic weapons have become ubiquitous and may be 
rented in Karachi on an hourly basis. In Karachi criminal vio- 
lence, especially kidnapping for ransom and, in effect, open 
warfare among political groups, rendered the city so dangerous 
that in May 1992 the military had to be called in to launch 
Operation Cleanup to apprehend criminals and terrorists and 
to seize unauthorized weapons. Criminality extends into all lev- 
els of society. Known criminals have ties to political figures and 
are able to frustrate legitimate attempts to enforce law and 
order. In early 1994, the army was still actively involved in law 
enforcement in Sindh. 

Crime statistics are reported but cannot be considered reli- 
able. Throughout the 1980s, there appeared to be an incre- 
mental increase in the number of crimes reported each year. 
According to the Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1991, from 8,000 
to 20,000 murders or attempted murders, 3,500 to 6,000 kid- 
nappings or abductions, 100 to 600 robberies, and 120,000 to 
250,000 other crimes were reported annually between 1981 
and 1990. 

Narcotics 

Narcotics have become a multiple challenge to law enforce- 
ment authorities. In the late 1980s, Pakistan and Afghanistan 
exported nearly half the world's heroin, and, although their 
relative share declined somewhat thereafter, they remain 
among the world's major producers. Pakistan, especially under 
United States prodding, has attempted to cut back the cultiva- 
tion of poppies, but the government's influence has not 
extended effectively into tribal areas. In addition, various polit- 
ical and economic forces have been brought to bear to keep 
narcotics police from pursuing their work too assiduously. In 
1991 the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board — an organization 
that was supposed to have close ties to the United States Drug 
Enforcement Administration — was so riddled with corruption 
that its new director had to fire a majority of the staff. The vast 



308 



National Security 



profits generated by the narcotics industry not only had cor- 
rupted the enforcement authorities, including, it was rumored, 
some military units, but also had funded many other related 
crimes. 

Courts and Criminal Procedure 

Pakistan has an extensive penal code of some 511 articles, 
based on the Indian Penal Code of 1860, extensively amended 
during both the preindependence and the postindependence 
eras, and an equally extensive Code of Criminal Procedure. 
Numerous other laws relating to criminal behavior have also 
been enacted. Much of Pakistan's code deals with crimes 
against persons and property — including the crime of dacoity 
(robbery by armed gangs) and the misappropriation of prop- 
erty. 

Pakistani courts can, and do, impose the death sentence, as 
well as imprisonment, forfeiture of property, and fines. Impris- 
onment is either "rigorous" — the equivalent of hard labor for 
up to fourteen years — or "simple" — confinement without hard 
labor. Another form is "banishment," which involves serving in 
a maximum security prison for periods of seven years to life. In 
February 1979, Zia ul-Haq issued new laws that punished rape, 
adultery, and the "carnal knowledge of a virgin" by stoning; 
first-time theft by amputation of the right hand; and consump- 
tion of alcohol by eighty lashes. Stoning and amputation, it 
should be noted, had not been carried out as of early 1994 — at 
least not outside of the tribal area where tribal custom, rather 
than the Pakistani penal code, is the law of the land. 

Article 45 of the constitution bestows on the president the 
right to grant a pardon or to remit, suspend, or commute any 
sentence passed by any court. There are also legal provisions 
for parole. 

In principle, articles 9 through 13 of the constitution and 
provisions of the codes guarantee most of the same protections 
that are found in British and United States law. These rights 
include, for example, the right to bail and to counsel, the right 
of habeas corpus, the right of cross-examination, the right of 
representation, the right of being informed of charges, the 
right of appeal, and the right of the prevention of double jeop- 
ardy. 

The code contains copious provisions for punishment of 
crimes against the state or against public tranquillity. These 
crimes extend to conspiracy against the government, incite- 



309 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

ment of hatred, contempt or disaffection toward a lawfully con- 
stituted authority, unlawful assembly, and public disturbances. 
Punishments range from terms of imprisonment to life in 
prison or death. 

In most instances, a person apprehended appears before a 
magistrate or assistant commissioner, who decides on bail; the 
magistrate may also try less serious cases. Serious cases are tried 
before the sessions courts, which can award punishments up to 
death. The provincial high court hears appeals and automati- 
cally reviews any conviction involving the death penalty. The 
highest level of appeal for criminal cases is the federal 
Supreme Court. 

Under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special 
Courts) Act of 1975, the government established special courts 
to try cases involving crimes of a "terrorist" nature (for exam- 
ple, murder and sabotage). In 1987 another ordinance was 
passed establishing Speedy Trial Courts, which were empow- 
ered to hand down a death penalty after a three-day trial in 
which almost no adjournments were permitted. The jurisdic- 
tional authority of both kinds of courts was amended in 1988, 
but they have continued to operate. In 1991 the Speedy Trial 
Courts were given new jurisdictional authority to try particu- 
larly heinous crimes under the constitution's Twelfth Amend- 
ment. These courts handle cases that attract widespread public 
attention, especially those dealing with murder and drug 
offenses and in which the government believes that justice 
must be meted out rapidly. Only one appeal is permitted. In 
1990 special "accountability" courts were set up to try individu- 
als from Benazir's first administration who were charged with 
corruption. In late 1993, Benazir announced that her govern- 
ment would stop referring new cases to the special courts and 
would allow the constitutional authority for these courts to 
lapse in 1994. 

The court system and the provisions of criminal law do not 
extend into the tribal areas along the Afghan border. These 
areas are administrated by political agents who work with tribal 
leaders to maintain law and order according to tribal stan- 
dards. 

Prisons 

Under the 1962 West Pakistan Jail Warden Service Rules, 
prisons are managed by a career prison service, which sets qual- 
ifications for wardens, but these guidelines are reportedly not 



310 



National Security 



well observed. The service is organized by province under an 
inspector general of prisons. At division level, the senior offi- 
cial is the director of prisons, and there are jail superinten- 
dents at district and municipal levels. Simple lockups are 
maintained in some villages. There are some female wardens to 
handle female prisoners, but more are needed. 

Prisons are not salubrious places. The common criminal 
from a poor background is assigned to Class C confinement, 
with virtually no amenities. Abuse is common. Prisoners of 
higher social status are assigned to Class B prisons, where con- 
ditions are better, and they can purchase better food and some 
amenities. Class A prisons are for "prominent" offenders. Con- 
jugal visits are not the rule but are allowed in some cases. 

Juveniles are handled separately in both the court system 
and in confinement. The criminal code prescribes special 
courts for offenders under age fifteen unless they are charged 
with a particularly serious offense and a high court orders that 
they be tried before a regular sessions court. There are juvenile 
wards in regular jails for offenders up to age twenty-one. In 
addition, a few reform institutions for boys between eleven and 
twenty years of age attempt to rehabilitate young offenders. 

Islamic Provisions 

The process of Islamization that has taken place in Pakistan, 
especially in the Zia years, has raised considerable concern 
about criminal law. In February 1979, President Zia promul- 
gated a new legal code for Pakistan based on Islamic law and 
established the Federal Shariat Court to hear appeals arising 
from the new code. The Federal Shariat Court also has other 
extensive powers (see Role of Islam, ch. 4). It lies within the dis- 
cretion of the court of first instance to decide whether to try a 
case under civil or sharia law. If the latter, then the appeals pro- 
cess goes to the Federal Shariat Court, rather than to the high 
courts. 

Sharia law was not intended to replace the criminal code but 
to bring specific parts of it into accordance with the Quran and 
the sharia. Its most notable provisions are contained in the 
hudood (sing., hadd) ordinances promulgated in 1979. The first 
ordinance deals with offenses against property, the second with 
zina (adultery) and zina-bil-jabr (rape), the third with qazf (false 
accusation of zina) , and the fourth with prohibition of alco- 
holic beverages. Under the ordinances, there are two levels of 
cases: hudood cases, which have particularly strict Islamic evi- 



311 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

dentiary requirements and call for specific "Islamic" punish- 
ments; and tazir cases, where the evidence requirements are 
less strict and the punishments less draconian. 

A later decision by the Federal Shariat Court has made defil- 
ing the name of the Prophet Muhammad punishable by a man- 
datory death penalty. This decision has raised concerns in 
Pakistan's small Christian community and especially among the 
badly persecuted Ahmadiyya religious minority. Orthodox 
Pakistani Muslims consider Ahmadiyyas heretical, and the 
group has been prohibited from asserting any claim to being 
Muslim — even the use of everyday Islamic greetings (see Non- 
Muslim Minorities, ch. 2). 

As a hadd crime, rape is punishable by hanging; adultery and 
fornication, as well as qazf, by stoning to death. Crimes against 
property of substantial value call for amputation of hands or 
feet. Public drunkenness and, in the case of Muslims, any con- 
sumption of alcohol, are punishable by flogging. 

For the most part, Islamic punishments have not been car- 
ried out, the sole exception being flogging, which has been 
imposed primarily for tazir crimes, as well as for narcotics- 
related crimes. In addition, alleged political crimes also 
resulted in flogging during the last period of martial law 
(1977-85). Hudood sentences of amputation have been passed 
but either have been reversed on appeal or have not been car- 
ried out. Occasional stonings for adultery have always taken 
place in tribal and other rural areas, but no sentence of stoning 
under the 1979 hudood laws has been carried out. 

The Federal Shariat Court has been involved mainly with 
noncriminal matters, aside from the review of hudood convic- 
tions, which in most cases the Federal Shariat Court has 
reversed. In other matters, such as provision of equal treatment 
under the law and requirement for a standard of evidence, its 
application of Islamic principles has even served as a liberaliz- 
ing factor, including in the military justice system. Overall, as of 
early 1994 Islamic legal intrusions have had only a limited 
effect on criminal law, although the potential for growth is 
there, especially under the more activist leadership that the 
Federal Shariat Court has shown since 1990. 

Among the more notable peculiarities of the new enact- 
ments is the issue of rape. On the one hand, the crime is rarely 
proven because four adult Muslim males of good reputation 
must appear as witness to the act. If the charge fails, then the 
woman who has brought it can be punished for false accusation 



312 



National Security 



or, more commonly, for adultery herself because through her 
charge she has admitted an illicit sexual act. In 1991 two-thirds 
(some 2,000) of the women imprisoned in Pakistan were being 
held on such charges. This treatment, of course, has a very 
chilling effect on women who are raped. 

Laws passed in the 1980s give the victim of a murder or other 
violence, or the victim's heirs, the right to inflict an equivalent 
harm. At the same time, however, there is a legal alternative in 
payment of blood money, which enables wealthy Pakistanis to 
avoid punishment by paying money. Under the law, only half of 
the amount must be paid if the victim is female. 

In 1984 parts of the Indian Evidence Act of 1872 were 
changed with much fanfare to meet Islamic criteria, but there 
was little real change. Demands by Islamic enthusiasts that the 
testimony of two women be considered the equivalent of that 
of one man were met only symbolically. The hudood ordinances, 
however, do contain evidential provisions that discriminate 
sharply against women. 

In May 1991, the National Assembly passed the Shariat Bill, 
intended to bring the entire justice system into accord with 
Islamic norms. These norms had not yet been established, and, 
as of early 1994, no serious attempt had been made to draft 
and pass the laws and constitutional amendments that would 
be required. Many observers believed that the act was meant as 
an empty sop to Islamist extremists, but it seemed likely that 
there would be constant pressure to implement the act more 
fully. 

Emergency Provisions 

The British colonial constitutional provisions and penal 
codes gave the authorities ample scope for overriding regular 
legal procedures in the case of persons suspected of political 
agitation or threats to the public order. These provisions and 
codes were perpetuated and strengthened in Pakistan. The 
Security of Pakistan Act empowers authorities to move against 
any person "acting in a manner prejudicial to the defence, 
external affairs and security of Pakistan or the maintenance of 
public order." Under the act, persons may be detained, their 
business activities, employment, or movements may be 
restricted, and they may be required to report regularly to a 
magistrate. 

Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the 
government to act preventively if it perceives the danger of 



313 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

public disorder. A magistrate may prohibit meetings of five or 
more persons, forbid the carrying of firearms, and impose 
"preventive detention" on anybody thought likely to disturb 
public order. Although a detainee is entitled to be informed of 
the reason for his detention and to a fair review of the case, 
these restrictions are in practice easy to circumvent, and the 
constitution specifically denies such detainees procedural guar- 
antees. The government, especially in periods of martial law, 
has used Section 144 frequently when feeling its position could 
be threatened by demonstrations and public opposition to its 
policies; Section 144's provisions have also been used, however, 
to contain disorder that is not political. 

In 1991 Pakistan adopted the Terrorist Affected Areas (Spe- 
cial Courts) Ordinance, which extends the authority of Speedy 
Trial Courts and gives the police expanded powers to use weap- 
ons. The Maintenance of Public Order Act allows detention 
without trial for three months, extendable to twelve months in 
some cases. This act has been used to silence political oppo- 
nents of the government. 

Although persons accused of crimes are entitled to bail, 
there have been a number of restrictions placed on this right in 
cases involving alleged threats to national security. In late 1992, 
the law requiring automatic bail for anyone in jail for two years 
who had not yet been convicted was rescinded, and the high 
courts were prohibited from hearing bail applications from 
persons facing trial in the special courts set up in 1975 to try 
terrorists. A Pakistani jurist commented: "The government can 
now arrest anyone, call him a terrorist, and keep him in prison 
indefinitely." 

Subversion and Civil Unrest 

Internal threats to Pakistan come from several sources. The 
greatest danger to the democratic constitutional structure is 
posed by the recurrent intervention in the government of the 
Pakistani military and, since the Zia years, by the president 
who, under the controversial Eighth Amendment to the consti- 
tution, is empowered to arbitrarily dismiss the prime minister 
and National Assembly as well as the provisional governors. It 
could be argued that the military has only intervened when the 
political situation has deteriorated hopelessly and that the 
threat is in fact from much more deep-seated problems. 

Another danger is the problem of ethnic unrest. Punjab, 
with almost 60 percent of the population, dominates almost all 



314 



National Security 



aspects of national life. This fact is resented by smaller ethnic 
groups, all of whom have at one time been actively dissident. 

For the most part, with the exception of Sindh, the situation 
was quiet in the early 1990s. Sparsely settled Balochistan 
required an extensive pacification campaign by the army from 
1973 to 1977 as Baloch fought an insurgency fueled by eco- 
nomic grievances and a desire for regional autonomy. Of spe- 
cial concern to Baloch dissidents was the influx of Punjabi 
settlers into their resource-rich but sparsely populated lands. 
Soviet assistance to Baloch dissidents was alleged. During the 
government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, hostilities in Balochistan 
were protracted, but the succeeding regime of Zia ul-Haq 
relied successfully on an economic rather than military 
approach in Balochistan, and was, in large part, able to diffuse 
the situation. The potential for unrest remains, however, 
because Baloch feel threatened by the growing numbers of 
non-Baloch moving into the province. The North-West Fron- 
tier Province has long been restive and subject to Kabul's blan- 
dishments on the basis of shared Pakhtun identity, but 
Afghanistan no longer offers a feasible alternative, and the 
Afghan Pakhtun tribal groups have benefitted from Pakistan's 
modest prosperity. Some Kashmiris in Pakistani-held Azad 
(Free) Kashmir probably envision a future independent of 
Pakistan, but their attentions have been absorbed by the prob- 
lems of Indian-held Kashmir. 

In the early 1990s, the principal challenge came from Sindh, 
Pakistan's second most populous province, where the indige- 
nous population was under increasing pressure from 
non-Sindhis who had migrated there. Based on their ethnic 
identity, Sindhis have formed several political movements, 
notably the Jaye Sindh, which the government perceived as 
threatening to Pakistan's unity. Islamabad also claimed that 
these groups were receiving help from India in their quest to 
establish a "Sindhudesh," or independent homeland for Sin- 
dhis. The muhajir (immigrants from India and their descen- 
dants) minority in Sindh, which dominates Karachi, has been 
in sharp conflict with the Sindhis and other ethnic groups. Fur- 
ther, large numbers of kidnapping and bombings in Sindh — 
the virtual breakdown of law and order — necessitated the 
imposition of army rule in 1992 (see Prospects for Social Cohe- 
sion, ch. 2). 

An additional source of unrest has been the rampant gun 
culture and spread of narcotics-based corruption, particularly 



315 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

since the war in Afghanistan. Pakistanis have always been well 
armed, but the availability of cheap, modern weapons has 
meant that criminals and private citizens have significant fire- 
power at their disposal. Because most violence is criminal or 
anomic, it does not pose a direct threat to the state, but should 
the crisis of governability in Sindh spread more broadly, it 
could place unbearable stress on the nation. 

In the early 1990s, foreign-sponsored subversion in Pakistan 
appeared to be insignificant. The Afghans were too preoccu- 
pied with their own concerns to agitate along the frontier, and 
the Soviet Union, which had long had adversarial relations with 
Pakistan, had fragmented into a number of self-absorbed states 
occupied by the struggle for survival in a new postcommunist 
world. India had ties to dissident groups in Sindh and perhaps 
elsewhere; these, however, were probably maintained in order 
to remind Pakistan that its involvement with Punjabi Sikh and 
Kashmiri Muslim insurgents in India was not cost-free. In its 
more youthfully exuberant days, the Islamic regime in Iran was 
involved in subversive support of Shia elements in Pakistan, but 
such activity was no longer a significant factor. 

During the Zia period, a group called Al-Zulfiqar, operating 
from Damascus and Kabul and seeking to destabilize the gov- 
ernment through terrorist actions, hijacked an aircraft in 1981. 
Murtaza Bhutto, a son of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, was involved, and 
Al-Zulfiqar claimed to have some relationship to the Pakistan 
People's Party (PPP), which was totally denied by the PPP. 
Although authorities have reported continued activity by Al- 
Zulfiqar, its existence is shadowy at best, and with the return of 
democratic rule, its activities have been insignificant. There are 
no other known, organized subversive groups that threaten the 
government in any serious way. 

Pakistan's attitude toward terrorism is somewhat more 
ambivalent than that of most other countries. On the one 
hand, Al-Zulfiqar demonstrated to Pakistan the importance of 
international cooperation in combatting international terror- 
ism as manifested in airplane hijackings and bombings. On the 
other hand, however, Pakistan has had no qualms about sup- 
porting insurgents in India, some of whom are engaged in 
activities that can only be described as terrorist. 

In January 1993, the United States warned Pakistan that it 
was under "active continuing review" for possible inclusion on 
the Department of State list of terrorist countries for its alleged 
support of terrorist activities in India. By July, however, the 



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National Security 



United States had withdrawn its threat, having determined that 
Pakistan had implemented "a policy for ending official support 
for terrorism in India." 

As Pakistan approached the end of its first half-century of 
existence, its security problems had changed, yet were in many 
ways the same. The global setting had altered radically, but the 
enmity with India remained a constant, although it had gained 
in predictability and, probably, stability. Subversion was still a 
potential rather than an active threat. Problems of law and 
order were more acute, but the means of dealing with them 
had not changed greatly. Rather, Pakistan's security problems 
were rooted in its own polity and society. Repeated political col- 
lapse, corruption, inability to define its ethnic and religious 
identities, and failure to meet the needs of the people — these 
are challenges that could eviscerate a state even with the most 
capable military machine and efficient security apparatus. Paki- 
stan, as it considers its continuing security dilemma and the 
international image it wishes to project, must energetically con- 
front and deal with these harsh realities. 

* * * 

The government of Pakistan goes to considerable lengths to 
protect dissemination of information about its armed forces, 
making research on the military difficult. One of the few offi- 
cially sanctioned publications is Defenders of Pakistan by Brian 
Tetley, essentially a coffee-table book but with useful informa- 
tion on the role, functions, and organization of the armed 
forces. For early history, Fazl Muqeem Khan's The Story of the 
Pakistan Army remains an indispensable source. Research by 
United States and Pakistani scholars during the 1980s has con- 
siderably enriched the understanding of the military. The his- 
torical picture is amplified by the two volumes of Shaukat Riza's 
The Pakistan Army and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema's Pakistan's Defence 
Policy, 1947-58. Hasan-Askari Rizvi has contributed two excel- 
lent studies — The Military and Politics in Pakistan and Pakistan 
and the Geostrategic Environment, both of which cover the mod- 
ern period, as does Robert G. Wirsing's Pakistan's Security under 
Zia, 1977-1988. Foremost in the analytical field is Stephen P. 
Cohen's The Pakistan Army. The most current information is 
available from the annual International Institute for Strategic 
Studies' The Military Balance and Jane's Defence Weekly, as well as 
several publications authored by Richard P. Cronin and Bar- 



317 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

bara Leitch LePoer of the Congressional Research Service of 
the Library of Congress. Of these, South Asia: U.S. Interests and 
Policy Issues is particularly useful. (For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



318 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Population Growth, Selected Years, 1951-93 

3 Gross Domestic Product by Sector, Selected Fiscal Years, 

1982-93 

4 Government Budget, Fiscal Years 1990-93 

5 Balance of Trade, Selected Fiscal Years, 1980-92 

6 Composition of Imports, Fiscal Years 1989-92 

7 Composition of Exports, Fiscal Years 1989-92 

8 Balance of Payments, Fiscal Years 1988-92 

9 Estimated Labor Force by Sector, Fiscal Years 1981, 1991, 

and 1992 

10 Area of Major Crops, Selected Fiscal Years, 1961-92 

1 1 Production of Major Crops, Selected Fiscal Years, 1961-92 

12 Average Growth Rate of Selected Industrial Products, 

Fiscal Years 1988-92 

13 Heads of State and Heads of Government, 1947-94 

14 Order of Battle and Major Equipment of Ground Forces, 

1994 

15 Order of Battle and Major Equipment of Naval Forces, 

1994 

16 Order of Battle and Major Equipment of Air Force, 1994 



319 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 


0.04 


inches 


Centimeters 


0.39 


inches 




3.3 


feet 


Kilometers 


0.62 


miles 




2.47 


acres 


Square kilometers 


0.39 


square miles 


Cubic meters 


35.3 


cubic feet 


Liters 


0.26 


gallons 


Kilograms 


2.2 


pounds 


Metric tons 


0.98 


long tons 




1.1 


short tons 




2,204.0 


pounds 


Degrees Celsius (Centigrade) 


1.8 


degrees Fahrenheit 



and add 32 



Table 2. Population Growth, Selected Years, 1951-93 



Population Average Annual 

(in millions) Growth Rate 



1951 33.7 n.a. 2 

1961 42.9 2.3 

1971 65.2 3.7 

1981 84.2 3.1 

1987 100.7 3.1 

1992 118.0 3.1 

1993 123.4 3.1 



Estimated. 
2 n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Planning Commission, Seventh Five-Year 
Plan, 1988-93; and Perspective Plan, 1988-2003, Islamabad, 1988; and World 
Bank, World Development Report, 1992, New York, 1992, 268. 



321 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



Table 3. Gross Domestic Product by Sector, Selected Fiscal Years, 

1982-93 

(in percentages at current factor cost) 





1982 


1987 


1 QQ9 1 




o ' J* o • • • 


31.6 


26.3 


25.6 


25.0 


Mining and quarrying 


0.4 


0.7 


0.7 


0.7 


Manufacturing 


15.1 


16.7 


17.5 


17.3 


Utilities 


2.2 


2.3 


3.3 


3.7 


Construction 


4.5 


4.4 


4.2 


4.2 


Wholesale and retail trade 


15.1 


15.7 


17.0 


16.1 


Transportation and communications 


9.4 


8.7 


8.4 


10.3 


Banking and insurance 


2.5 


3.2 


3.1 


2.9 




4.5 


4.9 


4.4 


4.4 




7.3 


9.9 


8.4 


7.8 


Other services 


7.3 


7.4 


7.5 


7.6 


TOTAL* 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 



Provisional. 

2 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Paki- 
stan, Afghanistan, 1993-94, London, 1993, 21; and Pakistan, Federal Bureau of 
Statistics, Statistics Division, Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1991, Karachi, 1991, 
473-74. 



322 



Appendix 



Table 4. Government Budget, Fiscal Years 1 990-93 1 
(in billions of rupees) 2 



1990 



1991 



1992 d 



1993 4 



Revenues 
Tax revenues 

Income and corporation taxes 14.3 19.1 25.9 31.3 

Property taxes 1.4 1.7 2.1 3.9 

Excise duties 23.3 25.0 32.3 44.3 

Sales taxes 15.6 16.9 21.5 26.9 

Taxes on international trade 50.7 50.5 62.5 71.4 

Other UA 16.4 22.8 26.0 

Total tax revenues 119.4 129.6 167.2 203.8 

Nontax revenues 39.4 34.2 55.5 58.0 

Total revenues 158.8 163.9 222.6 261.9 

(of which, provincial revenues) .... 6.6 7.1 15.7 18.9 
Expenditures 
Current expenditures 

Defense 58.7 64.6 75.8 82.2 

Interest on debt 46.7 50.0 63.6 75.5 

Subsidies 9.0 10.7 10.1 7.3 

Other 51.1 70.3 82.9 92.3 

Total current expenditures 165.6 195.7 232.4 257.3 

Development expenditures 56.1 65.3 83.2 72.3 

Total expenditures 221.6 261.0 315.6 329.7 

Income from autonomous agencies 6.8 7.9 14.3 3.2 

Budget deficit 56.1 89.2 78.7 64.6 

Deficit financed by 

External (net) 22.9 22.1 21.8 17.1 

Domestic nonbank 29.6 23.7 -0.6 26.2 

Domestic banks 3.5 43.4 57.5 21.3 

1 Includes federal aid to provincial governments. Figures may not add to totals because of 
rounding. 

2 For value of the rupee — see Glossary. 

3 Provisional. 

4 Proposed. 

Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey: Sta- 
tistical Supplement, 1991-92, Islamabad, 1992, 162-64. 



323 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



Table 5. Balance of Trade, Selected Fiscal Years, 1980-92 
(in billions of rupees) 1 



Year Exports Imports Balance 



1980 23.4 46.9 -23.5 

1985 38.0 89.8 -51.8 

1990 106.5 148.9 -42.4 

1991 138.3 171.1 -32.8 

1992 2 171.7 229.9 -58.2 



For value of the rupee — see Glossary. 
2 Provisional. 

Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey: Sta- 
tistical Supplement, 1991-92, Islamabad, 1992, 190. 



Table 6. Composition of Imports, Fiscal Years 1 989-92 
(in millions of rupees) 1 



Commodity 


1989 


1990 


1991 


1992 2 


Chemicals 


13,046 


15,259 


15,448 


21,997 




3,318 


3,723 


4,408 


5,184 


Dyes and colors 


1,419 


1,868 


2,136 


2,945 


Chemical fertilizers 


3,534 


4,437 


5,911 


6,367 


Electrical goods 


4,962 


4,259 


4,929 


7,469 


Nonelectrical machinery 


26,597 


25,438 


30,195 


54,527 


Transportation equipment 


8,403 


10,119 


11,443 


20,638 


Paper products 


2,734 


2,876 


3,216 


4,027 


Iron and steel 


7,131 


6,993 


7,100 


10,236 


Nonferrous metals 


2,018 


2,594 


2,110 


2,784 


Oil and oil products 


18,509 


24,937 


37,823 


34,406 


Edible oils 


8,576 


8,262 


9,020 


10,025 


Grains, pulses, and flour 


8,598 


9,241 


3,855 


9,979 


Other 


26,996 


28,847 


38,449 


39,305 


TOTAL 


135,841 


148,853 


176,043 


229,889 



For value of the rupee — see Glossary. 
Provisional. 



Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey: Sta- 
tistical Supplement, 1991-92, Islamabad, 1992, 203. 



324 



Appendix 



Table 7. Composition of Exports, Fiscal Years 1989-92 
(in millions of rupees) 1 



Commodity 


1989 


1990 


1991 


1992 2 


Fish products 


2,096 


2,024 


2,575 


2,852 


Rice 


5,967 


5,144 


7,848 


10,340 


Raw cotton 


18,032 


9,550 


9,553 


12,944 


Cotton waste 


240 


597 


1,255 


1,482 


Cotton yarn 


11,645 


17,917 


26,675 


29,170 




Q f\Al 


1Z,UUU 


lo.iyy 


OA 2*70 


Leather 


4,702 


6,002 


6,184 


5,991 


Oil and oil products 


352 


235 


2,228 


2,048 


Synthetic textiles 


2,240 


4,556 


7,807 


10,430 


Footwear 


365 


504 


724 


997 


Ready-made garments 


9,692 


14,341 


18,666 


25,823 




1,221 


1,502 


1,901 


2,253 


Carpets 


4,451 


4,923 


5,003 


5,709 


Sporting goods 


1,369 


2,311 


3,099 


3,515 


Other 


18,864 


24,863 


30,792 


37,829 


TOTAL 


90,183 


106,469 


139,509 


171,755 



For value of the rupee — see Glossary. 
Provisional. 



Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey: Sta- 
tistical Supplement, 1991-92, Islamabad, 1992, 194-97. 



Table 8. Balance of Payments, Fiscal Years 1 988-92 
(in millions of United States dollars at current prices) 





1988 


1989 


1990 


1991 


1992 1 


Exports 


4,362 


4,634 


4,926 


5,902 


6,884 




-6,919 


-7,207 


-7,411 


-8,385 


-9,095 


Invisibles (net) 


875 


639 


594 


312 


-325 


Current account balance . . 


-1,682 


-1,934 


-1,891 


-2,171 


-2,536 


Private capital (net) 


330 


328 


473 


506 


1,730 


Public capital (net) 


1,242 


1,659 


1,840 


1,737 


929 


Capital account balance. . . 


1,572 


1,987 


2,313 


2,243 


2,659 


Errors and omissions (net) . . 


-30 


-42 


-45 


-66 


74 


Change in reserves (minus 












sign indicates increase) . . . 


140 


-11 


-377 


-6 


-197 



Provisional. 



Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey: Sta- 
tistical Supplement, 1991-92, Islamabad, 1992, 189. 



325 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



Table 9. Estimated Labor Force by Sector, Fiscal Years 1981, 1991, 

and 1992 
(in thousands) 



Sector 


1981 


1991 


1992 


Agriculture 


13,010 


16,260 


16,670 


Mining and manufacturing 


3,480 


4,080 


4,210 


Construction 


1,200 


2,030 


2,090 


Electric power and gas 


230 


190 


190 


Transportation and communications 


1,150 


1,550 


1,600 


Trade ...... 


2,840 


3,790 


3,900 


Other services 


2,790 


3,880 


4,010 


Other 


950 


1,030 


1,150 


TOTAL 


25,650 


32,810 


33,820 



Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey: Sta- 
tistical Supplement, 1991-92, Islamabad, 1992, 30. 



Table 10. Area of Major Crops, Selected Fiscal Years, 1961-92 
(in thousands of hectares) 



Crop 1961 1981 1991 1992 1 



Wheat 4,639 6,984 7,911 7,823 

Rice 1,181 1,933 2,113 2,097 

Corn 480 769 845 847 

Chickpeas 1,106 843 1,092 1,021 

Sugarcane 388 825 884 880 

Cotton 1,293 2,108 2,662 2,836 



Provisional. 

Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey: Sta- 
tistical Supplement, 1991-92, Islamabad, 1992, 63. 



326 



Appendix 



Table 11. Production of Major Crops, Selected Fiscal Years, 1961-92 
(in thousands of tons) 



Crop 1961 1981 1991 1992 1 



Wheat 3,8H 11,475 14,565 14,694 

Rice 1,030 3,123 3,261 3,243 

Corn 439 970 1,185 1,204 

Chickpeas 610 337 531 499 

Sugarcane 11,641 32,359 35,989 35,658 

Cotton 301 715 1,637 2,181 



Provisional. 

Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey: Sta- 
tistical Supplement, 1991-92, Islamabad, 1992, 64. 

Table 12. Average Growth Rate of Selected Industrial Products, Fiscal 

Years 1988-92 
(in percentage change from previous year) 



Product 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1 



Cotton yarn 16.83 10.64 20.28 14.22 11.30 

Cotton cloth 18.30 -4.18 9.26 -0.65 5.60 

Jute goods -1.85 -6.82 -7.80 3.24 3.64 

Vegetable ghee 14.45 28.55 7.37 3.85 10.71 

Cigarettes 1.92 -22.43 2.26 -0.70 -4.98 

Fertilizers -2.42 2.52 3.72 -2.70 -5.28 

Cement 8.67 0.75 5.09 4.63 6.90 

Soda ash 2.92 7.61 3.60 5.55 24.02 

Caustic soda 11.66 8.48 11.28 6.08 4.33 

1 Provisional. 



Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey: Sta- 
tistical Supplement, 1991-92, Islamabad, 1992, 107. 



327 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



Table 13. Heads of State and Heads of Government, 1947-94 



Leader 



Position 



Term of Office 



Mohammad Alijinnah .... Governor General August 1947-September 1948 

Liaquat Ali Khan Prime Minister August 1947-October 1951 

Khwaja Nazimuddin Governor General September 1948-October 1951 

Ghulam Mohammad Governor General October 1951 -August 1955 

Khwaja Nazimuddin Prime Minister October 1951 -April 1953 

Mohammad Ali Bogra Prime Minister April 1953-August 1955 

Iskander Mirza Governor General/Presi- August 1955-October 1958 

dent 

Chaudhuri Mohammad 

Ali Prime Minister August 1955-September 1956 

H.S. Suhrawardy Prime Minister September 1956-October 1957 

LI. Chundrigar Prime Minister October-December 1957 

Firoz Khan Noon Prime Minister December 1957-October 1958 

Mohammad Ayub Khan CMLA/President 2 October 1958-March 1969 

Agha Mohammad Yahya 

Khan CMLA/President March 1969-December 1971 

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto CMLA/President/Prime December 1971-July 1977 

Minister 

Fazal Elahi Chaudhry President August 1973-September 1978 

Mohammad Ziaul-Haq ... CMLA/President July 1977-August 1988 

Mohammad Khanjunejo . . Prime Minister March 1985-May 1988 

Ghulam Ishaq Khan President August 1988-July 1993 

Benazir Bhutto Prime Minister December 1988- August 1990 

Ghulam Mustaphajatoi .... Prime Minister (caretaker) August-November 1990 

Mian Nawaz Sharif Prime Minister November 1990-April 1993 

Balakh Sher Mazari Prime Minister (caretaker) April-May 1993 

Mian Nawaz Sharif Prime Minister May-July 1993 

Wassim Sajjad President (caretaker) July- November 1993 

Moeen Qureshi Prime Minister (caretaker) July-October 1993 

Benazir Bhutto Prime Minister October 1993- 

Farooq Leghari President November 1993- 

1 When a head of state or head of government held more than one position, not all offices 
were for exactly the same term. Dates shown are for the longest period a leader was in 
power. The title of the head of state was changed from governor general to president 
under the 1956 constitution. 

2 CMLA — chief martial law administrator. 



328 



Appendix 



Table 14. Order of Battle and Major Equipment 
of Ground Forces, 1994 



Organization or Equipment 



Personnel 


520,000 




Military units . . 


9 


Corps headquarters 




1 


Area command (division) 




2 


Armored divisions 




19 


Infantry divisions 




7 


Independent armored brigades 




9 


Independent infantry brigades 




9 


Corps artillery brigades (2 more forming) 




1 


Air defense command (3 air defense groups; 8 brigades) 




7 


Engineering brigades 




3 


Armed reconnaissance regiments 




1 


Special forces group (3 battalions) 




7 


Aircraft squadrons 




8 


Helicopter squadrons 




1 


Independent observation flight 


Equipment .... 


1,950+ 


Tanks 




820 


Armored personnel carriers 




1,566 


Towed artillery 




240 


Self-propelled artillery 




45 


Multiple rocket launchers 




725 


Mortars 




18 


Surface-to-surface missiles 




800 


Antitank guided weapons 




850 


Surface-to-air missiles 



Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1994-1995, London, 1994, 
159-61. 



329 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



Table 15. Order of Battle and Major Equipment of 
Naval Forces, 1994 



Organization or Equipment 



Personnel 


22.000 1 




Military units . . . 


4 


Commands, including 1 fleet headquarters 


Equipment 


6 


Submarines 




3 


Destroyers 




10 


Frigates 




13 


Patrol and coastal combatant craft 




4 


Inshore craft 




3 


Mine warfare craft 




3 


Support and miscellaneous 




4 


SA-316B (antisubmarine warfare) helicopters 




6 


Sea King Mk 45 (antisubmarine warfare) helicopters 




6 


Lynx HAS MK-3 (antisubmarine warfare) helicopters 




4 


Atlantic aircraft (operated by air force) 



Includes Naval Air Arm and Maritime Security Agency. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1994-1995, London, 1994, 
159-61. 



Table 1 6. Order of Battle and Major Equipment of Air Force, 1 994 

Organization or Equipment 



Personnel 45,000 

Military units .... 7 Fighter/ground attack squadrons 

10 Fighter squadrons 

1 Reconnaissance squadron 

12 Transport squadrons 

1 Helicopter search-and-rescue squadron 

1 Helicopter transport squadron 

7 Air defense surface-to-air batteries 

1 Antisubmarine warfare/maritime reconnaissance squadron 



Equipment 
Fighter/ground 
attack 

aircraft 



100 
34 
80 
50 
30 
15 



J-6/JJ-6 
F-16 

Q-5 

Mirage IH-O 
Mirage III-EP 



330 



Appendix 



Table 16. Order of Battle and Major Equipment of Air Force, 1994 

Organization or Equipment 



3 
58 

Transports 12 

1 
3 
3 
2 
2 



Search and 
rescue 6 

Reconnais- 
sance 12 

Helicopters 
(transport) ... 12 

4 

12 

Training 12 



30 
24 
6 
10 
44 



Mirage HI-DP 
Mi rage -5 

C-130 
L-12 

Boeing 707 
Falcon 20 
F-27-200 
Beech 



SA-319 



Combat-capable Mirage III-RP 

SA-316 
SA-321 

SA-315 B Lama 

CJ-6 
JH 

Mashshaq 
MiG-15UTI 
T-33A 
T-37BC 



Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1994-1995, London, 1994, 
159-61. 



331 



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361 



Glossary 



fiscal year (FY) — -July 1 to June 30; FY 1994, for example, ran 
from July 1993 through June 1994. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — A value measure of the flow of 
domestic goods and services produced by an economy 
over a period of time, usually one year. Only output values 
of goods for final consumption and investment are 
included because the values of primary and intermediate 
production are assumed to be included in final prices. 
GDP is sometimes aggregated and shown at market prices, 
meaning that indirect taxes and subsidies are included; 
when these have been eliminated, the result is GDP at fac- 
tor cost. The word gross indicates that deductions for 
depreciation of physical assets have not been made. See also 
gross national product. 

gross national product (GNP) — Gross domestic product {q.v.) 
plus the net income or loss stemming from transactions 
with foreign countries. GNP is the broadest measure of the 
output of goods and services of an economy. It can be cal- 
culated at market prices, which include indirect taxes and 
subsidies. Because indirect taxes and subsidies are only 
transfer payments, GNP is often calculated at factor cost by 
removing indirect taxes and subsidies. 

haq mehr — Promissory gift from the bride's in-laws at the time of 
marriage. A kind of bridewealth based on Islamic tradi- 
tions stipulated in the marriage contract, to be paid to the 
wife in the event of divorce or her husband's early death. 

hudood (sing., hadd) — The most serious kinds of crime in 
Islamic law, such as those pertaining to theft and adultery. 

imam — Generally, the leader of congregational prayers, imply- 
ing no ordination or special spiritual powers beyond suffi- 
cient education to carry out this function. The word is also 
used figuratively by many Sunni (q.v.) Muslims to mean 
the leader of the Islamic community. Among Shia (q.v.) 
Muslims, it indicates the particular descendant of the 
House of Ali who is believed to have been God's desig- 
nated repository of the spiritual authority inherent in that 
line. The identity of this individual and the means of ascer- 
taining his identity have been the major issues causing divi- 
sions among the Shia. 



363 



Pakistan: A Country Study 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with 
the World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized 
agency affiliated with the United Nations and is responsi- 
ble for stabilizing international exchange loans to its mem- 
bers (including industrialized and developing countries) 
when they experience balance of payments difficulties. 
These loans frequently carry conditions that require sub- 
stantial international economic adjustments by the recipi- 
ents, most of which are developing countries. 

jizya — A tax imposed on non-Muslims in a Muslim state meant 
to compensate the state for the protection given to 
non-Muslims who are not permitted to serve in the mili- 
tary. 

muhajir — Immigrant or descendant of immigrants from India 
who fled to Pakistan after partition in 1947. 

mujahidin (sing., mujahid) — Fighters of a jihad, a Muslim holy 
war; Afghan freedom fighters. 

mullahs — Generic term for members of the Islamic clergy; usu- 
ally refers to preachers or other low-ranking clerics who 
have not earned the right to interpret religious laws. 

mustahaqeen- — Muslims deserving of receiving zakat (q.v.) as stip- 
ulated in the Quran, such as the poor, the needy, recent 
converts to Islam, those who do the good works of God, 
and those who collect and disburse zakat. 

Nizam-i-Mustafa — Rule of the Prophet, i.e., rule by sharia (q.v.) 
law according to Zia ul-Haq's use of the term. 

Pakhtuns — Term used for speakers of Pakhtu or Pashto, who 
are frequently called Pathans or Pashtuns. The tribes 
north of Peshawar are mostly Pahktu speaking, those south 
of Peshawar mostly Pashto speaking. 

pakhtunwali — Tenets of the Pakhtun code of honor. 

Pathans — Pakhtuns (q.v.). 

pir — Successor to the founder of a Sufi (q.v.) order or of a local 
subdivision of an order; in the Sufi tradition, a religious 
man considered to have mystic powers. 

rupee (R or Re; pi., Rs) — The national currency, consisting of 
100 paisa. From 1947 to 1972, Pakistan was a member of 
the sterling area, but in 1971, when the United States dol- 
lar was devalued, the rupee was unpegged from sterling 
and pegged to the dollar at the rate of Rs4.76 per US$1. 
On May 12, 1972, the rupee was devalued from Rs4.76 to 
Rsll per US$1. In February 1973, when the dollar was 
again devalued, the rupee maintained its value in terms of 



364 



Glossary 



gold, and its value in relation to the dollar rose to Rs9.90 
per US$1, where it remained until January 1982. After Jan- 
uary 1982, the rupee was pegged to a market basket of cur- 
rencies important to Pakistan's trade. The rupee 
subsequently depreciated steadily against the dollar, reach- 
ing Rs30.30 to US$1 at the end of February 1994. Notes 
are printed in denominations of Rs 1,000, 500, 100, 50, 10, 
5, 2, and 1. Coins are minted in denominations of Rsl, as 
well as 50, 10, 5, 2, and 1 paisa. 
sharia — Islamic law. Based on the Quran and the sunna (q.v.) 
with interpretations of Muslim jurisprudence. There are 
four major Sunni (q.v.) schools (of which the Hanafi is 
dominant in Pakistan) and one Shia (q.v.) school 
(Jafariya) . 

Shia — The smaller of the two major subdivisions of Islam. In 
Pakistan, the two principal subgroups of Shiism are the 
"Twelvers" (Ithna Ashari), who follow the same system as 
the majority group in Iran, and the "Seveners" (Ismailis or 
Agha Khanis) . 

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) — 
Comprises the seven nations of South Asia: Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka; 
headquartered in Kathmandu. Founded as South Asia 
Regional Cooperation (SARC) at a meeting for foreign 
ministers in New Delhi on August 1-2, 1983; the group was 
renamed when the 1983 agreement was ratified at the 
inaugural summit meeting at Dhaka, Bangladesh, on 
December 7-8, 1985. SAARC's goal is to effect economic, 
technical, and cultural cooperation and to provide a 
forum for discussions of South Asia's political problems. 

Sufi — A follower of Sufism, or Islamic mysticism. 

sunna — In common usage, refers to the deeds and utterances 
of Muhammad that form the basis for the practice of the 
Muslim community. 

Sunni — The larger of the two major subdivisions of Islam, fol- 
lowed by a majority of Pakistanis. 

ulama (sing., alim) — Islamic scholars. 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of four 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) , the Interna- 
tional Development Association (IDA), the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) , and the Multilateral Invest- 
ment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The IBRD, established 



365 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



in 1945, has as its primary purpose the provision of loans 
to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, 
a legally separate loan fund but administered by the staff 
of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the 
poorest developing countries on much easier terms than 
those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 
1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans 
and assistance designed specifically to encourage the 
growth of productive private enterprises in the less devel- 
oped countries. The MIGA, founded in 1988, insures pri- 
vate foreign investment in developing countries against 
various noncommercial risks. The president and certain 
senior officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the 
IFC. The four institutions are owned by the governments 
of the countries that subscribe their capital. To participate 
in the World Bank group, member states must first belong 
to the International Monetary Fund (IMF — q.u). 
zakat — Islamic system of social welfare based on an alms tax on 
wealth held more than a year. 



366 



Index 



Abdur Rahman Khan, Amir, 21 
Abedi, Agha Hasan, 162-63; fraud by, 
162 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS), 140-41; government policies 
on, 140; testing for, 141 
ADB. See Asian Development Bank 
Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology, 49 
Afghanistan: Baloch in, 113; and Baloch 
insurrection, 61-62; border with, 79, 
80, 316; border disputes with, 80, 247, 
263, 276; in Economic Co-operation 
Organization, 167; military relations 
with, 302; policy on, 209; refugees 
from, xxxvii, 98-100, 110, 117, 159, 
165-66, 199, 201, 247, 276-77; rela- 
tions with, 35, 247; revolution in, 275; 
Soviet occupation of, xxxvi, xxxvii, 66, 
69, 72, 98-100, 117, 144, 152, 159, 
226, 246, 247, 249, 252, 275, 276-78; 
Soviet withdrawal from, xxxvii, 72-73, 
284-85; wars of, with Britain, 17, 20 
Afghan resistance movement (see also 
mujahidin), 276; aid to, 152, 234, 247, 
249 

Afghan-Turkish aristocracy, 13 

Aga Khan III, 23 

Agha Khan, Sadr ad Din, 1 27 

Agha Khan Rural Support Development 
Project, 117 

Agha Khan University Hospital, 141 

Agreement of Cooperation, 265-66, 270 

agricultural development, 205 

Agricultural Development Bank, 163 

agricultural prices, 238 

agricultural production, 83, 149, 179-81 

agricultural products (see also under indi- 
vidual crops): cash crops, 180; cotton, 
5, 36, 149, 167, 172, 180, 183; exports 
of, 180; grain, 36, 179, 180; opium, 
112, 139-40; rice, 167, 172, 180; sugar, 
36,183 

agriculture, 149, 172-82; by Baloch, 113- 
14; under Bhutto, 155; under British 
Raj, 151; cropping patterns in, 179- 



81; distribution of, 83-86; employ- 
ment in, 170, 171; export crops, 167; 
food crops, 5; irrigation in, 114; land 
used for, 172; mechanization of, 155; 
under Nawaz Sharif, 231; nonirri- 
gated, 173; in North-West Frontier 
Province, 173; by Pakhtuns, 112; as 
percentage of gross domestic product, 
151, 172; problems in, 154; in Punjab, 
172, 173; in Sindh, 112, 172; taxes on, 
160,178,238 

Ahmadiyyas, 128, 130-31; declared here- 
tics, 40, 42, 131, 217; discrimination 
against, 129, 131, 143, 217, 312; in 
National Assembly, 67; political 
unrest by, 40; restrictions on, 131, 312 

Ahmed, AkbarS.,4, 109 

AID. See United States Agency for Inter- 
national Development 

AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome 

Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium, 51, 165; 
members of, 165 

air force, 291-92; aircraft of, 291-92; in 
civil war, 58; exercises of, 287; insignia, 
295; materiel, xliii, 72; number of per- 
sonnel, 291; officers, 261-62; organi- 
zation of, 291; ranks, 295; training, 
293; uniforms, 295 

airlines, 139, 192, 194; privatized, 150, 
233 

airports, 194; police in, 304 
air transportation, 190, 192-94 
Akbar, 12-13 

Akbar Khan, Mohammad, 40 
Alavi, Hamza, 96 
Albuquerque, Alfonso de, 14-15 
alcoholism, 140 
Alexander the Great, 7 
Algeria: Islamic militants from, xlii 
Aligarh Movement: activities of, 26; ori- 
gins of, 22; platform of, 22-23 
Aligarh Muslim University, 22 
Allied Bank, 162 

All-India Muslim League. See Muslim 



367 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



League 

All-Pakistan Muhajir Students Organiza- 
tion, 221 

All-Pakistan Women's Association, 124 
Al Nahayan family, 1 62 
Al-Zulfiqar, 220, 316 
American Express Bank, 162 
Amnesty International, 100, 130, 306-7 
Anglo-Afghan War, First (1838-42), 17 
Anglo-Afghan War, Second (1878-80), 
20 

Anjam, 242 

April Revolution (Afghanistan), 275 
archaeological research, 4-5 
aristocracy: Afghan-Turkish, 13 
armed forces, 203, 285-304; under Bena- 
zir, 282; British influence on, 259; 
under British Raj, 257-60; under 
Bhutto, 273; buildup of, 277; civic- 
action role of, 286; under constitution 
of 1973, 285-86; defense strategy of, 
286-87; education for, 292; ethnic bal- 
ance in, 286, 292; influences on, 266- 
67; insignia, 295; and Islam, 302-4; 
length of tours in, 293; manpower 
base of, 292; under martial law, 267- 
68; missions of, 285-86; moderniza- 
tion of, 277; number of personnel in, 
274, 277; oath for, 285-86; Pakhtuns 
in, 112; paramilitary, 263, 289, 304; in 
partition, 260-61; pay and benefits in, 
293; in Persian Gulf, 98, 277-78; per- 
sonnel in, 292-95; political role of, 40, 
203, 224, 226; popular opinion of, 
257, 299; and president, 285; Punjabis 
in, 77, 106, 259; purged, 59; ranks, 
259-60, 295; recruitment for, 259, 
292; reforms in, 258; restructuring of, 
266, 274; role of, 257, 260; from rural 
areas, 292; in Saudi Arabia, 71; struc- 
ture of, 259; training, 292-94; uni- 
forms, 295 
army, 288-90; brutality of, 57, 61, 271- 
72; chief of staff, 59, 236, 288; in civil 
war, 57; commander in chief, 264; in 
Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-48, 263; 
insignia, 295; Islam in, 302; materiel 
of, 288-89; mission of, 289-90; num- 
ber of personnel in, 261, 288; officers 
in, 261; organization of, 288; political 
role of, xxxv, 282; ranks, 295; reserves, 
288; role of, 277; social classes in, 135; 



surrender in East Pakistan of, 245; 

training of, 289, 293; uniforms, 295 
Army Corps of Engineers, 288 
Army Special Services Group, 276 
art: Indo-Greek, 7 

Aryan people. See Indo-Aryan people 
Arya Samaj, 21 
Asghar Khan, 63, 223, 228 
Ashoka, 7 

Asian Development Bank (ADB): out- 
standing debt to, 165 

Associated Press of Pakistan, 242 

Attlee, Clement, 32 

attorney general, 213 

auditor general, 213 

Aurangzeb, 12-13, 14 

Australia: recognition of Bangladesh by, 
250 

Awami Dost, 64 

Awami League, 50, 215; banned, xxxiv, 
57; in elections of 1965, 50; in elec- 
tions of 1970, xxxiv, 56, 206; platform 
of, 39; six-point program of, 53, 54, 
55-56; in Suhrawardy government, 44; 
support for, 55-56 

Awami National Party, 222; in elections 
of 1990, 222, 228; in elections of 1993, 
222; founded, 222; political base of, 
222 

Awami Tehrik, 222 

Ayub Khan, Mohammad, 41, 216; back- 
ground of, 44-45; charges of corrup- 
tion against, 53; as chief martial law 
administrator, xxxiii, 204; as com- 
mander in chief, 44, 261, 264; coup by, 
204; illness of, 54; opposition to, 49, 
50, 53-54, 218, 269; power of, 45; as 
president, 50; resignation of, xxxiii, 
54, 206, 271 

Ayub Khan government, 44, 44-54, 97, 
204-6; armed forces under, 265; civil 
service under, 37, 205; foreign policy 
under, 50-54; land reform under, 46, 
47, 50, 177-78; national security 
under, 270; overthrown, 48-49; 
reforms under, xxxv, 45-47, 268; 
repression under, 54 

Azad, 241 

Azad Kashmir, 80; British annexation of, 

17, 79; fighting over, xxxi, xliii 
Azad Kashmir Radio, 194, 242 
Azerbaijan: in Economic Co-operation 



368 



Index 



Organization, 167; relations with, 248 

Babri Mosque: destruction of, 113 

Babur of Ferghana, 1 1 

Badshahi Mosque, 97 

Baghdad Pact, 43, 249, 265 

Bahadur Shah II, 18; attempt to restore, 
21; death of, 21; exile of, 21 

Baharia Foundation, 293-94 

balance of payments, 150; deficit, 97; dif- 
ficulties, 168-70 

balance of trade, 166; vulnerability of, 
167 

Balochi language, 103, 113; speakers of, 
103 

Baloch people, xxxii, 77, 113-17; British 
relations with, 20; geographic distribu- 
tion of, 113; honor of, 116; hospitality 
of, 116; lineages of, 114; marriage 
among, 114, 115; occupations of, 113- 
14; origins of, 113; percentage of, in 
population, 105; refugees among, 116; 
religion of, 114-15; social structure of, 
114-16; Zikri, 114-15 

Balochistan: British annexation of, 20; 
under British Raj, 28, 80, 116; elec- 
tions in, 56; health care in, 138; insur- 
rection in, 61-62, 116, 274, 275, 315; 
mining in, 189; minorities in, 130; 
Muslim invasion of, 8; under One 
Unit Plan, 44; in partition, 31, 32-33; 
political affiliations in, 222; Punjabis 
in, 61; purdah in, 118; refugees in, 
xxxvii, 100, 117; separatist movement 
in, 61-62, 66, 116-17, 143; slavery in, 
117; topography of, 113 

Balochistan Plateau, 82 

Baltistan, 80 

Bangladesh: armed forces of, 57; govern- 
ment-in-exile of, 57; languages of, 104; 
independence of, xxxii, xxxiv, 3, 54- 
58, 79, 199, 206, 243, 245, 263; recog- 
nition of, 250; relations with, 58, 70, 
246; in South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation, 70, 168; trade 
with, 246 

Bangla language, 104; as official lan- 
guage, 104; publications in, 242 
Bankers Equity, 163 

banking, 161-65; under British, 151; 
interest rates in, 163, 164, 218, 232, 



234; Islamic, 65, 129, 164, 218, 232; 
nationalized, xxxv, 59, 155, 220; priva- 
tized, 150, 157 

Bank of America, 162 

Bank of Credit and Commerce Interna- 
tional (BCCI), 162; collapse of, 162; 
founded, 162; fraud by, 162, 233 

Bank of England, 162 

banks: assets of, 162; branches of, 162; 
central, 161-62; commercial, 162, 163; 
development, 163; foreign, 162; Islam- 
ization of, 218; nationalized, 162; 
privatized, 157, 233 

Baroghil Pass, 83 

Basic Democracies, xxxiii, 47-49, 205, 
208; institutions under, 48, 205; intro- 
duction of, 47; purpose of, 47-48; 
reforms under, 47-49; structure of, 
205, 208; suffrage under, 206 

Basic Democrats, 48, 50, 205; election of, 
206 

Battle ofBuxar (1764), 16 

Battle ofPlassey (1757), 16 

BCCI. See Bank of Credit and Commerce 

International 
Beas River, 51 

Beg, Mirza Aslam, 226, 249, 282, 302 

Benazir. See Bhutto, Benazir 

Bengal (see also Bengal and Assam Prov- 
ince), 16; coal mines in, 19; parti- 
tioned, 23, 32 

Bengal and Assam Province, 23; in parti- 
tion, 31 

Bengali language. See Bangla language 

Bengali people, xxxii; British attitudes 
toward, 20 

Bhashani, Maulana, 222 

Bhutan: in South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation, 70, 168 

Bhutto, Benazir, xxxv, 209, 280; arrested, 
64; background of, 225; charges 
against, 228; in elections of 1988, 69; 
in elections of 1993, xxix; ethnicity of, 
106-9; opposition to, 225-26; and 
Pakistan People's Party, 68, 220; as 
prime minister, xxxvii-xxxviii, xl, 66, 
69, 210, 280; problems of, 238, 240; 
rivalry of, with Nawaz Sharif, xxxviii, 
xl, 225, 234; support for, 223, 226 

Bhutto, Benazir, government, first, xxx- 
vii-xxxviii, 66, 223-27; and armed 
forces, 280-82; dismissed, xxxviii, 



369 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



226, 282; expectations of, 224, 226; 
members of, 224, 226; nepotism in, 
225; problems in, xxxviii, 225, 226; 
promises of, 224; reforms attempted 
by, 224 

Bhutto, Benazir, government, second, xl, 
130, 238-41; aid to, 161; allegations by, 
of corruption, 152; budget under, xl- 
xli; budget deficit under, 161; human 
rights under, 307; privatization under, 
184; promises in, xl; reforms under, 
140, 158 

Bhutto, Murtaza, 220-21, 240-11, 316 

Bhutto, Nusrat, 220; arrested, 64; opposi- 
tion of, to martial law, 64-65; prob- 
lems with, 240, 241 

Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, xxxiv; arrested, 63, 
274; background of, xxxiv; as chief 
martial law administrator, xxxiv, 206, 
220, 272; demonstrations against, 63; 
diplomacy of, 273; election campaigns 
of, 55; in elections of 1970, 206; in 
elections of 1977, 63; ethnicity of, 106; 
executed, xxxv, xxxvi, 64, 71-72, 207, 
275, 285; and form of government, 61; 
opposition to, 60, 274; overthrown, 
207, 274; as president, xxxiv, 58, 206, 
218, 220, 272; as prime minister, 220; 
resignation of, 53; support for, 60 

Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, government, 58-63, 
207; armed forces under, 273, 304; 
attacks on, 64; civil service under, 37, 
62; development under, 155-56; econ- 
omy under, 58, 60, 62; foreign affairs 
under, 62, 251, 273; guestworkers 
under, 97-98; Islam under, 42, 129, 
143, 217; land reform under, 62, 143, 
178; nepotism under, 143; planning 
under, 158; purges under, xxxv, 59; 
repression under, 64, 207 

Bihar, 16; coal mines in, 19 

Bihar and Orissa Province: created, 23 

Binder, Leonard, 257 

birth control. See family planning 

black market, 151; crackdown on, 45 

blasphemy law, 129-30 

Board of Industrial Management, 59 

Bogra, Mohammad Ali, 41 

Bolan Pass, 20 

border problems: with Afghanistan, 80, 
247, 263, 276; with China, 248; with 
India, 263, 279 



borders, 79-82; with Afghanistan, 79, 80, 
247, 316; with China, 79, 248; with 
India, 79, 82, 263, 316; with Iran, 79, 
80, 316 

Bosnia and Herzegovina: peacekeeping 
forces in, 302 

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, xliii 

Brahui language, 103; speakers of, 103 

bribery, 78, 139, 151, 152 

Britain: in Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium, 
1 65; materiel from, 250; military offic- 
ers from, 262, 264; military training 
provided by, 250, 293, 303; recogni- 
tion of Bangladesh by, 250; relations 
with, 250; trade with, 167 

British East India Company, 15-16, 258; 
armed forces of, 16, 18, 258; end of 
rule by, 18, 259; mutiny against, 18 

British Empire {see also British Raj) , 3 

British Indian Army, 260; origins of, 258; 
racial criteria for, 20; recruiting for, 
17, 20, 259 

British Raj, 18-33, 259; administrative 
style in, 18-19; agriculture under, 151; 
armed forces under, 257-60; attitudes 
of, toward ethnic groups, 20, 21-22; 
Balochistan under, 28, 20, 116; desire 
for end of, 3, 30; dyarchy under, 26, 
27, 28; economy under, 151; forward 
policy of, 20-21; improvements in 
infrastructure under, 19; indirect rule 
by, 116; industry under, 151; infra- 
structure under, 151; internal security 
under, 304,313; Kashmir annexed by, 
17, 79; North- West Frontier Province 
under, 28; Pakistanis in, 170, 171; par- 
amountcy doctrine of, 19; political 
repression by, 30; Punjab annexed by, 
17; Punjabi soldiers fighting for, 17, 
30; relations of, with Indian princes, 
19; resistance to, 22; suffrage under, 
24-25; territory acquired under, 17, 
20; wars of, with Afghanistan, 17, 20; 
wars of, with Sikhs, 17 

Buddha (Siddhartha Gautama), 7 

Buddhism, 7; origins of, 7 

Buddhists: in National Assembly, 67 

Burushaski: speakers of, 103 

Bush, George, xliii, 252 

Business and Professional Women's Asso- 
ciation, 124 



370 



Index 



Cabinet Defence Committee, 287 
Cabinet Mission Plan, 31-32; reaction to, 
31-32 

Cable News Network (CNN), 79, 229, 
243 

Calcutta massacre (1946), 32 
Canada: in Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium, 
165 

canal colonies, 19, 86, 96 
capital: flight, 156; formation, 183 
Carter, Jimmy, xxxvi, 71-72, 251-52, 276 
caste system, 6-7, 8; origins of, 6-7 
censorship: of radio, 243; of television, 

79, 243; under Yahya Khan, 57 
census: employment data, 119; of 1981, 

92, 119; problems taking, 91-92, 109 
CENTO. See Central Treaty Organization 
Central Election Commission, 213, 228 
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 

43, 249, 250, 265; disbanded, 251, 276 
Chandragupta, 7 
Charter of Women's Rights, 122 
Chase Manhattan Bank, 1 62 
Chaudhry, Fazal Elahi, 63 
Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali, 41 
Chelmsford, Marquess of, 25 
Chenab River, 86; irrigation from, 51 
chief martial law administrator 

(CM LA), xxxiii, xxxiv, xxxv, 54-55, 

220, 271 

children: abuse of, 45; family relations 
of, 102; health of, 136-37; number of, 
per family, 92 

China: aid from, 52, 248; border with, 
79; materiel from, xliv, 52, 248, 271; 
military relations with, 300-301; occu- 
pation of Tibet by, 51; relations with, 
51, 81, 224, 246, 248-49, 268, 270, 
272, 284; trade with, 51 , 167 

Chitral Scouts, 289 

Chittagong: port of, 266 

Christians: geographic distribution of, 
140; under Government of India Act 
of 1909, 24; in National Assembly, 67, 
211; percentage of, in population, 125 

Churchill, Winston, 30 

Citibank, 1 62 

Civil and Military Gazette, 242 

Civil Service of Pakistan, 37, 41, 78, 202- 
3; under Ayub Khan, 37, 45, 46; under 
Basic Democracies, 49; under Bhutto, 
37, 62; disbanded, 202; corruption in, 



45, 144; employment in, 149; ineffi- 
ciency in, xli, 45; under Mirza, 44; 
Pakhtuns in, 112; at partition, 202; 
and political stability, 202; politiciza- 
tion of, 62, 202, 203; Punjabis in, 106; 
reform of, 58, 220; reorganization of, 
37; social classes in, 135 

civil war (1971), xxix, xxxii, xxxiv, 57-58, 
199, 243, 271-72; begun, 206; casual- 
ties in, 272; cease-fire in, 58; Indian 
intervention in, 245, 272; Pakistan's 
surrender in, xxxiv, 58; security impli- 
cations of, 273 

climate, 87-88; in Islamabad, 87; in Kara- 
chi, 87-88; monsoon, 87; rainfall, 87, 
150, 172; temperature, 87 

Clinton, William J., xliii 

Clive, Robert, 16, 258 

CMLA. See chief martial law administra- 
tor 

CNN. See Cable News Network 

coal, 19, 186-87; mines, 187; production, 

186-87; reserves, 186; shortages, 36 
Coast Guard, 289 

Code of Criminal Procedure, 309, 313- 
14 

Cohen, Stephen P., 292, 302 
Cold War, 265; end of, 284, 285 
Combined Opposition Parties, 50, 226; 

in elections of 1965, 50 
Command and Staff College at Quetta, 

293 

Commonwealth of Nations: membership 
in, 43, 250 

communications. See telecommunica- 
tions 

community development, 205 

Congress, 32, 69, 260; in elections of 
1946, 31; founded, 215; government, 
35; Jinnah in, 25, 27; Muslims and, 23; 
outlawed, 31; and partition, 30, 244; 
platform of, 3, 22, 30; preparation of, 
for independence, 38; and separate 
electorates, 24, 25; support for, 22 

Congress-Muslim League Pact (Lucknow 
Pact) (1916), 25 

Constituent Assembly, 200, 216; dis- 
missed, 204; duties of, 203; Jinnah in, 
38, 200; members of, 40; of 1946, 32, 
38; of 1955, 41; One Unit Plan of, 43; 
problems in, 40, 203; revived, 204 

constitution of 1956, 203; adopted, 41, 



371 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



203, 204; drafted, 203; executive 
under, 41, 55; Islam under, 42-43; leg- 
islature under, 41; suspended, 44, 267 

constitution of 1962, 47, 48, 49-50, 206; 
abrogated, 54, 206; individual rights 
under, 49-50; Islam under, 49; opposi- 
tion to, 49; representation in National 
Assembly under, 55 

constitution of 1973, 210-14; amend- 
ments to, 233; armed forces under, 
285-86; Eighth Amendment to, xxx- 
viii, 68, 208, 210, 224, 231, 236, 237, 
240, 285, 314; executive under, 60; 
federal principle under, 210-13; gov- 
ernment structure under, 210-14; 
Islam under, 207; judiciary under, 
213-14; legislature under, 60, 207, 
210-13; president under, 207, 208, 
210, 235; prime minister under, 207; 
prisoners' rights under, 309; promul- 
gated, 207; provincial governments 
under, 213; reinstated, 208, 280; sus- 
pended, 207 

construction, 184; employment in, 149, 
170, 171; government role in, 220; 
housing, 184; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, 151; privatized, 157 

Continuous Motivation System Pro- 
gramme, 93 

corruption, xl, xli, 78, 152, 268, 315-16; 
allegations of, 64, 68, 209, 226, 275; in 
banking, 162-63; in civil service, 144, 
308; in government, 53, 60; increase 
in, 151-52; in police force, 45, 152, 
306 

cotton, 5, 155; export of, 36, 156, 167, 
172; production of, xl, 36, 149, 180, 
183 

Council Muslim League, 50; in elections 

of 1965,50 
Council of Advisers. S<?<?Majlis-i-Shoora 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 

for 1993, 307 
coup d'etat, attempted: of 1951, 40 
coups d'etat, xxix; of 1958, 44, 204; of 

1977, 63,207 
courts, 213-14, 309-10; jurisdiction of, 

213; military, 299-300; provincial, 213; 

special, 214, 233 
courts, sharia, 213; established, 43, 65, 

232; opposition to, 240; ulama in, 66, 

213 



crime, 232, 308 

criminal justice system {see afcojudiciary; 

see also under courts) , 309-10; appeals 

in, 310; defendants' rights in, 309, 

314; Islamic, 309, 311-13; punishment 

in, 309-10, 312 
Cripps, Sir Stafford, 30, 31 
culture: under Basic Democracies, 48; 

diversity of, 201 
currency, 53; devaluation of, xxix, 155, 

237; overvaluation of, 36 
Curzon, George Nathaniel (Lord Cur- 

zon), 23 
customs: duties, 160, 161, 168 
Cyrus the Great, 7 



dacoits, 264, 306, 309 

da Gama, Vasco, 11, 14 

Dalai Lama, 51 

Dalhousie, Lord, 18 

Dara Shikoh, 14 

Dardic languages, 103 

Data Ganj Baksh, 128 

Dawn, 242 

debt servicing, 160 

Decade of Development, 54 

Defence Council, 287 

defense industry, 274, 295-99, 301; 
nationalization of, 153; self-suffi- 
ciency in, 295 

defense spending, 78, 160, 274; increases 
in, 159; as percentage of government 
budget, xli; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, 299; as percentage 
of gross national product, 132, 274, 
299 

Degari coal mine, 187 
Delhi: Muslim invasion of, 9; sacking of 
(1398), 11 

Delhi Sultanate, 9-11; dynasty of, 9; 

expansion of, 9 
Democratic Action Committee, 54 
demonstrations. .See political demonstra- 
tions 

Deoband Movement, 22, 223; activities 

of, 26; platform of, 22 
development advisory councils, 48 
development planning, 158-60 
development policy, 230 
Dhaka: as legislative capital, 46; political 

unrest in, 54 



372 



Index 



Din-i-Ilahi, 13 
Direct Action, 32 

Directive Principles of State Policy, 42- 
43 

Directorate for Inter-Services Intelli- 
gence, 276, 288 

district officers, 19 

districts: under British rule, 19 

divorce: regulation of, 47, 122; rights to, 
66 

diwan, 16 

Dogra Dynasty, 1 7 

Dogras: British attitudes toward, 20 

drainage, 82-87, 176-77; maintenance 

of, 176-77 
Dravidian languages, 103 
Dravidian people: cultural heritage of, 5 
drought, xl, 159 

drug addiction {see also heroin), 139-40, 
226 

drug addicts {see also heroin) , xlii 
drug syndicates, xlii 

drug trafficking, xliv, 73, 151, 238, 308- 
9, 315-16; by armed forces personnel, 
278; crackdown on, 238; growth of, 66; 
investment in, 152 

Dulles, John Foster, 265 

Durand, Sir Mortimer, 21, 80 

Durand Line, 21, 35, 80, 247 

Dutch East India Company, 15-16 

dyarchy, 26, 27, 28, 231 

earthquakes, 87 

East Pakistan. See Pakistan, East 

East Pakistan Rifles, 57 

East Wing. See Pakistan, East 

EBDO. See Elective Bodies Disqualifica- 
tion Order 

EC. See European Community 

ECO. See Economic Co-operation Orga- 
nization 

Economic Co-operation Organization 
(ECO), 248, 249; founded, 167; mem- 
bership in, 167, 248, 254 

economic development, xxx, 78, 90-91, 
117; under Bhutto, 155-56 

economic growth, 97, 184; under Ayub 
Khan, 47; under Bhutto, 62; under 
Mirza, 268; under Zia, 277 

economic planning {see also under indi- 
vidual plans): under Bhutto, 158; for 



development, 158-60; under Zia, 159 
economic policy: under Nawaz Sharif, 
232 

Economic Reform Order (1972), 59 

economy, 78; under Benazir, 158; under 
Bhutto, 58, 60, 62; informal, 151; 
Islamization of, 157; under Nawaz 
Sharif, 157, 231, 233; problems in, xliv, 
34, 36; under Qureshi, 157-58; revital- 
ization of, 58; role of government in, 
60, 152-60; structure of, 150-52; 
under Zia, 156-57 

education {see also schools), 78, 131-35; 
access to, 22, 150; under Basic Democ- 
racies, 48; under Benazir, 158; British, 
22; curriculum in, 134; foreign, 135; 
government spending on, 78, 132, 
134-35, 159; Islamic, 232; languages 
of, 104-5; reform, 134-35, 224; in 
rural areas, 134; of soldiers, 292; struc- 
ture of, 132-33; in urban areas, 134; of 
women, 112, 120, 133-34, 135, 158 

Egypt: Islamic militants from, xlii; in 
Organization of the Islamic Confer- 
ence, 71 

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 43, 265 

Eisenhower Doctrine, 266 

Ejaz ul-Haq, 228 

elections: for Basic Democrats, 206; boy- 
cotted, 239; campaigns for, 55-56, 
228-29; canceled, 44, 64, 208; Con- 
gress in, 31; in East Pakistan, 38-39; 
fraud in, xxxv, 64, 229; introduction 
of, 19, 24; to legislative councils, 24, 
27, 213; local, 64, 213; Muslim League 
in, 30, 31; to National Assembly, 50, 
55, 69, 206, 221, 222, 238; of 1935, 27; 
of 1946, 30, 31; of 1954, 38-39; of 
1959, 44; of 1965, 50; of 1970, 55-56, 
206, 271; of 1977, xxxv, 63, 64, 207, 
220, 274; of 1979, 64, 208; of 1985, 67, 
208, 209, 280; of 1988, xxxvii-xxxviii, 
69, 216, 221, 223, 224; of 1990, xxxviii, 
227, 228-29, 282; of 1993, xxix, 217, 
218, 221, 222, 223, 238, 239; observers 
for, 229, 239; for parliament, xxxvii- 
xxxviii, 211; postponed, xxxvii, 275; 
for president, 50, 210, 235; promised, 
63-64; for provincial assemblies, 69; 
referendums, 67-68 

Elective Bodies Disqualification Order 
(EBDO), 45 



373 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



electorates, separate, 23-24, 28; reaction 
to, 24, 25, 27 

electric power: capacity, 188; consump- 
tion of, 187-88; corruption in, 152; 
cuts, 188; diversion of, 188; genera- 
tion, development of, 187, 188; 
imported, 34; prices of, 238; priva- 
tized, 150, 157, 233; in Punjab, 34; 
shortages, 149, 188; thermal, 187, 188 

elite class, 77; Baloch in, 116; languages 
of, 104; modernist, 42; Punjabis in, 77, 
106 

Elliot, Gilbert (fourth earl of Minto), 24 
employment, 170; in agriculture, 170, 
171; in communications, 170; in con- 
struction, 170, 171; in industry, 149, 
170, 171; of men, 119; of Pakhtuns, 
112; in service sector, 170; in trade, 
170, 171; in transportation, 170, 171; 
of women, 119, 120, 123-24, 170 
energy (see also electric power; see also 
under individual energy sources) , 1 84—89; 
biogas, 189; consumption, 187-88; 
import of, 159; investment in, 188; 
renewable, 188-89; sources, 182-83, 
184-85 

Enforcement of Hudood Ordinance 
(1979), 122 

English: as language of elite, 22; as lan- 
guage of instruction, 104-5, 134; as 
language of military, 293; publications 
in, 242; speakers of, 103, 104 

environment (see also pollution), 78, 88- 
90 

ethnic diversity, 77 

ethnic groups (see also under individual 
groups), 103-17, 143; in armed forces, 
286; distribution of, 105; at partition, 
142; tensions among, 91-92, 145, 199, 
201-2, 204, 263; violence among, xxix, 
xxxviii, xlii, xliv, 113, 129, 201, 222, 
224, 314—15; in West Pakistan, xxxii 

ethnic identity, 113 

European Community (EC): relations 
with, 237 

exchange rate, 150, 155; dispute over, 
with India, 151; overvaluation of, 154 

executive branch (see also president): 
under constitution of 1973, 60 

Export Bonus Vouchers Scheme (1959), 
47 

exports (see also under individual prod- 



ucts), 166-67; of agricultural products, 
180; under Bhutto, 155; of crops, 167, 
172; of drugs, 308; duties on, 36; of 
manufactured products, 167, 183; 
markets for, 167; of materiel, 298; to 
Middle East, 180; under Mughal 
Empire, 15; under Nawaz Sharif, 231; 
of textiles, 167, 183 
external debt, 168-70; as percentage of 
gross national product, 170; total, 170 



Faisalabad: origins of, 96; population of, 
95,97 

families (see also kinship patterns): assis- 
tance from, 141; descent in, 101, 114; 
honor of, 101, 116; importance of, 95, 
100, 114; siblings in, 102; size of, 92, 
94; women in, 101-2 

family laws: under constitution of 1962, 
50; reform of, 47 

family planning: contraceptives in, 93, 
136, 218; government encouragement 
of, 92-93, 94; laws on, 47; services, 93 

Family Planning Association of Pakistan, 
92-93 

Family Welfare Centres, 93 

FAO. See United Nations Food and Agri- 
culture Organization 

farmers: sharecroppers, 177; tenant, 112, 
150, 150, 155, 177, 179 

farming: subsidies for, xxix, 237; taxes 
on, 156, 160, 238 

farms: ownership of, 1 77-79; size of, 1 79 

Fauji Foundation, 293 

Federal Cabinet (see also government) , 
211; dismissed, 217; members of, 211 

Federal Investigative Agency, 304 

Federal Land Commission, 213 

Federally Administered Tribal Areas, 211 

Federal Public Service Commission, 213 

Federal Security Force, 59, 273-74, 304; 
number of personnel in, 273 

Federal Shariat Court, 164, 232, 300; 
established, xxxvi, 208, 311; jurisdic- 
tion of, 213-14, 311, 312 

finance, 160-65; and budget, 160-61; 
and credit, 164; and fiscal administra- 
tion, 161; and monetary process, 161- 
65 

financial stability, xl, 150 

fishing, 182; by Balochi, 113-14; as per- 



374 



Index 



centage of gross domestic product, 
172, 182 

Five Thousand Years of Pakistan 

(Wheeler) , 3 
Five-Year Plan, Eighth (1993-98), 91, 

159-60; education under, 132, 133; 

health under, 137; women under, 124 
Five-Year Plan, Fifth (1978-83), 159 
Five-Year Plan, First (1955-60), 93, 158 
Five-Year Plan, Fourth (1970-75), 158 
Five-Year Plan, Second (1960-65), 158; 

health under, 137 
Five-Year Plan, Seventh (1988-93), 94, 

159; education under, 132, 133, 135; 

housing construction under, 184 
Five-Year Plan, Sixth (1983-88), 94, 159; 

telecommunications under, 194 
Five-Year Plan, Third (1965-70), 158 
floods, xl, 86, 89, 149, 151, 172, 289 
food: aid, 165; crops, 5; processing, 183; 

production, 89; self-sufficiency in, 89, 

159 

Ford, Gerald R., 251 

foreign assistance, xxxvii, 158, 160, 165- 

66, 277; for Afghan refugees, 165-66; 

from Aid-to-Paki stan Consortium, 165; 

from Britain, 165; from Canada, 165; 

from China, 52; from France, 165; 

from Germany, 165; from Japan, 165; 

from Middle East, 165; requested, xl; 

from Saudi Arabia, 165; from the 

United States, 43, 45, 72, 152, 158, 

165, 166, 250, 251-52, 276, 278, 284; 

from World Bank, 165 
Foreign Assistance Act (United States): 

Glenn Amendment, 72; Pressler 

Amendment, xliii, 72, 252, 284, 291; 

Solarz Amendment, 72; Symington 

Amendment, 72, 251-52 
foreign debt, xl; under Nawaz Sharif, 

231; payments, 231 
foreign economic relations, 165-70; 

external debt, 1 68-70 
foreign exchange: access to, 47; under 

Ayub Khan, 47; earnings, 98, 249; 

under Nawaz Sharif, 231, 233; reform 

of, 150, 231, 233; regulation of, 168; 

reserves, xli 
foreign investment: restrictions on, 165; 

in stock exchanges, xli 
foreign policy, 43, 243-54; under Ayub 

Khan, 50-54; under Bhutto, 62 



foreign relations, 251, 267, 272; under 

Zia ul-Haq, 52, 209 
forestry, 91, 172, 181-82; as percentage 

of gross domestic product, 172 
forests: and deforestation, 89, 181-82; 

land used for, 172, 181; regeneration 

of, 181 
"forward policy," 20-21 
France: in Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium, 

165; materiel from, 271 
French East India Company, 15-16 
Friends not Masters (Ayub Khan), 50 
Frontier Corps, 289, 304 
Frontier Post, 242 

Frontier Works Organization, 290 

Gandhara kingdom, 7 

Gandhi, Indira, 58, 69 

Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand, 26; 
civil disobedience by, 26, 30; and parti- 
tion, 30; talks of, withjinnah, 31 

Gandhi, Rajiv, 70 

Ganges River valley: irrigation canals in, 
19 

gas, natural, 185; pipelines, 186; produc- 
tion of, 186; reserves, 186 

GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 

Gautama, Siddhartha (Buddha) , 7 

GDP. See gross domestic product 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), xli 

geographic areas, 82-83; Balochistan 
Plateau, 82; Indus River plain, 82; 
northern highlands, 82 

geostrategic situation, xxix, xxx, xxxvii, 
69, 247, 263, 276; and Cold War, 250, 
284-85; United States goals in, 43 

Germany: in Aid-to-Pakistan Consor- 
tium, 165; trade with, 167 

Ghaffar Khan, Khan Abdul, 35, 44, 222 

Ghazni: Muslim invasion of, 9 

Ghulam Ahmad, Mirza, 1 30 

Ghulam Mohammad, 38, 40, 204, 217; 
death of, 41; resignation of, 41 

Ghulam Mohammad government, 41 

Gilgit, 80 

Gilgit Agency, 20 

Gilgit Scouts, 289 

GNP. See gross national product 

Goa: captured, 14 



375 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



Gorbachev, Mikhail, 72-73, 278 
government {see also self-government), 
78; bribery in, 152; under British, 151; 
distribution of power between center 
and provinces, 33-34; form of, xxix, 
53, 58, 61, 200, 206, 210; officers in, 
278, 283; Punjabis in, 77; role of, in 
economy, 60, 152-60; role of Islam in, 
41-42, 59, 128-29; structure of, 210- 
14 

government, interim (1946), 32 

government, local, 213; autonomy of, 
213; under Basic Democracies, 48; 
elections for, 211; functions of, 213 

government budget: austerity measures 
in, xxix, 150, 238; under Benazir, xl- 
xli; for defense, xli, 78, 299; for educa- 
tion, 78; for health, 78; as percentage 
of gross domestic product, 299; as per- 
centage of gross national product, 299 

government budget deficit, 150, 224; 
under Benazir, 161; efforts to limit, 
157; as percentage of gross domestic 
product, 161; as percentage of gross 
national product, 238 

Government of India Act of 1 85 8, 1 8 

Government of India Act of 1909, 24; 
reaction to, 24 

Government of India Act of 1919, 25-26; 
decennial review of, 27 

Government of India Act of 1935, 27, 
40-41, 200; amendments to, 40-41 

government spending: reduction of, 158 

governor general, 18-19, 200, 204 

governor's rule, 40 

Gracey, Sir Douglas, 44 

Great Mughals, 11-14 

Greek rule, 7 

Green Revolution, 47 

gross domestic product (GDP), 149-50; 
growth of, xl, 149, 151 

gross domestic product percentages: 
agriculture, 151, 172; budget deficit, 
161; communications, 151; construc- 
tion, 151; defense spending, 299; fish- 
ing, 172, 182; forestry, 172; industry, 
151; manufacturing, 151, 183; mining, 
151; service sector, 151; trade, 151; 
transportation, 151; utilities, 151 

gross national product (GNP): under 
Bhutto, 62; defense spending as a per- 
centage of, 132, 274, 299; education 



budget as a percentage of, 132; exter- 
nal debt as percentage of, 170; manu- 
facturing investment as a percentage 
of, 183 

guestworkers, 171; encouragement of, 
97-98; in Kuwait, 170; in Middle East, 
71, 156, 170, 171, 194, 249; number of, 
98; in Persian Gulf, 71, 97-98, 171, 
249, 250; remittances from, 71, 98, 
170, 171, 184, 249, 277; in Saudi Ara- 
bia, 170; stresses on, 98 

Gujranwala: population of, 97 

Gupta people, 8 

Gurkas: British attitudes toward, 20 

HabibBank, 163 
hadith, 126 

Haq, Fazlul, 215-16; platform of, 39 
Haq, Mahbubul, 152, 154 
Harappa, 4-5 

health, 135-41; under Benazir, 158; and 
causes of death, 136; and disease, 88, 
89-90, 136; government spending on, 
78, 159; malnutrition, 135, 136-37; 
special problems in, 139-41 

health care: access to, xxx, 77, 92, 136, 
150; maternal and child, 93, 94, 136- 
37, 138; policies, 137-39, 224; quality 
of, 138; in rural areas, 137-38; tradi- 
tional, 138-39; for women, 92 

health care professionals: as guestwork- 
ers, 171; number of, 138; training for, 
138 

health facilities: nationalized, 138 
Heavy Industries facility, 298 
HeerRanjha (Waris Shah), 105 
Herald, 242 

heroin: production, 139-40; use of, xlii, 
140, 144 

Hikmatyar, Gulbaddin, 73, 247 

Himalaya mountains, 83 

Hindi language, 104 

Hinduism: origins of, 3; sects of, 21 

Hindu Kush, 80, 83 

Hindu-Muslim cooperation, 25, 28 

Hindus, 13; British attitudes toward, 20; 
in East Pakistan, 215; etymology of, 86; 
fleeing Pakistan, xxx, 34, 112; geo- 
graphic distribution of, 130; Muslim 
attitudes toward, 23; in National 
Assembly, 67, 211; percentage of, in 



376 



Index 



population, 125; tax on, 14; violence 

against, 113 
Hindustani language, 104 
History Today (Ahmed) , 4 
hoarding: crackdown on, 45, 47 
Hong Kong: investment from, 1 65; trade 

with, 167 

House Building Finance Corporation, 
163, 164 

housing: construction, 184; financing 
for, 163; investment in, 184; in rural 
areas, 184; in urban areas, 119, 184 
Hub Chowki power station, 188 
human rights, xxx, 71-72; abuses, xlii, 
73, 251, 306-7; in civil war, 57; under 
Zia, 275 

Human Rights Commission, 129, 307 

Humayun, 13 

Huns, 8 

Hurriyat, 242 

Husayn, Saddam, 302 

Hussain, Altaf, 221, 222, 228 

Hussain, Mushahid, 286 

Hyderabad: ethnic identity in, 113; in 

partition, xxxi, 33, 244; population in, 

97 

hydroelectric power (see also electric 
power; energy), 51, 182, 185; capacity, 
187; generation of, 174, 187; national- 
ized, 153; potential, 187 

identity cards, 128, 131 
IJI. See Islamic Democratic Alliance 
ijma (consensus), 42 
imams: restrictions on, 46 
IMET. See International Military Educa- 
tion and Training 
IMF. See International Monetary Fund 
imperial service, 13 

imports, 166; control of, 154, 168; duties 
on, 161; of energy, 159, 166; sources 
of, 167; of textiles, xli; of timber, 182; 
of vegetable oil, 180-81 

income (see also wages): bribery to sup- 
plement, 78; per capita, 77 

income distribution, xlii, 77, 144, 150, 
153, 154-55 

independence, xxix, 33-43, 200-201; 
problems at, 33-37 

India: aid from, 51; armed forces of, 261 , 
286; and Baloch insurrection, 62; bor- 



der with, 79, 82, 263, 279, 316; in civil 
war, 245, 272; control of Indus River 
by, 150-51; disputes with, xlii-xliii, 50- 
54, 82, 151, 173, 226, 263; disputes 
with, over Kashmir, 244-45; electricity 
from, 34; etymology of, 86; export 
duties in, 36; foreign relations of, 267, 
272; imports from, 34; materiel for, 
262, 267, 269, 278; migration to, 5-6; 
nonalignment of, 265; nuclear weap- 
ons of, 62, 70, 245-46, 274, 279; parti- 
tion of, 30-33, 36, 37, 262; peace 
settlement with, 58; princely states in, 
244; prisoners of war in, 245; refugees 
from, 34, 95, 199, 201, 244; refugees 
in, 34, 51, 112, 244, 271-72; relations 
of, with United States, 52, 268-69; 
relations with, 51, 57, 62, 69-70, 225, 
243, 244-46, 278-79; as security 
threat, 264; in South Asian Association 
for Regional Cooperation, 70, 168; 
trade with, 36, 37, 154,167 

India Councils Act (1892), 23 

India Independence Act (1947), 32, 35, 
41, 200 

Indian Civil Service, 19; division of, 37; 

recruiting for, 19 
Indian Constituent Assembly, 40 
Indian Evidence Act (1872), 313 
Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun, 

259 

Indian Mutiny. See Sepoy Rebellion 
Indian National Congress. See Congress 
Indian Police Act (1861), 304 
Indian Police Service, 306; division of, 
37 

Indians: in elective office, 24 
Indo-Aryan languages, 103 
Indo-Aryan people, 3 
Indo-European languages, 6, 103 
Indo-Gangetic Plain: invasion of, 9 
In do-Greek art, 7 
Indo-Muslim culture, 11 
Indonesia: peacekeeping forces in, 302; 

relations with, 270 
Indo-Pakistani War (1947-48), xxxi, 243, 

262; army in, 263; cease-fire in, 36, 

244, 262 

Indo-Pakistani War (1965), xxxi, 50-54, 
82, 243, 263, 269-74; casualties in, 
269; cease-fire in, 53; origins of, 52, 82; 
reaction to, 270; support during, 52 



377 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



Indo-Pakistani War (1971), 52, 243, 245, 
251 

Indo-Pakistani Western Boundary Case 
Tribunal, 82 

Indus Basin Development Fund, 173; 
financing for, 51, 173 

Indus River, 86; distribution of water 
from, 51, 150-51, 173; etymology of, 
86; hydrological balance of, 176; irri- 
gation from, 149, 154, 172, 173, 174 

Indus River basin, 86; agriculture in, 149 

Indus River plain, 4, 82; ancient artifacts 
in, 4-5; agriculture in, 172; early civili- 
zation of, 4-5, 86; irrigation canals in, 
19 

Industrial Development Bank, 163 
industrialization, 149; emphasis on, 153; 
import-substitution, 166; incentives 
for, 154; under Nawaz Sharif, 230, 231 
industry, 182-89; under British, 151; 
employment in, 149, 170, 171; imports 
by, 168; investment in, 156; national- 
ized, 220; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, 151; pollution by, 
89; privatized, 157, 233 
Indus Waters Treaty (1960), 51 , 70, 173 
inefficiency: in civil service, 45; crack- 
down on, 45; in police, 45 
infant mortality, 137 

inflation, 100, 150, 165; under Benazir, 

xl, 226; under Bhutto, 62 
infrastructure: improvement of, 230, 

233; problems in, xli, 149 
inheritance, 66 

insurance services: nationalized, xxxiv, 

59, 155, 220; privatized, 150, 157 
intellectuals, 268 

Intelsat. See International Telecommuni- 
cations Satellite Organization 

interest rates, 163, 164 

International Atomic Energy Agency, 70 

International Military Education and 
Training (IMET), 293 

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
161; aid from, 161; credits from, xl 

International Telecommunications Sat- 
ellite Organization (Intelsat), 194 

Inter-Service Selection Board, 288 

Inundation Programme, 93 

investment: decline in, 155-56; in 
energy, 188; foreign, 165; in housing, 
184; liberalized, 150; under Nawaz 



Sharif, 230; private, 155-56, 157, 159, 
183, 188; public, 156, 159, 183, 184; 
restrictions on, 165 

Investment Corporation of Pakistan, 
163, 164 

Iqbal, Sir Muhammad, 28, 128 

Iran: Baloch in, 113; border with, 79, 80, 
316; in Central Treaty Organization, 
43, 249; in Economic Co-operation 
Organization, 167; geostrategic 
importance of, 43; guestworkers in, 
249; military relations with, 301; rela- 
tions with, 270, 301 

Iranian Revolution (1979), 275, 301 

Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), 71 

Iraq: in Baghdad Pact, 43, 249; Islamic 
militants from, xlii 

irrigation, 91, 172, 173-76; in 
Balochistan, 114; under British Raj, 
17, 19, 86, 112; canals, 19, 51, 86; con- 
struction programs, 173-74; depen- 
dence on, 150, 172; energy for, 189; 
from Indus River, 149, 150, 154, 172, 
173; investment in, 154; maintenance 
of, 176-77; pollution in, 89; problems 
with, 149, 174; in Punjab, 17, 19; in 
Sindh, 112 

Ishaq Khan, Ghulam: allegations by, of 
corruption, 152; background of, 202, 
235; ethnicity of, 112, 236; power 
struggle of, with Nawaz Sharif, 236, 
237; as president, xxxviii, xxix, 69, 
210, 221, 226, 235-36, 280, 282; resig- 
nation of, xxix, 237, 283 

Islam (see also sharia), 8-11; and armed 
forces, 302-4; under Bhutto, 129; in 
constitution of 1956, 42-43; in consti- 
tution of 1962, 49; in constitution of 
1973, 207; conversion to, 8; etymology 
of, 125; five pillars of, 126; govern- 
ment intervention in, 128; interpreta- 
tion of, 42, 65, 142, 144; introduction 
of, xxx, 8, 127-28, 258; politicized, 
128-30; predestination in, 127; prohi- 
bitions in, 43, 65, 126-27; role of, 
xxxii, xxxvi, xl, 33, 41-42, 59, 77, 120, 
127-29, 199, 201, 203, 208, 224; as 
state religion, 207, 208, 210, 215, 217; 
tenets of, 125-27; under Zia, xxxvi, 
129, 144 

Islamabad: as administrative capital, 46, 
97; airport at, 194; climate in, 87; pop- 



378 



Index 



ulation of, 97; stock market in, 165 
Islamabad Capital Territory, 211 
Islamic conquest, 8 

Islamic Democratic Alliance (Islami Jam- 
hoori Ittehad— IJI), 216-17; in elec- 
tions of 1988, 216; in elections of 
1990, xxxviii, 216-17, 228-29, 282; 
founded, 216; in Nawaz Sharif govern- 
ment, 229-30, 234; platform of, 229 

Islamic identity, 42 

Islamic militants, xlii, 73 

Islamic Research Institute, 49 

Islamic socialism, 58, 143, 220 

Islamic Society of Students. S<eejamiat-i- 
Tulaba-i-Islam 

Islami Jamhoori Ittehad. See Islamic 
Democratic Alliance 

Islami Jamhoori Mahaz, 223 

Islamist movement, 303; interpretation 
of Islam by, 42; under Nawaz Sharif, 
232 

Islamization program, xxxvii, 122, 129, 
65, 208, 218, 232, 234; banking under, 
164; consequences of, 129; criminal 
justice system under, 31 1-13; economy 
under, 157; financial system under, 65; 
legal system under, 66; opposition to, 
217, 223, 234; referendum on, 67-68; 
welfare under, 141 

Israel, 249 

itjihad (interpretation of Islamic law), 42 
Ittefaq Industries, 162 

Jafari, Wasim, 224 
Jahangir: tomb of, 97 
Jainism, 7 

Jalianwala Bagh massacre, 26 
Jamhoori Watan Party: in elections of 
1990, 229 

Jamiat-i-Islami (JI), 39, 50, 217-18; in 
elections of 1965, 50; in elections of 
1993, 218; founded, 217; members of, 
42; in Nawaz Sharif government, 234; 
platform of, 217; in Zia government, 
64 

Jamiat-i-Tulaba-i-Islam (Islamic Society 

of Students), 218 
Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind (JUH), 222-23; 

founded, 223; platform of, 223 
Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI), 22, 60, 

222-23; in elections of 1990, 229; ori- 



gins of, 222 
Jammu and Kashmir (see also Kashmir), 
80; in partition, xxxi, 33, 35-36, 244, 
262 

J ana Sangh, 69-70 
Janata Party, 69-70 
Janbaz Force, 289 
Jang, 242 

Janjua, Asif Nawaz. See Nawaz Janjua, Asif 
Japan: in Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium, 

165; trade with, 167 
Jasarat, 242 

Jatoi, Ghulam Mustafa, 226; background 
of, 227 

Jatoi caretaker government, 226, 227-29; 

accountability proceedings under, 

227-28 
JayeSindh, 315 
Jesuits, 15 

Jhelum River, 86, 173; irrigation from, 51 
JI. SgeJamiat-i-Islami 
jihad, 127, 303 
Jinnah, Fatima, 50 

Jinnah, Mohammad Ali, 25, 37-38; back- 
ground of, 25; in Congress, 25, 27; in 
Constituent Assembly, 38, 200; death 
of, xxxii, 38, 215; as governor general, 
33, 200; in Muslim League, 25, 29, 37- 
38, 200, 215; policies of, 28, 30, 32; 
power of, 37-38; and religion, xxxvi, 
128; roles of, 37-38; talks of, with Gan- 
dhi, 31; and women's roles, 121 

Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Centre, 
141 

jizya (head tax), 11, 13, 14 
Johnson, Lyndon B., 250 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, 287-88 
Joint Services Staff College, 288 
Jordan: Islamic militants from, xlii; Paki- 
stani military instructors in, 301 
journalists: arrested, 64 
judges: appointment of, 213 
judiciary, 213-14; bribery in, 152 
JUH. SeeJamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind 
JUI. SeeJamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam 
Junagadh: in partition, xxxi, 33 
Junejo, Mohammad Khan, 216; dis- 
missed, 68, 209, 280; in elections of 
1990, 228; as prime minister, 68, 209, 
280 
jute, 36 



379 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



Kabul: British retreat from, 17 
Kabul River, 86 
Kanishka, 8 

Karachi, xliv-xlv, 34; airport at, 194; cli- 
mate in, 87-88; ethnic identity in, 113; 
ethnic violence in, 129; growth of, 96; 
minorities in, 130; muhajirs in, 96-97, 
154, 315; political affiliation in, 50; 
political unrest in, 54, 226; population 
of, xliv, 95, 96; port of, 36, 192, 266; 
violence in, xliv, 308 

Karachi Shipyard, 298 

Karachi Stock Exchange, 165 

Karachi University, 221 

Karakoram Pass, 51 

Karakoram Range, 83; temperatures on, 
87 

Kashmir {see atojammu and Kashmir): 
annexed by Britain, 17; cease-fire line 
in, 244, 245; fighting over, xxxi, xlii- 
xliii,7l, 80, 226, 240, 243, 269; Paki- 
stani guerrillas in, 52-53, 245, 269, 
284; policy on, 234; rebellion in, xlii— 
xliii, 245, 284, 315; wars with India 
over, 50-54, 82, 243 

Kazakhstan: relations with, 248 

Keamari Harbor, 1 41 

Khalji Dynasty, 9 

Khan, Chinggis (Genghis), 11 

khan of Kalat: independence declared 
by, 35, 44; treaty with, 20 

Khan Sahib: assassinated, 44 

Khilafat Movement, 26-27; reaction to, 
27 

Khojak Pass, 83 

Khomeini, Ruhollah (Ayatollah), 139 
Khrushchev, Nikita S., 267 
Khudai-i-Khitmagar (Red Shirts), 35 
Khulna: political unrest in, 54 
Khyber Pass, 83 
Khyber Rifles, 289 
King Edward Medical College, 137 
kinship patterns, 100-103, 143-44; 

households in, 101; lineages in, 101 
Kipling, Rudyard, 106 
Kirthar Range, 83 
Kissinger, Henry, 248 
Korea, Republic of (South Korea): trade 

with, 167 
Korean War (1950-53), 36, 265 
Krishak Sramik Party, 39, 215; platform 

of, 39 



K2 (Mount Godwin Austen) , 83 
Kurram Militia, 289 
Kushans (Yueh-Chih) , 8 
Kuwait: Pakistani military instructors in, 
301 

Kyrgyzstan: in Economic Co-operation 
Organization, 167; relations with, 248 



labor unions: collective bargaining for, 
155 

Labour Force Survey (1987-88), 92 

Labour Party (Britain), 31 

Lahore, 17, 96; airport at, 194; features 
of, 97; Muslim invasion of, 9; political 
unrest in, 54; population of, 95, 97; 
purdah in, 119; stock market in, 165 

Lahore conference (1966), 53 

Lahore Fort, 97 

Lahore-Multan railroad: construction of, 

4 

Lahore Resolution (Pakistan Resolu- 
tion) (1940), 29, 34, 215 

Lakhra coal mine, 187 

land: arable, 83-86, 172; area, 79, 172; 
ceilings on holdings of, 46; cultivated, 
172; distribution of, 46-47, 150, 179; 
taxes on, 157; use, 172-73 

landowners, 106, 112 

land reform, 176-79; avoided, 178-79; 
under Ayub Khan, 46, 47, 50, 177-78; 
under Bhutto, 62, 143, 178, 220; 
under constitution of 1962, 50 

Land Reform Commission, 46 

land tenure, 114, 178 

language {see also linguistic groups; see 
also under individual languages) , 202; 
distribution of, 103, 105; of publica- 
tion, 242; riots over, 104, 143; stan- 
dardized, 103; vernacular, 103 

Larkhana: ethnic identity in, 113 

Law of Evidence, 122 

Lawrence, Stringer, 258 

legal system: women under, 66 

Leghari, Farooq: as president, xxix, 239- 
40 

legislative assemblies, 27 

Legislative Assembly, 204; under consti- 
tution of 1956, 41, 204; disbanded, 
204 

legislative councils: Indians in, 24; pro- 
vincial, 26 



380 



Index 



legislature (see also Legislative Assembly; 
Majlis-i-Shoora; National Assembly): 
under constitution of 1973, 60, 210- 
13; elections for, 211; minorities in, 
211 

Liaquat Ali Khan, 37; assassinated, xxxiii, 

38, 40, 215, 267; as prime minister, 

xxxii-xxxiii, 38, 200-201 
Liaquat Ali Khan government, 200-201; 

armed forces as threat to, 40 
Liberation Force. See Mukti Bahini 
Libya: Pakistani military instructors in, 

301; guestworkers in, 249 
Line of Control (see also Pakistan-India 

cease-fire line), xliii, 71, 245, 279 
linguistic groups (see also under individual 

groups), 103-17 
literacy, 77, 135; of men, 133; rate, xxx, 

130, 131, 133, 134, 242; of women, 

xxx, 120, 133 
literature: Sanskrit, 8 
livestock, 91, 114, 181 
living standards: attempts to improve, 

149, 159 
Lodhi Dynasty, 9, 11 
London roundtable conferences, 27 
Lucknow Pact. See Congress-Muslim 

League Pact 

MacDonald, Ramsay, 27 
maharajas, 16 

Mahmud of Ghazni: raids by, 8-9 
Maintenance of Public Order Act 

(1991), 314 
Majlis-i-Shoora (Council of Advisers) (see 

also legislature) , 65, 210-13 
Maker wal/Gullakhel coal mine, 187 
Malaysia: Pakistani banks in, 162; trade 

with, 167 

Maldives: in South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation, 70, 168 

maliks, 111 

Mamluk Dynasty, 9 

Mangla Dam, 86, 173; capacity, 187 

mansabdari system (see also zamindari sys- 
tem), 13, 14 

manufacturing, 183-84; exports by, 167, 
183; growth, 183; investment in, 154, 
183; nationalized, xxxiv, 154, 155, 156; 
as percentage of gross domestic prod- 
uct, 151,183 



Mardan: population in, 97 

Mari gas field, 186 

Maritime Security Agency, 290 

marriage, 114, 115; age for, 136; 
arranged, 102; with cousins, 102, 114, 
115; dowry for, 103; laws, 47; regula- 
tion of, 47, 122; relation by, 102; 
women in, 102-3 

martial law (see also chief martial law 
administrator), xxix, 203, 206, 257, 
274-76; armed forces under, 267-68; 
declared in 1953, 40, 217; declared in 
1958, 44, 45, 204, 267-68; declared in 
1969, 54; declared in 1977, 220, 274; 
in East Pakistan, 55-57; ended, xxxiv, 
49, 59, 68, 206, 207, 208, 220, 268, 
280; opposition to, 268; reforms 
under, 45-47; suit protesting, 64—65 

Masawat, 242 

Mashriq, 242 

materiel (see also nuclear weapons), 274, 
298-99; air force, xliii, 72; from Brit- 
ain, 250; from China, xliv, 52, 271, 
300-301; distribution of, 262; domes- 
tic, 295-99; embargo, 250-51; exports, 
298; from France, 271; investment in, 
152; navy, 266, 298; procurement of, 
144; from Russia, 301; from the 
United States, xliii, 72, 266, 270, 271, 
277, 279, 284, 300 

Maududi, Maulana Abdul Ala, 42-43, 
217 

Mauryan Empire, 7 
Mayo Hospital, 137 

Mazari, Balakh Sher: as caretaker prime 
minister, 237 

media, 241-43; censoring of, 243; gov- 
ernment controls on, 232; importance 
of, 241; restrictions on, 241 

Mehran Bank, 162 

Mehran Force, 289 

men: honor of, 118, 119; literacy of, 133; 
occupations of, 119; relations of, with 
women, 118, 119; roles of, 98, 118-20; 
tobacco use by, 139 

merchant marine, 192 

Meting coal mine, 187 

middle class, 77; and nationalism, 22; 
political affiliations of, 42 

Middle East: aid from, 165; exports to, 
180; guestworkers in, 71, 156, 170, 
171, 194; military ties to, 71, 301; rela- 



381 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



tions in, 249-50 

migration, 144; to India, 5-6, 34; to Paki- 
stan, 34-35; to Persian Gulf, 97-98 

military: assistance, xxxvii, 43, 45, 152, 
166, 250, 252, 265, 266, 276; coopera- 
tion, 250; development, xxx; doctrine, 
302-4; justice, 299-300; policy, 59; 
relations, 300-302; training, 250, 260 

military officers, 261-62; background of, 
293; British, 262, 264; in government, 
278, 283; in narcotics trafficking, 278; 
number of, 261; pay and benefits, 293; 
purged, 59, 273; recruitment of, 259, 
293; retirement, 293; training of, 260, 
293-94, 303; in Zia government, xxxvi 

military personnel, enlisted, 292; pay 
and benefits, 293; retirement, 293 

minerals: resources, 189 

mines: under British Raj, 19; coal, 19 

mining, 189 

Ministry of Commerce, 211 
Ministry of Communications, 211 
Ministry of Culture, 211 
Ministry of Defence, 211, 287-88, 299 
Ministry of Defence Production, 211, 
295-98 

Ministry of Education, 132, 211 
Ministry of Environment, 211 
Ministry of Finance and Economic 

Affairs, 211; Military Finance Division, 

287 

Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 211 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 211 
Ministry of Health, 93, 141, 211 
Ministry of Housing, 21 1 
Ministry of Information and Broadcast- 
ing, 195, 211 
Ministry of Interior, 211, 289, 305 
Ministry of Kashmiri Affairs and North- 
ern Areas, 211 
Ministry of Labour, Manpower, and 

Overseas Pakistanis, 98 
Ministry of Law and Justice, 211 
Ministry of Local Government, 21 1 
Ministry of Minority Affairs, 21 1 
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural 

Resources Production, 211 
Ministry of Planning and Economic 

Development, 93, 211 
Ministry of Production, 59 
Ministry of Railroads, 21 1 
Ministry of Religious Affairs, 211 



Ministry of Science and Technology, 21 1 
Ministry of Social Welfare, 21 1 
Ministry of Special Education, 211 
Ministry of Sports, 211 
Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, 

211, 289 
Ministry of Tourism, 211 
Ministry of Water and Power, 211 
Ministry of Women's Development, 134, 

211 

Ministry of Youth Affairs, 21 1 
minorities, 130-31, 143 
Minto, fourth earl of. See Elliot, Gilbert 
Mirza, Iskander, 41, 204; martial law 

under, 44, 267; ousted, 44, 204 
modernization, 42 

Mohammedan Educational Conference 

(1870s), 120 
Mohenjo-daro, 4 

money: growth of, 164; supply, 164-65 
monsoon, 87 

Montagu, Edwin Samuel, 25 
Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, 25-26, 
27 

Morley, John, 24 

Morley-Minto Reforms. See Government 
of India Act of 1909 

Morning News, 242 

mountains, 82, 83; temperatures on, 87 
Mountbatten, Louis, xxx-xxxi, 32 
Mount Godwin Austen (K2) , 83 
Movement for the Restoration of 
Democracy (MRD), 220-21, 223; dis- 
solved, 221; formed, 64; platform of, 
64 

MQM. See Refugee People's Movement 
MRD. See Movement for the Restoration 

of Democracy 
Mughal Empire (1526-1858), 3, 11-16; 
administration of, 13, 14; aristocracy 
under, 13; end of, 18; imperial service 
of, 13; languages of, 104; legal system 
of, 13; rebellions against, 14; religion 
under, 13; succession in, 13, 14; taxes 
under, 14; trade under, 15; ulama 
under, 13 

Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz. See Refugee Peo- 
ple's Movement 

muhajirs {see also refugees), xxxii, 95, 96- 
97, 112-13, 142-43; and ethnic ten- 
sion, xliv, 66, 129, 201, 224, 315; lan- 
guages of, 104; percentage of, in 



382 



Index 



population, 105; role of, in economy, 
154; violence among, xxxviii, 96 

Muhammad (Prophet), 125, 126 

Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College, 
22,120 

Muhammad of Ghor, 9 

mujahidin, 73, 127, 247-48, 276; assis- 
tance to, 249 

Mujibur Rahman, Sheikh, 206; arrested, 

xxxiv, 57; six-point program of, 53 
Mukti Bahini (Liberation Force) (Bang- 
ladesh), 57, 272 

mullahs: interpretation of Islam by, 42 
Multan: Muslim invasion of, 9 
Muqeem Khan, Fazl, 262 
Muslim, 242 

Muslim Commercial Bank, 162 
Muslim courts. See courts, sharia 
Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (1961), 

xxxv, 66, 122, 129, 143 
Muslim invaders, 3 

Muslim League (see also Pakistan Muslim 
League), 32, 215-16, 260; conferences 
of, 28, 29; in Constituent Assembly, 41; 
created, 3, 23, 215; decline of, xxxii, 
204, 215, 216; in elections of 1946, 30; 
in elections of 1954, 38-39; in elec- 
tions of 1970, 56; Jinnah in, 25, 29, 32, 
37-38, 200, 215; platform of, 3, 23, 24, 
30, 215; preparation of, for indepen- 
dence, 38, 104; reconstituted, 50; 
repression under, 39-40; and separate 
electorates, 24, 25; support for, 38, 39, 
43 

Muslim nationalism, 21-24, 120 
Muslim Personal Law (1937), 120-21 
Muslim Personal Law of Sharia (1948), 
121-22 

Muslims (see also Islam), 124; British atti- 
tudes toward, 20, 21-22; in canal colo- 
nies, 19; fleeing India, xxx, 34; 
massacre of, in Calcutta, 32; percent- 
age of, in population, 124; reputation 
of, 9 

Muslims, Shia, xliv, 13, 127, 142; 

demands of, 144; percentage of, in 

population, 125 
Muslims, Sunni, xliv, 13, 124, 127; 

Hanafi, 114-15, 127; percentage of, in 

population, 124 
Muslim state: desire for, 28-29 
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, 



43, 250, 253, 265 



NAM. S^Nonaligned Movement 
Nana Sahib, 21 
Nanga Parbat, 83 
narcotics. See under drugs 

Nation, 242 

National AIDS Control Programme, 141 

National Assembly, 59, 208; dissolved, 
xxxviii, 68, 209, 226, 267; elections for, 
50, 55, 206; legislation by, 211; mem- 
bers of, 50, 55, 59, 210-11; minorities 
in, 67, 211; opening postponed, xxxiv, 
271; sessions of, 50; voting for, 48, 50; 
women in, 50,55, 56, 67, 206 

National Awami Party, 39, 50, 59-60, 
222; in elections of 1965, 50; in elec- 
tions of 1970, 56; platform of, 39, 50 

National Cadet Corps, 289 

national conservation, 90-91 

National Conservation Strategy Report 
(1992), 89, 90, 91 

National Credit Consultative Council, 
164 

National Defence College, 287, 293-94 
National Democratic Institute for Inter- 
national Affairs, 221 
National Democratic Party, 222 
National Development Finance Corpora- 
tion, 163 
National Education Council, 134 
National Finance Commission, 160; 

members of, 160 
National Guard, 289 
National Highway Authority, 233 
National Institute of Health, 141 
National Investment Trust, 163, 164 
nationalism (see also Muslim national- 
ism): support for, 22; suppression of, 
260 

nationalization, xxxiv-xxxv, 156, 220; of 
banking, xxxv, 59, 162; under Bhutto, 
59; of defense industry, 153; of energy, 
153; of hospitals, 138; of insurance 
industry, xxxiv, 59; of manufacturing, 
xxxiv, 155; of schools, 134, 135; of tele- 
communications, 153; of transporta- 
tion, 153 

National Logistics Cell, 290 

National People's Party, 227; formed, 
227 



383 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



National Press Trust, 242 
National Telecommunications Network, 
194 

natural resources: under Nawaz Sharif, 
230 

navy, 290-91; air wing, 274, 290; com- 
mands, 290; exercises of, 287; fleet of, 
290; insignia, 295; marine commando 
unit, 291; materiel, 266, 298; number 
of personnel in, 290; officers, 261-62; 
organization of, 290; ranks, 295; 
reserves, 290; threats to, 291; training, 
293; uniforms, 295 

nawabs, 16 

Nawa-i-Waqt, 242 

Nawaz Janjua, Asif, 282 

Nawaz Sharif, Mian, xxxviii, 43, 216; 
assessments of, 231; background of, 
230; in elections of 1988, 216; in elec- 
tions of 1990, xxxviii, 228, 229, 282; in 
elections of 1993, xxix; ethnicity of, 
106; power struggle of, with Ishaq 
Khan, 236, 237; as prime minister, 
xxxviii, 216, 236-37, 282; resignation 
of, xxix, 237, 283; rivalry of, with 
Benazir, xxxviii, xl, xliii, 225, 234 

Nawaz Sharif government (1990-93), 
xxxviii, 229-35; accomplishments of, 
232; allegations by, of corruption in, 
152; assessments of, 231; cabinet of, 
231; dismissal of, xxxviii, 236-37, 283; 
economy under, 157, 231, 233; 
nuclear program under, 70; privatiza- 
tion under, 157; problems in, 233-34; 
reconstruction plan of, 230; rein- 
stated, 237; religion under, 66, 131 

Nazimuddin, Khwaja, 38, 40-41; dis- 
missal of, 41; as governor general, 200 

Nehru, Jawaharlal, 26, 30, 70; armed 
forces under, 261; and partition, 31- 
32 

Nehru, Motilal, 25, 28 

Nepal: in South Asian Association for 

Regional Cooperation, 70, 168; trade 

with, 167 
Netherlands, 15 
News, 242 

newspapers (see also journalists; media): 
languages of publication, 242; Muslim- 
owned, 241-42; restrictions on, 45, 
232; shut down, 64, 241 

New Zealand: recognition of Bangladesh 



by, 250 

NGOs. See nongovernment organiza- 
tions 
Niazi, Hidayat, 233 
Nixon, Richard M., 251 , 271-72 
Nizam-i-Mustafa, 63, 65 
nomadism, 113-14 
Nonaligned Movement (NAM), 278 
nonalignment, 43 

nongovernment organizations (NGOs), 
78,91 

Northern Areas, 80 

northern highlands, 82, 83 

North-West Frontier Province: agricul- 
ture in, 173; autonomy movement in, 
143; under British Raj, 28; Congress 
government in, 35; elections in, 31, 
56; ethnic violence in, 275, 315; health 
care in, 138; Muslim League in, 43; 
under One Unit Plan, 44; opium pro- 
duction in, 140; in partition, 31; politi- 
cal affiliation in, 50, 222; provincial 
assemblies in, xxix; purdah in, 118; 
refugees in, xxxvii, 100; schools in, 
112; soldiers from, 292, 293 

Now or Never, 28-29 

nuclear energy, 187; plans for, 187 

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, 70, 
252-53 

nuclear weapons, xxx, 70, 303; develop- 
ment of, xxxvi, 62, 70, 71-72, 73, 166, 
240, 245-46, 251, 274, 276, 279, 284, 
298, 301; India's possession of, 62, 70, 
245-46, 274, 279, 303; potential use 
of, xliii 

Nur Pak, 114-15 



Objectives Resolution (1949), 40, 203-4, 
208-9 

occupation (see also guestworkers) : of 
men, 119; of Punjabis, 106; of women, 
119 

oil: distribution of, 155; imports of, 166, 
185-86; prices, 238; production, 185- 
86 

Oman: Pakistani banks in, 162 

One Unit Plan, 43-44; dissolved, 55; 
introduction of, 43 

opium, 112; cultivation, 139-40; smug- 
gling, 139-40 

Orangi Pilot Project, 124 



384 



Index 



Organization of the Islamic Conference, 

42,71,249, 254, 278 
Orient Press of India, 242 
Orissa, 16 



Pahlavas, 8 

Pahlavi, Muhammad Reza, 275 
Pakhtu language (Pashto), 103 
Pakhtun people, xxxii, 44, 77, 109-12, 
236, 315; border dispute of, 80; British 
attitudes toward, 20, 111; census of, 
109; clans of, 110-11; code of conduct 
of, 109; education of, 112; egalitarian- 
ism of, 111; and ethnic tension, 129; 
feuds among, 109-10, 111; geographic 
distribution of, 109; honor of, 109; 
hospitality of, 110; occupations of, 
112; percentage of, in population, 
105; political affiliations of, 222; refu- 
gees among, 110; revenge among, 
109-10; secession movement in, 80; 
women, 109, 112 
Pakistan: British assets in, 37; etymology 
of, 28; movement to establish, 28-30; 
refugees from, 34; refugees in, 34 
Pakistan, East: elections in, 38-39, 50, 
55-56; investment in, 46; languages of, 
104; military crackdown on, xxxiv, 57, 
251, 271-72; minorities in, 215; in 
National Assembly, 55; political affilia- 
tion in, 50, 55-56; political unrest in, 
56, 143, 271; provinces in, 34; rivalry 
of, with West Pakistan, xxxi-xxxii; 
secession of, xxxii, xxxiii-xxxiv, 3, 206, 
263; and Tashkent Declaration, 53 
Pakistan, West: elections in, 50, 55, 56, 
206; ethnic groups in, xxxii; Muslim 
League in, 43; in National Assembly, 
55; under One Unit Plan, 44; political 
affiliations in, 55, 56; provinces in, 34; 
rivalry of, with East Pakistan, xxxi- 
xxxii; and Tashkent Declaration, 53 
Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, 298 
Pakistan Air Force. See air force 
Pakistan Air Force Act (1953) , 299 
Pakistan Army. See army 
Pakistan Army Act (1952), 299 
Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation, 
194, 242 

Pakistan Cooperative Societies, 163, 233 
Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA), 



217, 221, 223; in elections of 1990, 
228-29 

Pakistan-India cease-fire line {see also 
Line of Control), 81-82 

Pakistan Industrial Credit and Invest- 
ment Corporation, 163 

Pakistan International Airlines, 139, 192, 
228 

Pakistan Islamic Front: in elections of 

1993,218 
Pakistan-Kuwait Investment, 163-64 
Pakistan-Libya Holding, 163-64 
Pakistan Medical Research Council, 88 
Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul, 293 
Pakistan Mineral Development Corpora- 
tion, 187 

Pakistan Muslim League (PML), 50, 64, 
216, 228, 234 

Pakistan Muslim League-Junejo (PML-J), 
68, 216, 228 

Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Sharif 
(PML-N) , xl, 216; in elections of 1990, 
228; in elections of 1993, xxix, 221, 
238; formed, 216; in Nawaz Sharif gov- 
ernment, 230, 234 

Pakistan Narcotics Board, 140, 308 

Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), 63, 
223; in elections of 1977, 63, 220; sup- 
port for, 63; in Zia government, 64 

Pakistan National Shipping Corporation, 
192 

Pakistan Navy Ordinance (1961), 299 

Pakistan Ordnance Factory at Wah Can- 
tonment, 295, 298 

Pakistan People's Party (PPP), 54, 59, 
143, 218-21; under Benazir, 68, 209, 
234; in elections of 1970, xxxiv, 55, 56, 
206; in elections of 1977, xxxv, 63, 
220; in elections of 1988, 69, 221; in 
elections of 1990, 216-17; in elections 
of 1993, xxix, 221, 238; founded, 53; 
platform of, 59, 218, 220; purged, 
xxxv; slogan of, xxxiv, 55, 218; sup- 
pressed, 64 

Pakistan Press International, 242 

Pakistan Rangers, 289, 304 

Pakistan Resolution. See Lahore Resolu- 
tion 

Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1991, 308 
Pakistan Telecommunications Associa- 
tion: privatized, 194 
Pakistan Television Corporation, 195, 



385 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



229, 242 
Pakistan Times, 242 

Pakistan Women Lawyers' Association, 
124 

paramountcy, 19 

parliamentary system: collapse of, 43-44 
Parsis, 130; in National Assembly, 67 
partition, 30-33, 150, 262; armed forces 
in, 260-61; distribution of provinces 
in, 31, 32-33; expectations for, 142; 
Mountbatten's plan for, xxx-xxxi, 32, 
244; opposition to, 30; preparations 
for, 33; violence during, xxx, 34, 38, 
244 

Pashto language. S^Pakhtu language 
Pathans. S^Pakhtun people 
patron-client relationship, 116 
PDA. See Pakistan Democratic Alliance 
penal code, 309; religion under, 129 
People's Television Network, 229, 243 
Persian Gulf: armed forces in, 98, 277- 
78; camel boys in, 117; guestworkers 
in, 71, 97-98, 171, 249; migration to, 
97-98; military relations with, 301; 
relations in, 249 
Persian Gulf War, 98, 170, 171, 234, 302 
Perspective Plan (1988-2003), 89 
Peshawar: airport at, 194; political unrest 

in, 54; population in, 97 
petroleum. See oil 
Planning Commission, 154, 158 
PML. See Pakistan Muslim League 
PML-J. See Pakistan Muslim League- 
Junejo 

PML-N. See Pakistan Muslim League- 
Nawaz Sharif 

PNA. ^Pakistan National Alliance 

Police Rules (1934), 304 

Police Service of Pakistan, 304-5; arms 
of, 306; attitudes toward, 306; corrup- 
tion in, 45, 152, 306; education for, 
305-6; human right abuses by, xlii, 
306, 307; inefficiency in, 45; missions 
of, 304; organization of, 304-6; Pakh- 
tuns in, 112; politicization of, 306; 
ranks in, 305-6; recruitment for, 305; 
women in, 305 

Police Training College, 305 

political activity: banned, 57, 64 

political culture, 230 

political demonstrations: against Bhutto, 
63, 274; in East Pakistan, 56; by Gan- 



dhi, 26; by Jinnah, 32; against Yahya 
Khan, 58; against Zia, 64 
political opposition: to Ayub Khan, 49, 
50, 53, 54; to Benazir, 225-26; against 
Mughal Empire, 14; repression of, 26, 
46, 207 

political parties (see also under individual 
parties), 214; banned, 50, 64, 209, 216, 
267; problems with, 214-15; revived, 
68,69 

political repression, 214; under Ayub 
Khan , 54; under British Raj , 1 8, 21 , 26 , 
30; in East Pakistan, 57; under Muslim 
League, 39-40 

political rivalry, 199, 234 

political stability, 199-200, 214, 231-32; 
and the civil service, 202 

political unrest, 220, 271, 314-17; by the 
Ahmadiyyas, 40; under Ayub Khan, 54; 
in Balochistan, 66; suppression of, 260 

political violence, xliv; under Benazir, 
226; under Bhutto, 60; under British 
Raj, 31; casualties of, 34; at indepen- 
dence, xxx, 34, 38; over language pol- 
icy, 104 

politicians, 268; bribes for, 151; purged, 

45, 204, 238 
pollution {see also environment), 88-90, 

91; of air, 90; health problems caused 

by, 88, 89-90; noise, 90; of water, 88, 

89-90 

polygyny: restrictions on, 47, 66, 120 
population, 91-100; age distribution in, 
170; density, 91, 92; distribution of, 92, 
95; distribution of languages in, 103, 
105; ethnic distribution in, 105; of 
Faisalabad, 95; of Islamabad, 97; of 
Karachi, xliv, 95, 96; of Lahore, 95, 97; 
Muslims as percentage of, 124; in 
1971, 93; in 1980, 94; in 1981, 92; in 
1994, 91; planning, 92-95; poverty in, 
77, 150; projected, 91, 94; rural, 92; 
urban, 92, 95, 97; women as percent- 
age of, 92 

population statistics: birth rate, 92; death 
rate, 92; growth rate, xxx, xl, xli, 79, 
89, 91, 93, 97, 149, 226; infant mortal- 
ity rate, 137 
Population Welfare Division, 93 
Port Health Office, 141 
Port Muhammad bin Qasim, 192 
ports, 36, 192; under British, 151; priva- 



386 



Index 



tized, 157 

Portugal: exploration of India by, 14; as 

sea power, 14-15 
Porus, 7 

poverty, xxx; attempts to alleviate, 58, 
153; percentage of population in, 77, 
150; rate, 135; in Sindh, 112 
PPP. See Pakistan People's Party 
president (see also executive branch), 
204; under constitution of 1956, 41; 
under constitution of 1962, 49; under 
constitution of 1973, 208, 210, 235, 
285; elections for, 50, 235; powers of, 
49, 208, 210; requirements for, 210; 
succession to, 211; term of, 210; voting 
for, 48 

press (see also journalists; media; newspa- 
pers): censorship of, 57; restrictions 
on, 26, 45, 232 

Press and Publications Ordinance, 45 

prices: of food, 238; of fuel, 238; of utili- 
ties, 158, 238 

prime minister: appointment of, 211 

princely states, 16; autonomy of, 28; Brit- 
ish doctrine of paramountcy and, 19; 
in India, 36, 244; in Pakistan, 35; in 
partition, xxxi, 33, 35, 244 

prisoners: political, 54, 307; torture of, 
xlii; of war, 245, 272 

prisons, 310-11; conditions in, 311;juve- 
nile, 311 

prison service, 310 

privatization, 157; under Benazir, 184; of 
energy, 188; of industry, 157, 233; 
under Nawaz Sharif, 231, 233, 234; 
opposition to, 234; of schools, 134; of 
state enterprises, xli, 150, 184; of tele- 
communications, 194 

provinces: autonomy of, 27, 213, 224; 
under British rule, 19, 26, 27; legisla- 
tive councils in, 26, 211, 213; police 
forces of, 304; rivalries among, 199, 
201, 224 

provincial assemblies, 48, 208; dissolved, 
68, 267 

Provisional Constitutional Order of 
1980, 65 

Provisional Constitutional Order of 
1981, 65 

Public and Representative Office Dis- 
qualification Act (1949), 39-40, 45 
publications: restrictions on, 45; in 



Urdu, 22 

public sector: expansion of, 156; imports 

by, 168; production, 184 
Public-Sector Development Programme, 

160 

Punjab, 3, 16-17; agriculture in, 172, 
173; annexed by British, 17; British 
government of, 17; climate in, 88; 
dominance of, 43; elections in, 56; 
electricity in, 34; irrigation in, 17, 19; 
muhajirs in, 95; under One Unit Plan, 
44; in partition, 31, 32; political affilia- 
tion in, 50, 225; provincial assemblies 
in, xxix; purdah in, 118; religious 
unrest in, 143 

Punjabi language, 103, 105; origins of, 3, 
105; speakers of, 103, 105 

Punjabi people, 77, 105-9, xxxii; in 
Balochistan, 61; clans of, 105, 106; 
diversity among, 105; in elite class, 77, 
106; health care in, 138; occupations 
in, 77, 106; origins of, 105; percentage 
of, in population, 105; social networks 
of, 106 

Punjabi soldiers, 292, 293; fighting for 
British, 17, 18, 30; in Sepoy Rebellion, 
18, 259 

Puranas, 6 

purdah, 118-20; attempts to end, 120; of 

rural women, 118; types of, 119; of 

urban women, 119 
purges: of armed forces, 59; under Ayub 

Khan, 45; under Bhutto, xxxv, 59; of 

politicians, 45, 204 

Qasim, Muhammad bin, 8 

Quaid-i-Azam Karachi International Air- 
port, 141 

Quetta: airport at, 194 

Quetta High Court, 65 

Quit India Movement, 30-31 , 260 

Quran, 125, 126 

Qureshi, Ishtiaq Husain, 78 

Qureshi, Moeen, 237 

Qureshi caretaker government, xxix, 
237-38, 283; economy under, xxix, 
157-58; reforms under, xxix, 140, 
237-38, 307; taxes under, 160, 161 



Rabbani, Burhanuddin, 247 



387 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



Radcliffe, Sir Cyril, 82 
Radcliffe Award, 82 

radio, 79, 194, 242; censoring of, 243; 
languages of broadcast, 194; networks, 
194 

Rahman, Maulana Fazlur, 222 

Rahman, Ziaur, 57, 70 

railroads, 189-90; construction of, 4; 
nationalization of, 154, 192; priva- 
tized, 192; security for, 304 

Rajput kingdoms: Islamic raids against, 9 

Ranjit Singh, Maharaja, 17 

Rann of Kutch, 82; dispute over, 82 

Ravi River, 51, 86 

Rawalpindi: purdah in, 119 

Rawalpindi Conspiracy, 40 

RCD. See Regional Cooperation for 
Development 

Reagan, Ronald, 72, 252 

Red Shirts. See Khudai-i-Khitmagar 

Refugee People's Movement (Muhajir 
Qaumi Mahaz— MQM), 112-13, 221- 
22, 226; election boycott by, 239; in 
elections of 1988, 221, 224; in elec- 
tions of 1990, 228; formed, 66, 221- 
22; platform of, 222; political activities 
of, 226 

refugees {see also muhajirs): Afghan, xxx- 
vii, 98-100, 110, 117, 159, 165-66, 199, 
201, 247, 276; geographic distribution 
of, 100; Hindu, xxx, 34; from India, 
xxx, 34, 95, 154, 199, 201, 244; in 
India, xxx, 57, 244, 271-72; Muslim, 
xxx, 34; numbers of, xxxvii, 57, 100, 
199, 247, 276; from Pakistan, xxx, 34, 
57; political affiliations of, 42; prob- 
lems caused by, 100, 117, 276-77; 
restrictions on, 100; in rural areas, 34- 
35; Sikh, xxx, 34; in urban areas, 35; 
villages for, 100 

Regional Cooperation for Development 
(RCD), 249 

regions: diversity of, 77; rivalries among, 
199, 201-2, 204, 215 

religion (see also under individual denomi- 
nations) , 124-31; distribution of, in 
population, 114; under Mughal 
Empire, 13; under Nawaz Sharif, 66, 
131; syncretic, 13 

religious tensions, 92, 145, 204 

religious violence, xlii, xliv, 143 

remittances from guestworkers, 98 



Reproductive Health Centres, 93 
Republican Party, 44; in Suhrawardy gov- 
ernment, 44, 216 
Resource Development Corporation, 
189 

Revival of the Constitution of 1973 
Order, 68 

rice: export of, 156, 167, 172, 180; pro- 
duction of, 1 80 
Rice Export Corporation, 180 
rivers: pollution of, 89 
Riza, Shaukat, 283 

roads, 190; construction of, 51, 156, 157, 

233, 290; system, 190-92 
Royal Indian Air Force, 260 
Royal Indian Navy, 260 
Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, 

259 

Royal Navy: mutiny in, 31 

rural areas: under Ayub Khan, 47; educa- 
tion in, 134; health care in, 137-38; 
housing in, 184; political unrest in, 54; 
population in, 92; poverty in, 135; pur- 
dah in, 118; refugees in, 34-35; sanita- 
tion in, 136; soldiers from, 292; water 
in, 136; women in, 118 

rural development, 47; under Basic 
Democracies, 48 

Russia (see also Soviet Union): expansion 
of, 17, 20; materiel from, 301 



SAARC. See South Asian Association for 

Regional Cooperation 
Sadik, Nans, 253 
Safed Koh Range, 83 
Saindak Integrated Mineral Project, 189 
Sajjad, Wasim, 239; as acting president, 

237 
Saka rule, 8 

Sandeman, Sir Robert, 20 

sanitation, 77, 88, 89, 136; under Basic 

Democracies, 48 
Sanskrit: literature, 8; origins of, 3 
Sassanian people, 8 

Saudi Arabia: aid from, 165; guestwork- 
ers in, 171; Islamic militants from, xlii; 
Pakistani banks in, 162; Pakistani mili- 
tary in, 71, 301; relations with, 249; 
trade with, 167 

Saudi-Pak Industrial and Agricultural 
Investment, 163-64 



388 



Index 



Saur Revolution (Afghanistan), 275 

Sayyid Dynasty, 9 

Schackle, Christopher, 104 

schools, 132; admission to, 78; attrition 
rate, 133; enrollment in, 131, 133, 
134, 150; for girls, 112, 135; national- 
ization of, 134, 135; in North- West 
Frontier Province, 112; number of, 
132-33; privatization of, 134; techni- 
cal, 132, 135 

SEATO. See Southeast Asia Treaty Orga- 
nization 

security, internal, 264, 304-17; under 
British Raj, 304; emergency provi- 
sions, 313-14; intelligence agencies, 
276; preventive detention, 314 

security, national, 199, 243-44; under 
Ayub Khan, 270; after civil war, 273; 
collapse of, 268-69; relations, 243-44; 
threats to, 264 

Security of Pakistan Act (1952), 40, 313 

self-government, 25, 27 

Senate, 210, 211 

Sepoy Rebellion (1857-58), 18, 21, 258- 

59; origin of, 1 8 
sepoys, 18, 258 

service sector, 189-95; employment in, 
149, 170; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, 151 

ShahAlam II, 16 

Shahbaz Qalander, 128 

Shaheen Air International, 194 

Shaheen Foundation, 295 

Shahjahan, 11-12, 13 

Shah, Waris, 105 

Shalimar Gardens, 97 

sharia {see also courts, sharia; Federal 
Shariat Court; Islam), 43, 66, 201, 
31 1-13; and armed forces, 300; hudood 
ordinances, 311-12, 313; marriage 
under, 103; and media, 243; retribu- 
tion in, 312; women under, 312-13; 
under Zia, xxxvi 

Shariat Bill, 66, 68, 123, 129, 218, 232, 
313 

Sharigh coal mine, 187 
Shastri, Lai Bahadur, 53 
Shina language, 103 

shipping: nationalized, 155; privatized, 

150,157,233 
shortages: of coal, 36; of food, 36 
Siachen Glacier, 71, 80, 279 



Sialkot: population of, 97 

Sikhism: origins of, 3 

Sikhs: British attitudes toward, 20; Brit- 
ish wars with, 17; in canal colonies, 19; 
fleeing Pakistan, xxx, 34, 112; under- 
Government of India Act of 1909, 24; 
in National Assembly, 67, 211; rise of, 
17 

Sikh separatists, 71 

Simla Agreement (1972), 24, 62, 71, 81- 
82, 245, 273 

Simla Delegation, 23-24 

Simon, Sir John, 27 

Simon Commission, 28 

Sindh: agriculture in, 112, 172; elections 
in, 56; etymology of, 86; health care 
in, 138; land distribution in, 179; 
minorities in, 130; muhajirs in, 95; 
Muslim invasion of, 8, 9; Muslim 
League in, 43; under One Unit Plan, 
44; in partition, 31, 32-33; poverty in, 
112; purdah in, 118; rulers of, 16; vio- 
lence in, xlii, 66, 226, 232-33, 282, 
306-7,315 

Sindhi language, 103; origins of, 3; 
speakers of, 66, 103 

Sindhi people, xxxii, 77, 112-13; and 
ethnic tension, xxxviii, xliv, 129; occu- 
pations of, 112; percentage of, in pop- 
ulation, 105; social system of, 112-13; 
solidarity of, 61 

Sindh Province, 3, 28 

Singapore: investment from, 165 

Sino-Indian war (1962), 248, 269 

Siraiki language: speakers of, 1 03 

Siraj-ud-Dawlah, Nawab, 16 

slavery, 117 

Small Business Finance Corporation, 

163 
smoking, 139 

smuggling: crackdown on, 45 

social classes (see also under individual 

classes): in army, 135; in civil service, 

135 

social development, xxx, 78, 142-45, 
150; and citizenship, 78, 144-45; 
neglect of, xli 

social problems, xli-xlii 

social welfare: under Basic Democracies, 
48 

Solidarity Movement. SeeTehrik-i-Istiqlal 
Somalia: peacekeeping forces in, 253- 



389 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



54, 302 

Sor Range coal mine, 187 

South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC): election 
observers from, 229; formed, 70, 168; 
members of, 70, 167, 168, 246, 254 

South Asian nuclear-free zone, 70 

South Asian Preferential Trade Agree- 
ment, 168 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO), 251; membership in, 43, 
250; withdrawal from, 273 

South Korea. See Korea, Republic of 

South Waziristan Scouts, 289 

Soviet Union (see also Russia), 278; aid 
from, 183; and Baloch insurrection, 
62, 117; foreign relations of, 267, 272; 
neutrality of, 52; occupation of 
Afghanistan by, xxxvi, xxxvii, 66, 69, 
72, 117, 144, 152, 159, 246, 247, 249, 
252, 275, 276-78; relations with, 43, 
51 , 224, 270; withdrawal from Afghani- 
stan by, xxxvii, 72-73, 284-85 

Spear, Sir Percival, 27 

Special Communication Organization, 
290 

Speedy Trial Courts, 233, 310, 314 

Sri Lanka: in South Asian Association for 

Regional Cooperation, 70, 168; trade 

with, 167 

State Bank of Pakistan, 161-62; estab- 
lished, 161; loans under, 164; role of, 
161-62 

state enterprises, 154, 156; investment 

in, 184; privatized, xli, 150, 157, 183, 

233; production by, 184 
state of emergency: under Ishaq Khan, 

227; under Yahya Khan, 58 
steel mill, 183-84, 189 
stock exchange, 165; foreign investment 

in, xli 

strikes, xl; in East Pakistan, 56; in Kara- 
chi, 226 

structural adjustment program, xl, 150 
student associations, 221; under Ayub 

Khan, 46; banned, 218 
student demonstrations: against Tash- 
kent Declaration, 53 
students: number of, 132-33; political 

affiliations of, 42, 218 
subsidies: cut, xxix, 237 
Sudan: Islamic militants from, xlii 



suffrage, 53; under Basic Democracies, 

206; under British Raj, 24-25, 26 
Sufism: introduction of, 8, 127-28 
sugar, 36, 183 

Suhrawardy, Hussain Shahid, 32, 215-16; 

arrested, 45; platform of, 39; as prime 

minister, 216 
Suhrawardy government, 44 
Sui natural gas field, 186 
Sulaiman Range, 83 
sunna, 126 

Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Spe- 
cial Courts) Act (1975), 310 

Supreme Court, 213; decisions of, xxx- 
viii, 64-65, 204, 217, 222, 237; jurisdic- 
tion of, 213, 310; sessions of, 50 

Sur Dynasty, 13 

Sutlej River, 51, 86 

Sword of the Faithful. See Zarb-e-Momin 
Syed Ahmad Khan, 22, 120; demands of, 

22-23; and Hindus, 23 
Syria: Pakistani military instructors in, 

301 



Tajikistan: in Economic Co-operation 
Organization, 167 

Taj Mahal, 11-12 

Talpur mirs, 16 

Tamerlane. S^Timur 

Tarbela Dam, 86, 174; capacity, 187 

Tashkent Declaration, 53, 245, 270 

taxes, 53; under Ayub Khan, 47; collec- 
tion of, 160; corporation, 160; evasion 
of, xli, 160; excise, 160, 161; on farm 
income, 156, 160, 178, 238; income, 
160, 161; indirect, 160; jizya, 11, 13, 
14; on land, 157; under Mughal 
Empire, 14; under Nawaz Sharif, 231; 
as percentage of gross domestic prod- 
uct, 160; under Qureshi, 158, 161; 
reform of, 155, 231; sales, 161; on 
wealth, 161; under Yahya Khan, 55 

Taxila, 7 

teachers: as guestworkers, 171; morale 
of, 132; number of, 132-33; training 
of, 132 

Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (Solidarity Movement) , 
223; in elections of 1990, 228; 
founded, 223; platform of, 223 

tehsil councils, 48, 208 

telecommunications, 194-95, 290; under 



390 



Index 



British Raj, 19; corruption in, 152; 
employment in, 170; improvements 
in, 194; nationalization of, 154; as per- 
centage of gross domestic product, 
151; privatized, 150, 157, 233 
telephones, 194; nationalization of, 154 
television, 79, 242-43; censorship of, 79 
terrorism, xlii, 232, 276-77, 306, 310, 
316 

Terrorist Affected Areas (Special 
Courts) Ordinance (1991), 314 

textiles, xli; exports of, 167, 183; import 
quotas, xli 

Thar Desert, 82, 83; coal field in, 186 

Thatta: ethnic identity in, 113 

Tibet: China's occupation of, 51 

Tikka Khan, 56-57, 59 

Timur (Tamerlane), 11 

Tochi Scouts, 289 

Topi, Tantia, 21 

topography, 82-87 

torture, 306, 307 

tourism, 195; sites for, 4 

trade {see also balance of trade; exports; 
imports), 166-68; ancient, 4; attempts 
to open, 168; with Bangladesh, 246; 
with China, 51; deficit, 166, 168; 
employment in, 149, 170; European 
merchants in, 15; government role in, 
220; with India, 36, 37, 151, 154; 
under Mughal Empire, 15; as percent- 
age of gross domestic product, 151 

trade unions: under Ayub Khan, 46; 
under Bhutto, 59 

trading posts (factories), 15-16, 96, 258 

transportation, 189-94; air, 190, 192-94; 
under British Raj, 19, 151; employ- 
ment in, 149, 170, 171; government 
role in, 220; merchant marine, 192; 
Pakhtuns in, 112; as percentage of 
gross domestic product, 151; ports, 
192; privatized, 157; railroads, 189-90, 
192; roads, 190-92; vehicles, 192 

treaties: with khan of Kalat, 20 

Treaty of Amritsar (1850), 17 

Treaty of Gandamak (1879) , 20 

Treaty of Peace with Japan (1951), 265 

Tufail Muhammad, Mian, 218 

Tughlaq Dynasty, 9 

Tunisia: Islamic militants from, xlii 

Turkey: Allied peace settlement with, 26, 
265; in Central Treaty Organization, 



43, 249; in Economic Co-operation 
Organization, 167; geostrategic 
importance of, 43; government of, 27; 
military relations with, 302 
Turkmenistan: in Economic Co-opera- 
tion Organization, 167; relations with, 
248 

Turko-Pakistan Pact (1954), 265 
Turks: invasion by, 8 

Two Nations Theory, xxix, 28-30, 128; 
origins of, 23, 128 

ulama: under constitution of 1962, 49; 
interpretation of Islam by, 42, 65; 
movements led by, 22; under Mughal 
Empire, 13; political involvement of, 
217, 223; in sharia courts, 66, 213 

Umayyad caliph, 8 

underemployment, 135, 149, 171 

UNDP. See United Nations Development 
Programme 

unemployment, xliv, 171; under Bena- 
zir, 226; under Nawaz Sharif, 231 

UNFPA. See United Nations Population 
Fund 

UNHCR. See United Nations High Com- 
missioner for Refugees 

UNICEE See United Nations Children's 
Fund 

union councils, 48, 205, 208 

United Arab Emirates: guestworkers in, 
171; Pakistani banks in, 162; Pakistani 
military instructors in, 301 

United Front, 39; in Constituent Assem- 
bly, 41; platform of, 39 

United Nations: admitted to, 35, 253; 
membership in, 43; peacekeeping mis- 
sions, 253-54, 302 

United Nations Children's Fund 
(UNICEF), 123 

United Nations Development Pro- 
gramme (UNDP), 253 

United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), 253 

United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), 100 

United Nations Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM), 253-54, 302 

United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA), 253 

United Nations Protection Force in Bos- 



391 



Pakistan: A Country Study 



nia and Herzegovina (UNPROFOR 

BH), 254, 302 
United Nations Security Council, 36 
United States: aid from, 43, 45, 51, 70, 

72, 152, 158, 166, 173, 248-49, 250, 

251, 278; in Aid-to-Pakistan Consor- 
tium, 165; embassy, burned, xxxvii, 

252, 276; influence on, 266-67; mate- 
riel from, xliii, 72, 250-51, 266, 270, 

271, 274, 277, 279, 284, 300; military 
assistance from, 43, 45, 166, 247, 248- 
49, 250, 265, 266, 300; military cooper- 
ation with, 250, 264—67; military train- 
ing by, 266, 293, 303; and nuclear 
weapons, 70, 72, 246, 284; Pakistanis 
in, 170, 171; relations of, with India, 
52, 268-69; relations with, xxxvi-xxx- 
vii, 43, 51, 52, 67, 71-72, 73, 224, 225, 
237, 240, 246, 250-53, 268-69, 270, 

272, 276, 284, 316-17; security rela- 
tions with, 244; trade with, 167 

United States Agency for International 
Development (AID), 139, 166 

University Grants Commission, 132 

UNOSOM. See United Nations Opera- 
tion in Somalia 

UNPROFOR BH. See United Nations 
Protection Force in Bosnia and Herze- 
govina 

uprising of 1 857-58. See Sepoy Rebellion 

urban areas: under Basic Democracies, 
48; education in, 134; employment in, 
149; growth of, 95-97; housing in, 
119, 184; political affiliations in, 42; 
population in, 92, 95, 97; poverty in, 
135; purdah in, 119; refugees in, 34- 
35, 100; sanitation in, 136; topology 
of, 96; violence in, xxxvii, 96, 100; 
water in, 136; women in, 119 

urban migration, 9$-97; process, 95 

Urdu, 103; as language of instruction, 
105, 134; as national language, xxxii, 
104, 202; originsiof, 3, 104; publica- 
tions in, 22, 242; speakers of, 103, 104 

ushr, 141-42, 157 

Usmani, Shabir Ahmad, 223 

usury: prohibitions against, 43, 65, 129, 
164 

utilities: as percentage of gross domestic 
product, 151; prices of, 158; privatiza- 
tion of, 150 

Uzbekistan: in Economic Co-operation 



Organization, 167; relations with, 248 

Vajpayee, Atal Behari, 69-70 
Vale of Kashmir, xlii-xliii 
Vedas, 6 

veiling, 119; types of, 119 

Victoria, Queen, 18; proclaimed empress 

of India, 18 
voting. See suffrage 

Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman), 213, 
214 

wages {see also income), 78; minimum, 
155, 156 

Waheed, Abdul: as chief of the army staff 
(COAS), 236, 283, 286, 288 

Wakhan Corridor, 80, 83 

Wali Khan, Khan Abdul, 222, 228; back- 
ground of, 222 

Warsak Dam, 86 

Waseem, Mohammad, 283 

water: charges for, 174; distribution of, 
from Indus River, 51, 150-51, 174-75; 
pollution of, 88, 89-90; potable, 88, 
1 36; wasting of, 1 75-76 

Water and Power Development Author- 
ity, 188 

Wavell, Lord, 31 

Wazirabad: population in, 97 

welfare {see alsozakat), 135, 141-42 

wells, 174, 176 

West Pakistan. See Pakistan, West 

West Pakistan Jail Warden Service Rules 
(1962), 310-11 

West Wing. See Pakistan, West 

Wheeler, Sir Mortimer, 3 

Wirsing, Robert G., 276 

women, 118-24; abuse of, 45; in armed 
forces, 289; under Benazir, 158; broth- 
ers of, 102; and childbearing, 94-95, 
103, 136; dowry for, 103; education of, 
112, 120, 135; employment of, 119, 
120, 123-24, 170; and family relation- 
ships, 101-2; health care for, 92, 136- 
37; health of, 136-37, 139; literacy of, 
xxx, 120, 133; marriage of, 102-3, 136; 
occupations of, 119; as percentage of 
population, 92; in police force, 305; in 
politics, 50, 55, 56, 67, 206; popular 
view of, 119-20; purdah for, 118-20; 



392 



Index 



reputations of, 109, 118; relations of, 
to men, 118, 119; restrictions on, 109, 
118, 120, 123, 129; rights of, xxxv, xl, 
47, 66, 78, 120, 121-22, 224-25, 240; 
roles of, 98, 118-20, 121, 123; under 
sharia, 312-13; status of, 94-95, 120- 
24; veiling of, 119 
Women Guard, 289 
Women's Action Forum, 122-23, 124 
women's associations, 47, 66, 91, 122, 
129 

women's movement, 120-20, 122-23, 

124; goals of, 124 
Woolsey, James, xliii 

work force, 170-71; in agriculture, 170; 
in communications, 170; in construc- 
tion, 149, 170; growth of, 170; in 
industry, 149, 170; in service sector, 
149, 170; in trade, 149, 170; in trans- 
portation, 149, 170; women in, 119, 
120, 123-24, 170 

World Bank: aid from, 161, 165, 173; 
development programs, 51; outstand- 
ing debt to, 165 

World War I, 25; casualties in, 260; peace 
settlements in, 26 

World War II, 30; expanison of British 
Indian Army in, 260 

Yahya Khan, Agha Mohammad, xxxiii; as 
chief martial law administrator, 54, 
206, 271; in elections of 1970, 56, 271; 
as president, 54, 206, 271; resignation 
of, 58, 206, 272 

Yahya Khan government, xxxiv, 54-58, 
206; demonstrations against, 58; dis- 
solved, 56 

Yamuna River valley: irrigation canals in, 
19 



Yaqub Khan, Sahibzada, 224 



zakat (see also welfare), 126, 141-42, 157; 
eligibility for, 142; legislation of, 65, 
129 

Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 141-42, 157 
Zamindar, 242 

zamindari system (see also mansabdari sys- 
tem), 14 

Zarb-e-Momin (Sword of the Faithful), 
287 

Zardari, Asif Ali: allegations of corrup- 
tion against, 152, 226, 238 
Zhob Militia, 289 

Zia ul-Haq, Mohammad: as chief of the 
army staff (COAS), xxxv, 59, 274, 277; 
as chief martial law administrator 
(CMLA) , xxxv, 207, 275, 277; death of, 
xxxvii, 63, 69, 210, 280; ethnicity of, 
106; international opinion of, xxxvi- 
xxxvii; as president, 275, 280; state vis- 
its by, 70-71 

Zia ul-Haq government, xxxvi, 63-73, 
178, 207-10, 277; army officers in, 
xxxvi; constitution suspended under, 
207, 275; economy under, 156-57; 
elections postponed by, xxxvii, 275; 
foreign relations under, 52, 209; 
human rights under, 275; interpreta- 
tion of Islam under, xxxvi, 42, 131, 
144; Islamization program of, xxxvii, 
65, 66, 122, 141, 144, 218, 311; lan- 
guage under, 105; members of, 64; 
nepotism under, 143-44; nuclear pro- 
gram under, 70, 251; opposition to, 
64; planning under, 159; women 
under, 122 

zilla councils, 48, 208 

Zoroastrians, 130, 144 



393 



Contributors 



Craig Baxter is Professor of Politics and History at Juniata Col- 
lege, Huntingdon, Pennsylvania. 

Mary Louise Becker is an independent scholar and consultant 
in South Asian political and economic development. 

Peter R. Blood is Senior Research Specialist for Asia at the Fed- 
eral Research Division, Library of Congress. 

John D. Rogers is Lecturer on Social Studies, Harvard Univer- 
sity, Cambridge, Massachusetts; and Visiting Research Fel- 
low, Center of South Asian and Indian Ocean Studies, 
Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts. 

Thomas Perry Thornton is Adjunct Professor of Political Sci- 
ence and Asian Studies at the Johns Hopkins University 
and Georgetown University. 

Anita M. Weiss is Associate Professor of International Studies at 
the University of Oregon. 



395 



Published Country Studies 
(Area Handbook Series) 



J JU — OJ 


/\lglld.IllS tall 


CCO, ozr 
J J \J—J 


Dominican Republic 


550-98 


Albania 




and Haiti 


550-44 


Algeria 


550-52 


Ecuador 


550-59 


Angola 


550^3 


Egypt 


550-73 


Argentina 


550-150 


El Salvador 


jjU— 111 


Armenia, Azerbaijan, 


JJU— Zo 


Ethiopia 




and Georgia 


550-167 


Finland 


550-169 


Australia 


550-173 


Germany, East 


550-176 


Austria 


550-155 


Germany, Fed. Rep. of 


550-175 


Bangladesh 


550-153 


Ghana 


jOU — 1 1Z 


oeiarus anu ivioioova 


ccn Q7 

J JU— o / 


vji eece 


550-170 


Belgium 


550-78 


Guatemala 


550-66 


Bolivia 


550-174 


Guinea 


550-20 


Brazil 


550-82 


Guyana and Belize 


550-168 


Bulgaria 


550-151 


Honduras 


JJU — 01 


Burma 


J JU— 10J 


Hungary 


550-50 


Cambodia 


550-21 


India 


550-166 


Cameroon 


550-154 


Indian Ocean 


550-159 


Chad 


550-39 


Indonesia 


550-77 


Chile 


550-68 


Iran 


CCA Sf\ 

550-60 


China 


CCA O 1 

550-31 


Iraq 


550-26 


Colombia 


550-25 


Israel 


550-33 


Commonwealth Carib- 


550-182 


Italy 




bean, Islands of the 


550-30 


Japan 


550-91 


Congo 


550-34 


Jordan 


550-90 


Costa Rica 


550-56 


Kenya 


550-69 


Cote d'lvoire (Ivory 


550-81 


Korea, North 




Coast) 


550-41 


Korea, South 


550-152 


Cuba 


550-58 


Laos 


550-22 


Cyprus 


550-24 


Lebanon 


550-158 


Czechoslovakia 


550-38 


Liberia 



397 



550-85 


Libya 


550-184 


Sincranorp 


550-172 


Malawi 


550-86 


Somalia 


550^5 


Malaysia 


550-93 


South Africa 


550-161 


Mauritania 


550-95 


Soviet Union 


550-79 


Mexico 


550-179 


Spain 




A/Trvn onli a 

IVlVJllgUllcl 


550-96 


Sri T anlra 


550^9 


Morocco 


550-27 


Sudan 


550-64 


Mozambique 


550-17 


Syria 


550-35 


Nepal and Bhutan 


550-62 


Tanzania 


550-88 


Nicaragua 


550-53 


Thailand 


550-157 


Nigeria 


550-89 


Tunisia 


550-94 


Oceania 


550-80 


Turkey 


550^8 


Pakistan 


550-74 


Uganda 


550-^6 


Panama 


550-97 


Uruguay 


550-156 


Paraguay 


550-71 


Venezuela 


550-185 


Persian Onlf Statps 


550-32 


Vietnam 


550^2 


Peru 


550-183 


Yemens, The 


550-72 


Philippines 




Yugoslavia 


550-162 


Poland 


j jU— / 


Zaire 


550-181 


Portugal 


jjU-/j 


Zambia 


550-160 


Romania 


550-171 


Zimbabwe 


550-37 


Rwanda and Burundi 






550-51 


Saudi Arabia 






550-70 


Senegal 






550-180 


Sierra Leone 







398 



is 



PIN: 004212-000 



